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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Aldo Chircop, Erik Franckx, Timo Koivurova, Erik J. Molenaar,  
and David L. VanderZwaag 
 
 
The recent history of international ocean relations between Canada and the 
European Union (EU) merits particular scholarly attention. The headlines in the 
media have tended to focus on differences rather than commonalities, and in 
particular those few differences that led to confrontation, probably not without 
some assistance from the media. The “Turbot War” in the 1990s is by now 
a classic case of confrontation on the high seas motivated by conflicting 
fisheries and related conservation interests. Canada arrested a Spanish fishing 
vessel on the high seas, possibly in violation of international law and ostensibly 
in support of Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) fisheries 
conservation measures to which the European Community (EC) had objected in 
accordance with NAFO’s founding documents. The ensuing dispute was the 
climax of an ongoing dispute over the allocation of quotas in the NAFO region. 
Of more recent vintage is the seal hunt in Atlantic Canada, seen as an animal 
welfare issue in the European Union (EU), but considered by Canada as a 
sustainable use of a natural resource and trade issue. The EU is Canada’s 
second largest market for seal products and consequently Canada’s seeking 
relief against Belgium and the Netherlands through the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is not surprising. More recently, clouds appear to be 
gathering on the horizon concerning the European Commission’s Arctic 
communication which addresses, among others, the enhanced future usage of 
Arctic navigation. Canada is of the view that the Northwest Passage constitutes 
internal waters subject to full Canadian sovereignty. Differences on some recent 
non-ocean issues have also received extensive publicity, such as Canada’s 
apparent retraction on its Kyoto commitments, measures of the EC concerning 
approval and marketing of Canadian products containing genetically-modified 
organisms, trade description of scallops, and restrictions on the import of 
Canadian beef raised with hormones. 
Scholarly attention is merited to enable a dispassionate study of the 
broader scope of this important relationship outside the arena. Publicised 
differences frequently mask the reality that more often than not Canadian and 
EU international relations, including ocean relations, are generally marked 
more by convergence than divergence, and that differences are by and large 
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resolved in a non-confrontational manner. When there are disputes, consultation 
and diplomacy are normally employed. For example, Canada and the EC 
amicably resolved a dispute over taxes and exemptions for wine and beer that 
was initially a WTO complaint. There are numerous examples where the 
seemingly normal or unspectacular technical cooperation in ocean affairs with 
EU Member States occurs on a regular basis. Cooperation within the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is taken for granted and therefore 
not normally reported upon. The exchange of fishery science information is 
similarly “quiet.” At times the apparent differences in approach are purely 
linguistic, as for example Canada’s “ocean” policy as compared to the 
European Commission’s “maritime” policy, when in effect the general purpose 
and content are comparable. In other instances, the difference is more 
substantial. For instance, the development of Canada’s ocean policy (National 
Oceans Strategy) was mandated by legislation (Oceans Act) whereas the EU’s 
Integrated Maritime Policy was adopted as a political initiative. Whether there 
are similarities or differences, it is useful to seek to understand what is behind 
the convergence or divergence in the practices of two entities which between 
them account for a large measure of the world’s coastal and ocean areas, 
capabilities and actual activities. 
 There is also another motivation behind this book which serves as context 
for decision making on ocean and maritime affairs: comparative “federalism.” 
Canada has had experience as a federal state since confederation in 1867, and 
with full authority over external affairs since 1931. In comparison, the EU is 
a supranational organisation originating from the Coal and Steel Community 
(1951), the European Economic Community (1957), and European Atomic 
Energy Community (1957), which were integrated into the European 
Communities (1967), and further evolving into the EC and the EU (1993). 
The EU continues to internally integrate and evolve in the direction of 
a “federal” union. Repatriated in 1982, Canada’s constitution has a complex 
structure that allocates powers between federal and provincial levels and 
recognises aboriginal rights. Aboriginal rights have received further 
constitutional recognition in a series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions. 
Although oceans issues (fisheries, navigation and shipping, and including 
external affairs) are prima facie attributed to the federal level, the coastal 
provinces and territories have interests and claims over how Canada’s oceans 
are managed and how their benefits are distributed. In the case of offshore 
development in the Atlantic region, a special political arrangement was worked 
out between the federal government and the provinces of Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Nova Scotia which included an allocation of regulatory 
responsibilities and royalty management to a joint board. Unlike Canada, 
  
 3 
the EU has sovereign states as members and they do not necessarily enjoy 
exclusive competence on some ocean issue areas such as fisheries conservation 
and management, whereas they retain broad competence on other ocean issues 
such as offshore development and military uses. Central to the comparison 
between Canadian and EU ocean policy making is the relationship between the 
central (federal or supra-national) and component units (provinces, territories 
and Member States). As the EU continues to evolve as a “federal” arrangement, 
it is not surprising that it will seek to learn lessons from an older (albeit smaller) 
sibling on key policy domains where the relations between the centre and the 
constituent membership is in play. Ocean issues are one such policy domain 
where the Commission has studied the Canadian experience in anticipation of 
the launching of maritime policy consultations and eventual adoption of the 
Blue Book. And equally, Canada has frequently looked at the EU to learn from 
ground-breaking initiatives, such as renewable energy policies and practices.  
 This book is the result of a cooperative project led by scholars from 
Canadian and European universities and with the participation of practitioners. 
Although in Canada the “EU” is common currency, there is sparse 
understanding of the nature and complexities of this supranational organisation 
among Canadian scholars. The challenge of integration for an organisation that 
currently has 27 diverse Member States with over 500 million inhabitants is 
probably not fully appreciated. At Canadian law schools the teaching of EU law 
is a relatively recent phenomenon and is far behind the comparative attention 
US law receives. In part this may be explained by the North American 
geographic and trade realities, but it is also true that the EU is a major trade 
partner for Canada. Similarly among EU scholars, there is insufficient 
understanding of Canada as a highly diverse federal state of 33 million 
inhabitants whose middle-of-the-road foreign policy has enabled it to play 
a role far beyond its size. 
 The issue areas of focus in this book are ocean-related. The aim is to 
increase academic and public understanding of Canadian and EU approaches 
and challenges in governing key human uses of the oceans. The general 
approach of the book is comparative, pitting colleagues on both sides of the 
Atlantic to identify and reflect upon areas of convergence and divergence in 
Canadian and EU interests and practices. A running theme throughout the book 
is ocean governance because across those sectors Canada and the EU are facing 
numerous common issues. Those issues include: comparing ocean policy 
development and implementation experiences; how to establish, strengthen and 
modernise regional fisheries management organisations; current directions for 
Arctic policy and whether existing regional governance arrangements for the 
North, such as the Arctic Council, are sufficient; the role of maritime spatial 
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planning in advancing maritime policy; how to effectively counter illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; how far coastal states and regional 
entities can go in unilaterally controlling and criminalising vessel-source 
pollution and increasing conditions for port entry on environmental grounds; 
how to respond to the problem of exotic species introduced by ballast waters 
from ships; how to address illegal immigration at sea; how to address high seas 
governance “gaps,” for example, management of discrete high seas fish stocks, 
establishment of high seas marine protected areas and protection of 
biodiversity; and how to address growing energy security concerns surrounding 
offshore oil and gas and the prospects of renewable ocean energy. Addressing 
potential terrorist threats in ports and at sea, and interdiction and enforcement at 
sea are further high priority issues. How Canada and the EU (including EU 
Member States) project their interests in international organisations with marine 
and environmental mandates is also addressed in the various issue areas above. 
 The project that produced this book had a three-part methodology. First, 
an initial workshop of leading scholars of Canada (Dalhousie University) and 
the EU (University of Lapland, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Utrecht University) 
was convened in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, to share perspectives on ocean 
governance approaches and challenges, to identify issues to be targeted and to 
plan for the engagement of policy makers. Second, teams of scholars undertook 
cooperative and comparative investigations of selected ocean governance 
topics. Third, a final workshop involving participating scholars and 
practitioners from the European Commission (in particular the Directorate-
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE); Directorate-General 
for External Relations (DG RELEX); Directorate-General for Transport and 
Energy (DG TREN)  and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)) was 
convened in Brussels in cooperation with the Institute for European Studies 
(IES).  The purpose of the workshop, also involving representatives from the 
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Brussels embassy), was to share 
research findings, invite critical comments on research results, and distill 
comparative lessons. 
 This book consists of the proceedings of the final workshop (namely 
presented papers and summary of discussions). The project was able to achieve 
several stated objectives. It has engendered among project participants a clearer 
comparative understanding of evolving Canadian and EU ocean policy interests 
in key marine sectors and issues and their projection in the international arena. 
The project has explored approaches for how Canada and the EU might play 
leading roles in furthering the progress and development of the law of the sea, 
international environmental law, international maritime law, and international 
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ocean governance. The project enhanced appreciation of the increasingly 
important roles of various groups (policy makers, NGOs, industry, 
and academics) in Canadian and EU approaches and challenges in ocean policy 
and governance. The project has facilitated greater Canadian-EU cooperation in 
addressing ocean governance weaknesses and gaps in the issue areas addressed.  
Finally, the project has forged cooperative research linkages among 
participating institutions in Canada and the EU that have law of the sea, and 
ocean policy and governance interests and programmes. 
 Finally, the co-editors and contributors to this book acknowledge the 
generous grant from the Public Diplomacy and Outreach European Union and 
EU-Canada relations programme, funded by the European Commission (DG 
RELEX) that has enabled this project to occur and to be brought to fruition. 
The co-directors want to express their sincere thanks to Yasmina Sioud for the 
effective administration of the project at the Commission and the technical 
editors (Susan Rolston and Adam Stepien) for their diligent work in putting the 
book together. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Challenges to Ocean Policy Making 
 
Erik Franckx 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The formulation of national ocean policies is a recent phenomenon as witnessed 
by the practice of states. This development relates to the fact that the present-
day constitution for the oceans, namely the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, starts from the premise “that the problems of ocean space are 
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole,”1 while at the same 
time adhering to a zonal approach.2 States, when addressing ocean issues, 
normally follow this latter approach,3 which raises questions about the 
coherence of their ocean policies. However, if sustainability is ever to be 
achieved, coherence of national policies seems to be a conditio sine qua non. 
Hence there is a need for states to try to develop an approach that not only 
appreciates the unique nature of ocean ecology but also the continued escalation 
of ocean use interactions.4 States must coordinate their separately developed 
zonal pieces of legislation into an integrated whole. Often all of this is 
packaged under the label “ocean policy.” 
The call for an integrated development of the ocean and its resources 
received prominence during the United Nations Conference on Environment 
                                                 
1
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,10 December 1982, entered into force on 
16 November 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 et seq., available: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> (retrieved 10 February 2009) [hereinafter 
LOS Convention], third preambular paragraph. 
2
 It will suffice to notice in this respect that in addition to existing maritime zones under the 
1958 Law of the Sea Conventions system, the LOS Convention added complexity to the zonal 
approach by adding two new zones, namely the exclusive economic zone and the international 
seabed area. 
3
 Y. Tanaka, “Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections 
on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea,” International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 19 (2004), pp. 483–514, giving arguments pro and contra the zonal approach in 
ocean management. 
4
 L. Juda, “Changing National Approaches to Ocean Governance: The United States, Canada, 
and Australia,” Ocean Development and International Law 34 (2003), p. 161, 162. Juda also 
refers to the approach as the “systems” approach as opposed to a sectoral or zonal approach in 
ocean governance. 
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and Development held at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, where it was declared 
that “the marine environment … forms an integrated whole that is an essential 
component of the global life-support system and a positive asset that presents 
opportunities for sustainable development.”5 The Rio Conference developed the 
observations of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development 
report “Our Common Future.”6 It attempted to formulate a pathway through 
which states, in appreciating the linkages inherent in the environment, could 
formulate integrated policies or measures in the management of resources.7 
Subsequently, organisations such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission (IOC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) adopted programmes which advocate the benefits of integrated 
coastal zone management. Within the European Union, the Council in 1994 
adopted the Implementation of Coastal Zone Management in Europe.8 
Nevertheless, with rare exceptions, one had to wait for the twenty-first century 
to see countries embark upon this new avenue of trying to bring some order into 
the divergent approaches to ocean matters, and above all, to bring some 
hierarchy in the way future policy would be developed. 
 
 
2.2. National Ocean Policies: A General Comparison 
 
With several countries now having adopted a national ocean policy, it is 
interesting to have a closer look at these policies from a comparative 
perspective in order to disclose some of their similarities, but, as it will turn out, 
mostly their divergences. Separate contributions in this volume will address the 
Canadian and European approaches in some detail. The present contribution 
intends to provide, with a thick brush, the general picture which frames these 
two case studies. 
                                                 
5
 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1, Vols. 1-
III (1992), paragraph 17.1, available: <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/ 
english/agenda21chapter17.htm> (retrieved 10 February 2009). 
6
 G. H. Brundtland, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), available: 
<http://www.worldinbalance.net/agreements/1987-brundtland.php> (retrieved 10 February 
2009).  
7
 Id., Chapter 1 (A Threatened Future), Section 48. 
8
 Implementation of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe. Official Journal C127 
E/271, 29 May 2003, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2003:127E:0269:0273:EN:PDF> (retrieved 10 February 2009). 
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Without trying to be exhaustive, the present contribution simply takes as 
point of departure a recent UNESCO publication that brings together the 
national ocean policies of ten different countries, namely Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Colombia, Japan, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation and 
the United States, adopted between 1994 and 2007.9 This is an ongoing project 
that will be updated as new texts become available through the webpages of the 
Advisory Body of Experts on the Law of the Sea10 of the IOC.11 As of the time 
of writing, no new texts have been added. This contribution will therefore be 
limited to the countries listed above, less Canada as it is dealt with in a separate 
contribution in this volume. 
As remarked by the IOC Executive Secretary in his introductory remarks 
to the above-mentioned UNESCO publication, it should first of all be noted that 
this new trend is not sparked by any intellectual exercise. Rather it is driven by 
the necessity of states who feel that the increased reliance on the oceans in an 
ever expanding quest to master the remaining untapped resources, be they 
located on the seabed and ocean floor, in its subsoil, or in the waters 
superjacent thereto, has reached the limit of what the zonal approach can 
reasonably be expected to accomplish without starting to substantially 
compromise the further development of these resources.12 States have 
attempted to remedy this situation by trial and error rather than by following 
a general and clear roadmap from which they could not deviate. Indeed, in 
order to overcome the inherent deficiencies accumulated over the years by 
applying the zonal approach to ocean matters, each country finds itself today in 
a totally different position and consequently tries to find the most appropriate 
way to bring coherence and sustainability in the way it manages its own ocean’s 
affairs. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the leitmotiv when 
reading through these national ocean policies can be best captured by the 
“united in diversity” motto so dear to the European Union. 
Comparing the expressed reasons why a national ocean policy has been or 
should be elaborated reveals the concordance of the many countries that 
                                                 
9
 International Oceanographic Commission, National Ocean Policy. The Basic Texts from 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, 
United States of America, IOC Technical Paper, 75, Law of the Sea Dossier 1 (Paris: UNESCO, 
2007), available: <http://ioc3.unesco.org/abelos/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_ 
download&gid=267> (retrieved 10 February 2009) [hereinafter IOC Study]. 
10
 This committee is composed of legal and scientific experts and assists the IOC with respect to 
the latter’s role in relation to the LOS Convention. The present author represents Belgium on 
this body. 
11
 See more specifically <http://ioc3.unesco.org/abelos/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=55&Itemid=62> (retrieved 10 February 2009). 
12
 P. Bernal, National Ocean Policy, Introduction. In: IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 1. 
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emphasise their respective importance as a maritime nation. Often this is based 
on the long coastlines countries possess, washing different oceans,13 sometimes 
in combination with their overseas territories,14 the extent of their maritime 
zones in a particular area,15 the revenues generated by the sea,16 or simply 
because a country is totally surrounded by water.17 Other states stress historic 
considerations, either alone18 or in combination with other factors.19 In this 
respect the case of China is interesting. China also justifies its national oceans 
policy by the fact that, in combination with many of the above features, 
demographic pressure naturally directs China’s interest to offshore areas.20 
What all of the policies have in common is that sustainability generally 
forms a basic cornerstone of the edifice.21 However, in the national ocean 
policy of the Russian Federation, it is applied to the state itself rather than to the 
oceans and its resources.22  
But that is where most of the similarities end. If one looks, for instance, at 
the nature of the documents included in the IOC Study, great differences have 
to be noted. The document of the United States, no matter how impressive,23 
remains a mere blueprint for action drawn up by a commission established by 
Congress to make recommendations.24 On the other side of the spectrum one 
                                                 
13
 Especially if it is the only such country on a particular continent, such as Colombia in South 
America (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 103). 
14
 E.g., Australia (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 8). 
15
 E.g., Portugal which states that it has one of the largest exclusive economic zones in Europe 
(IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 208). 
16
 E.g., the United States (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 249). 
17
 E.g., Japan (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 121). 
18
 E.g., Norway (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 131). 
19
 E.g., the Russian Federation (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 231). 
20
 IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 76. 
21
 See Australia (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 5); Brazil (id., pp. 50–52); China (id., p. 76); 
Colombia (id., p. 95); Japan (id., p. 121); Norway (id., p. 132); Portugal (id., pp. 208–212); and 
the United States (id., p. 247). Often only the basic reliance on the sustainability principle has 
been pinpointed here, even though the texts may contain many practical applications of the 
principle. 
22
 IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 233, 240 and 245. It is also applied to the Russian fleet (id., 
p. 236) and food security for minority peoples in coastal regions (id., p. 244). 
23
 U.S Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. Final Report 
(20 September 2004), Available: <http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/ 
welcome.html#full>. The full report, including several appendices, contains 522 pp. Several 
appendices published separately can be found there as well. 
24
 33 United States Code §857–19 note (National Ocean Policy). Colombia seems to follow 
a similar path (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 94). The same holds true for Portugal (task force 
instructed to work out a comprehensive policy), but this document was later approved by the 
Council of Ministers (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 205–207). 
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finds Australia, where a clear centralisation in the decision making process is 
imposed by law.25 This is seen in the institutionalised stipulation in Australia’s 
policy document which provides for the establishment of a National Oceans 
Ministerial Board consisting of commonwealth ministers.26 The Ministerial 
Board will be advised by the National Oceans Advisory Body, whereas the 
development of regional initiatives and secretariat support will be handled by 
the Regional Marine Plan Steering Committee and the National Oceans Office 
respectively.27 In the middle of the spectrum, one observes the situation in 
Brazil where a comprehensive legal package of laws formally integrating all 
levels of government (regional, state and federal) in the process has been met 
with “incipient implementation.”28 
Another major point of divergence is the method relied upon to arrive at 
a national ocean policy. Some of the states in this study provide for a general 
procedure that governmental agencies are obliged to follow during the 
enactment process of ocean-related legislation with a harmonised national 
policy as the logical outcome.29 Others merely state what the policy is, either by 
looking into the future30 or to the past by stating what has already been 
accomplished.31 In between these approaches are states that provide for rather 
                                                 
25
 Once adopted, regional marine plans involving the different stakeholders will be binding on 
all relevant agencies (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 11–12). 
26
 Australia (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 14–15). 
27
 Id. See also Juda, n. 4 above, p. 174 et seq. for background to the Australian Ocean Policy 
recommendation. 
28
 S. Jablonski, and M. Filet, “Coastal Management in Brazil, a Political Riddle?” Ocean and 
Coastal Management 51 (2008):536-543, p. 541. The authors focus on Brazil’s definition of its 
oceans as a coastal patrimony, arguing that the reason for this could be because the more 
incisive laws in relation to ocean and coastal management are in the form of resolutions and not 
of decrees, hence the presumption of a weak system by those required to act. 
29
 Once again, Australia can be cited as an example (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 11–13). Japan 
also seems to fit this category (id., pp. 121–129). 
30
 The Russian Federation is a good example of this approach (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 231–
245), projecting a policy up to 2020. 
31
 The example of China can be mentioned (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 74–91), even though 
mention is made of the Long-Term National Marine Environmental Protection Programme, 
which runs to 2010. In China, moreover, these policies are deeply rooted in the political 
structure of the state. See M. Lau, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Peoples 
Republic of China. An Assessment of Structural Impacts on Decision Making Processes,” 
Ocean and Coastal Management 48 (2005): 115–159. Lau divides the political system into 
functioning legislation, implementing agency, and public participation. Lau notes the further 
division of the State Oceanic Administration into six departments (key departments include 
marine environmental protection, international cooperation, sea area management, as well as 
science and technology) that supervise 23 sub-units ranging from research and development to 
media organisations and training institutions (id., p. 135). This is in addition to the State 
Oceanic Administration’s split into three branches with responsibility for the Northern Sea, 
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detailed overviews, indicating which administration is responsible for taking 
the lead in situations where the interests of different ministries overlap.32 
This tendency towards overlapping sectors in ocean policy requires 
an improved operational process in order to balance sectoral interests and 
coordinate action and goals in accordance with sustainability principles.33 There 
is some action, albeit divergent, on the part of states to reduce fragmentation in 
policy making. Some states institute a comprehensive legal framework covering 
their oceans,34 some take a sector-by-sector approach,35 whereas others are still 
embroiled in determining their remit of responsibility over marine areas due to 
clear overlaps between key agencies.36 
Coherence is a desired framework in the implementation process. 
However, states take diverging approaches to arriving at a coherent national 
policy, following an integrated approach in order to sustainably use the oceans. 
Some of the reviewed ocean policies are guided by the ultimate objective of 
sustainability.37 Others simply pay lip service to it.38 Finally, a few countries 
                                                                                                                                  
the Eastern China Sea and the South China Sea. This is coupled with the political-economic 
network of participation, usually by stakeholders with political leanings as politicians in China 
can be involved in business matters (id., p. 135). 
32
 The example of Brazil can be mentioned here (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 45–49). 
33
 Addressing overlapping sectors and possible tensions in policy beforehand ensures fewer 
anomalies in the regulation of coastal states’ marine environments and economies. 
34
 The UK’s Marine and Coastal Access Bill, 2008, H.L. Bill [1] is a good example of 
an overarching policy framework for all UK waters. Available: <http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldbills/001/2009001.pdf> (retrieved 10 February 2009) [herein-
after UK Marine Bill]. 
35
 Norway is a good example of a state that uses the sectoral method. Currently, there is 
an integrated management framework in place for fisheries, transport and petroleum in the 
Barents Sea area off the Lofoten Islands. Similar plans will follow for the Norwegian Sea and 
the Norwegian part of the North Sea. See Ministry of Environment (Norway), Integrated 
Management of the Marine Environment of the Barents Sea and the Sea Areas off the Lofoten 
Islands (management plan), available: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Selected-topics/ 
Svalbard_og_polaromradene/Integrated-Management-of-the-Barents-Sea.html?id=87148> (re-
trieved 10 February 2009) for more on this process in the Barents area. 
36
 Lau, n. 31 above, pp. 142–145. In looking at China, Lau notes the State Oceanic 
Administration’s acknowledgement of conflicts in spheres of influence with agencies like the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Land 
and Resources, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the National Bureau of 
Forestry, and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
37
 In alphabetical order the following countries can be mentioned: Australia (IOC Study, n. 9 
above, pp. 11–12, 17–18 and 38–39); Norway (id., pp. 132 and 139–198); Portugal (id., p. 206); 
and the United States (id., pp. 252–260). 
38
 Brazil, for instance, simply mentions harmonisation and prioritisation as basic principles 
(IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 50). The Colombian entry has a section on integrated coastal area 
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look at national ocean policy from a military perspective, focussing on their 
need to be able to adequately defend their ocean interests.39 
The role of ecological sustainability in ocean policies varies widely. 
Sustainable management of marine regions is dependent on the condition of the 
ecosystem under consideration.40 Some countries are willing to further 
strengthen this concept by, for instance, adopting a more robust approach to the 
precautionary principle, a key element in achieving ecological sustainability. 
Normally, the precautionary approach requires that the absence of adequate 
scientific information is not a hindrance to the implementation of conservation 
and management measures.41 For example, Australia’s statement that 
incomplete information is not to be used as a reason for postponing 
precautionary measures42 is evidence of an enhanced intrinsic value in 
conservation and management. Some countries may highlight the precautionary 
principle as a fundamental policy objective,43 while others barely mention it44 
or remain silent on the issue.45 
                                                                                                                                  
management that remains, however, rather vague (id., p. 109) and contrasts sharply with the 
crux of the document which outlines specific actions to be taken in specific domains. 
39
 The best example is the Russian Federation. It states as one of the principles of its domestic 
marine policy the “[p]ossession of the required naval capacity and its effective use where 
necessary to support by force the marine activity of the State” (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 234). 
Sustainability under this approach is tied to the development of the state and aims at 
strengthening the position of the Russian Federation as one of the leading maritime powers (id., 
p. 245). To a lesser extent Brazil fits this category as well (id., pp. 43–44). 
40
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission. Roadmap for Maritime 
Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles in the EU. The European Union notes the 
importance of sustainability in its recent policy document on maritime spatial planning, 
COM(2008) 791 final (Brussels, 25 November 2008) [hereinafter MSP Document]. 
41
 See, for example, the definition in the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
8 September 1995, International Legal Materials 34 (1995): 1542–1580, Art. 6(2), available: 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement>. 
42
 IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 17. Australia also wholeheartedly adopts an ecosystem-based 
approach (id., pp. 11–13) and aims at ecosystem integrity (id., pp. 38–39). 
43
 See the examples of Colombia (IOC Study, n. 9 above, especially at p. 113), Norway (id., 
pp. 140 and 199–200) preparing for an ecosystem-based approach (id., p. 132), Portugal (id., 
pp. 213–216), and the United States, which makes the ecosystem-based management approach 
a fundamental pillar of its policy proposals (id., p. 246 (statement of principle) and the other 
references in the text itself to this approach). 
44
 A good example is Brazil (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 50 and 52). See also the examples of 
China (id., pp. 80 and 83) and Russia (id., pp. 238–239). 
45
 G. Hønneland, “Towards a Precautionary Fisheries Management in Russia?” Ocean and 
Coastal Management 48 (2005): 619–631, pp. 619, 621. Hønneland notes Russia’s silence in 
ensuring that the precautionary principle is translated in national legislation. For instance, the 
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Divergences between national ocean policies of the countries are also 
evident in the extent of the powers vested in the administrative organs 
responsible for implementing the proposed changes. On the one extreme of the 
spectrum one finds Japan, which has created a Headquarters for Ocean Policy 
led by the Prime Minister and composed of all Ministers of State.46 In other 
countries, e.g., Norway, the proposed structural changes tend to be weak.47 
However, this does not necessarily mean that concrete plans are lacking in such 
countries. The Norwegian plans, for instance, are much more concrete than 
those of Japan. In some cases, there are divergences in the kind of power given 
to administrative units. For example in China, where the State Oceanic 
Administration, an established administrative unit, has substantial powers, 
a plethora of lower administrative units and sub-units can preclude the 
completion of recommendations, with some recommendations achieving their 
goals and others falling short.48 While this might signify the need for a stronger 
State Oceanic Administration, this can also point in the direction of a more 
structural problem that needs to be solved first. 
Finally, the issue of securing the necessary financial resources to sustain 
such an integrated ocean policy is not uniformly regulated. Some countries do 
address the issue, be it in a most general49 or, inversely, a very specific 
                                                                                                                                  
2001 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation even though it specifically deals with 
exploitation of Russia’s oceans is silent on the aspect of precaution. Another inactive state in 
relation to the precautionary principle is Japan (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 127). Article 25 of its 
Basic Act on Ocean Policy is the closest to a preventative provision in the country’s basic plan, 
and states the government’s intention to ensure that the coast is protected and exploited 
appropriately. 
46
 IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 128. 
47
 E.g., Norway (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 198). 
48
 Lau, n. 31 above, p. 416. See also B. Penga, H. Honga, X. Xuea, & D. Jin, “On the 
Measurement of Socioeconomic Benefits of Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) Application 
to Xiamen, China,” Ocean and Coastal Management 49 (2006): 93–109. The authors examine 
the impact of the sectoral approach in Xiamen Province, noting the benefits of successful 
implementation of the integrated coastal management approach in the province (id., pp. 101–
106). However, the accuracy of these estimates, lack of data on the impact of the State Oceanic 
Administration in ocean management in this region, as well as the report’s lack of data on 
fisheries management, leaves this so-called success open to refutations. 
49
 For example, Japan states that the government shall take all necessary financial measures 
(IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 123). See also the Brazilian (id., p. 53), Colombian (id., pp. 105–107 
and 119), American (id., pp. 254, 258–259, 261–265, 267 and 269–271), and Portuguese entries 
in this respect (id., pp. 217, 219 and 228–229). 
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manner.50 Others only mention specific actions that will be financed.51 Still 
others do not specifically touch upon this issue.52 
 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
Other examples could be given, but this list suffices to press home the point that 
a national oceans policy is a chameleonic type of notion. Its content is easily 
adapted to the political priorities of the countries establishing them. 
Nevertheless, states are all confronted with the same basic problem, namely that 
if coherence and sustainability are to be achieved in future ocean use, some 
difficult issues will have to be tackled, if not now, then probably with more 
vigour at a later stage. It is therefore a positive development to see that 
countries are at least willing to learn from each other’s experiences. Japan, for 
instance, when it embarked upon this process based its policy decisions, inter 
alia, on the preparatory work of a non-governmental institution that very 
carefully studied the examples of other countries that had already had some 
experience with the process.53 
The European Union, in its attempt to regulate usage of the oceans by 
bringing all maritime concerns within the region into a centralised policy as 
well as balancing the different uses of the oceans, adds one more policy-making 
                                                 
50
 Australia, for example, indicates the amount of money put aside for the implementation of the 
plan (IOC Study, n. 9 above, p. 6). It also pinpoints specific sources (see id., pp. 20, 22, 24–26 
and 34). 
51
 See the Norwegian (IOC Study, n. 9 above, pp. 163, 168–171, 173–174, 183, 186, 194 and 
197) and Russian (id., pp. 236, 238 and 243–244) examples. 
52
 UK Marine Bill, n. 34 above, had its Second Reading in the House of Lords on 15 December 
2008 and started its Committee stages on 12 January 2009. The bill does not specifically 
address the issue of funding. See: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, A Sea 
Change. A Marine Bill White Paper, Cm. 7047 (March 2007), available: 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/marine/pdf/legislation/marinebill-whitepaper07.pdf> (retrieved 10 
February 2009). For additional concerns regarding funding see Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, Taking forward the Marine Bill: The Government response to pre-
legislative scrutiny and public consultation, 2008, Cm. 7422, pp. 13–14, available: 
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm74/7422/7422.asp> (retrieved 10 Feb-
ruary 2009). 
53
 M. Hayashi, “The Re-birth of Japan as an Ocean State: The New Basic Act and Ocean 
Policy” (contribution to an international conference, entitled “Ocean Governance: Structures, 
Functions, and Innovation,” organised by the Law of the Sea Institute, University of California, 
Berkeley, and Inha University, Seoul, at Berkeley, California, United States, 4–5 November 
2008). Point reaffirmed during a personal conversation between M. Hayashi and the present 
author at that occasion. 
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level that requires harmonisation and prioritisation to the already complicated 
picture sketched above.54 This European initiative may well be the precursor of 
the future state of ocean policy making. Indeed, ocean policies as they have 
been articulated so far are primarily state-centric. However, it cannot be 
overemphasised that there is a real need to ensure a coordinated effort spanning 
bordering states’ policies. This will not only simplify decision-making 
processes for licensing procedures but can also lead to cross-border cooperation 
and consultation.55 The nature of the maritime domain as an ecosystem cuts 
across administrative lines highlighting the importance of a coordinated 
approach in policy making and implementation56 which so far is not readily 
found in states’ ocean policies. 
 
 
  
                                                 
54
 J. Rankin, “Taming Tensions on Europe’s Seas,” Maritime Policy 13, 1 (2007). 
55
 MSP Document, n. 40 above, p. 10. 
56
 The UK Marine Bill, n. 34 above, is also a good example of best practice as it is designed to 
work together with Scotland’s current consultations on a Scottish Marine Bill. These pieces of 
legislation recognise the need for a symbiotic approach in the development of both policies 
within the Union. See <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/07/11100221/5> 
(retrieved 10 February 2009) for a full version of this bill. Chapter 2, Articles 48–49 are 
especially relevant to this study. Within the EU member states and non-member states, the 
INTERREG IIIB CADSES (Central, Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern European Space) 
Project is the best example of a cross-border initiative. Sixteen states in the Baltic, Adriatic and 
Black Sea regions, in accordance with sustainability principles, aim to ensure a cross-border 
approach in policy making and consultations. For a copy of the Project’s handbook, see 
PlanCoast, Handbook on Integrated Maritime Spatial Planning (April 2008), available: 
<http://www.plancoast.eu/files/handbook_web.pdf> (retrieved 10 February 2009). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Comparing the Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union and the 
Oceans Policy of Canada 
 
Timo Koivurova 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This contribution compares the European Union’s newly-adopted Integrated 
Maritime Policy (IMP)1 to the integrated ocean policy of Canada, which in 
1996 became the first country to declare that it had a full-scale integrated ocean 
policy.2 It can be presumed that the European Union (EU) can benefit from the 
                                                 
1
 The term Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) is used here to denote the following three 
documents: The Integrated Maritime Policy, adopted via a Communication (the so-called Blue 
Book), its accompanying Action Plan (which specifies the broad guidance given in the IMP) 
and the “environmental dimension” of the IMP, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(MSFD). The European Council, which adopted the Integrated Maritime Policy, understood it 
as composing of these three elements. It is important to keep in mind that references will also 
be made to the Communication and the Action Plan using the term IMP. Additionally, specific 
references will be made directly to the MSFD. See European Commission, An Integrated 
Maritime Policy for the European Union, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 575 final 
(Brussels, 10 October 2007) [hereinafter IMP]. The IMP was adopted by the European Council 
in December 2007; available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF> (retrieved 20 November 2008). The IMP was accompanied by 
an Action Plan that. See also, European Commission, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: An Integrated Maritime Policy 
for the European Union, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007) 1278 (Brussels, 
10 October 2007), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/ActionPaper/action_ 
plan_en.pd> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter Action Plan]; and Directive 
2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing 
a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive) (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal L 164, 25 June 
2008 P. 0019 – 0040, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:32008L0056:EN:HTML> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter MSFD]. 
2
 As provided in Canada’s Oceans Strategy: “On January 31, 1997, the Government of Canada 
brought the Oceans Act into force, making Canada the first country in the world to have 
comprehensive oceans management legislation,” Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our 
Future (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc_e.pdf> (retrieved 10 December 
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Canadian ocean policy, both as a model to construct an integrated ocean policy 
as well as from the experience gained in Canada while implementing its ocean 
policy. This analysis focuses on the basic documents laying out integrated 
ocean policies in Canada and the European Union, respectively. First, however, 
it is important to examine in general the evolution of integrated ocean policies, 
which will assist in understanding the place of Canadian and EU integrated 
ocean policies in a larger trajectory.  
 
 
3.2. The Emergence of National Integrated Ocean Policies: Problems and 
Possibilities  
 
It is a formidable task to create an effective national integrated ocean policy. 
The reasons for this are well known, but useful to review. It is difficult to find 
an area of policy comparable in scope to integrated oceans policy: it goes 
beyond the co-ordination of maritime policies, not least because 70–80 per cent 
of marine pollution is caused by land-based activities. The coordination of the 
policy areas that an integrated oceans policy may interact with is not an easy 
task. Established policy areas typically operate on the basis of their own values 
and traditions, which is reflected in the legal system, where various legal 
regulations guide action on sectoral issues related to ocean areas and policy 
supervision is entrusted to a variety of ministries and agencies.  
Another important factor making effective national integrated ocean 
governance challenging is the comparatively marginal role of ocean issues in 
national or local politics. In most constituencies, political issues related to the 
ocean — the immediate coastline being an exception — escape the attention of 
politicians, who should take the lead in advancing such a challenging policy 
initiative. Ocean policy as an instrument of coordinated planning and 
supervision is also a relatively new phenomenon, for until the mid-twentieth 
century, ocean activities remained at a relatively low level and their 
environmental impact was negligible. 
                                                                                                                                  
2008) [hereinafter Oceans Strategy]. It should be noted, however, that the Netherlands and 
India already had integrated oceans policies in the 1980s; see, e.g., “Ocean Development,” 
Government of India website, available: <http://india.gov.in/sectors/science/ocean_ 
development.php> (retrieved 20 November 2008); and M. Barry, I. Elema and P. Molen, 
“Governing the North Sea in the Netherlands,” Paper presented at the International Federation 
of Surveyors (FIG) Working Week and 125th Anniversary of FIG: “Still on the Frontier,” 
available: <http://www.fig.net/pub/fig_2003/ TS_20/TS20_2_Barry_et_al.pdf> (retrieved 20 
November 2008). 
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 It is also important to note the main reasons why these integrated ocean 
policies have emerged. The frustration related to conflicting decisions and plans 
by various arms of the state, resulting from a fragmented agency and legal 
structure, certainly induces many to at least think about how the situation might 
be improved.3 The ever-increasing degradation of the oceans, an awareness of 
which has been made possible by the more sophisticated findings of the marine 
sciences (and whose publicity is guaranteed by dedicated environmental non-
governmental organisations), has provided additional impetus for integrated 
policies, since ocean ecosystems can only produce their services up to a certain 
point.4 A zonal approach to national ocean policy is also many times the 
preferred option. While this approach makes the ocean policy coherent 
internally (that various maritime zones are established and legislated on the 
basis of the law of the sea and function consistently as part of national ocean 
                                                 
3
 Both the IMP and the Canadian ocean policy express this in explicit terms. Chapter 2 
(Context) of the IMP (n.1 above) contains the following passage:  
Increasing competition for marine space and the cumulative impact of human activities 
on marine ecosystems render the current fragmented decision-making in maritime 
affairs inadequate, and demand a more collaborative and integrated approach. For too 
long policies on, for instance, maritime transport, fisheries, energy, surveillance and 
policing of the seas, tourism, the marine environment, and marine research have 
developed on separate tracks, at times leading to inefficiencies, incoherencies and 
conflicts of use. 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy (id.) provides in “The Context for Canada’s Oceans Strategy” as 
follows:  
Canada’s oceans are governed by a complex web of laws and regulations managed by 
different levels of government. This governance structure points to the need for 
developing a unified vision and integrated approach to ocean management that 
effectively considers the impact of individual sector activities on each other, and on 
the oceans as a whole. 
4
 Chapter 2 (Context) of the IMP (id.) contains the following statement:  
Ensuring that use of the marine environment is genuinely sustainable is a prerequisite 
for these industries to be competitive. The growing vulnerability of coastal areas, 
increasingly crowded coastal waters, the key role of the oceans in the climate system 
and the continuous deterioration of the marine environment all call for a stronger focus 
on our oceans and seas. 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy (id.) provides in “The Context for Canada’s Oceans Strategy” as 
follows:  
Oceans are facing severe environmental threats from over-exploitation, pollution from 
land-based and sea-based activities and the alteration and destruction of habitats and 
ecosystems. The health of oceans is affected by sewage and pollutant discharge in 
marine waters, excessive growth of marine plant life, alien species introduction and 
changes to hydrology and sediment flow. Despite efforts to improve environmental 
quality of coasts and seas both in Canada and abroad, degradation of ocean 
environments has continued. 
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policy), it has caused problems of uncoordinated development (given that for 
different policy areas, the maritime zones mean different things) and has led to 
calls for integrated ocean management.5  
 The first generation of ocean policies was focused on the coordination of 
various ocean uses rather than on how their overall impact on the marine 
ecosystems could be addressed.6 With the rise of the environmental movement, 
and especially its culmination in the 1992 United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (and, more recently, the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development), the trend changed towards full-scale integrated 
ocean governance policies. Such a policy was adopted in Canada already in 
1996 with the Oceans Act and the ensuing policy instruments. As has been 
pointed out in the literature, the coming into force of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) in 1994 strengthened this 
trend, but only indirectly7 as the LOS Convention itself did not encourage the 
use of integrated ocean governance policies. However, since it laid out so many 
new powers and duties in the marine environment, the LOS Convention clearly 
served as a catalyst for integrated ocean policies. The various legal and policy 
instruments aimed at closing the gaps on the path to using oceans as commons, 
with the related danger of a tragedy of the commons, were very important in 
inducing states to think of their maritime areas in a new way. The management 
tools developed in science and nationally were gradually transferred to the 
instruments adopted by various intergovernmental organisations. Together they 
pushed states to adopt integrated management approaches, one of which was 
the designation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in their coastal areas and in 
large marine ecosystems.  
 In principle, there is an overwhelming consensus that more holistic ways 
to manage the oceans are imperative.8 Yet, as the research has pointed out, such 
approaches face many kinds of problems.9 States may well opt nationally for 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Y. Tanaka, “Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: 
Reflections on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea,” International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 19 (2004): 483–514.  
6
 For a historical overview, see L. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The 
Evolution of Ocean Governance (London: Routledge, 1996). 
7
 The preamble of the LOS Convention provides: “Conscious that the problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.” United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). 
8
 For an early but useful theoretical insight into the basic requirements for an integrated ocean 
policy see A. Underdal, “Integrated Marine Policy: What? Why? How?” Marine Policy 4 
(1980): 159–169. 
9
 See, e.g., J.-P. Lévy, “A National Ocean Policy: An Elusive Quest,” Marine Policy 17 (1993): 
75–80. For a recent authoritative comparison, see International Oceanographic Commission, 
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divergent policies — not uniform ones — and try to expand (even abuse) their 
already expanded ocean powers on the basis of national interests. If there had 
been a meeting of states parties to the LOS Convention, national ocean 
governance might have developed in more co-ordinated and uniform manner 
than it has. States parties could have closely followed the development of one 
another’s ocean policy through meetings of the parties and implementation 
committees. Such a process would have arguably also meant that national ocean 
policies would have paid more attention to the international law of the sea than 
to national interests.  
 
 
3.3. Comparison Between the European Union and Canadian Approaches 
to Ocean Policy 
 
The IMP is clearly a unique exercise in the history of ocean governance. Even 
though the EU is acting like a federal state in many ways  in some policy areas 
in an even more integrated manner than federal entities — its ocean powers 
differ vastly from those of federal states. While federal states may have 
constitutionally delegated many of their powers to their sub-units in many 
policy areas, this does not usually apply to maritime areas where the federal 
level exercises most powers affecting areas beyond the immediate coastal zone 
or territorial sea. This fundamental fact does not hold true for the EU, which, 
apart from having exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries, has only shared powers 
over many of the maritime policies. The Member States legislate the extent of 
their maritime areas and exercise and enforce most powers therein. This is a 
significant difference between the EU and federal states with respect to ocean 
governance, and prevents any straightforward comparison between them. This 
is not to say that useful lessons cannot be found, but care must be taken in such 
comparisons.  
 The IMP should, in the opinion of the present author, be seen as the first-
ever social experiment in integrated ocean policy where the governing entity is 
a supranational organisation. The increasing legal development towards holistic 
                                                                                                                                  
National Ocean Policy. The Basic Texts from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, 
Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, United States of America (Paris: Unesco, 2007) 
(IOC Technical Paper, 75, Law of the Sea Dossier 1), available: <http://ioc3.unesco.org/abelos/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=267> (retrieved 20 November 
2008). See also R. Friedheim, “Designing the Ocean Policy Future: An Essay on How I Am 
Going To Do That,” Ocean Development & International Law 31 (2000): 183–195, pp. 187–
189. 
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ocean management has justified increasing the EU’s powers in maritime areas. 
Yet, the overwhelming challenge of coordinating the actions of sovereign 
nations that exercise most of the powers pertaining to their sea areas clearly 
distinguishes the EU’s formulation of an integrated maritime policy from the 
efforts of federal states to create a regional policy. In addition, the IMP can be 
seen as the most comprehensive policy ever adopted by the EU as it criss-
crosses all possible policy areas, adding to the challenge of co-ordinating action 
within the EU.  
 The strong maritime traditions of European nation-states would seem to 
pose difficulties for creating integrated ocean governance at the EU level. 
Given the EU structure in maritime affairs, one might have assumed that 
an integrated maritime policy would never have materialised, and if it had, that 
it would certainly not have been able to borrow from earlier federal integrated 
ocean policies, in particular Canada’s. Yet some interesting similarities exist 
between the two policies. A review of the similarities and differences between 
the ocean policies of the EU and Canada follows. 
 No similarities are evident in the way the ocean policies were legally 
constructed in the EU and Canada. The Canadian ocean policy was very 
logically constructed. It was given a clear legal foundation through the 1996 
Oceans Act,10 which established the various maritime zones and laid down 
institutional powers and management structures. The goals, values, principles 
and management strategies were then specified by political means through the 
2002 Oceans Strategy,11 which implements the section 29 obligation of the 
minister and is based on practical experience gained in the interim, and the 
2005 Action Plan.12 Specific guidance for implementing integrated 
management plans pursuant to the Oceans Act is provided in the “Policy and 
Operational Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and 
Marine Environments in Canada,”13 which was adopted in conjunction with the 
Oceans Strategy.  
                                                 
10
 The Oceans Act came into force in 1997; see Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, available: 
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/O-2.4/> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
11
 Oceans Strategy, n. 2 above. 
12
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Action Plan (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
2005), available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/oap-pao/index_e.asp> (re-
trieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter Oceans Action Plan]. 
13
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated 
Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada (Ottawa: Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/ 
cosframework-cadresoc/page01_e.asp> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter Policy and 
Operational Framework]. 
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 The development process was essentially the reverse in the case of the 
IMP, even though it also started with a legal act, the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive (MSFD).14 The process started with the sixth 
environmental action program, which identified marine environment protection 
as a priority area. This paved the way to the adoption of the MSFD (part of the 
European Marine Strategy) under the lead of DG Environment. The MSFD 
focused on protecting marine ecosystems and was later deemed by the 
European Council to be the “environmental pillar” of the IMP.15 The MSFD 
requires the Member States to identify their marine regions and sub-regions and 
to achieve good environmental status in all of them by the year 2020. 
The Commission started the process of creating the full-scale IMP in 2005. It 
was adopted on 10 October 2007 (and later by the European Council in 
December 2007) as a political initiative, not through formal legal procedures. 
The IMP is led by DG Mare.16  
 This difference in how the integrated policies of the EU and Canada were 
implemented has concrete consequences. In the EU, work on holistic ocean 
governance started from the “environmental pillar,” which was adopted through 
                                                 
14
 Since the Directive was subject to the co-decision procedure, it had to be accepted by both 
the European Parliament and the Council. MSFD, n. 1 above. 
15
 The heads of states and governments of the EU agreed to the following conclusions on 
maritime policy at the meeting of the European Council of 14 December 2007 as follows:  
The European Council welcomes the Commission Communication on an integrated 
maritime policy for the European Union and the proposed Action Plan which sets out 
the first concrete steps in developing an integrated approach to maritime affairs. The 
broad participation in the preceding public consultation and the comprehensive debate 
at the Lisbon Ministerial Conference reflected the interest which stakeholders show for 
the development of such a policy. The future integrated maritime policy should ensure 
synergies and coherence between sectorial policies, bring added value and fully 
respect the principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore it should be developed as a tool to 
address the challenges facing Europe's sustainable development and competitiveness. 
It should take particularly account of the different specificities of Member States and 
specific maritime regions which should call for increased cooperation, including 
islands, archipelagos and outermost regions as well as of the international dimension. 
The European Council welcomes the conclusion of the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive as the environmental pillar of this policy. The European Council invites the 
Commission to come forward with the initiatives and proposals contained in the 
Action Plan and calls on the future Presidencies to work on the establishment of an 
integrated maritime policy for the Union. The Commission is invited to report on 
progress achieved to the European Council at the end of 2009.  
Conclusions from the European Council (14 December 2007), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
maritimeaffairs/conclusions_20071214_en.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
16
 For a useful overview, see V. Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental 
Protection in the International Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 
pp. 94–104.  
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a legal act (the MSFD) in 2008. The MSFD requires, among other things, that 
“Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 15 July 2010 at the latest. 
They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those 
provisions.”17 Hence, the process of identifying the marine regions and sub-
regions, as well as actions to achieve good environmental status for these 
waters, has started in full because it is legally required of the Member States. 
The same does not hold true for the IMP, which is a political document and is 
co-ordinated by a different directorate (DG Mare) than that supervising the 
implementation of the MSFD. The Commission has recently issued guidance to 
assist Member States in creating their national IMPs. However, the problem 
may be that in practice there is no legal backing for this guidance. In Canada, 
by contrast, all of the goals of the ocean policy are contained in the Oceans Act 
and related policy documents and co-ordinated by a single government agency, 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Having a different legal basis 
and co-ordinating agency than its Canadian counterpart, the IMP may well tilt 
towards environmental goals rather than those advanced in the Blue Book.  
 Another difference between the policies is that the Canadian instruments 
provide only broad strategic level guidance, whereas the IMP and the 
accompanying Action Plan sets out very specific operational actions for the EU. 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy is a strategic document whose final part, “Strategic 
Directions for Implementing Canada’s Oceans Strategy,” moves slightly into 
operational goals. While Canada’s Oceans Action Plan does contain some 
operational goals in its final part “Initiatives for Phase I of the Oceans Action 
Plan,” overall the document is more strategic in nature.18 As is aptly noted in 
the Oceans Action Plan, the Oceans Strategy is based on a phased approach 
towards implementation. Although the IMP and Action Plan both contain 
strategic level guidance, they also provide details about individual actions to be 
taken, with the Action Plan even evaluating the benefits of those actions. This 
has the advantage of providing more specific guidance but, of course, leaves 
less discretion for the Commission in implementing the IMP.  
 The differences between the ocean policies of the EU and Canada thus 
appear to be numerous. The Canadian approach proceeds logically, in a step-
by-step fashion, from a clear legal foundation to political goal setting, whereas 
the EU approach follows two distinct but interlinked tracks. The tracks differ in 
that the MSFD is legally binding while the IMP is not, and each is led by 
different directorates; they are linked in that the MSFD is the “environmental 
                                                 
17
 MSFD, Article 26 (1), n. 1 above. 
18
 However, the Policy and Operational Framework (n. 13 above) provides more specific 
guidance on implementing integrated management plans.  
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dimension” of the IMP. Importantly, the process of drafting both the IMP and 
the Canadian ocean policy were as inclusive as possible, involving all the 
relevant stakeholders. The same approach has continued with the 
implementation of both ocean policies: transparency, public participation and 
stakeholder involvement have been given a lot of attention. This is very clear in 
the Canadian approach, which not only aims to involve all levels of government 
and Aboriginal peoples who have jurisdiction in the relevant maritime areas, 
but also encourages citizens to participate. The rationale is that broad 
participation will enhance the legitimacy of ocean management.19 
 In the EU, the IMP was the result of extensive stakeholder participation: 
Over 490 contributions were received and over 230 events held in the year-long 
stakeholder consultation process, which certainly increased the legitimacy of 
the exercise.20 The guidance given to Member States in drawing up their 
national integrated maritime policies also demonstrates that the EU is dedicated 
to the principle of subsidiarity in the making of the IMP. The guidelines 
encourage the Member States to draw up their national IMPs together with all 
relevant levels of government and stakeholders.21  
                                                 
19
 See the Policy Framework section of the Oceans Strategy:  
Finally, the Strategy responds to the desire of Canadians to be engaged in ocean 
management activities by promoting stewardship and public awareness. Oceans 
stewardship means acting responsibly to conserve the oceans and their resources for 
present and future generations. Through stewardship initiatives, the government can 
encourage Canadians to volunteer and actively participate in the caring for ocean 
resources in meaningful and positive ways. Citizens also want to be engaged in 
decisions that affect them, and look for support for stewardship projects. Canada's 
Oceans Strategy builds on an existing foundation of stewardship and public awareness 
activities and will continue to develop and promote national initiatives in these areas. 
This active participation is encouraged through the Integrated Management planning 
process, but also through more specific activities. Stewardship initiatives under the 
Strategy will be co-ordinated with others such as the National Stewardship Initiative 
and the Natural Legacy Agenda. As well, oceans stewardship initiatives are important 
for supporting Canada's international commitments under Chapter 36 of Agenda 21. 
Industry is also interested in public/private sector partnerships that contribute to 
sustainable ocean use. Government roles in this relationship are to enable and 
encourage the public and private sectors to participate as completely as possible in 
helping to support sustainable ocean use. (Oceans Strategy, n. 2 above) 
20
 See DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, Report on Consultations 
(2007), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0574: 
FIN:EN:PDF> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
21
 DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission, Towards best practice in 
integrated maritime governance and stakeholder consultation. Guidelines for an Integrated 
Approach to Maritime Policy, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(2008) 395 final (Brussels, 26 June 2008), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
  
 28 
 Both the IMP and the Canada’s ocean policy started out in similar ways 
from the financial point of view. In general, the EU spending is planned for 
several years under a Financial Framework, which lays down maximum 
amounts by category of expenditure. The current framework was established in 
2006 and covers the period 2007–2013. When the Financial Framework was 
established, the IMP was not yet in place. As a result, no provisions were made 
for the IMP. In 2009, the amounts proposed in the budget to finance the 
IMP are drawn from unutilised amounts originally foreseen for the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP). According to the responsible EU official, “This does 
not mean that all the needs of the CFP have not been adequately addressed in 
the 2009 budget. They have been. Had the IMP not required the resources that 
have been proposed for it, these resources would not have been utilised for 
another purpose.”22 Initially, the Canadian ocean policy lacked its own budget. 
Fiscal restraints in 1997 meant that no new funds were provided to implement 
the 1996 Oceans Act or Canada’s Oceans Strategy. “Until the federal 
government’s approval of the Oceans Action Plan in 2005, funding for 
implementation of the national ocean management approach had been achieved 
through reallocation of funds within DFO.”23 Yet, this changed with the Oceans 
Action Plan and Health of the Oceans commitment, both of which provided 
new funding for ocean policy.24 
 When we examine the substantive elements of the two policies, it does 
seem that the EU has benefited from the Canadian experience.25 First, the 
institutional powers have been designed in IMP in much the same way as in the 
Oceans Act. In contrast to the United States’ integrated ocean policy, which is 
based on a committee working under the Council of Environmental Quality, the 
lead agency in Canada is the minister for the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans. The EU used the same approach, with the DG Fisheries and Maritime 
                                                                                                                                  
maritimeaffairs/pdf/com08_395_en.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter Guide-
lines]. 
22
 Official of the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, C1, pers. comm. 
(19 December 2008). 
23
 See Mageau, VanderZwaag & Farlinger chapter in this book (Chapter IV), p. 79. 
24
 Id. 
25
 In fact, when the EU provided guidelines for Member States on how to do the national IMPs, 
it referred to the experience of many countries, including Canada, and stated:  
The principles, objectives and modalities of all these maritime policies are largely 
similar. All these countries recognise the major contribution made by sea-based 
activities to their economy. They all acknowledge that the intensive development of 
these activities poses a challenge to sustainable development and use of their sea 
resources. And they have all decided to develop an overall policy that allows a 
comprehensive, coordinated approach, ensuring sustainable development of the 
different sea resources and activities. (Guidelines, n. 21 above, p. 5) 
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Affairs acting as the lead agency in developing the IMP. The directorate was 
administratively re-organised on the basis of marine regions and renamed DG 
Mare (maritime affairs and fisheries),26 and is the directorate that steers the IMP 
process.  
 The goals of the two ocean policies are essentially the same: to promote 
economic development in such a way that possibly conflicting uses of the ocean 
can co-exist and prosper and that the overall health of ocean ecosystems is 
maintained in the long term. These overarching goals are guided by similar 
principles in both policies: decision-making principles (e.g., the precautionary 
principle) and management principles (e.g., an ecosystem approach, co-
management).27  
 Moreover, specific goals are expressed in remarkably similar terms, e.g., 
promoting economic prosperity, stimulating better marine science, building 
maritime heritage, and taking international leadership in the development of the 
law of the sea.28 The goal of becoming an international leader in ocean 
governance is a good illustration of the similarities between the two policies. 
Although both share this goal, the two policies use different approaches to 
realizing it. An examination of the relevant parts of each policy illustrates the 
difference in the extent to which they provide guidance for action.  
                                                 
26
 This is recent development, see European Commission, “Commission: new organisation will 
boost implementation of EU integrated maritime policy and Common Fisheries Policy,” Press 
Release (27 March 2008), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/press/press_rel 
270308_ en.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
27
 The IMP provides (1. Executive Summary): “These actions will be guided by the principles 
of subsidiarity and competitiveness, the ecosystem approach, and stakeholder participation.” 
The preambular paragraphs 27 and 44 of the “environmental dimension” of the IMP, the 
MSFD, endorse the precautionary principle. The preamble of the Oceans Act, n. 10 above, 
refers to the sustainable development ecosystem approach to the oceans and their resources; the 
precautionary approach to the conservation, management and exploitation of marine resources; 
the integrated management of oceans and marine resources; and economic diversification and 
the generation of wealth for the benefit of all Canadians, and in particular for coastal 
communities. The Oceans Strategy, n. 2 above, outlines the following principles: sustainable 
development, integrated management and precautionary approach.  
28
 Canada’s Oceans Strategy, n. 2 above, outlines three policy objectives: understanding and 
protecting the marine environment, supporting sustainable economic opportunities, and 
international leadership. This is complemented in the Oceans Action Plan, n. 12 above, to 
expressly include ocean science and technology. The IMP, n. 1 above, includes as its action 
areas (section 4) the following: maximising the sustainable use of the oceans; delivering the 
highest quality of life in coastal regions and seas, building a knowledge and innovation base for 
the maritime policy, promoting Europe’s leadership in international maritime affairs and, 
finally, raising the visibility of maritime Europe. 
  
 30 
 Both Canada and the EU are committed to similar goals in regard to high 
seas biodiversity and marine protected areas. Canada’s Oceans Action Plan 
provides: 
 
There are a number of important areas, such as the protection of high-
seas biodiversity and the concept of high-seas marine protected areas, 
where Canada can bring to the global stage practical solutions that can 
lead international benchmarking and best practice exercises.29 
 
The EU provides much more specific guidance on this issue (as on many 
others). Section 4.4. of the IMP provides:  
 
The Commission will propose an Implementing Agreement of UNCLOS 
[footnote omitted - TK] on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction and work towards successful conclusion of international 
negotiations on Marine Protected Areas on the high seas. 
 
The Action Plan provides background to the action, describes the action and 
describes the benefits of choosing exactly this action: 
 
Background:  
The Green Paper on Maritime Policy highlights the importance of 
protecting the marine environment and biodiversity in Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdiction (ABNJ), including through a multilateral 
implementing agreement protecting marine biodiversity under 
UNCLOS. These initiatives are necessary to meet the objectives agreed 
in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Joint Plan of Action 
to significantly reduce current rates of biodiversity loss by 2010 and to 
establish representative networks of marine protected areas by 2012. 
 
Action: 
International negotiations are focussing on developing an international 
regulatory framework that will allow co-ordinated action to protect 
marine biodiversity in the high seas, including through the establishment 
of marine protected areas in ABNJ. They also include participation by 
the EU in international discussions on marine genetic resources in ABNJ 
to better understand the underlying environmental and socio-economic 
                                                 
29
 Oceans Action Plan, n. 12 above, Initiatives for Phase I of the Oceans Action Plan, 
International Leadership, Sovereignty and Security. 
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issues. Negotiations are ongoing in several global fora, including in 
particular the United Nations General Assembly context (law of the sea), 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and sectoral organisations. At 
regional level, negotiations are ongoing under regional seas conventions 
(e.g. North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Baltic) and regional fisheries 
organisations. Delivering on these objectives will depend on the 
outcome of such international negotiations, which makes it difficult to 
estimate a timetable. In addition to these negotiations, the Commission 
will before the end of 2009 put forward a strategy for the protection of 
high seas biodiversity through the designation of marine protected areas. 
 
Benefits of an integrated approach/relevance for an integrated maritime 
policy: 
Action in this area must be seen in conjunction and coherent with EU 
internal action on the protection of habitats, and the across-the-board 
implementation of an eco-system-based approach, including in fisheries. 
Furthermore, an integrated approach to these issues aims at going 
beyond the current sectoral fragmentation of measures in the high seas. 
The joint implementation of international commitments under UN 
instruments is necessary to ensure coherent action by economic sectors 
in the high seas, a condition for sustainable development in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.30 
 
Clearly, the goals are very close to each other, but the EU’s approach identifies 
the specific steps to be taken, explicitly justifying the planned action and 
identifying specific policy and legislative actions in the IMP.31 
 The more specific integrated management approach of the EU has 
similarities but also differences to that of Canada. These differences mainly 
stem from the constitutional structures of the two policy entities, but also from 
their management traditions. Both Canada and the EU promote the 
establishment of marine protected areas. Canada has three schemes for 
establishing MPAs, with the responsibilities allocated to three agencies for 
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 Oceans Action Plan, n. 12 above, pp. 30–31. 
31
 See, e.g., IMP, n. 1 above, “The Commission will: reassess, in close cooperation with social 
partners, the exclusions affecting maritime sectors in EU labour legislation,” (p. 9) and “The 
Commission will: propose a new ports policy, taking account of the multiple roles of ports and 
the wider context of European logistics; make proposals to reduce the levels of air pollution 
from ships in ports, namely by removing tax disadvantages for shore side electricity; issue 
guidelines on the application of the relevant Community environmental legislation to port 
development” (p. 8). 
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different issue areas. However, DFO has overall authority in co-ordinating the 
development and implementation of a national system of marine protected areas 
on the basis of section 35 (2) of the Oceans Act.32 In the EU, the responsible 
directorate is DG Environment, which supervises the NATURA 2000 
programme and ensures that the EU complies with its international obligations 
in respect of MPAs. These areas may be those already designated under the 
Wild Birds or Habitats directives or under international legal obligations. The 
MSFD lays down a legal obligation for the Commission to report on the 
progress made with respect to marine protected areas.33 
 However, the management scheme in Canada is more flexible in the sense 
that DFO minister can establish different kinds of integrated management 
systems depending on the overall load facing the ecosystem. The Canadian 
system also develops incrementally: there is no requirement to first map out all 
the marine regions. Rather, the large ocean management areas (LOMAs), and 
more specific integrated governance schemes, are created one-by-one over 
time.34 Even though more specific guidance in implementing these various 
integrated governance schemes is given in the “Policy and Operational 
Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine 
Environments in Canada,” the management system is built on tailoring the kind 
of management structure that best suits the specific conditions in an area. 
The EU system is more rigid in the sense that it first requires all marine regions 
to be mapped out by Member States with the help of the Commission. 
Subsequently, management measures are to be laid down to achieve the good 
environmental status by 2020 at the latest. However, the guidance given to 
Member States to implement their own national IMPs contains possibilities for 
creating various sorts of ocean management models, with participation from 
national coast guards, national maritime agencies and operators of surveillance 
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 See Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Marine Protected Areas Policy. Developing a National 
System of Protected Areas for the Marine Environment (March 1999),” available: 
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/mpapolicy-politiquezpm/page05_e.asp> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
33
 Article 21 of the MSFD, “Progress report on protected areas,” n.1 above, reads: “On the basis 
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 Appendix to the 2002 ocean governance document lists the integrated management schemes 
already in place. Oceans Strategy, n. 2 above, available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans-
habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/page09_e.asp> (retrieved 20 November 2008), Appendix – 
Integrated Management Initiatives at Work. 
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systems, together with all possible stakeholders. This stage of national 
management and implementation is to be carried out by the Maritime Spatial 
Planning, which means there are possibilities to come up with various kinds of 
integrated management structures throughout European seas.  
 
3.4. Evaluation 
 
Even though the constitutional structures of the EU and Canada differ in 
maritime affairs, it is clear that their ocean policies exhibit similar features. 
This is perhaps not so surprising given that the international binding and non-
binding instruments which have established the basic ideals for integrated 
ocean governance have also found their way into both Canadian and EU ocean 
policies. As discussed above, there are interesting similarities between the two 
policies that may well result from Canada being one of the first states to lay 
down a comprehensive integrated ocean policy.  
 In comparison to federal states, the greatest challenge for the EU in 
implementing its IMP is how the Member States will implement the MSFD 
and, perhaps most importantly, the national IMPs for which guidance was given 
recently. As the IMP requires, the Commission will 
 
invite Member States to draw up national integrated maritime policies, 
working closely with stakeholders, in particular the coastal regions; 
propose in 2008 a set of guidelines for these national integrated maritime 
policies and report annually on EU and Member States' actions in this 
regard from 2009.35 
 
Hence, the first signs of whether the Member States have started to react to this 
political initiative in their national policy will be seen in 2009. However, it does 
seem that the EU might find it better that the Member States fulfil their 
“environmental dimension” obligations of the IMP, given that the MSFD 
obligations are legally required whereas the other obligations adopted via the 
Communication are not.36 
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 IMP, n. 1 above, p. 5. 
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 On the other hand, the recently published Roadmap for Maritime Spatial Planning shows that 
several integrated management structures have already been developed in the EU Member States. 
See European Commission, Roadmap for Maritime Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles 
in the EU, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, COM(2008) 791 final (Brussels, 25 
November 2008), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008: 
0791:FIN:EN:PDF> (retrieved 10 January 2009). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Oceans Policy:  A Canadian Case Study* 
 
Camille Mageau,** David L. VanderZwaag, and Susan Farlinger 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Over the years, Canada, like most other coastal nations, has developed 
an intricate set of policies and regulatory instruments focused on the 
management of traditional sectoral uses of the oceans. A decade ago, 
the necessary steps were taken to modernise the way in which Canadian 
authorities manage ocean-based activities. Canada did not set out to design 
“one” comprehensive, all inclusive oceans policy. The primary approach taken 
was to identify, through Canada’s Oceans Act,1 one federal lead authority 
responsible for the coordination and harmonisation of existing policy and 
statutory instruments and to formulate a national vision and guiding principles 
for oceans management within which existing and emerging policies and laws 
would be interpreted and implemented.  
This chapter outlines Canada’s statutory and policy instruments and 
implementation approach to oceans management. The political and 
environmental context within which a new management approach was 
developed will be described as well as the processes which led to the 
development of the Oceans Act, its policy framework, Canada’s Oceans 
Strategy2 and finally, the Government of Canada’s blueprint for action, 
Canada’s Oceans Action Plan.3 The relationship between key ocean-related 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is an updated version of a chapter expected to appear in B. Cecin-Sain, 
M. Balgos and D. L. VanderZwaag, eds, Integrated National and Regional Ocean Policies: 
Comparative Practices and Future Prospects (United Nations University Press, forthcoming). 
**
 The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of 
Canada. 
1
 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31. 
2
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Ottawa: 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc_e.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 
2008). 
3
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan for Present and Future 
Generations (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Communications Branch, 2005), available: 
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agreements and Canadian domestic law and practice is summarised. In closing, 
lessons learned during the past decade will be examined, as will the challenges 
which lie ahead.  
 
 
4.2. Ocean Policy Context, Processes and Institutional Arrangements  
 
4.2.1. Basic Information 
 
Canada is a maritime nation which borders on the North Pacific, the Arctic and 
the North Atlantic oceans, with marine areas covering a broad range of ocean 
climactic and oceanographic environments. Canada’s current ocean regions 
total almost three million square kilometres,4 and this will likely increase 
significantly once the extended continental shelf is delimited through the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) process.5 
Eight out of the ten provinces and all three territories border on oceans, 
and approximately 24 percent of Canada’s population inhabits the coastal zone 
along a coastline which is one of the longest in the world at about 245,000 
kilometres.6 The oceans provide the recreational, environmental, employment, 
income, and cultural staples to over seven million Canadians who live in coastal 
communities.7 
Challenges in coastal and marine environments are recognised by 
governments worldwide. Canada has, in the past, defined itself as a fishing and 
shipping nation, with a long history and culture based on the rich productivity 
and diversity of its ocean resources. With the emergence of a number of other 
ocean-related industries, many of which vie for access to the same ocean space, 
the footprint of each industry and that of the sum of these activities have taken 
their toll on the environment resulting in: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/oap-pao/index_e.asp> (retrieved 14 Novem-
ber 2008). 
4
 World Resources Institute (WRI), Earth Trends – The Environmental Information Portal. 
Country Profiles, Canada (2004), available: <http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_ 
profiles/coa_cou_124.pdf> (retrieved 14 November 2008) [hereinafter WRI]. 
5
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
reprinted in I.L.M. 21(6): 1261–1354 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
6
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Oceans Management,” (n.d.), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/index_e.asp> (retrieved 15 November 2008). 
7
 WRI, n. 4 above. 
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• failing oceans health, including declining fish stocks, increasing 
numbers of marine species at risk and invasive species, 
declining biodiversity, and marine habitat loss; 
• growing oceans user conflicts and administrative, jurisdictional and 
regulatory complexities; and,  
• an oceans industry sector that is significantly weaker than its potential.  
 
The marine areas that border Canada are vastly different from one 
another. The Pacific coast of Canada is characterised by a relatively narrow 
continental shelf about 50 kilometres in width and a very indented coastal area 
of bays, fjords with inlets, wetlands, and estuaries. In addition to shipping, and 
aboriginal, recreational and commercial fishing activities, the dominant 
industries include ecotourism, with an increasing focus on aquaculture in some 
areas of the coast.  
The Atlantic coast has a much wider continental shelf. Offshore areas 
have traditionally supported extensive and varied fishing, marine transportation 
activities and, increasingly, initiatives related to oil and gas, ecotourism and 
aquaculture.  
The Arctic marine area along the northern coast of Canada and its 
archipelago is characterised by a broad shallow shelf and land fast ice. 
Transportation activities in the Arctic are largely seasonal and predominantly 
community re-supply oriented. Land mining, oil and gas exploration, 
ecotourism, and subsistence harvesting all contribute to the marine-based 
northern economy.  
 Canada still has unresolved ocean boundaries.8 In the Arctic, the offshore 
boundary in the Beaufort Sea between Alaska and the Yukon remains in 
dispute, while Canada and Greenland (Denmark) have yet to settle the 
boundary in the Lincoln Sea. On the Pacific coast, Canada has maritime 
boundary issues with the United States in the Dixon Entrance region (British 
Columbia – Alaska) and seaward of the Juan de Fuca Strait (British Columbia – 
Washington). In the Gulf of Maine, on the Atlantic coast, Canada and the 
United States continue to dispute the ownership of Machias Seal Island in the 
Bay of Fundy and jurisdiction over adjacent waters.9 
Over the last 15 years, the oceans have been a dynamic growth sector for 
the Canadian economy, and currently generate over CAD22 billion (2002 
estimate) directly through ocean-related industries. Commercial fishing 
                                                 
8
 D. L. VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine Environmental Protection: Charting a Legal Course 
Towards Sustainable Development (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995). 
9
 T. L. McDorman, P. M. Saunders, and D. L. VanderZwaag, “The Gulf of Maine Boundary: 
Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course?” Marine Policy 9, no. 2 (1985): 90–107. 
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continues to make an annual contribution to Canada’s oceans economy totalling 
CAD2 billion (harvest value), supplemented by a further CAD1 billion from the 
fish processing industry. Employment in aquaculture has grown by over 460 
percent, and the value of fish farm production has increased by more than 500 
percent. Offshore oil and gas production has increased in annual investment 
value over the past decade from CAD250 million to CAD5 billion. 
Employment in the offshore oil and gas sector now represents 4.0 percent of the 
overall oceans industry compared to past levels of 0.3 percent. Considerable 
renewable energy resources such as offshore wind, wave and tidal energy have 
been identified on all three of Canada’s coasts and initial projects are 
currently in early development in both British Columbia and the Bay of Fundy. 
Recreation and tourism have grown by over 33 percent in the past decade 
despite a drop in the number of recreational anglers. There has been major 
growth in both coastal tourism (156 percent) and cruise ship tourism (176 
percent in the number of passengers); and although tourism still remains a 
relatively small contributor to the oceans economy, it is increasing in its 
significance. As a maritime nation, Canada has a significant and vibrant 
shipping industry.  CAD143.7 billion worth of goods and commodities moved 
through Canada’s national marine transportation system in 2006.10 
Aboriginal communities have the longest history of coastal occupancy. 
Coastal aboriginal cultures are tied to ocean resources for food, social, and 
ceremonial reasons. Commerce between First Nations, and after contact 
between aboriginal communities and Europeans, were often based on oceans 
activities or resources.  
Canada is a confederation of ten provinces and three northern territories. 
Federal jurisdiction extends to marine navigation and shipping, international 
affairs, defence, environmental protection, as well as the protection of living 
resources within offshore areas.11 Provinces, the sub-national authorities within 
Canada, may also exert jurisdiction over some offshore waters. In general, 
provinces own and manage the seabed within the coastal inter-tidal area. 
Provinces have constitutional authority over property and civil rights within the 
province pursuant to section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.12 Canadian 
case law has recognised two legal foundations for provincial offshore 
jurisdiction, marine areas considered inter fauces terrae (between the jaws of 
                                                 
10
 Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2007, An Overview (Ottawa: Minister of Public 
Works and Government Services, 2007), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/ 
anre2007/index.html> (retrieved 21 November 2008). 
11
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the Federal Government in the Oceans Sector 
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 1997). 
12
 Constitution Act, 1987 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
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land) and marine areas considered to be part of a province at the time of 
confederation.13 
Management of activities within Canadian marine waters has developed 
on a sector or regional basis and is therefore diverse and lacks a cohesive 
approach. For example, there are ten major and 13 minor federal agencies that 
have mandates that impact on oceans. There are roughly 50 federal statutes 
directly impacting ocean-related activities and more than 80 provincial laws 
that affect coastal and marine planning.14 
In addition to this legislated division of power, Canada sets as a high 
priority its constitutional obligations to Aboriginal peoples. The Constitution 
Act, 1982 recognises and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights.15 Where 
land claim agreements have been settled, and include specific resource 
management responsibilities and commitments by the federal government to 
cooperate and collaborate with the signatories, the situation is clear. In many 
cases, however, claims which may impact on ocean areas have not yet been 
settled, and interim arrangements which do not prejudice the outcomes of land 
claims discussions are in place, being developed, or needed.16 
The Oceans Act contains an explicit provision to provide certainty that it 
does not abrogate or derogate from existing aboriginal and treaty rights.17 This 
provision sets out the framework for the relationship of Oceans Act 
programmes and activities with Aboriginal peoples.  While integrated planning 
and the development of marine protected areas are without prejudice to rights 
and title, the involvement and support of Aboriginal peoples is clearly required 
where their interests are potentially affected. Many coastal communities, of and 
by themselves, have large Aboriginal populations and in some areas, specific 
arrangements respecting harvesting and co-management have been made with 
aboriginal authorities.  
The importance of the oceans to the federal, provincial, First Nations, 
municipal, and local communities, stakeholders, and interest groups requires 
engagement of these interests in setting priorities and planning oceans 
activities. It is this context that informed the development of an Oceans Act. 
The federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is the lead 
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 Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia, 1 S.C.R. 388 [1984]. 
14
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the Provincial and Territorial Governments in the 
Oceans Sector (Ottawa: Oceans Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1997). 
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 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
16
 C. R. Brown, C. Rebecca, and J. I. Reynolds, “Aboriginal Title to Sea Spaces: 
A Comparative Study,” University of British Columbia Law Review 37, no. 2 (2004): 449–493; 
D. J. R. Moodie, “Aboriginal Maritime Title in Nova Scotia: An “Extravagant and Absurd 
Idea’?” University of British Columbia Law Review 37, no. 2 (2004): 495–540. 
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 Oceans Act, n. 1 above, s. 2.1. 
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federal agency responsible for the coordination of both domestic and 
international oceans policy. This mandate is in addition to more traditional 
marine responsibilities related to the management of aboriginal, commercial 
and recreational fisheries, marine safety and communication, environmental 
response, and the provision of marine scientific advice and research.  
 
 
4.2.2. Brief Overview of Nature and Evolution of National Oceans Policy 
 
Although the development of a national oceans policy and legislation was first 
proposed in 1987,18 the first steps towards the elaboration of a national oceans 
policy for Canada were taken when the Government of Canada, in 1996, 
enacted the Oceans Act. This statute formalises, in a comprehensive way, how 
Canada’s oceans are to be defined and managed. 
The Oceans Act lays the foundation for the oceans policy by committing 
to a number of principles and is structured to delineate the geographic area over 
which Canada intends to apply its ocean management approach.19 The Act 
defines the guiding principles of integrated management, sustainable 
development, and the precautionary approach, provides the mandate to develop 
and implement programmes to implement these principles, and situates DFO’s 
existing regulatory and management authorities within the context of oceans 
management. The Act also recognises other mandated authorities and provides 
guidance on how their mandates should be delivered within the marine 
environment.  
The development and review of the Oceans Act, through the public and 
parliamentary processes, was complemented by a broad public consultation 
process which led to Canada’s Oceans Strategy, the over-arching oceans policy 
framework for the integrated management of Canada’s oceans.20 During the 
five years immediately following the proclamation of the Oceans Act, the ocean 
management programmes outlined in the statute were piloted in the field to 
better define the policy guidance required and inform the development of the 
federal Oceans Action Plan. 
Flowing from the political commitment in the October 2004 Speech from 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Policy for Canada: A Strategy to Meet the Challenges 
and Opportunities on the Oceans Frontier (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Information 
and Publications Branch, 1987). 
19
 Oceans Act, n. 1 above, ss. 28–30. 
20
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans: Experience and Practices, Monograph No. 
7, Sustainable Development in Canada Series (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1999). 
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the Throne and the 2005 Budget Speech,21 Canada’s Oceans Action Plan 
outlines and funds priority areas for action under four major themes, namely: 
international leadership, sovereignty, and security; integrated oceans 
management for sustainable development; health of the oceans; and science and 
technology.22 As part of the National Water Strategy, the federal budget, on 19 
March 2007, proposed CAD19 million over two years to support the Health of 
the Oceans, which will further support sustainable development, management 
and protection of ocean resources, and water quality.23 
 
 
4.2.3. Policy Development Processes 
 
In Canada, the development of an oceans policy has been, and continues to be, 
an evolutionary process. In 1994, the National Advisory Board on Science and 
Technology (NABST), following extensive public consultations, recommended 
to the prime minister that Canada move decisively to address environmental 
issues confronting oceanic areas and maximise the economic benefits that could 
be derived by managing ocean resources more sustainably.24 Specific 
recommendations focused on the need to develop a national policy as well as 
legislation focused on the management of ocean and coastal spaces and 
resources.  
Although similar calls had been made in the past, there was, at this time, 
a convergence of domestic and international fishing and pollution issues, 
primarily in the North Atlantic, that served to focus public, as well as political, 
interest.25 As a result of this heightened profile, drafting of a comprehensive 
Oceans Act was initiated and the act came into force on 31 January 1997.  
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 Government of Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-
Eighth Parliament of Canada (Ottawa: Prime Minister’s Office, 5 October 2004), available: 
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/38-1-e.html> (retrieved 13 Nov-
ember 2008); Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Speech 2005 (Ottawa: Department of 
Finance Canada, 2005), available: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/ speeche.pdf> (retrieved 
14 November 2008). 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 3 above, p. 5. 
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 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Speech 2007 (Ottawa: Department of Finance 
Canada, 2007), available: <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2007/pdf/speeche.pdf> (retrieved 12 Nov-
ember 2008).  
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 National Advisory Board on Science and Technology (NABST), Opportunities from our 
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25
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4.2.3.1. The Oceans Act 
 
The Oceans Act is comprised of three parts, which provide the necessary 
infrastructure to move forward with a modern oceans governance framework. 
Part One of the Act recognises Canada’s maritime zones and commits the 
Government of Canada to meeting its conservation and management 
responsibilities within these marine areas. Consistent with the terms of the LOS 
Convention, Canada has defined its territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone, and continental shelf excluding the outermost extent. Canada is 
in the process of delimiting the outer extent of the continental shelf and intends 
to make a submission to the UN Commission for the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf by the required deadline in 2013.26 
Part Two of the Act provides the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans with 
specific policy and programme authorities to implement Canada’s approach to 
oceans management in estuarine, coastal, and marine ecosystems. Section 29 of 
the Oceans Act provides for the development of a national strategy, Canada’s 
Oceans Strategy, which constitutes the policy framework for modern oceans 
management and serves as guidance for the development and updating of 
sector-based policies and processes. The Act calls upon the minister to develop 
this strategy in collaboration with federal colleagues, provincial and territorial 
governments, affected aboriginal organisations, coastal communities, and other 
persons and bodies, including those bodies established under land claims 
agreements. Finally, the Act includes provisions for the development of three 
specific programme areas: 1) marine protected areas; 2) marine environmental 
quality; and 3) integrated management plans. These programmes are the key 
tools to implement the national ocean policy objectives: understanding and 
protecting the marine environment, supporting sustainable economic 
opportunities, and international leadership. 
Part Three of the Oceans Act sets out the accountabilities for the Act. It 
identifies the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans as the lead federal authority 
responsible for oceans management within Canada and situates the existing 
resource management, scientific, hydrographic, coast guard, and other 
responsibilities of the department within an oceans management context. 
                                                                                                                                  
Chapter 1 Fisheries and Oceans Canada – Canada’s Oceans Management Strategy (Ottawa: 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2005), available: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/ 
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Following adoption of the Oceans Act, DFO re-allocated modest funds to 
support the implementation of the Act through a series of pilot projects and the 
development of Canada’s Oceans Strategy in consultation with Canadians.27 
Pilot projects were selected based on feasibility criteria, including the 
complexity of the ocean issues involved, the receptivity of potential partners, 
the level of scientific information available, and the conservation imperatives of 
the area. Projects included the identification of areas of interest for marine 
protected areas, and the announcement of several pilot marine protected areas, 
such as the Sable Gully and Endeavour Hot Vents in 1998.28 Pilot integrated 
management initiatives were also established in the area of the Eastern Scotian 
Shelf (ESSIM) in 1998, the Beaufort Sea in 2000, and the Pacific North Coast 
of British Columbia (PCIMA) in 2001.29 The pilot integrated management and 
marine protected areas projects provided lessons with respect to policy 
integration, the building of relationships, the development of the governance 
structures, and related arrangements. 
The policy development process continued its course with two public 
engagement and consultation processes. The first was focused on the vision for 
the Oceans Act.30 The other focussed on a structured consultation on Canada’s 
Oceans Strategy and was designed to solicit federal, provincial, First Nations, 
and public input. Over a period of five years, DFO engaged the views and 
perspectives of Canadians by supporting a wide range of discussions, 
workshops, and consultation activities across the country. 
 
 
4.2.3.2. Canada’s Oceans Strategy 
 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy and its companion Integrated Management and 
Operational Framework were released in 2002 following formal federal, 
provincial, territorial, aboriginal, and public consultations.31 Presented to 
Cabinet, the Oceans Strategy received government endorsement and became 
the basis upon which federal activities were to be conducted in marine waters.  
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 2 above. 
28
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Statement by David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada: Announcement on Offshore Marine Protected Areas (Ottawa: Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada, 8 December 1998). 
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 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, n. 25 above. 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, A Vision for Ocean Management, Ministerial Vision Paper 
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1994). 
31
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 2 above; Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Policy and 
Operational Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine 
Environments in Canada (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002). 
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The release of the Canada’s Oceans Strategy as a policy of the 
Government of Canada set out the achievement of its objectives as a shared 
responsibility for all federal departments with an oceans mandate.32 
The following fundamental principles are set out in the Oceans Act and 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy: 
 
• Integrated Management: plan and manage human activities impacting 
on oceans in a comprehensive fashion while considering all factors 
necessary for the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources 
and the shared use of ocean space. 
• Sustainable Development: integrate social, economic, and 
environmental aspects of decision making. 
• Precautionary Approach: err on the side of caution in making 
management decisions. 
 
Integrated management is a spatially-based planning process that results 
in common understanding of ecosystem and human activity objectives on the 
part of regulators, stakeholders, and interested parties and the production of an 
“integrated management plan” for a geographic area.33 The plan provides 
a framework to conduct activities and to develop and implement integrated and 
adaptive management strategies and actions. The plans are based on the 
recognition that integrated management planning must occur in an ecosystem 
context for the decisions to be environmentally sound and ocean activities 
sustainable.  
Canada’s Oceans Strategy commits the government to work 
collaboratively within the federal government and among levels of government, 
to share responsibility for achieving common objectives, and to engage 
Canadians in ocean-related decisions in which they have a stake.34 Integrated 
management planning includes the establishment of institutional governance 
mechanisms as a cornerstone of the national oceans approach. This integration 
is not limited to policies and legislative authorities that oversee the management 
of oceans activities; its primary focus is planning and managing activities on 
a geographic basis.  
Integration is required to achieve sustainable development, which in itself 
requires that conservation issues be addressed and that economic diversification 
and multiple uses be recognised as legitimate objectives to be striven for. 
                                                 
32
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 2 above, p. 18. 
33
 B. Cicin-Sain and R. W. Knight, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and 
Practices (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998). 
34
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 2 above, pp. 18–20. 
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The ability to adapt management decisions to reflect new scientific and 
technical developments, changing economic and social objectives, and to 
respond to positive or negative environmental responses, is key to achieving the 
principles of integrated management and sustainable development. 
The precautionary approach should be followed as part of the decision-
making process for integrated management. When there is a risk of serious or 
irreversible harm and there is significant scientific uncertainty, then decisions 
and management options will err on the side of caution. Within the context of 
oceans management, application of the precautionary principle is inextricably 
linked to two other concepts, an ecosystem-based and science-based approach 
to decision making.35 
The ecosystem-based approach relies on the identification of ecosystem 
objectives that, together with social and economic objectives, form the basis for 
integrated management planning and related decision making. These ecosystem 
objectives are based on an assessment of ecological information and an 
evaluation of the risk posed to ecosystem structure and function based on both 
available information and uncertainties. In this way, the risks of uncertainty are 
incorporated into decisions and are managed into the future through adaptive 
management. 
 
 
4.2.4. Institutional Arrangements and Processes Used 
 
Following prime ministerial acceptance of the recommendation by NABST’s 
Committee on Oceans and Coasts (1994) that Canada formulate an overall 
oceans policy framework and develop ocean-focused legislation,36 a ministerial 
vision paper on oceans management was released.37 Public comments on the 
vision paper served to form the basis of the draft legislation. While 
parliamentary procedures do not allow for public review of draft legislation, 
information sessions outlining the intent of the legislation were held. 
The normal parliamentary consultation procedures, which involve formal 
publication of draft legislation by the House of Commons, as well as targeted 
consultations with affected parties, were conducted. Witnesses to the 
                                                 
35
 D. Cobb, M. Kislalioglu Berkes, and F. Berkes, “Ecosystem-based management and marine 
environmental quality indicators in northern Canada,” in F. Berkes, R. Huebert, H. Fast, 
M. Manseau, and A. Diduck, eds., Breaking Ice: Renewable Resource and Ocean Management 
in the Canadian North (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005): 71–94. 
36
 NABST, n. 24 above. 
37
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 30 above. 
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parliamentary review process, including potentially affected stakeholders, 
environmental non-government organisations, Aboriginal peoples, coastal 
communities, and academics, broadened the scope of the Act. 
DFO also led the development of Canada’s Oceans Strategy, 
incorporating the lessons learned from the pilot application of the Oceans Act 
programme and the views expressed during public engagement processes. 
Policy development entailed consulting a range of governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders and using different mechanisms to connect with 
sub-national and aboriginal authorities and the academic community. Since 
1997, DFO has engaged the views and perspectives of Canadians by supporting 
a wide range of discussions, workshops, and consultation activities across the 
country. These activities include the public discussion document, “Towards 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy”38; an interactive website (http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/index_e.asp); public opinion polls and research; 
an international Oceans Stewardship Conference39; international workshops on 
integrated management; cross-country consultation sessions; the establishment 
and use of a Minister’s Advisory Council on Oceans40; and a national oceans 
discussion series in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
and the International Oceans Institute of Canada.41 Bilateral meetings were 
conducted with key national stakeholders including environmental non-
governmental organisations and the main aboriginal organisations. 
The development of a national oceans policy, therefore, involved a mix of 
legislation, policy development, pilot projects, and relationship building. While 
legislation and policy development take place at the national level in federal 
departments such as DFO, coordination and collaboration are required at many 
levels to create the environment and tools to implement such a horizontal 
collaborative initiative. Governance arrangements and processes are described 
below and Table 4.1 gives an indication of the complexity of these 
relationships. 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Toward Canada’s Oceans Strategy,” Discussion Paper 
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1997). 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Partnerships for Living Oceans,” Canadian Oceans 
Stewardship Conference Report, 6–8 June 2001, Vancouver, British Columbia (Ottawa: Oceans 
Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2001). 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Thibault Appoints Two New Members to Minister’s Advisory 
Council on Oceans,” News Release (Ottawa, 10 December 2002). 
41
 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), “Oceans Explorations 2001: Learning From Our 
Oceans” (IDEAS, CBC Radio One, 2001), available: <http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/features/ 
oceans> (retrieved 10 November 2008) [hereinafter CBC]. 
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Table 4.1. National, sub-national and local oceans governance structures and 
agreements  
 
Examples of Governance Structures 
 National Sub-National Local 
Examples of 
Agreements 
International 
 
Membership in 
international 
committees, 
councils and science 
organisations, 
including regional 
fisheries 
management 
organisations,  
Arctic Council, 
Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-
operation (APEC), 
International 
Maritime 
Organization, 
Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic 
Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Other 
government 
departments 
(OGD) 
   
Deputy ministers’ 
committee 
Support committees  
Sub-national 
implementation 
committees 
OGD 
planning or 
regulatory 
processes 
National 
Marine 
Protected Area 
Strategy 
Provinces 
and 
territories 
 
Canadian Council of 
Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
Ministers’ 
Oceans Task Group  
  
ESSIM Regional 
Oceans Management 
Committee 
 
Lead on 
coastal 
planning 
Canada/British 
Columbia 
MOU  
 
Canada/ 
Quebec St. 
Lawrence 
Action Plan 
Aboriginal  
organisations   
  
 
 
 
   
Co-management 
bodies established 
pursuant to 
Inuvialuit Final 
Land Claims 
Agreement directly 
involved in Beaufort 
Sea ocean 
management 
planning bodies 
Planning 
process/ 
traditional 
ecological 
knowledge 
consultation 
Turning Point 
Agreement 
(British 
Columbia-First 
Nations 
agreement 
relating to 
Pacific North 
Coast LOMA) 
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Stakeholders 
Local 
communities 
 
Sub-National 
Implementation 
Committees 
Advisory/Planning 
Process   
Industry 
stakeholders 
 
Sub-national 
implementation 
committees 
Advisory/planning 
process 
 
 
Ocean 
Management 
Research 
Network  
 
Canadian 
Association of 
Petroleum 
Producers 
/draft seismic 
regulations 
Oceans 
interest 
groups 
 
Sub-national 
implementation 
committees 
Advisory/planning 
process 
  Membership 
on Canadian 
delegations 
 
A Minister’s Advisory Council on Oceans was established in September 
2000 for a three-year term to provide advice on ocean management policy 
issues and to help engage the public and private sectors in issues related to 
oceans management.42 The council consisted of nine individuals from diverse 
backgrounds representing a range of interest groups, including Aboriginal 
peoples, industry members and academics.43 As such, the council was 
instrumental in increasing public understanding and awareness of the nature 
and intent of Canada’s ocean management approach. 
In 2001, federal, provincial and territorial ministers agreed that an Oceans 
Task Group would be established under the aegis of the Canadian Council of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers to help develop and implement Canada’s 
Oceans Strategy.44 This task group continues to provide a forum for federal-
provincial issues on oceans management with its work guided by an annual 
workplan approved by ministerial council.  
Further, to foster the scientific understanding necessary to support ocean 
management policy, and to bridge the gap between natural and social sciences, 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 40 above. 
43
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Members of the Minister’s Advisory Council on Oceans 
(MACO),” Backgrounder (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, September 2000). 
44
 Canadian Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers, “Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Ministers Make Progress in Key Areas,” News Release Ref: 830-729/04 (Toronto: Canadian 
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS), 20 September 2001), available: 
<http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo01/83072904_e.html> (retrieved 12 November 2008). 
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an Ocean Management Research Network (OMRN) was established as a joint 
initiative between the Social Science and Humanities Research Council 
(SSHRC) and DFO in 2001. The OMRN has created a national network of 
interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral research working groups to create 
knowledge and best practices for sustainable oceans management.45  
To aid federal government coordination and input to ocean policy 
development, a system of interdepartmental committees on oceans was 
established at the deputy minister, assistant deputy minister, and programme 
levels. Four interdepartmental working groups were also formed to focus on the 
four “pillars” set out in Canada’s Oceans Action Plan, namely, international 
leadership, sovereignty and security; integrated oceans management for 
sustainable development; health of the oceans; and oceans science and 
technology.46   
The call to advance modern ocean management in the Speech from the 
Throne in 2004 and the 2005 Budget Speech,47 and the designation by the 
prime minister of a parliamentary secretary to support implementation of the 
Oceans Action Plan provided the high-level profile and the political pressure 
necessary to secure the funding needed for a government-wide initiative.48 This 
resulted in the Oceans Action Plan (2005–2007). In 2007, the government 
further committed five years of funding to specific elements of the broad 
oceans agenda, namely, Health of the Oceans, a CAD61.5 million initiative 
comprised of 22 specific components being carried out by five partnered federal 
departments/agencies.49 
Overall, the various governance mechanisms and agreements have been 
effective in developing a policy framework and action plan that reflects a range 
of stakeholder interests. These initiatives have been endorsed at the highest 
levels of government.  
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 Ocean Management Research Network, “Review and Update from the National Secretariat: 
Network News” (Oceans Management Research Network, June 2004), available: 
<http://www.omrn.ca/eng_about.html> (retrieved 20 January 2007). 
46
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Performance Report for the Period ending March 31, 2004” 
(Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada, 2004), available: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/03-
04/FO-PO/FO-POd34_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
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 Government of Canada, n. 21 above; Department of Finance Canada, n. 21 above. 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 46 above. 
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4.3. Nature of the Policy and Legislation Established  
 
4.3.1. Nature of the Resulting Policy 
 
The Oceans Act is enabling legislation, designed to provide the Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans with the responsibility of focusing current federal 
legislative and policy tools to increase the linkages among and overall 
effectiveness of federal government efforts in specific geographic areas.50 This 
collaborative aspect of the legislation is the most challenging to implement in 
that willing partners are needed to advance ocean management. 
Intergovernmental agreements have been required, as well as negotiations with 
industry and aboriginal authorities. Implementation of Oceans Act programmes 
have moved at different paces in different areas, with more rapid progress 
achieved in ocean management areas where existing collaborative mechanisms 
were already in place. As lead and facilitator, DFO has had to concentrate on 
building the relationships while at the same time developing the science-based 
tools and fostering the governance arrangements needed to incorporate the 
values and interests of others.  
The Oceans Act and the oceans policy framework do not supersede nor 
fetter other policies or statutes, but provide context within which other ocean-
related mandates should operate. On this basis, both the Act and Canada’s 
Oceans Strategy provide the broad framework to guide further federal policy 
development to work with other levels of government and provide new context 
within which to interpret older policies. Together, they provide the principles 
and key tools to implement modern oceans governance, within which existing 
policies and statutes, and traditional relationships between regulators and their 
traditional “clients,” may operate. As the guiding principles such as precaution 
and adaptive management are interpreted and utilised in integrated management 
planning, they will be integrated into new sectoral policies. Since the building 
blocks of Canada’s oceans policy framework, and the associated 
implementation programmes, are solidly anchored on precaution, ecosystem-
based management, and sustainable development, these principles are by 
definition imbedded in decisions that will be taken within the integrated 
management planning areas.  
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4.3.2. Implementation of Principles 
 
In Canada, an ecologically-based framework to guide the development of 
integrated management plans has been developed. The integrated management 
planning framework extends from the large to the small scale, i.e., from large 
ocean management areas (LOMAs) to coastal management areas (CMAs). 
The Canadian approach to integrated management recognises that management 
objectives and planning practices must reflect the fact that ecosystems nest 
within other ecosystems. Governance structures, practices, and decisions 
respecting resource and activities management are made with explicit 
consideration of ecosystem impact. As such, the precautionary approach is built 
into integrated management through the identification of ecosystem objectives 
that activities must respect within specified planning areas. A brief review of 
Canada’s incorporation of the principles of ecosystem-based management, 
integrated management, the precautionary approach, and public participation 
and community-based management follows. 
 
 
4.3.2.1. Ecosystem-based Management  
 
The Preamble of the Oceans Act states that “conservation, based on 
an ecosystem approach, is of fundamental importance to maintaining biological 
diversity and productivity in the marine environment.” An ecosystem-based 
approach to management recognises that human activities must be managed in 
consideration of the inter-relationships between organisms, their habitats, and 
the physical environment, based on the best science available. The Act further 
holds that human activities should be managed such that marine ecosystems, 
their structure (e.g., biological diversity), function (e.g., productivity), and 
overall environmental quality (e.g., water and habitat quality) are not 
compromised and are maintained at appropriate temporal and spatial scales. It 
is in these key areas that ecosystem objectives will be set for each of the 
integrated management areas.51  
Significant domestic and international efforts have been invested in 
making this principle operational.52 In 2001, Canada held a scientific workshop 
to develop a preliminary framework which had conservation of species and 
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 B. Cicin-Sain, ed., “The Role of Indicators in Integrated Coastal Management, Special issue,” 
Oceans and Coastal Management 46, n. 3–4 (2003). 
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 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), A Reference Guide on the Use of 
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habitats and the sustainability of human use as the two over-arching 
objectives.53 Work has continued in Canada, and internationally, to further 
refine the initial objectives identified at this meeting. Three over-arching 
ecosystem objectives have been identified: maintain populations, species and 
communities within bounds of natural variability; conserve the function of each 
component of the ecosystem so that it can play its natural role in the food web; 
and conserve the physical and chemical properties of the ecosystem.54 This 
work has resulted in the development of a process and tools to apply 
ecosystem-based management to decision making within Canada’s LOMAs.  
Figure 4.1 outlines the process used in Canada to apply an ecosystem-
based approach to integrated oceans management. Implementation of 
ecosystem-based management begins with the identification of marine 
ecoregions that are based on ecological features and functions.55 Existing 
scientific and traditional information on the state and condition of the 
ecosystem bound within the planning area is then collected, and a science-based 
review of that information and an evaluation of the risks posed to ecosystem 
structure and function are conducted. As a result of the review and evaluation 
of known scientific information, ecologically and biologically significant areas, 
ecologically and biologically significant species, and community properties, as 
well as degraded areas and depleted species of special concern, are identified.56 
Priority ecosystem-based conservation objectives and limits are defined within 
these ecoregions. Management decisions and the choice of management 
measures adopted are informed by the conservation objectives.57   
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Figure 4.1. Development of ecosystem-based management objectives to support 
integrated management (IM) planning 
 
 
Source: Oceans Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Ottawa, April 2009. 
 
It is important to reiterate that integrated management is a means to 
achieve an end—the sustainable management of ocean resources and spaces. 
For this reason, Canada’s integrated management processes are designed to 
initially identify conservation objectives which must be respected by any 
activity wishing to operate in the planning area if the ecosystem is to continue 
to function and sustain the pressures of resource extraction and other ocean 
uses. Once the “conservation limits” are defined, the Canadian integrated 
management process focuses on the identification of social, cultural, and 
economic objectives or desirable targets that sub-national and local 
governments, stakeholders, and the public wish to achieve in the planning area. 
Ecosystem considerations are being incorporated into fisheries 
management policies, plans, and practices. For example, in Canadian waters 
where relatively unique and highly sensitive marine ecosystems are known to 
exist, and where there is scientific evidence that fishing practices are having a 
long-term adverse effect on the ecosystem, action has been taken to mitigate 
these effects through the application of management measures. These measures 
include: 
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• fishing gear modifications, mesh and hook size considerations, and 
other measures to ensure that fishing practices conform to specific 
habitat conservation requirements 
• application of seasonal and area fishing closures if impacts cannot be 
mitigated 
• establishment of marine protected areas where long-term protection 
measures cannot be adequately addressed through fishing closures and 
other measures 
• monitoring of the area for compliance and management effectiveness 
 
However, ecosystems do not respect political or administrative 
boundaries. As a result, it has been important to give effect to the concept of 
collaborative planning and management systems. Domestic decision making 
across ecosystems will be connected by the participation of federal, provincial, 
territorial, aboriginal, and local authorities and programmes. The minister has 
the option to use bilateral agreements with provinces/territories and co-
management arrangements with aboriginal groups to implement and achieve 
ecosystem objectives. For example, in 2004, the governments of Canada and 
British Columbia signed a Memorandum of Understanding Respecting the 
Implementation of Canada’s Oceans Strategy on the Pacific Coast of Canada, 
with a commitment to develop sub-agreements focused on integrated 
management, marine protected areas, and information sharing.58 In the Arctic, 
the Beaufort Sea Integrated Management Planning Initiative (BSIMPI) is 
guided by the Senior Management Committee, a collaborative body composed 
of representatives from government, aboriginal, and industry stakeholder 
groups.59 
Ecosystem-based management objectives for large oceans management 
areas are set at an ecosystem or broad ecoregion scale. Integrated management 
planning units, and sectoral management plans nested within these areas, do not 
necessarily correspond to an entire ecoregion. Consequently, the Oceans Act 
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provides the authority to set marine environmental quality guidelines, 
requirements and standards which can be specific to one particular planning 
area, but which complement the broader scale ecosystem objectives.60 
Monitoring programmes tied to the ecoregion-level ecosystem objectives and 
the marine environmental quality targets linked to specific management plans 
provide a mechanism for tracking change over time and triggering management 
action. 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Integrated Management  
 
Recognising that integration must carry over to the planning of conservation 
areas as well, the Oceans Act calls for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to 
lead and coordinate the development and implementation of a national system 
of marine protected areas on behalf of the Government of Canada.61 Three 
federal agencies, DFO, Parks Canada, and Environment Canada, are mandated 
to establish federal marine protected areas, and provincial authorities also are 
active in protecting areas within their areas of jurisdiction.62 To maximise the 
effectiveness of federal intervention, and ensure that the appropriate tools are 
being used, DFO, in collaboration with other federal departments, has 
developed a Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy to achieve a national 
network of marine protected areas.63 Efforts to achieve a similar network with 
provincial authorities are focused on the development of federal-provincial 
collaboration agreements and their direct involvement in the five integrated 
management priority areas within which ecologically and biologically sensitive 
areas are being identified.  
As part of the Oceans Action Plan, implementation of integrated 
management is focused in five priority geographic areas where mandated 
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federal, provincial, territorial, and aboriginal authorities are working 
cooperatively to develop integrated ocean management plans. These priority 
integrated management areas are Placentia Bay/Grand Banks off 
Newfoundland, the Scotian Shelf off Nova Scotia, the Beaufort Sea in the 
western Arctic, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the Pacific North Coast, or Queen 
Charlotte Basin, off British Columbia (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Priority integrated management planning areas  
 
 
Source: Oceans Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Ottawa, April 2009. 
 
Activities undertaken within each of the planning areas include the 
assessment and overview of the state of health of marine ecosystems, which 
provide mandated authorities and stakeholders with information on marine and 
coastal ecosystems, and recommendations to support planning and management 
decisions. In collaboration with the Geological Survey of Canada, DFO is 
mapping the seabed to better characterise benthic habitats, define bottom 
communities, and support identification of the most appropriate management 
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actions.64 Areas, species, and community properties in need of special 
management and/or conservation measures have also been identified, as have 
degraded areas and depleted species. Governance arrangements to foster 
federal, provincial, territorial, and aboriginal collaboration have been 
established as have fora to engage citizens and stakeholders.  
While some of these activities were already well advanced in some of the 
priority LOMAs due to previous federal investments and efforts, the influx of 
additional funds and the strict accountability attached to the special budget 
allocations have ensured implementation of Oceans Action Plan initiatives 
within a prescribed period of time. The Eastern Scotian Shelf is well advanced 
with the final draft of the ESSIM Integrated Ocean Management Plan released 
in July 2006.65 In the other priority LOMAs of the Pacific North Coast, the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence, the Placentia Bay/Grand Banks, and Beaufort Sea, ecosystem 
overview report and assessments are complete.  Ecologically and biologically 
significant areas, species, and properties have also been identified and priority 
conservation objectives formulated. 
Integrated management is more than the development of spatially-based 
management plans. Effective management requires integration at a variety of 
levels. There are numerous examples of spatial integration where efforts 
between provincial authorities, responsible for land-based issues and inter-tidal 
seabed, and federal authorities, responsible for overlying waters and resources, 
are being coordinated to establish the necessary protection measures on land 
and in coastal waters to achieve the objectives of coastal marine protected 
areas. For example, coastal sand dunes adjacent to the Basin Head Marine 
Protected Area, off Prince Edward Island, have been protected under the 
authority of the provincial Natural Areas Protection Act.66  
There are numerous opportunities for science and spatial co-location of 
federal and provincial science programmes in the five geographic areas. 
A primary example is the targeted use of seabed mapping using side scan sonar 
to support integrated management within the priority areas while still 
addressing the primary agency’s geological mandate. A further example is 
provided by the development of the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy by 
DFO, Parks Canada, and Environment Canada. The strategy requires the three 
federal agencies with marine protected area mandates to establish a network of 
marine protected areas, integrate information, engage public interests, and 
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determine the best means to achieving the objectives of the marine protected 
area.67 
Integration among sectors is multifaceted. One example is the 
establishment of ONE OCEAN in 2002. This stakeholder driven information 
and public education group was established in Newfoundland by leaders in the 
oil and gas industry and the fishing industry to resolve issues of common 
concern through informal interventions and information exchanges.68  
At the international level, Canada has worked with the United States and 
the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) to develop 
a handbook on the identification and use of governance, socioeconomic, and 
ecological objectives, and related indicators. These objectives and indicators 
measure the effectiveness of integrated coastal and oceans management.69 
 
 
4.3.2.3. Precautionary Approach 
 
Canada has recognised the importance of the precautionary approach in key 
legislation and policy documents. The preamble to the Oceans Act calls for 
a precautionary approach to marine resources management. Section 30 of the 
Act mandates that Canada’s national oceans strategy be founded on the 
principles of sustainable development, integrated management, and the 
precautionary approach.  
Other Canadian legislation also incorporates the precautionary approach. 
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA),70 for example, 
requires that administrative decisions under the act, such as whether to allow 
new chemical substances into Canada, follows the precautionary principle. 
CEPA also encourages pollution prevention approaches. The 2003 amendments 
to section 4 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) specifically 
embed precaution as a fundamental purpose of the statute.71  
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Through an interdepartmental consultation process, Canada has 
developed guiding principles to be followed by departments/agencies in 
applying precaution. The Framework for the Application of Precaution in 
Science-based Decision Making about Risk,72 issued in 2003, is broad and 
applicable to all federal mandates. It is, however, only one element which 
guides implementation of the precautionary approach. In oceans management, 
the primary guidance for the precautionary approach remains Canada’s Oceans 
Strategy and in more detail,73 the Policy and Operational Framework for 
Integrated Management.74 The latter specifies that priority will be given to 
maintaining ecosystem health and integrity, especially in the case of 
uncertainty. DFO’s Aquaculture Policy Framework also notes the need for 
aquaculture development to occur in the context of a precautionary approach.75 
Other DFO policies such as, the Wild Salmon Policy,76 New Emerging 
Fisheries Policy,77 and the development of an ecosystem-based model for 
recovery strategy development for endangered and threatened species, all 
require reference to ecosystem considerations and uncertainty.78 
Much work remains for all levels of government in working out the 
application of precaution, with laws varying between strong and weak versions. 
Canada has adopted a strong precautionary approach to ocean dumping through 
a “reverse listing” approach, where only wastes on an acceptable list may be 
disposed of at sea.79 Ballast Water Control and Management Regulations,80 
issued to reduce the risk of harmful aquatic species being introduced into 
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Canadian waters through ships’ ballast water, are arguably another example of 
precautionary application. The regulations prescribe management measures for 
ballast water, requiring exchange at least 200 nautical miles from shore and in 
water depths greater than 2,000 metres before entering Canadian waters. 
Emergency ballast exchange within Canadian waters is also restricted to 
specific zones. These zones are identified based on lowest ecological risk. 
Although the Fisheries Act prohibits the deposit of deleterious substances into 
waters frequented by fish,81 discharge standards for six major industries, 
including pulp and paper mills and petroleum refineries, are set in regulations 
that do not explicitly emphasise pollution prevention and precaution. Canada is 
also party to various international bodies, working groups, regional fisheries 
management organisations, and international scientific organisations where the 
precautionary approach continues to evolve, and implementation tools are 
developed, for fisheries.82 
Tensions have arisen in Canada over how the precautionary 
principle/approach should be applied.83 For example, concerns have been raised 
with respect to the potential risks associated with escapees and the possible 
spread of parasites from finfish aquaculture operations. There have been calls 
for the removal of existing open pen salmon farms and prohibition of new 
farms.84 Instead of a prohibitory approach to precaution, governments have 
responded with various regulatory and licensing controls to mitigate the impact 
of fish farms, including mandatory monitoring programmes with specific 
intervention measures.85  
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The Supreme Court of Canada has opened the legal door for Canadian 
courts to review administrative decisions in light of adherence to the 
precautionary principle. In the 2001 Spraytech case,86 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
referred to the precautionary principle’s wide acceptance in international law 
and policy and relied on the principle to help justify a broad interpretation of 
provincial legislation as authorising municipalities to regulate pesticides. She 
recognised that the values and principles reflected in international law may help 
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.87  
 
 
4.3.2.4. Public Participation and Community-based Management 
 
Canadian ocean management policy clearly indicates a commitment to citizen 
engagement. The overall objective is to create governance mechanisms that 
foster a greater involvement of the people most affected by decisions. LOMAs 
primarily address large-scale ecosystem and economic development issues; 
they also provide the context for nesting a network of smaller CMAs or other 
ocean management tools, such as marine protected areas. 
Participants in ocean and coastal management are clearly identified, 
including the federal government, provincial/territorial/local authorities, 
aboriginal organisations and communities, industry, NGOs, community groups, 
and the academic/science/research community. In keeping with the enabling 
(rather than directive) and collaborative nature of the Oceans Act, oceans 
management programmes in Canada clearly direct and enable community 
involvement in the design and management of integrated management plans 
and marine protected areas.88 
CMAs enable communities to play a stronger role in issues affecting their 
future by matching local capabilities and development priorities to the 
opportunities and carrying capacity of the local ecosystem. Local economic 
issues, such as inshore fisheries, conventional tourism and ecotourism, 
aquaculture sites, ports, and other transportation facilities may all be matters 
considered. Local community groups and individuals play essential roles in 
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helping to understand the management area and issues, ensuring that the 
planning process and associated actions are relevant to the area, and providing 
“on the ground” expertise and capacity for plan implementation, monitoring, 
and compliance promotion.  
 
 
4.3.3. Authority at National Level 
 
In addition to leading and facilitating the development and implementation of 
an oceans management strategy, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is 
authorised to 
 
• coordinate the activities of ocean stakeholders to develop a strategy, 
• develop tools and coordinate with stakeholders the development of 
specific plans to implement the strategy, 
• develop integrated management plans for all Canadian marine waters, 
• establish, as required, sub-national and local bodies to assist with the 
implementation plans, 
• establish and enforce measures/regulations associated with marine 
protected areas, and 
• develop marine environmental quality guidelines. 
 
In the October 2004 Speech from the Throne, the Government of Canada 
made better management of its ocean spaces and resources a government-wide 
priority and called for the development of “an Oceans Action Plan by 
maximising the use and development of oceans technology, establishing a 
network of Marine Protected Areas, implementing integrated management 
plans and enhancing the enforcement of rules governing oceans and fisheries, 
including rules governing straddling fish stocks.”89 The government also made 
a significant investment in strengthening initiatives related to international 
fisheries and oceans governance. These efforts are focused on improving 
compliance within the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), 
creating conditions for change, and strengthening global fisheries and oceans 
governance.  
With the endorsement of the government-wide Oceans Action Plan, seven 
federal departments are now responsible for the delivery of specific elements of 
this national work plan. Their tasks range from international coordination, 
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completion of ecosystem overview reports, and developing governance 
arrangements, to seabed mapping. Table 4.2 identifies key activities in Phase 1 
of the Oceans Action Plan. 
 
Table 4.2. Key activities of Phase 1 of the Oceans Action Plan 
 
Oceans Action Plan Phase 1 Initiative Key Activities 
International Leadership, Sovereignty and Security 
1. Gulf of Maine Canada-United States 
collaboration 
Joint ecosystem overview and objectives 
setting for integrated management planning 
2. Arctic Marine Strategic Plan Eight countries address key issues in the 
circumpolar Arctic via the Working Group 
for the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME) of the Arctic 
Council 
3. International fisheries and oceans 
governance 
Ecosystemic research with a focus on the 
Grand Banks 
Appointment of an ambassador for 
fisheries conservation 
Strengthening global governance 
Integrated Management in Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs) 
4. Ecosystem overview and assessment 
reports 
Review and assessment of scientific 
knowledge in five LOMAs 
5. Ecologically and biologically significant 
areas (EBSA) 
Identification of areas and species requiring 
special management measures in LOMAs  
6. Seabed mapping  Characterisation of habitat in LOMAs 
7. Ecosystem objectives (EO)/ Smart 
regulations 
Ecosystem specific EOs and possible 
regulatory options 
8. Economic assessment and analysis Documentation of value of activities in 
support of integrated management planning 
9. Targeted sub-national consultations Engagement of affected and responsible 
parties in LOMAs, marine protected areas 
10. Agreements with provinces, territories, 
and aboriginal authorities 
Development of agreements on roles and 
responsibilities. 
11. Sub-national management and advisory 
bodies 
Intergovernmental and stakeholder for 
LOMA planning and management 
Health of the Oceans 
12. Oceans Act marine protected areas 
(MPAs) 
Key MPAs designated by 2007 
  
 64 
13. Canadian Wildlife Service marine 
wildlife areas 
Key marine wildlife areas designated 
14. National Marine Protected Area Strategy 
to establish a network 
Implementation of federal MPA strategy to 
establish a network 
15. Science research and advice for marine 
protected areas 
Development of tools including selection 
criteria for EBSAs 
16. Ballast water and marine pollution 
regulations 
Science support and completion of the 
regulatory process 
17. Pollution prevention surveillance for sea-
based sources 
Increased surveillance 
Oceans Science and Technology 
18. Oceans technology network Support of technology networks and 
research priorities 
19. Placentia Bay Technology Demonstration 
Project 
Integration of real time data to support 
oceans management decisions 
 
An Oceans Action Plan Secretariat coordinates integration of the inter-
departmental efforts to deliver the Oceans Action Plan. In addition to housing 
the secretariat, DFO is responsible for the implementation of ocean 
programmes key to plan implementation (integrated management, marine 
protected areas, and marine environmental quality). 
 
 
4.3.4. National and Sub-National Division of Authority  
 
While there is a clear federal responsibility for the protection of the marine 
environment and the sustainable use of marine resources, effective 
environmental protection and conservation require broad-based partnerships. 
Provincial, territorial, and local governments have roles and responsibilities 
with regards to oceans activities. Provinces and territories have primary 
responsibility for their lands, the shoreline and specific seabed areas, and 
municipalities have responsibility for many of the land-based activities 
affecting the marine environment, such as sewage and waste disposal. 
Aboriginal authorities also have a key governance role to play where settled 
land claims include marine resource management responsibilities  
There is a strong provincial/territorial desire and a practical need for sub-
national engagement. To this end, the federal, provincial, and territorial 
governments collaborate under the auspices of the Canadian Council of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers (CCFAM) through the Oceans Task Group 
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and through existing and developing regional governance mechanisms to 
develop joint work plans and approaches.90 One of the goals is the development 
of agreements or memoranda of understanding similar to the Canada-British 
Columbia memorandum of understanding (MOU) on oceans to support 
integrated planning and ensure complementary and harmonised regulation. This 
initiative also involves collaboration with Aboriginal peoples and governments 
in priority areas and, where possible, establishes agreements to strengthen 
oceans management and address oceans priorities. 
The efforts of the Oceans Task Group are supplemented by regional 
federal and provincial implementation committees focused on the Oceans 
Action Plan. An Aquaculture Task Group under the CCFAM, composed of both 
federal and provincial representatives, has facilitated discussions on clarifying 
and coordinating federal-provincial responsibilities in relation to aquaculture.91 
Management and advisory bodies are currently in place, or being 
established, to support specific integrated management plans and marine 
protected area management plans. They involve a forum for stakeholders, 
including industry, academia, NGOs, Aboriginal peoples, and citizens. Their 
goals are to provide on-going communication, information-sharing, input, and 
to effectively inform oceans management planning processes. For example, 
the ESSIM Stakeholder Advisory Council is a representative multi-stakeholder 
working group that provides “regular input, advice and support” to the 
initiative’s planning process.92 
Various other federal-provincial coordination mechanisms also exist. For 
example, councils of federal-provincial/territorial ministers address 
environment, wildlife, and energy issues. Joint federal-provincial offshore 
petroleum boards have been established for Nova Scotia and Newfoundland 
and Labrador through accords and mirror federal-provincial legislation.93 
The boards are responsible for reviewing environmental impacts of proposed 
offshore hydrocarbon activities and for imposing operational conditions.94  
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4.3.5. Domestic Implementation of International Agreements  
 
The effectiveness of Canada’s management efforts in the Arctic, Pacific and 
Atlantic oceans requires close collaboration and cooperation with adjacent 
nations and with other states. Canada has worked with the United States and 
Mexico through the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) since 
199495 and, more recently, through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America96 to address issues of common concern. Canada and the United 
States are also coordinating efforts under their respective oceans action plans. 
Canada also participates in the Arctic Council,97 which provides a mechanism 
for eight circumpolar nations to collaborate with respect to addressing Arctic 
marine environmental issues.  
While a broad array of international environmental agreements have 
relevance to the oceans, this chapter briefly discusses Canada’s implementation 
efforts and challenges under five key documents: the LOS Convention, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, MARPOL 73/78, the 1996 Protocol to 
the London Convention, and the Global Programme of Action for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. 
 
 
4.3.5.1. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
Although Canada was a leading country in negotiations for the LOS 
Convention and signed the convention in 1982,98 it did not ratify the LOS 
Convention until 7 November 2003 with the convention entering into force for 
Canada on 7 December 2003.99 Delays in ratification were, in part, due to deep 
concerns relating to high seas and straddling stock fisheries issues. Canada had 
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already, through the Oceans Act,100 incorporated into domestic law its maritime 
zones and the jurisdictional entitlements set out in the LOS Convention, namely 
a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles 
from the territorial sea baselines, a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), and a continental margin extending beyond the EEZ in accordance with 
Article 76 of the LOS Convention.101 
Recent federal funding has enabled Canada to initiate the process to 
delimit the outer extent of its continental shelf. Canada plans on making 
a submission to the UN Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf by 
2013. A number of challenges related to LOS Convention implementation face 
Canada, including issues related to revenue sharing responsibilities of federal 
and provincial authorities for oil and gas production beyond 200 nautical 
miles,102 and the scope of Canada’s powers to regulate shipping as new areas 
become accessible in the Arctic due to climactic variations.103 
By ratifying the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in August 1999, 104Canada has made international fisheries reform 
and modernisation a major priority.105 In May 2005, Canada hosted a major 
international conference on high seas fisheries governance,106 and Canada 
continues to push for more effective addressing of illegal, unreported and 
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unregulated (IUU) fishing.107 Various high seas biodiversity and fishing issues 
remain to be worked out, not only in Canadian ocean policy, but globally. For 
example, how might discrete high seas fish stocks be better managed108 and 
how should access to genetic biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction be 
addressed?109  
 
 
4.3.5.2. Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), as an international treaty, 
identifies a common problem, sets overall goals, policies and general 
obligations, and organises technical and financial cooperation.110 The re-
sponsibility for achieving its goals rests with countries themselves. Under the 
convention, governments undertake to conserve and sustainably use 
biodiversity. Parties are required to develop national biodiversity strategies and 
action plans and to integrate these into broader national plans for environment 
and development. Following the adoption of a Canadian Biodiversity Strategy 
in 1995,111 Canada’s progress has varied in implementing the key commitments 
under Article 8 of the CBD. Implementation of the Oceans Action Plan 
addresses several key components of the national biodiversity strategy, 
including a focus on the establishment of a network of marine protected areas, 
regulating the risk associated with the use and release of living modified 
organisms, preventing and controlling the introduction of alien species, and 
developing necessary legislation or other regulatory provisions to protect 
threatened species and populations. 
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Marine protected areas are established under the authority of the three 
federal agencies, DFO, Parks Canada and Environment Canada. Under the 
authority of the Oceans Act,112 seven offshore marine protected areas have been 
established: the Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents (2003) and the Bowie 
Seamount (2008) off British Columbia; the Gully (2004) off Nova Scotia; Basin 
Head (2005) off Prince Edward Island; Gilbert Bay (2005) off Labrador; 
Eastport (2005) off Newfoundland; and the Musquash Estuary Marine 
Protected Area (2006) off New Brunswick.113  Three additional Oceans Act 
marine protected areas are at various stages in the designation process (one of 
which may be officially designated before Parliament recesses for the summer 
in 2009) and a further six areas of interest identified via conservation setting 
priorities and consultations but not yet endorsed by the Minister and for which 
formal regulatory work has not been undertaken but will need to be completed 
before the end of fiscal year 2012 under the Health of the Oceans initiative. 
These Oceans Act marine protected areas (Figure 4.3) complement the 
contributions of the other federal marine protected area authorities to building 
a domestic network. The national biodiversity strategy also links Canada’s 
marine protected areas network on a continental basis, through a proposed 
regional marine protected area action plan with the United States and 
Mexico,114 and on a global level, particularly through the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development commitment to establish a representative network by 
2012.115 
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Figure 4.3. Oceans Act marine protected areas and areas of interest 
 
 
Source: Oceans Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Ottawa, April 2009. 
 
With respect to the introduction of new alien aquatic species via ballast 
water in ships, Canada initially relied upon voluntary measures set out in the 
Guidelines for the Control of Ballast Water Discharge from Ships in Waters 
under Canadian Jurisdiction.116 However, in light of the 2004 International 
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships” Ballast Water and 
Sediments,117 Canada issued binding Ballast Water Control and Management 
Regulations which came into force 8 June 2006.118 
                                                 
116
 Transport Canada, Guidelines for the Control of Ballast Water Discharge from Ships in 
Waters under Canadian Jurisdiction, Transport Canada Publication No. 13617 (Ottawa: 
Canadian Marine Advisory Council, Transport Canada, 2001), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
MarineSafety/TP/Tp13617/Tp13617Erev1.pdf> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
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In December 2002, Canada enacted the Species at Risk Act (SARA).119 
The Act is part of a three-pronged Government of Canada strategy for the 
protection of wildlife species at risk, which also includes commitments under 
the 1996 national Accord for the Protection of Species at Risk and activities 
under the Habitat Stewardship Programme for Species at Risk. SARA 
implements key elements of the Canadian Biodiversity Strategy. The Act 
requires recovery strategies and action plans to be prepared for listed 
endangered and threatened species and management plans for species of special 
concern. SARA formally recognises the role of the independent advisory 
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) in 
assessing species at risk. SARA applies to all federal lands in Canada, all 
wildlife species listed as being at risk, and their critical habitat. The Act also 
puts in place various prohibitions, such as prohibiting persons from killing, 
harming, harassing, or taking an individual of a listed endangered or threatened 
species and from damaging or destroying the residence of one or more 
individuals of a listed endangered/threatened species. The need to better define 
with scientific rigour key provisions of the act relating to critical marine habitat 
and residences, as well as the shared accountability between federal ministers, 
and between federal and provincial ministers, make it difficult to fully assess 
the effectiveness of the statute and to make recommendations for its 
improvement.120  
However, listing of some marine fish species has been a challenge since 
listing under SARA involves a political decision rather than scientific 
determination. For example, COSEWIC has listed as endangered Cultus Lake 
and Sakinaw Lake sockeye salmon populations, Interior Fraser River coho 
salmon, the Newfoundland and Labrador population of Atlantic cod and the 
porbeagle shark and has categorised as threatened, the Laurentian North 
population of Atlantic cod.121 Because of potential social and economic impacts 
of SARA listing for these populations, the Canadian government has chosen 
against listing.122 Other tools, such as government programmes and initiatives 
by NGOs and industry, are expected to protect and assist recovery of these non-
listed species. 
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The CBD’s Programme of Work on Marine and Coastal Biological 
Diversity includes consideration of protected areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.123 High seas issues, particularly as they relate to ecosystem health, 
are of interest to Canada. Canada is working with existing governance bodies 
and their scientific advisors to integrate scientific knowledge and expertise to 
provide best available scientific advice to inform decisions. For example, in 
December 2005, Canada hosted an international scientific experts” workshop to 
review and assess ecologically-based criteria for the identification of areas 
and/or resources that are ecologically and biologically significant and may 
require special management measures, including protected area status in high 
seas.124 The intent of the workshop was to provide integrated advice to 
authorities such as the CBD, the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for 
their consideration.  
 
 
4.3.5.3. MARPOL 73/78 
 
Canada has only formally accepted the first three annexes of MARPOL125 
dealing with oil pollution, noxious liquid substances carried in bulk and 
harmful substances carried in packaged form respectively. However, Canada 
has adopted Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for 
Dangerous Chemicals126 which will allow accession by Canada to the other 
three annexes covering sewage (Annex (IV), garbage (Annex V) and air 
pollution (Annex VI). The regulations issued under the Canada Shipping Act 
2001, also bring Canada into line with the revisions to Annexes I and II of 
MARPOL which came into force 1 January 2007. Prevention of pollution from 
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harmful substances in packaged form continues to be addressed by the 
Dangerous Goods Shipping Regulations.127 
Canada has chosen to apply stricter vessel-source pollution control 
standards for its Arctic waters. Pursuant to the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act,128 passed in 1970, Canada has imposed special pollution 
discharge and other restrictions for vessels operating in a 100 nautical mile 
pollution prevention zone. For example, oil deposits from ships are generally 
prohibited with just a few exceptions, such as when due to stranding or 
collision and when due to engine exhaust.129 Canada is proposing to extend the 
special  shipping standards out to 200 nautical miles in the Arctic in light of 
Article 234 of the LOS Convention.130 Article 234 grants coastal states special 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over vessels navigating in ice-covered 
waters.131  
 
 
4.3.5.4. 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention 
 
Becoming the tenth country to accede to the 1996 Protocol,132 which takes 
a precautionary approach to ocean disposal, Canada ensured its implementation 
through the provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.133 
The Act adopts a “safe list” approach by only allowing ocean disposal of 
a limited list of wastes listed in Schedule 5 and any disposal must be in 
accordance with the conditions of a Canadian permit. Before issuing an ocean 
disposal permit, the Minister of Environment is required to subject the 
application to a waste assessment process, set out in Schedule 6 of the Act, 
which, among other things, requires refusal of a permit if re-use, recycling, or 
treatments of the waste are practical options. 
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132
 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, London, 7 November 1996, (1997) I.L.M. 36: 1; Disposal at Sea 
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4.3.5.5. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-based Activities 
 
Canada became the first country to develop a National Programme of Action 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities 
(NPA) in 2000.134 The NPA sets national priorities for addressing land-based 
marine pollution and activities through a high, medium, and low ranking 
approach. Listed as high contaminant priorities are sewage and persistent 
organic pollutants. Responding to shoreline construction/alteration and wetland 
and salt marsh alteration are also listed as high priorities. Through separate 
chapters for four main coastal regions (the Pacific, Arctic, Southern Quebec/St. 
Lawrence, and the Atlantic), the NPA also describes regional problems, 
priorities, and needed actions. A federal/provincial/territorial committee, 
established in 1996 soon after the Global Programme of Action for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA) 
Washington Conference and co-chaired by Environment Canada and DFO, has 
been responsible for the development and implementation of the NPA.  
Tracking implementation activities is difficult because of the numerous 
sources of land-based marine pollution, the multiple jurisdictions and 
programmes involved along Canada’s extensive coastlines,135 and the lack of 
a dedicated funding for GPA implementation. Canada’s report to the 2001 
Intergovernmental Review Meeting on Implementation of the Global 
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-
based Activities included an annex highlighting more than 90 key programmes, 
within government, NGOs, and communities that address the goals and 
priorities of the GPA.136 For example, the collaborative development, by 
federal, provincial and local authorities, of integrated management processes 
and plans at the coastal management area (CMA) scale is contributing directly 
                                                 
134
 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory Committee on Canada’s National Programme of 
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, Canada’s 
National Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based 
Activities (NPA) (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2000). 
135
 For a summary of the various programmes in the four Atlantic provinces, see P. G. Wells, 
“Invigorating the United Nations Global Programme of Action (GPA) for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities – utilising both bottom-up and top-down 
approaches,” Marine Pollution Bulletin 44, no. 8 (2002): 719–721. 
136
 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory Committee on Canada’s National Programme of 
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, Implementing 
Canada’s National Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-based Activities: National Report to the 2001 Intergovernmental Review Meeting on 
Implementation of the Global Programme of Action (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2001). 
  
 75 
to the implementation of the NPA. In a national report on GPA implementation 
prepared for the Second Intergovernmental Review Meeting in Beijing, China 
in October 2006, Canada described various other projects contributing to GPA 
implementation including a technology investigation for enhancing municipal 
wastewater treatment in Arctic climates and an inventory of land-based sources 
of pollution in the Hudson Bay watershed.137 
Canada also contributes to the GPA by advancing GPA activities at the 
regional level. The Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (RPA), adopted by 
Arctic Council ministers in 1998, established two high priorities for regional 
action: addressing persistent organic pollutants and heavy metals, and identified 
pollution hot spots in the Russian Federation.138 The Arctic Council’s 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group has 
updated the RPA, under the lead of Canada and Iceland, with revisions going 
before the Arctic Council ministers for approval in April 2009.139  
Projects to assess effluent discharges from seafood processing plants have 
been undertaken on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.140 The Global 
Programme of Action Coalition for the Gulf of Maine (GPAC), a network of 
hundreds of individuals from community organisations, government, industry, 
indigenous communities, and researchers, was forged through a pilot project of 
the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation and has 
facilitated the convening of various bi-national workshops to further GPA 
implementation.141 GPAC helped to convene, in collaboration with the Gulf of 
Maine Council on the Marine Environment, a Gulf of Maine Summit where 
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participants discussed ecosystem indicators for three priority areas: 
contaminants and pathogens, fisheries and aquaculture, and land use.142 
 
 
4.3.6. Enforcement 
 
While each federal statute pertaining to oceans has its own set of regulations, 
enforcement procedures, penalties and fines, Section 35 of the Oceans Act 
provides the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans with the authority to develop 
specific regulations pertaining to the designation of marine protected areas and 
the prescription of measures needed to achieve the conservation objectives of 
the marine protected area. Section 37 of the Act provides for penalties if 
prescribed measures are contravened, with persons liable to a fine not 
exceeding CAD100,000 on summary conviction or up to CAD500,000 for an 
indictable offence. The Act also provides the authority to make regulations 
prescribing marine environmental quality requirements and standards. In 
practice, this is intended to give effect to those ecosystem objectives that 
require the force of regulation.  
With respect to enforcement and surveillance, the approach adopted by 
the Canadian government is to multi-task pollution prevention among fishery 
officers and other federal and provincial enforcement officers active in the 
geographic area where the oceans conservation or management measure is 
being applied. Notwithstanding the above, enforcement is only one of many 
measures on the compliance continuum. Consequently, substantial effort is 
dedicated in both the integrated management and marine protected area 
processes to engaging stakeholders and involving them in advisory and 
management bodies. Better understanding and “ownership” of the management 
plans and associated regulatory measures provides support and potentially 
reduces the more costly surveillance and enforcement efforts.  
Regulations developed under the Oceans Act include those to designate 
seven current marine protected areas and to date no contraventions have been 
detected. Regulations focused on the mitigation of seismic sound in the marine 
environment are also under development. As part of this process, DFO held 
targeted public consultations in 2005 and 2006 and revised its draft Statement 
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of Canadian Practice Respecting the Mitigation of Seismic Sound in the Marine 
Environment.143  The Statement of Canadian Practice has now been given effect 
under the authority of the Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia 
Petroleum Boards for oil and gas applications, and Oceans Act regulations are 
under development for non-oil and gas seismic surveys. 
Canada has been a leader in developing legislative provisions supportive 
of effective enforcement and creative sentencing options for those convicted of 
environmental and fisheries offences. Most federal and provincial statutes 
provide for strict liability offences where the Crown does not have to show fault 
(intentional, reckless, or negligent behaviour) by the offender but only a guilty 
act, such as a deleterious deposit into waters frequented by fish. Many statutes 
allow judges to be innovative in issuing sentencing orders beyond the 
traditional sanctions of fines or imprisonment. For example, section 79.2 of the 
Fisheries Act allows courts to impose various requirements on offenders, 
including prohibiting activities that may continue or repeat the offence, 
directing remedial and avoidance measures, directing convicted persons to 
publish the facts relating to the offence, requiring persons to pay governmental 
costs of remedial or preventative actions, ordering persons to perform 
community service, directing persons to contribute funds for the purpose of 
promoting fish habitat conservation and fisheries management, and requiring 
persons to comply with any other conditions for securing the person’s good 
conduct. 
A recent legislative effort to bolster enforcement in the oceans sector is 
aimed at more effectively countering ship-source pollution, especially in 
contravention of MARPOL standards, which has had damaging consequences 
to migratory seabirds. The 2005 amendments to the Migratory Birds 
Convention Act, 1994 and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 
expand the scope of persons who may be held responsible for offences,144 
extends the jurisdiction of Canadian courts to cover infringements in the EEZ, 
and substantially increases penalties.145 
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4.3.7. Research and Education 
 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy emphasises the need to base decisions on sound 
science and to address uncertainties in our knowledge base so that management 
actions can be adjusted as new scientific information becomes available.146 
The importance given to improving our understanding of marine ecosystems, 
their properties and critical functions, as well as the impacts of single and 
multiple activities on these parameters, has resulted in a shift in the orientation 
and organisational structure of the research and scientific support services 
within DFO and by other service providers. Increased partnerships with 
academia, international scientific organisations, and sister agencies in other 
governments have facilitated the development of tools for the application of 
ecosystem-based considerations of ocean issues and the building of a rigorous 
peer-review scientific advisory process designed to support all ocean managers. 
To further develop the scientific understanding necessary to support the 
implementation of Canada’s ocean management policy, an Ocean Management 
Research Network (OMRN) was established as a joint initiative between the 
Social Science and Humanities Research Council and the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans. The OMRN creates a national network of 
interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral research working groups to develop and 
integrate knowledge and best practices for sustainable oceans management.147  
The commitment to advance ocean science and technology is anchored in 
Canada’s Oceans Action Plan with the objective to improve information 
sharing through connecting information networks, promote innovation and new 
technologies by supporting prototype development and targeted research and 
development, and enhanced commercialisation through demonstration projects 
in the priority LOMAs.148  
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4.3.8. Financing 
 
Due to fiscal restraints in 1997, no new funds were provided to implement the 
Oceans Act or Canada’s Oceans Strategy. Until the federal government’s 
approval of the Oceans Action Plan in 2005, funding for implementation of the 
national ocean management approach had been achieved through reallocation 
of funds within DFO. The programmes delivered in the six administrative 
regions of DFO have been dependant on transfers of national funds on an 
annual basis. Since 1997, the department has redirected approximately CAD100 
million to fund the activities in support of the oceans strategy. 
The Oceans Action Plan, however, provided some new funding, in the 
order of CAD28 million over two years across involved departments.149  
The 2007 federal budget proposed CAD19 million over two years to help clean 
and protect Canada’s oceans and support increased water pollution prevention, 
surveillance, and enforcement along its coasts.150 Once approved by Cabinet 
(May 2007) and Treasury Board (September 2007), the Health of the Oceans 
commitment grew from CAD19 million over two years to CAD61.5 million 
over five years, projected through 2011–2012. This amount is allocated to five 
federal departments/agencies as follows: Transport Canada - CAD23.85 
million; DFO - CAD23.173 million; Environment Canada - CAD8 million; 
PCA - CAD6.25 million; and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada - CAD0.175 
million. 
 
 
4.4. Implementation, Evaluation and Long-term Outlook  
 
As referenced earlier, the single greatest challenge in implementing 
a “horizontal” oceans policy in Canada is the need to persuade or show other 
sectors, departments, levels of government, and traditional stakeholders that the 
policy and the integrated management process have benefit and interest for 
them. Moving from the theoretical level to the application of concepts, such as 
ecosystem-based management and precaution, in day-to-day decisions is 
fraught with science challenges, as well as concerns about change. The focus on 
                                                 
149
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developing operational tools and guidelines for application has helped to 
overcome some of these challenges. 
There are many challenges in implementing an oceans policy which seeks 
integration of the planning and management of ocean activities among various 
levels of government. An additional challenge is re-orientating single species, 
single activity decisions to decisions focused on the sustainability of the 
ecosystem and, therefore, of the industries and traditions dependent upon ocean 
resources. Perhaps the greatest challenges are implementing the institutional 
changes and building the relationships and capacities essential to achieving 
integration.  
It is through the development of area-based integrated management plans, 
such as the ESSIM Integrated Ocean Management Plan, that agencies and 
stakeholders will see themselves (or not) in the product and understand the 
ecosystem, social and economic objectives that will guide activities in the area. 
When addressing an ocean management issue, it is key to accurately 
assess the spatial and temporal scale at which the management action needs to 
be taken. If an environmental or economic issue is ecosystem-wide, a sub-
national or local intervention will not be effective in addressing the problem. 
Alternately, if the management issue is multi-sectoral and requires action by 
different government authorities, intervention by a limited number of 
responsible authorities will not result in the desired outcomes. An additional 
challenge is the selection of the appropriate performance indicators. Such 
indicators must also be chosen in consideration of the spatial and temporal scale 
at which the system will respond.  
 
 
4.4.1. Monitoring and Reporting 
 
The Oceans Act requires a review of the administration of the Act by 
Parliament within three years after its enactment.151 The Report on the Oceans 
Act by the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, in October 2001, 
concluded that the Act was fundamentally sound. It made 12 recommendations 
including a recommendation that a performance-based reporting system be 
established and reports provided to Parliament on an annual basis. A further 
recommendation called for the preparation of a state of the ocean report on 
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a periodic basis to track the health of the oceans, ocean communities, and 
related ocean industries.152 
On 29 September 2005, the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development reported to the House of Commons on Oceans Act 
implementation and issued key recommendations.153 Recommendations 
directed to DFO included: 
 
• having Canada’s Oceans Action Plan recognised and managed as 
a government horizontal initiative; 
• finalising and implementing operational guidance for integrated 
management planning, including marine protected areas, in the five 
priority ocean areas; 
• planning and managing its resources to ensure commitments and targets 
set out in departmental documents, such as the annual report on plans 
and priorities, are met, as well as the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development oceans commitments; 
• finalising and implementing an accountability framework for its 
management activities, and  
• improving communications to the public, including periodic information 
on the state of the oceans. 
 
The recommendations were addressed by the Government of Canada through 
Phase 1 of the Oceans Action Plan released in May 2005.154 The recom-
mendations continue to be addressed, in part, through the horizontal 
management of the Health of the Oceans initiative involving five federal 
organisations, as well as the ongoing convening of Interdepartmental Oceans 
Committees (ICOs) at the director general, assistant deputy minister, and 
deputy minister levels. 
Federal departments are required to provide a performance report to 
Parliament as part of their annual report on plans and priorities. Information on 
programmes, their budgets, plans, and expected results for integrated 
management, marine protected areas and other ocean management activities are 
provided for public scrutiny.155 
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DFO has developed a Results-based Management and Accountability 
Framework to monitor the progress and implementation of the national ocean 
policy.156 This framework sets out performance measurement goals and 
indicators to assess departmental progress. The Results-based Management and 
Accountability Framework was designed to track how DFO uses resources to 
undertake activities in order to affect the desired results and achieve stated 
outcomes. 
 From an oceans management programme perspective, monitoring, 
assessment, reporting, and re-evaluation of management measures applied to 
achieve the marine environmental quality objectives and social and economic 
objectives defined for integrated management and marine protected areas are 
an integral part of the operational frameworks of Oceans Act programmes.  
 
 
4.4.2. Outlook 
 
Funding for Phase 1 of the Oceans Action Plan, renewed funding in the 2007 
federal budget and interest shown by other levels of governments to develop 
collaborative governance arrangements and processes, augur well for short-term 
implementation of Canada’s Oceans Strategy. Integrated management 
processes are ongoing in five LOMAs and seven marine protected areas have 
been designated.  Work is progressing towards the designation of the remaining 
candidate marine protected areas originally identified during the pilot phase of 
the policy development process. For the implementation of the international 
pillar of the Oceans Action Plan, an international fisheries and oceans 
governance strategy is being implemented to provide a coordinated approach to 
addressing key fisheries and oceans governance issues. Key partnerships have 
been developing with coastal nations with shared interests and maritime 
boundaries, and considerable international efforts are being directed to 
addressing environmental issues in the high seas. 
Priority actions completed under Phase 1 of the Oceans Action Plan 
include the development of some ocean management agreements with federal, 
provincial, territorial, and aboriginal partners. Although these governance 
arrangements are pivotal, so to is the development of capacity at all levels of 
government, and within the stakeholder community, to implement integrated 
management in all Canadian marine waters. Changes in relationship among 
sectors, and between sectors and their regulators, require time and investment. 
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Successful replacement of sectoral relationships by multiple industry coalitions 
and management decisions integrated to focus on a geographic space rather 
than single activities all define the long-term outlook of successful oceans 
management in Canada. Health of the Oceans funding has secured support for 
the integrated management process with respect to the advancement of federal 
and national marine protected area networks, through to 2012. This augers well 
for meeting international biodiversity commitments. However, the broader 
commitment to applying integrated oceans management beyond the LOMA 
boundaries continues to be a challenge due to funding and capacity issues. 
 
 
4.5. Lessons Learned 
 
While Canada, like other countries, is still learning in the complex field of 
ocean policy and governance, seven major lessons do stand out. 
 
1. Enabling ocean management legislation provides a useful guide 
 
Canada’s Oceans Act has provided an important framework for directing how 
human uses of Canada’s oceans may be better managed. The Act has defined 
Canada’s maritime zones and recognised the attendant rights and 
responsibilities within those zones in conformity with the LOS Convention. 
The Act has clearly designated DFO as the lead federal authority for developing 
integrated management plans for marine areas, for setting the environmental 
quality standards which must be met, and for designating/establishing marine 
protected areas. The Act has facilitated the development of a broad policy 
framework and a government-wide plan of action. 
 
2. Passing an oceans act should not detract from the need for other 
legislative and regulatory reforms 
 
While Canada’s Oceans Act has substantially advanced ocean governance 
initiatives and arrangements, there remain several sectoral laws which do not 
yet reflect the modern ocean governance commitment of the Government of 
Canada. For example, Canada’s Fisheries Act, dating back to 1868, has yet to 
be “modernised” to reflect modern ocean governance principles, although the 
policies guiding its application have evolved over time.  
In response to this problem, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
introduced two proposed revisions of the Fisheries Act, Bill C-45 in December 
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2006 and Bill C-32 in November 2007. The proposed revisions explicitly 
supported the application of the principles of sustainable development, 
including the ecosystem approach, precaution, and increased stakeholder 
participation in decision making. However, both bills died on the order paper 
when the parliamentary sessions were prorogued (formally ended). As of the 
time of writing, a new fisheries bill had not been reintroduced.   
 
3. Including sustainable development principles in national oceans-
related legislation is very important 
 
While principles by their nature tend to be general and open to various 
interpretations, principles such as integration, precaution, and the ecosystem 
approach do serve useful functions. At the very least, principles invite decision 
makers and others to rethink traditional management approaches. Principles 
may be considered part of the search for “good governance.” They facilitate 
discussions and debate within government bureaucracies, but also among the 
broader public. 
 
4. Developing integrated management plans and establishing 
marine protected areas takes time 
 
Building the relationships and capacity required to bring participants at all 
levels to the table takes time and requires skilled negotiation. The special 
relationship of the government with Aboriginal peoples must be considered and 
managed in the development of marine protected areas and integrated 
management planning processes. Both of these processes involve multiple 
steps, all of them requiring, to a greater or lesser extent, the involvement of 
other government authorities and meaningful consultation with affected parties.  
In going forward, one of the major tests will be the management of public 
expectations for timely and focused intervention to address issues of immediate 
concern to them. User conflicts and environmental degradation have evolved 
over years. To change human relationships and to detect positive responses in 
the marine environment will likely require decades. 
 
5. Federated states face particular challenges in achieving integrated 
coastal/ocean management 
 
Being a country with eight provinces and three territories fronting ocean areas, 
Canada faces special challenges in achieving integrated coastal/ocean 
management. Canada’s Oceans Act recognises the constitutional limitations of 
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the federal government by limiting integrated management planning to marine 
waters and not directly encompassing provincial coastal lands and rivers.157 
The Oceans Act requirement for the federal government to collaborate with 
other levels of government seeks to draw in other government authorities as 
partners in the integrated management process while respecting the current 
division of powers. The extent to which integrated management planning 
initiatives will influence provincial laws, policies, and interests remains to be 
seen. 
The complexity of shared federal-provincial responsibilities may also 
affect the pace of legislative and regulatory developments. For example, 
development and enactment of Canada’s Species at Risk Act was prolonged in 
part due to the jurisdictional complexities and sensitivities surrounding species 
at risk. Several other ocean-related activities, such as aquaculture management, 
involve both federal and provincial authorities and, therefore, present 
significant challenges because of federal-provincial jurisdictional issues.  
The relationship of the federal government with provinces and territories 
continues to develop, and much of the success of integrated planning will 
depend on continuing progress. It is through these inter-jurisdictional 
relationships, and between regulators, that an existing fragmented set of laws 
and policies will be coordinated in the domestic management of oceans 
activities.  
 
6. Limited marine ecosystem understanding continues to be a major 
challenge 
 
While Canada is firmly committed to implementing an ecosystem-based 
approach to management, including fisheries management, the limited scientific 
data and understanding of complex marine ecosystems remains a challenge. 
Canada’s Oceans Action Plan has recognised that ecosystem-based science 
needs to be strengthened and one of the pillars of the plan is to enhance ocean 
science and technology.158 
 
7. Incentives are critical for changes in governance and 
accountability 
 
Ecosystem-based integrated management of oceans requires changes in 
governance both within the federal agencies and between levels of government. 
                                                 
157
 Oceans Act, n. 1 above, s. 28. 
158
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, n. 3 above, pp. 9–10. 
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Until implementation of the Oceans Action Plan was initiated, neither the 
necessary inter-agency structures, nor other departmental accountabilities were 
in place. During the first years of implementation of Canada’s Oceans Act and 
oceans policy, both accountability and financing (internal reallocation) were 
located with only one department (DFO). This situation did not support 
a coordinated federal approach.  
As recommended in the 2005 Report of the Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, a horizontal, all-of-government 
approach is a fundamental requirement for success in bringing all federal 
regulators to the table. Sub-national authorities (provincial, territorial, 
aboriginal) and stakeholders may require capacity-building and incentives to 
participate in a national programme. Financial investment is required to build 
integrated management and may be an important incentive both at the federal 
and sub-national level.  
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
Integrated management objectives involve significant changes in science 
advice, regulatory activities, and intergovernmental and stakeholder 
relationships. While progress has been made in pilot areas, the advent of the 
targeted Oceans Action Plan with federal government political and financial 
support is allowing the coherent development of integrated management plans 
in five key areas of Canada’s oceans. 
Experience gained since the promulgation of the Oceans Act, and 
adoption of Canada’s Oceans Strategy as the federal policy framework, has 
highlighted the need for clear implementation strategies. Efforts will need to 
continue on advancing 
  
• intersectoral and inter-departmental buy-in (Canada’s Oceans Action 
Plan), 
• intergovernmental(federal-provincial) relationships (Canadian Council 
of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers and federal-provincial 
agreements),  
• increased collaboration internationally to address issues of common 
concern, and 
• clear guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of ecosystem-
based management.  
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Implementing a results-based system of monitoring and reporting for 
government-wide initiatives is daunting, with ministerial accountabilities 
continuing to be linked to single activities as opposed to the horizontal target of 
integrated oceans management. Generating the political will, profile, and 
resources to support a robust policy and effective implementation of the 
integrated approach continue to be long-term goals.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Maritime Spatial Planning: About the Sustainable Management of the Use of 
Our Seas and Oceans 
 
Nicole Schäfer* 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The law of the land cannot swim. Every major marine activity impacts 
on every other one. [...] Sometimes this impact is positive; sometimes it 
is negative. It is simply not possible, in any meaningful way, to deal 
with these activities separately.1 
 
Sustainable development is at the heart of the European Union’s agenda.2 Its 
challenge is to ensure mutual reinforcement of economic growth, social 
welfare, and environmental protection. On 7 June 2006, the European 
Commission adopted the Green Paper “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for 
the Union: A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas.”3 With the Green Paper 
the European Union (EU) acknowledged for the first time that its policies on 
maritime transport, industry, coastal regions, offshore energy, fisheries, the 
marine environment, and other relevant areas had been developed separately. 
Attempts were made to ensure that their impact on one another was taken into 
account. But neither a governance structure was established that took care of 
the broader links between the different sectoral policies. Nor was the 
responsibility assumed for examining in a systematic manner how these 
policies could be combined to develop synergies and reinforce each other.  
It is indisputable that fragmented decision making can result in the 
adoption of conflicting measures, which in turn has negative consequences on 
the marine environment or imposes disproportionate constraints on competing 
                                                 
*
 The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the European Commission. 
1
 E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle. Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: 
United Nations University, 1998), p. 6. 
2
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on the review of the Sustainable Development Strategy: 
A Platform for Action, COM(2005) 658 final, 13 December 2005. 
3
 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a future maritime policy for the Union: 
A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas, COM(2006) 275 final, 7 June 2006. 
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maritime activities. The mainly sectoral treatment of complex ecosystems like 
the seas and oceans makes is difficult to comprehend the potential impact of 
one set of activities upon another. The Green Paper launched a broad debate 
about a future maritime policy for the EU. A year-long consultation phase was 
organised involving all stakeholders, decision makers, and institutions in the 
shaping of the new policy. Nearly 500 contributions were received throughout 
this consultation phase, clearly revealing the enormous potential of the seas and 
the scale of the challenge that has to be embraced to achieve sustainable use 
and development of our seas and oceans. 
The idea to forge a new vision for the management of our relations with 
the seas and oceans and to establish an integrated approach to maritime affairs 
that involves all relevant sectoral policies was broadly supported. 
Consequently, the various contributions led to the development of the so-called 
“Blue Book”—a policy white paper—which constitutes the foundation of a new 
integrated, inter-sectoral approach towards cooperation and effective 
coordination of all sea-related policies at various decision-making levels.4 
The new EU Integrated Maritime Policy recognises that all matters relating to 
Europe’s oceans and seas are interlinked and that sea-related policies must be 
developed in an integrated manner if the desired results are to be achieved. The 
Blue Book was adopted with an accompanying Action Plan on 10 October 
20075 and endorsed by the European Council in December 2007. 
Of course, the development of an EU Integrated Maritime Policy did not 
happen “out of the blue.” Facing the challenges of globalisation and 
competitiveness, climate change, degradation of the marine environment, 
maritime safety and security, and energy security, as well as overall 
sustainability, inevitably lead to more strategic and integrated thinking. In 
addition, this EU policy has to be seen in an international context. 
There is first and foremost the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOS Convention), adopted in 1982, which states in its preamble that 
“[...] the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be 
                                                 
4
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM(2007) 
574 final, 10 October 2007, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF>  (accessed 29 April 2009) [hereinafter Blue Book]. 
5
 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European 
Union, Brussels, SEC(2007) 1278, 10 October 2007, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
maritimeaffairs/pdf/ ActionPaper/action_plan_en.pdf> (accessed 29 April 2009). 
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considered as a whole [...]”.6 Other countries have established integrated 
regimes for the sustainable management of their oceans and seas. In 1997, 
Canada adopted the Oceans Act and became one of the first countries in the 
world to make a legislative commitment to a comprehensive approach for the 
protection and development of oceans and coastal waters.7 The Act calls for the 
development of a national oceans strategy to guide the management of 
Canada’s estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems. Canada’s Oceans Strategy, 
adopted in 2002, provides the overall strategic framework for Canada’s oceans-
related programmes and policies and introduces the aim of developing and 
implementing integrated ocean management plans.8  
Another example of a state that has adopted an integrated maritime 
regime is Australia, which established a Marine Park Authority for the Great 
Barrier Reef and already in 1994 had adopted a 25-year strategic plan for the 
Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area.9 The plan outlines strategies for 
managing and preserving this coral reef ecosystem and provides the basis to 
ensure wise use and protection of the World Heritage Area. Eight different 
strategic areas are identified, including resource management, research and 
monitoring, and integrated planning. For each of these areas, the strategic plan 
provides 5-year and 25-year objectives to guide the sustainable use and 
management of each area. It is important to note that although protected, the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is a multiple-use area. 
These are just two examples from many. For instance, the United States is 
active in the sustainable management of human activities at sea (e.g., in the 
Gulf of Maine), and on 27 October 2001, China adopted the Law on the 
Management of the Sea Uses. These examples make no claim to be complete, 
but they do illustrate that the recent developments at the European level 
towards an integrated maritime policy echo similar dynamic approaches from 
around the world. All these initiatives follow the same conviction: we have to 
change how we make policies and take decisions to safeguard ocean 
sustainability. 
                                                 
6
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
7
 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31. 
8
 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Ottawa: 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc_e.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 
2008). 
9
 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, The Great Barrier Reef: Keeping it great 
(Townsville: GBRMPA, 1994), available:  <http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/ 
0005/2111/mp_017_full.pdf> (retrieved 29 April 2009). 
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The implementation of an integrated maritime policy requires adequate 
planning tools that cut across sea-related sectoral policies and supports unified 
policy making. Maritime spatial planning is considered to be one of the key 
tools in this regard.  The following  sections elaborate on the development of 
maritime spatial planning, its character and procedural steps, as well as the 
challenges that lie ahead in order to use maritime spatial planning to its 
maximum capacity in the European Union. 
 
 
5.2. The Emergence of Maritime Spatial Planning  
 
We are at a crossroads in our relationship with the oceans.10 
 
At the European level the term maritime spatial planning is favoured over 
marine spatial planning, despite the current situation whereby many countries 
use a different term. During the development of the EU Integrated Maritime 
Policy, emphasis was placed on the fact that integrated sustainable management 
is more than nature protection and conservation. The ecosystem-based 
approach, which underpins not only the Integrated Maritime Policy but also 
maritime spatial planning, requires the consideration of ecological and socio-
economic aspects. The term maritime spatial planning highlights the 
importance of managing all sea-related sectors and human activities at sea in an 
integrated, well-balanced manner and in compliance with a healthy ecosystem. 
 
 
5.2.1. The Current Situation: Use Without Coordination 
 
Our interactions with the sea are more intense, more varied, and create more 
value than ever before. On the one hand technology and know-how allow us to 
extract ever more value from the sea, new uses such as offshore installations for 
renewable energy (particularly offshore wind farms) complement traditional 
uses, and more and more people benefit from the generated values. On the other 
hand the cumulative effect of this increased activity leads to competition for 
limited marine space and increases stress on marine ecosystems. The growing 
vulnerability of coastal areas, increasingly crowded coastal waters, the key role 
of the oceans in the world’s climate system, and the continuous deterioration of 
                                                 
10
 Blue Book, n. 4 above, p. 2. 
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the marine environment all call for a stronger focus on our oceans and seas. 
The current fragmented decision-making framework in maritime affairs in 
Europe is inadequate in meeting these challenges. Policies on, for instance, 
maritime transport, fisheries, energy, surveillance and policing of the seas, 
tourism, the marine environment, and marine research have developed on 
separate tracks, which leads to inefficiencies, incoherencies, and conflicts of 
use. 
The example of the Belgian part of the North Sea illustrates clearly the 
current situation of multiple uses of marine space without coordination. 
The scientific GAUFRE project (2003–2005)11 was launched to deal with the 
high level of use in the Belgian part of the North Sea in a structural manner. 
The North Sea is one of the most exploited areas of water in the world, and the 
Belgian part of the North Sea lies at the hub of these activities. An assessment 
of the current activities in the rather small Belgian sector of the North Sea 
resulted in a chaotic picture of overlapping uses and an overuse of the available 
marine space by 264 percent.12  
The GAUFRE project highlighted the urgent need for a spatial structure 
plan due to the demands of renewable energy at sea (offshore wind farms), 
the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU, and the requirement to delineate 
marine nature reserves (the Natura 2000 network)13 in the Belgian sector of the 
North Sea. It must be emphasised that the Belgian example is not 
an exceptional case. The same picture of uncoordinated, potentially conflicting, 
high-density uses could be drawn for any other European sea basin. 
 
                                                 
11
 The project was made up of an interdisciplinary team of experts, representing legal sciences, 
socio-economic sciences, as well as experts in marine biology and marine geology.  
12
 “The GAUFRE Project 2003–2005,” available: <http://www.maritieminstituut.be/ 
main.cgi?s_id=165=&lang=en> (retrieved on 29 April 2009). 
13
 The Habitats Directive (together with the Birds Directive) forms the cornerstone of Europe’s 
nature conservation policy. These directives require EU Member States to identify areas for 
nature protection, which will in turn form a Europe-wide network of nature protection areas—
the so-called Natura 2000 network, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/ 
legislation/habitatsdirective/index_en.htm> (retrieved on 29 April 2009).  
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Figure 5.1. Existing maritime uses in the Belgian part of the North Sea 
 
Source: “The GAUFRE Project 2003–2005,” available at Universiteit Gent Maritiem Instituut 
website: <http://www.maritieminstituut.be> (retrieved 18 November 2008). 
 
 
5.2.2. Maritime Spatial Planning: A Key Tool for Sustainable Decision 
Making 
 
Existing planning frameworks have a largely terrestrial focus and often do not 
address how coastal developments affect the sea and vice versa. Maritime 
spatial planning (MSP) is a coordinated, integrated process that builds on an 
ecosystem-based approach.14 It seeks to integrate all relevant maritime sectors 
                                                 
14
 The ecosystem approach refers to “the comprehensive integrated management of human 
activities based on the best available scientific knowledge about the ecosystem and its 
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and human activities; no sector is given priority over another. MSP therefore 
reaches beyond managing and protecting the marine environment. Its main 
objective is to allocate marine space in a rational manner and thus arbitrate 
between different sectoral or user interests. MSP provides certainty for 
investments through a reliable planning process that helps to secure the 
sustainable and integrated development of sea areas by balancing economic, 
social and environmental objectives.  
Despite some similarities, MSP differs significantly from terrestrial or 
land use planning. Thus terrestrial planning systems cannot simply be 
transferred to the marine environment. MSP operates in a continuous three-
dimensional environment and in complex ecosystems, and has to 
simultaneously address activities that take place on the seabed, in the water 
column, and on the water surface. These activities are usually not independent 
from each other but are permanently intertwined. MSP must take account of 
both fixed structures, such as oil rigs, pipelines or wind farms, but also the 
mobile nature of many maritime activities (such as fishing and navigation) that 
use space but not permanent structures. Additionally, the time dimension plays 
an important role in MSP. The compatibility or incompatibility of uses is highly 
dependent on the various seasonal stages of an ecosystem and might therefore 
significantly vary over time, e.g., compatibility between nature protection and 
fisheries, recreational fishing and commercial fisheries, or nature protection and 
marine tourism. This variation has to be taken into account when maritime 
spatial management decisions are made. 
The most striking difference, however, between MSP and terrestrial 
planning is the legal framework in which the related activities take place. Land 
use planning takes place against a common background of land tenure rights 
which do not have a maritime equivalent. Instead, maritime activities are 
regulated through a range of sectoral laws, plans, and licenses/permits. 
MSP is place-based management in the sense that it has to reflect the 
specific uses, needs and challenges of a given sea area. It is important to define 
the planning area in a transparent manner, involving all relevant stakeholders 
and decision makers, in order to avoid any misunderstandings or user conflicts 
throughout the process. This might result in a country deciding to develop 
a prescriptive maritime spatial plan only for a particularly vulnerable or densely 
                                                                                                                                  
dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences which are critical to the health of 
marine ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services and 
maintenance of ecosystem integrity.” C. Ehler and F. Douvere, Visions for a Sea Change. 
Report of the First International Workshop on Marine Spatial Planning, Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission and the Man and Biosphere Programme. IOC Manual and Guides 
46: ICAM Dossier, 3 (Paris: UNESCO, 2007), p. 16. 
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used area where conflicts between different activities are likely to occur. More 
general management principles might suffice for an area with a lower density of 
uses. The decision on whether to opt for a stricter or more flexible approach 
should be subject to an assessment and evaluation process.  
MSP is a circular process that—pursuant to the identification of the 
planning area—consists of the definition of objectives, the assessment of the 
present situation for which the best available data and information should be 
used, stakeholder involvement, the transparent and participatory development 
of a maritime spatial plan, the implementation of this plan, enforcement 
measures, evaluation, and subsequent revision or amendments to the plan. 
Figure 5.2 was developed by the BALANCE project and provides a good 
overview of the steps in the MSP process. The development of a maritime 
spatial plan is hence only one step in the entire process and by no means a final 
result.  
 
Figure 5.2. Planning cycle as developed by the BALANCE project 
 
 
Source: Jan Ekebom et al., Towards marine spatial planning in the Baltic Sea, BALANCE 
Technical Summary Report 4/4, May 2008, p. 21, available: <http://balance-eu.org/publications/ 
index.html> (retrieved 29 April 2009). 
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MSP can be implemented through various instruments of which zoning is 
only one possible option. Current practice shows, however, that the delineation 
of zones for certain maritime activities is the preferred option. The reason for 
this choice might be that the process of zoning is well known from land use 
planning and is therefore a familiar way to deal with spatial management. 
Whether or not zoning is the best way to implement MSP or whether other 
instruments have to be developed that are tailor made for the specific demands 
of MSP is a matter of further research and debate. 
 
 
5.3. Current Practices 
 
Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we 
must do.15 
 
At the European level, MSP is a fairly new approach. Implementation of MSP 
is the responsibility of EU Member States, and the experiences at the national 
level remain limited. Despite the application of the subsidiarity principle, action 
at the EU level can provide significant added value. As announced in the Blue 
Book for the EU Integrated Maritime Policy and the accompanying Action 
Plan, the European Commission adopted on 25 November 2008 the 
Communication “Roadmap on Maritime Spatial Planning: Achieving Common 
Principles in the EU.”16 This Communication aims to facilitate the development 
of MSP and to encourage its implementation both at the national and EU levels. 
To support this objective, the Roadmap provides information on existing 
approaches in EU Member States and other international examples, as well as 
indicating international and EU legal instruments that have an impact on MSP. 
Based on this stocktaking exercise, the Roadmap identifies ten key principles 
for MSP that will form the basis for a broad debate on a common approach to 
MSP in the EU. These key principles are: 
 
1. Using MSP according to area and type of activity 
2. Defining objectives to guide MSP 
3. Developing MSP in a transparent manner 
4. Stakeholder participation 
                                                 
15
 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). 
16
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission, Roadmap 
on Maritime Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles in the EU, COM(2008) 791, 
25 November 2008. 
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5. Coordination within Member States – simplifying decision making 
6. Ensuring the legal effect of national MSP 
7. Cross-border cooperation and consultation 
8. Incorporating monitoring and evaluation in the planning process 
9. Achieving coherence between terrestrial and maritime spatial planning – 
relationship with integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) 
10. A strong data and knowledge base 
 
As follow-up to the Roadmap, the European Commission is currently 
organising a series of four workshops throughout 2009 to further discuss the 
applicability of the key principles and to develop a common understanding on 
MSP across the EU. Additionally, it is envisaged that two pilot projects will be 
launched in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea/North East Atlantic area to test the 
cross-border implementation of MSP. These pilot projects will be run in close 
cooperation with EU Member States, relevant stakeholders, and international 
organisations. Finally, the Commission will launch a study on the economic 
benefits of MSP. Up until now such benefits are assumed but cannot yet be 
proven by facts and figures. This study will help to identify reliable information 
in this respect.  
 
5.3.1. Examples from European Countries 
 
Some European countries have been the forerunners for the implementation of 
MSP, while others have more recently started to develop integrated 
management strategies for their sea areas. The activities vary significantly 
regarding their legally-binding function and their sectoral coverage. Some 
Member States have developed, on the basis of their terrestrial planning law, 
maritime spatial plans that will become executive order law once the 
consultation process is finalised (e.g., Belgium and Germany). Others have 
developed strategic or integrated management plans that are not legally binding 
but aim to give guidance to the maritime sector regarding, for example, the 
location of maritime installations (e.g., the Netherlands and Norway). 
Furthermore, policy framework documents—marine bills—have been prepared 
(e.g., by the United Kingdom and Scotland) or currently are under preparation 
(e.g., by Sweden) to implement a national integrated maritime policy and to 
steer future maritime development in a sustainable way. In all these policy 
setting documents, MSP plays an important role in implementing a coordinated 
approach to the allocation of marine space. 
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Most recently, Poland has adopted guidelines on maritime policy. These 
guidelines seek to upgrade the maritime dimension in all areas of the country’s 
development. They are meant to be a basis for developing a regulatory system 
based on an integrated cross-sectoral approach to maritime affairs. The French 
government has launched the Grenelle de la Mer, applying the principles from 
the Grenelle de l’Environment, its long-term policy vision on ecological and 
sustainable development, to the oceans and seas. Further to the identified need 
for an integrated approach to the sea and new governance structures, the 
Grenelle de la Mer will develop a comprehensive strategy for the sea in the 
form of a law based on sound scientific, economic, and social assessment by the 
end 2009. 
It must be emphasised that MSP not only has a present but also a forward-
looking dimension. As far as current practice is concerned, EU Member States 
tend to focus mainly on the management of ongoing maritime uses and related 
licensing procedures. Given the ecosystem-based approach of MSP and the 
cross-border nature of all maritime activities, this approach can be seen as too 
short-sighted. Objective setting remains a sectoral-oriented process, which 
leads to an unrealistic account of user interests following on the slogan “no 
limits.” This way of objective setting does not reflect the capacity and the 
performance of the ecosystem and therefore has to be changed. An integrated 
assessment of all sectoral demands and the mirroring of the assessment results 
with the capability of a given ecosystem will very likely lead to a revision of 
the present set of objectives. In order to use MSP to its maximum management 
and steering capacity, foreseeable uses and sectoral developments have to be 
taken into account, as well as the political climate that influences the 
development of the sea and the ocean. 
Currently, there is a different approach to MSP in northern Europe 
compared to southern Europe. While many northern European countries have 
both a regime for integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and MSP, the 
southern European states tend to focus their activities on the implementation of 
ICZM. The management of coastal zones has a long tradition in these countries, 
and recent developments like the ratification of the ICZM protocol under the 
Barcelona Convention strengthen this tradition. The very complex situation of 
the Mediterranean Sea (a large number of third countries and so far no 
exclusive economic zone claims by EU Member States) challenges the 
implementation of MSP. However, both the Barcelona Convention ICZM 
protocol and the experience of other EU Member States with the spatial 
management of territorial waters (e.g., Spain has launched a study to zone its 
territorial waters for offshore wind uses, and the German federal state of 
Mecklemburg Vorpommern has developed integrated maritime spatial planning 
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for its territorial waters) offer interesting opportunities for the elaboration of 
MSP particularly in complex sea areas like the Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea.  
 
 
5.3.2. International Good Practices 
 
Internationally, there are many good practices examples that can be highlighted 
regarding the use and implementation of MSP. Australia, with its management 
of the Great Barrier Reef, has the longest tradition. As mentioned above, 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is a multiple-use area. The instrument of 
zoning is applied to help to manage and protect the values of the marine park. 
Zoning plans define what activities can occur in which locations, both to protect 
the marine environment and to separate potentially conflicting activities. 
Australia is currently the only country that has a sufficiently long experience 
with zoning (over 15 years), which has resulted in a monitoring and evaluation 
process of the ocean management activities at the Great Barrier Reef. This 
process was developed following extensive research and the most 
comprehensive community consultation process ever undertaken on 
an Australian environmental issue. It led, in 2004, to the introduction of revised 
zoning of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park as part of the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Authority’s Representative Areas Program.17 
In Canada, the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) 
Plan was endorsed by the senior intergovernmental Regional Committee on 
Ocean Management in December 2006. This is the first integrated ocean 
management plan under the Oceans Act (see above). The initiative is 
a collaborative ocean planning process that considers the ecosystem and all of 
its uses comprehensively. The aim of the plan is to provide a common basis for 
commitment and action for sustainable use, conservation, and integrated ocean 
management in the Eastern Scotian Shelf planning area. To achieve this aim the 
plan is organised according to the following goals: 
 
• Collaborative governance and integrated management 
• Sustainable human use 
• Healthy ecosystems 
 
                                                 
17
 Australian Government, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, available: 
<http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site> (retrieved 29 April 2009). 
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The ESSIM plan employs a multi-stakeholder planning and objective-
based approach to integrated ocean management. The objective-based 
management framework consists of a hierarchy of objectives, associated 
management strategies and actions, and a reporting system. Key elements are 
identified for effective implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the plan. 
This initiative represents a long-term commitment to integrated ocean 
management.  
These are only two of many examples that illustrate the rich international 
experiences in MSP that can benefit the development at European level and 
vice versa. Lessons are still to be learned and a number of challenges are ahead 
of us to improve the knowledge and skills that are needed to implement MSP in 
a meaningful way. The following section will touch upon some of these 
challenges. 
 
 
5.4. Challenges for Implementation and Future Development of MSP  
 
An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has 
come.18 
 
5.4.1. MSP in the High Seas 
 
According to the LOS Convention, a nation state has full jurisdiction in its 
internal waters and the territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) and sovereign 
rights for the purpose of economic exploitation (e.g., resources, energy) in the 
exclusive economic zone (up to 200 nautical miles). The possibility of 
regulating maritime uses in the high sea—in other words to implementing MSP 
in areas outside national jurisdiction—are very limited. This does not, however, 
mean that sustainable management of the high seas is not needed. As Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese stated, “In the seas and oceans, where everything flows, 
everything interacts with everything else, and resources are ‘straddling’, the 
notion of hard and fast ‘boundaries’ is rather meaningless to start with. It is 
impossible to manage resources or to protect the environment even within the 
largest Exclusive Economic Zone, if there is no management beyond the 
boundary.”19 The LOS Convention is not at its final stage. Regulations and 
                                                 
18
 Victor Hugo (1802–1885), Histoire d’un crime, 1852. 
19
 Borgese, n. 1 above, p. 123. 
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rules have to be flexible enough to adapt to changing framework conditions. 
When the LOS Convention was adopted, the urgent need for sustainable 
management and the protection of the marine environment were probably not as 
obvious as they are today. Some success has been made regarding the 
protection of the marine environment in the high seas (one example in this 
respect is the PELAGOS sanctuary for marine mammals in the 
Mediterranean20). It might be worth considering whether the LOS Convention 
should be amended to facilitate the use of MSP in the high seas. 
 
 
5.4.2. International Governance Structures 
 
Current practice shows that a reliable governance structure is a pre-condition 
for meaningful and long-term sustainable management of marine resources. 
Further work needs to be done to develop governance structures, particularly at 
the international level, when sea basins are shared by several countries or, in the 
case of the EU, by different Member States. The United Nations Environment 
Programme Regional Seas Programmes might offer an opportunity to achieving 
this goal. However, the objectives of the Programme and the various regional 
seas conventions largely focus on the protection of the marine environment. If 
MSP is to be respected and accepted by all maritime sectors, its neutral position 
is of utmost importance. As illustrated above, MSP provides the appropriate 
framework to arbitrate between sectoral interests. This only works if all the 
sectors are treated as equals. Any situation that can lead to a biased MSP 
process must be avoided. This could become a difficulty if regional sea 
conventions are given the added responsibility of implementing MSP at the 
international level whilst their mandate is not broadened beyond environmental 
issues.  
 
 
5.4.3. Cumulative Effects of Maritime Uses 
 
MSP builds on the ecosystem approach. Ecosystem-based management requires 
the protection of the ecosystem, its functioning and processes; the recognition 
of all inter-connectedness within and among systems; the integration of 
                                                 
20
 The Pelagos Sanctuary, available: <http://www.tethys.org/sanctuary.htm> (retrieved 29 April 
2009). 
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ecological, social, economic and institutional perspectives; and place-based 
management. In order to meet these requirements, assessment methods and 
instruments are needed that take the whole ecosystem into account. Currently, 
assessments are mainly carried out on a case-by-case basis (e.g., in the 
framework of an environment impact assessment for major infrastructure or 
installations) and in a national rather than cross-border context. Further research 
is urgently needed to develop appropriate tools and methodologies that help to 
measure the cumulative effects of human activities on an ecosystem.  
 
 
5.4.4. Compatibility of Uses: The Different Dimensions of MSP 
 
Knowledge about the compatibility of uses at sea remains very limited. 
Information that is available was mainly gathered with the focus on a certain 
situation or conflict (e.g., the reaction of migrating birds to a new offshore wind 
farm or the level of disturbance of marine mammals due to the installation and 
operational noise of windmills). The information is, therefore, generally site 
specific and results cannot necessarily be transferred to a similar situation or a 
different location. The question of compatibility is also closely linked to the 
cumulative effects of maritime activities. Although a specific location and 
activity might be compatible, compatibility might not be assured if the project 
in question is examined in the context of its adjacent uses. Furthermore, there 
are no reliable methods and instruments to measure the influence of the time 
dimension to compatibility. Research and further scientific input is needed to 
develop tools that better match the complex challenges posed in marine 
ecosystems. 
 
 
5.4.5. Educational Needs 
 
A relatively untouched challenge is that of educational needs. Who are the 
people that will implement maritime spatial planning? Where can these people 
be trained? What kind of knowledge do they need? Universities have only taken 
the first steps to build up this educational base, e.g., summer schools for MSP 
or ICZM. To date, no full curriculum has been developed to teach MSP at the 
university level. Lessons can be learned from land use planning. Educational 
institutions offer a programme of a general study that provides the students with 
an overview of the related sectoral policies and conveys integrated thinking, 
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coordination and cooperation with regard to land use planning. A similar set-up 
is needed for MSP. Students,  as well as employees of the responsible public 
authorities, have to have at least a basic knowledge about maritime transport, 
shipping, maritime energy (both fossil and renewable), oceanography, biology, 
the marine environment, fisheries and aquaculture, coastal and marine tourism, 
the land-sea interface and so forth. Internationally, it is time to join forces and 
develop training programmes and courses that provide the people that have to 
implement MSP with the required knowledge and skills. 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
MSP is a rather new development at the European level. Although spatial 
planning at sea was used by some countries at the national level already in the 
1960s and 1970s (examples are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Norway), the related management activities focussed to a large extend only on 
sectoral needs (planning for one particular sector like the dredging industry, 
offshore oil and gas exploitation, fisheries and aquaculture, etc.). This can not 
be considered MSP as it is defined today. Integrated plans that include all 
relevant maritime sectors did not exist and still are very rare. Even the most 
advanced EU Member States like Germany, the Netherlands or Belgium have 
not managed yet to integrate all maritime sectors. Particularly fisheries, but also 
recreational uses of the sea or military uses, are very challenging to integrate. 
This is not only due to the specific structure of the given sectors but also  to the 
restricted accessibility or limited availability of reliable data and information. 
At the European level, it is the first time that an attempt has been made towards 
a concerted framework for MSP, to encourage its implementation, and to 
develop a common understanding of the process and its instruments. A joint 
learning process that has only started, it is, however, promising. Global 
challenges like climate change and the maritime dimension that encompass 
virtually any human activity have led to the conviction that sectoral decision 
making should be replaced by an integrated, all-embracing approach to the 
management of marine resources. Diverse user interests in the seas and oceans 
have to be carefully measured and guided to ensure their compliance with 
a healthy marine environment that everything else depends on. 
This chapter has only touched upon some of the future challenges in 
regard to implementing MSP. The availability and accessibility of reliable 
information and data will also be an important issue in the future. If conflicts of 
uses between maritime sectors are to be avoided, or at least reduced to 
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a minimum, trust has to be build to turn the current “my interests first and 
without limits” approach into a real integrated approach. Implementing MSP 
will provide economic benefits. This is not only relevant for maritime 
industries, but also for the credibility of the whole MSP process. It is important 
to prove with facts and figures that the effort as well as the costs involved in 
implementing MSP will pay off. If we truly want to achieve sustainable use of 
marine resources and protect the marine environment for coming generations, 
MSP provides a promising way forward.21 
 
                                                 
21
 More information on the different aspects of MSP is provided in the Special Issue of Marine 
Policy, “The Role of Marine Spatial Planning in Implementing Ecosystem-Based Sea Use 
Management,” Volume 32, September 2008. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Ocean Renewable Energy in the European Union: Understanding and 
Strengthening EU-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean 
Governance  
 
Freedom-Kai Phillips∗ 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
Ocean-based renewable energy sources, though in their infancy relative to other 
more widely employed technologies (particularly wind and solar), have 
an immense potential to positively impact two preeminent EU energy policy 
goals: greenhouse gas emission reduction and security of supply. Europe has 
made many progressive strides in terms of renewable energy governance, and 
other nations may therefore benefit greatly from a comparative assessment of 
the EU’s ocean renewable energy policy. This contribution examines the legal 
framework governing the development of ocean renewable energy in the EU, in 
particular the Renewables Directive, and provides an overview of the various 
policy instruments employed by the Member States domestically, with special 
reference to those relevant for ocean renewable energy utilisation. Finally, 
the paper also includes a detailed case-study of the Scottish Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) as a singular example of a particularly 
comprehensive implementation scheme for commercially viable ocean energy 
projects. 
 
 
7.1.1. Energy Governance in the EU – Starting Points  
 
Apart from the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM)1 and the former Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
                                                 
∗
 I must offer a most heartfelt thank you to Professors Meinhard Doelle and David 
VanderZwaag at Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law. Were it not for their guidance, wisdom 
and continued patience this project would not have been a success. Also I would like to extend 
my gratitude to Ms. Maria Pettersson of Luleå University of Technology for her insightful 
comments and contributions to this chapter.  
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Community,2 there is a notable lack of treaty provisions in the field of energy. 
Although the treaty establishing the European Community obliges the EU to 
take the “energy measures” necessary for the achievement of such Community 
targets as a common market, and an economic and monetary union, it does not 
hold any provisions regarding the Community’s competence in energy matters. 
The lack of explicit Community competence in this respect is foremost due to 
the Member States’ unwillingness to give up sovereignty in an area of such 
considerable economic importance as energy supply. As a consequence, 
decisions affecting the use of land and water areas, such as physical planning, 
and decisions that significantly impact the choice of energy sources and the 
energy supply mix must be taken in unison.  
Notwithstanding the lack of expressed competence in energy matters, it is 
still possible for the EU to introduce energy policy instruments via the general 
competence since the Treaty does not include any special provisions regarding, 
for example, renewable energy. The EU may thus use its general competence 
regarding harmonisation and environmental protection to take measures with 
the intention to promote an increased use of renewable energy sources. 
The opportunity to direct the energy policy in the Member States via 
legislative measures was first used in 2001 with the adoption of the Renewables 
Directive. Prior to this piece of legislation, renewable energy was primarily 
promoted via cooperation agreements, recommendations and research support 
and to some extent via other environmentally related legislation, such as the 
energy conservation requirement that follows from the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention Control Directive.3 During 2000–2005, the EU established a system 
for emissions trading as a first step to achieving its commitments under the 
international climate regime. Under certain circumstances the emission trading 
system may promote an increased use of renewables, although the overall 
purpose with the system is to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, 
primarily carbon dioxide, and thus mitigate climate change. The trading system 
is built upon three legal regimes: the actual trading directive,4 which establishes 
                                                                                                                                  
1
 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Rome, 25 March 
1957. 
2
 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Paris, 18 April 1951. 
3
 Council Directive 96/91 of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control. 
4
 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, 
Official Journal 275/32 of 25 October 2003, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0046:EN:PDF> (retrieved 14 November 2008).  
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the cap-and-trade system; the “linking directive”,5 which links the EU trading 
system to the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Registries 
Regulation.6 The extent to which the trading system may promote the use of 
renewables will depend on, among other things, the size of the cap. 
A couple of other legal regimes have been adopted with the intention to 
promote the use of renewable energy sources, although they are of minor 
importance for the utilisation of ocean renewable energy development.7 
Overall, there are (at least) four EU directives that have bearing on the 
development of ocean renewable energy and each is based on the Community’s 
competence in matters regarding the environment (Article 175 (1)). The EU 
regulatory framework for offshore renewable development is examined below.  
 
 
7.2. The European Regulatory Framework  
 
In 2007, the Commission presented an energy policy for Europe (the “energy” 
package) with the intention to secure energy supply and promote sustainable 
development.8 The primary drivers behind the proposal are the imminent threat 
of climate change, the increasing import dependency, and the rising energy 
prices. In view of this, the EU made several decisions, e.g., to reduce the 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 20 percent and that one fifth of gross 
                                                 
5
 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms, Official 
Journal L 338/18 of 13 November 2004, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:338:0018:0023:EN:PDF> (retrieved 14 November 2008). 
6
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2216/2004 of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and 
secured system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, Official Journal L 386/1 of 29 December 2004, available: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:386:0001:0077:EN:PDF> (retrieved 
15 November 2008). 
7
 Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 on the 
promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport, [2003] Official Journal 
L 123/42 of 17 May 2003, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/res/legislation/doc/biofuels/ 
en_final.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008); Commission of the European Communities, 
Biomass Action Plan, Communication from the Commission, COM(2005) 628 final (Brussels, 
7 December 2005). 
8
 Commission of the European Communities, An energy policy for Europe, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, COM(2007) 1 
final (Brussels, 10 January 2007). 
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domestic consumption should stem from renewables by the year 2020.9 As 
a means to implement the energy policy, the Renewable Energy Road Map 
speaks in favour of policies and measures to e.g., remove administrative 
barriers and improve the existing legal framework to promote an increased use 
of renewables.  
Europe’s renewable energy renaissance has many longstanding public 
policy concerns at its foundation. Following the first oil crisis in the 1970s, 
Europe became astutely aware of the prevailing issue of energy security and 
how external energy developments may have far-reaching negative effects on 
European economies. Although minor strides were made to consider the issue, 
real progress to combat this innate vulnerability in European strategic policy 
was hindered early on by two key factors: complexity and cost. In the early 
1980s, energy again rose to the forefront of Europe’s domestic and foreign 
policy interests. Yet, this time it was not purely in the context of security; rather 
environmental protection became an ever-strengthening competing interest. As 
the geo-political landscape of the 1970s cooled, the price of energy began to 
stabilise. However, with the signing of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal 
Protocol,10 rising international anxiety over global greenhouse gas emission 
added a new dimension to the European security dynamic. In response, the 
European Community (EC) recognised the promotion of renewable energy 
sources as a new policy objective,11 subsequently removing market barriers to 
their exploration and development.12 The question of fossil fuel demands 
juxtaposing environmental protection culminated with the recognition of the 
problems posed by climate change and adoption of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed at the Rio 
                                                 
9
 Commission of the European Communities, Renewable Energy Road Map. Renewable 
Energies in the 21st century: building a more sustainable future, Commission Communication, 
COM(2006) 848 final (Brussels, 10 January 2007). 
10
 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 
no.26164, (entered into force 22 September 1988), available: <http://www.unep.org/Ozone/ 
pdfs/viennaconvention2002.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008); Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. no. 26369, 
(entered into force 1 January 1989) available: <http://www.unep.org/OZONE/pdfs/Montreal-
Protocol2000.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008). 
11
 Council Resolution of 16 September 1986 concerning new Community energy policy 
objectives for 1995 and convergence of the policies of the Member States, Official Journal 
C 241 of 25 September 1986, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:31986Y0925(01):EN:HTML> (retrieved 15 November 2008), para. 1.f. 
12
 Council Recommendation of 9 June 1988 on developing the exploitation of renewable energy 
sources in the Community(88/349/88), Official Journal L 160 of 28 June 1988, available:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31988H0349:EN:HTML> 
(retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 46. 
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Conference of 1992. At Rio, the international community established a global 
partnership for environmental protection and development aimed at preventing 
severe climatic interference.13 It was now readily apparent that the issues of 
environmental preservation and energy usage were increasingly interconnected 
and could not be addressed independently.  
Early on, European Member States were receptive to renewable energy 
sources as a means to foster a secure and sustainable energy supply. Shortly 
after Rio, the EC implemented the ALTENER programme as a financial 
support mechanism to promote innovation in renewable energy sources, 
coupled with a modest renewable energy target of 8 percent by 2005.14 In 1995, 
in response to the mounting environmental, economic and technological 
developments, the EC put forward a reformed energy policy to adapt to the 
rapid progress internationally and that was aimed at increasing overall 
competitiveness, gaining security of supply, environmental protection,15 and 
working towards a 12 percent renewable energy source mix by 2010.16 
Renewable energy sources were acknowledged as an avenue with immense 
potential, and one which should be more robustly promoted in the EU, as well 
as at the national level. Subsequently, the EC launched a second five-year 
promotion initiative – ALTENER II – with a bolstered budged and a broadened 
mandated,17 and granted Member States the option to give priority to 
installations using renewable energy sources.18 This approach allowed the EU 
to capitalise on the strategic gains made by the benchmark programme, 
                                                 
13
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. no. 
30822 (entered into force 21 March 1994), available: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ 
conveng.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
14
 Council Decision of 13 September 1993 concerning the promotion of renewable energy 
sources in the Community (Altener programme) (93/500/EEC), Official Journal L 235 of 
18 September 1993, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:31993D0500:EN:HTML> (retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 41. 
15
 Commission of the European Communities. White Paper: An Energy policy for the European 
Union, Com (95) 682 (Brussels, 13 December 1995), available: <http://aei.pitt.edu/1129/01/ 
energy_white_paper_COM_95_682.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008). 
16
 M. M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Rønne, and I. del Guayo, eds, Energy Law in Europe, 
2nd edition(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 376. 
17
 Common Position (EC) no 9/98 adopted by the Council on 19 January 1998 with a view to 
adopting a Council Decision concerning a multiannual programme for the promotion of 
renewable energy sources in the Community (Altener II), Official Journal C 62 of 26 February 
1998, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:062: 
0031:0037:EN:PDF> (retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 31. 
18
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal L 27 of 
30 January 1997, available: <http://www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/sectors/energy/documents/ 
electricity_directive/dir96-92.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 25.  
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simultaneously empowering Member States with the requisite flexibility 
necessary to expand the percentage played by renewable energy sources in the 
national energy mix indefinitely. 
Although the strategies imposed by the EU were forward looking, on-the-
ground progress of renewable energy sources was more modest. Member States 
developed renewable energy sources to differing degrees dependent upon their 
economic and geographic limitations, resulting in a great disparity in levels of 
renewable energy source consumption and types employed across the EU. 
Furthermore, a lack of “qualified objectives” made it difficult to calculate the 
progress of the ALTENER and associated programmes.19 The signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol increased international pressure for a reformed policy on 
renewable energy sources by the EU as the emission reduction framework in 
place proved to be inadequate to fulfill the EU’s international obligations.20 
Finally, because Member States developed renewable energy sources in 
a fragmented fashion, the EU lacked a clear-sighted common vision for the 
integration of renewable energy sources into the energy mix. Consequently, the 
European Parliament requested a concrete legal framework addressing, e.g., 
proposals for grid access for renewable energy sources,21 continuation of 
current programmes, as well as setting clear binding targets for future 
developments.22 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Special Report No 17/98, on support for renewable energy sources in the shared-cost actions 
of the Joule-Thermie Programme and the pilot actions of the Altener Programme together with 
the Commission's replies (Submitted pursuant to Article 188c(4)(2) of the EC Treaty), Official 
Journal C 356 of 20 November 1998, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998Y1120(03):EN:HTML> (retrieved 15 November 2008), 
p. 39, para. 7.1.  
20
 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Towards a European strategy for 
security of energy supply, Communication from the Commission, COM (2000) 796 (Brussels, 
29 November 2000), available: <http://aei.pitt.edu/1184/01/enegy_supply_security_gp_COM_ 
2000_769.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008). 
21
 Resolution A4-0199/98 incorporating Parliament’s recommendation to the Commission for a 
proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the feeding in of electricity from 
renewable sources of energy in the European Union, Official Journal C 210 of 17 June 1998, 
available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:210:0100:0165 
:EN:PDF> (retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 143. 
22
 Resolution A5-0078/2000 of the European Parliament on Electricity from renewable energy 
sources and the internal electricity market (SEC(1999) 470 ( C5-0342/1999 (2000/2002(COS)), 
Official Journal C 378 of 29 December 2000, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:378:0089:0095:EN:PDF> (retrieved 15 November 2008), p. 93, 
para. 6.  
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7.2.1. The Renewables Directive 
 
With the submission of the Renewables Directive (the so-called RES-E 
directive),23 the EU took a firm stance to enhance the role played by renewables 
in Europe and to establish a comprehensive framework to do so.24 Although 
many previous strides were made to foster momentum behind the use of 
renewable energy sources, in practice their integration into the Community 
energy mix was a slow process. The Renewables Directive aims to streamline 
and enhance the integration of renewable energy sources into the market. 
However, rather than trying to amalgamate the previous programmes, Member 
States are provided with the flexibility to implement their own unique 
renewable energy strategies or to experiment with various sources.25 
Functionally, the Directive accomplishes four key goals: (i) outlining key 
definitions; (ii) designing a complex reporting mechanism; (iii) designating the 
administrative requirements of Member States; and (iv) setting a bolstered 
renewable energy consumption target for the Community. Each of these goals 
must be assessed in more detail to clearly define the new energy framework in 
place for the Community and to truly appreciate the energy vision of the EU. 
 
 
7.2.1.1. Definitions 
 
The Renewables Directive outlines four key definitions in Article 2. Of most 
relevance, “renewable energy sources” is given a broad and expansive 
definition, and valid sources are enumerated. Most notably, both wave and tidal 
energy systems are encompassed as eligible sources,26 opening the door for 
future work on marine renewable energy development. Article 2 also defines 
“biomass” as biodegradable products, “consumption” as gross national energy 
usage, and “energy produced from renewable sources” as energy produced from 
purely renewable plants as well as hybrid plants (both renewable and non-
renewable). While the first two definitions are straightforward, the definition of 
                                                 
23
 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 27 September 2001 on 
the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal market, 
Official Journal L 283/33 of 27 October 2001, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/ 
dat/2001/l_283/l_28320011027en00330040.pdf> (retrieved 15 November 2008) [hereinafter 
Renewables Directive]. 
24
 Roggenkamp, n. 16 above, p. 377. 
25
 Id.  
26
 Renewables Directive, n. 23 above, Article 2(a), eligible sources are defined as “renewable 
non-fossil energy sources (wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, landfill 
gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases).”  
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energy produced from renewables has a key point. It is possible to use a hybrid 
plant as a start-up to a full scale renewable plant. This provides a transitional 
strategy for energy producers and opens the door for smaller scale or more 
localised projects, and lowers the economic burden on producers at the onset of 
a project.  
 
 
7.2.1.2. Reporting Mechanism 
 
A very important contribution made by the Renewables Directive is the design 
and implementation of a complex reporting mechanism for both the EU and 
Member States which has numerous requirements. First, Member States are 
obliged adopt and publish a report outlining domestic consumption targets for 
renewable energy sources over the next decade. Member States are also to 
conduct a review and re-evaluation of these targets every five years, with the 
caveat that they must be consistent with the targets outlined in the Annex, as 
well as those agreed upon under the Kyoto Protocol.27 
Second, Member States are to publish a report analysing the progress 
made towards meeting national targets, the reliability of the “guarantee of 
origin” system,28 and whether or not this progress is in line with national 
commitments. Moreover, progress is to be re-evaluated and republished on two-
year review cycles.29 Third, the Commission must publish a report assessing the 
progress made in terms of both domestic as well as Community renewable 
energy consumption targets. The Commission report may be accompanied by 
policy proposals to the European Parliament or revised targets where 
necessary.30 
Forth, the Commission shall evaluate the role played by support schemes, 
their cost-effectiveness, and their success in achieving national targets.31 Fifth, 
Member States are obliged to publish a report assessing both the devices used 
to ensure and expand grid access,32 as well as the existing legislative and 
regulatory mechanisms in place, with an aim to reducing barriers to increased 
renewable energy production, streamlining administrative procedures, and 
ensuring transparency and non-discriminatory behaviour towards renewable 
energy sources.33 Finally, based on the previous reports submitted by Member 
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States, the Commission will publish a summary report every five years with the 
first being no later than 31 December 2005, on the implementation of the 
Directive. This report will also consider the success of the guarantee system,34 
the efficacy of current administrative procedures with a view to disseminating 
best practices,35 the progress made towards achieving national and Community 
targets, the external costs of non-renewable energy sources, and, if necessary, it 
may make proposals to the European Parliament.36 In the end, the Renewables 
Directive includes a total of ten reporting requirements.37 The comprehen-
siveness of the reporting mechanism clearly demonstrates the importance of the 
renewable energy policy objective and the dedication to accomplishment 
embodied by the EU.  
 
 
7.2.1.3. Administrative Requirements  
 
Member States are required to take “appropriate steps” to foster greater use of 
renewables, and progress must be proportional to the committed targets found 
in the Annex.38 Fundamentally, these steps come in the form of complementary 
initiatives, such as support schemes (Article 4), guarantees of origin (Article 5), 
administrative and planning procedures (Article 6), and grid system issues 
(Article 7). Each of these four steps is discussed individually. 
 
1. Support Schemes  
 
Even with the cost of renewable energy source electricity dropping, due to both 
technological and economic advances, the overall expenditure associated with 
renewable energy production is still very high and is expected to remain as such 
in the medium term. Support schemes are an indispensable tool to make 
renewable energy source electricity affordable for consumers. Functionally, 
they come in four broad forms (although there are hybrid models in use) and 
are used to differing degrees across the EU.  
First, feed-in tariffs are used by most Member States and, generally 
speaking, are a tax paid by electricity companies and distributors to domestic 
renewable energy source electricity producers. This additional capital assists in 
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offsetting the high cost of renewable energy sources, and ensures a moderate 
price for consumers. The primary advantages of such a programme are security 
of investment, flexibility in application, and support for medium- and long-term 
technological cost reduction. However, because each Member State has 
different internal economic factors to consider prior to implementation of 
a feed-in tariff, they inevitably are extremely complex to harmonise at the 
Community level.39  
Second, the tradable green certificate system, admittedly not as 
widespread in terms of use,40 has many positive attributes. As a more market-
based initiative, green certificates’ help to offset the added cost of renewable 
electricity production by requiring consumers (and some producers depending 
upon the country) to purchase a specified number of certificates ensuring both 
consumption and production of renewable electricity. Certificates are purchased 
on a secondary market between consumers and producers, which ensures the 
highest possible return for investment with non-compliance punished via fine. 
However, the volatility of such a programme poses a deterrent to potential 
investors and does little to drive-down either technological or service prices.41  
Third, a pure-tendering procedure,42 the use of which was originally 
limited and is currently on the decline, is one where the state procures tenders 
for the production of renewable electricity, which is then provided to 
consumers at the price outlined by the provider in the tender. The theoretical 
advantage to such a system is the optimal use of market forces to provide the 
lowest price to consumers. However, in practical terms the tendering procedure 
might hinder advancement rather than drive it. Since the increased production 
cost is shouldered by the end-use consumer, there is little market force to drive 
down overall costs of renewable energy technology, and projects may hence 
fail due to uncompetitive bidding.43 
Finally, tax incentives are used to encourage more widespread use of 
renewables but are generally seen as an additional policy tool rather than 
a stand-alone strategy.44 Realistically, Member States tend to use a complex 
combination of the above programmes based on the internal needs of both the 
market and their citizens. 
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2. Guarantee of Origin 
 
One of the primary necessities of a renewable energy programme is the ability 
to differentiate unequivocally between renewable and non-renewable forms of 
electricity within the same market. Consumers have become increasingly 
interested in their ecological impact and are turning to renewables as one 
avenue to limit that impact even if they are more costly. However, if consumers 
are going to pay a premium for a green energy source, there must be 
administrative oversight to insure accuracy. Member States are granted full 
freedom to design their own domestic certification process barring that the 
procedure is accurate, transparent and non-discriminatory.45  
Although the procedural elements are in the hands of the Member State 
and thus will differ marginally across the EU, the substantive criteria for 
a “guarantee of origin” are expected to be identical EU wide. A guarantee of 
origin should outline the type of energy source used, the date(s) and location(s) 
production occurred, and provide consumers with an assurance of 
authenticity.46 Furthermore, guarantees of origin are expected to be mutually 
respected by other Member States, although refusal of recognition is acceptable 
as long as it is based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.47 
In practical terms, a guarantee of origin is going to be recognised across the 
Community.48 Finally, Member States are expected to designate to a competent 
body with oversight of the guarantee process to ensure accuracy, accountability, 
and reliability.49 
 
3. Administrative and Planning Procedures 
 
A major impediment to the wide scale development of renewable energy is the 
administrative barriers that must be satisfied by potential producers.50 As such, 
Member States are to designate to a competent body with the power to evaluate 
the current legislative and regulatory framework. The goal is to remove 
unnecessary regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to renewable electricity 
production, streamline existing administrative measures, and ensure that rules 
are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory.51 Although it seems wise to 
have common administrative criteria across the EU, in practice, flexibility is 
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necessary. Furthermore, Member States are expected to coordinate the varying 
administrative organs addressing renewable energy development domestically52 
because renewable energy projects typically fall under multiple and overlapping 
heads of power.  
 
4. Grid System Issues 
 
Producers of renewable electricity, often because of their small size and relative 
vulnerability, must be assured that the energy produced can be incorporated 
into the national grid effectively. Thus, Member States are expected to require 
domestic transmission system operators (TSO) and distribution system 
operators (DSO) to give priority grid access to installations producing 
electricity from renewable energy sources.53 Member States must also require 
TSOs and DSOs to establish and publish objective rules on grid adaptation and 
connection costs (cost-bearing),54 to provide new producers with a thorough 
estimate of the costs of grid connection,55 and to create and publish a set of 
standard rules for cost sharing among beneficiaries in relation to system 
instillation and grid upgrades (cost-sharing).56 The rationale for these points 
stems from the localised and often rural nature of renewable electricity 
production.  
Generally speaking, electricity grids were created during the era of state-
owned enterprises frequently left rural areas without the infrastructure 
necessary to transmit or connect to a national grid.57 In many cases, these 
infrastructure modernisation costs are shared among the parties, however, in 
some cases, Member States may require TSOs and DSOs to shoulder the full 
cost of adaptation.58 Regardless, grid system connection costs are required to 
only reflect the reasonable cost of the benefit of connection and must not be 
unduly prohibitive to the integration of renewable energy.59 Undoubtedly this 
is, and will continue to be, an issue of importance as the production of 
renewable energy increases. 
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7.2.1.4. Renewable Electricity Consumption Targets 
 
If the reporting element of the Renewables Directive is considered to be one of 
its most vital contributions, the bolstered renewable electricity consumption 
target is the most indispensable. Member States agreed upon individual 
indicative consumption targets which are, in many cases, quite progressive. 
However, they also vary greatly due to geographic and economic differences. 
For instance, Belgium has rather limited sources of renewable energies and thus 
its target is very low, 6 percent renewable electricity consumption by 2010.60 
Others, for instance Austria or Sweden, have a surplus and thus have 
considerably higher targets (78 and 60 percent respectively).61 If the Member 
States meet their national targets, 21 percent of total electricity consumption in 
the EU will be produced by renewable energy sources by 2010.  
Although some Member States are heading in the right direction, the 
majority of countries are behind schedule. In the present situation, the EU will 
only manage to produce 19 percent of its electricity from renewables in 2010. 
Hence, to accomplish its goals, additional efforts might be required.62  
 
 
7.2.1.5. Discussion 
 
In view of the fact that Member States are unlikely to achieve the sectoral 
targets for renewable electricity consumption proposed in the Renewables 
Directive, in many respects, the Directive can be considered a policy failure.63 
The shortcomings have varying explanations. First, although the cost of 
renewable energy technologies are on the decline, the inability to internalise the 
external costs of renewable energy sources into the market price of renewable 
electricity has negatively affected short-term funding options, in turn giving 
non-renewable sources a competitive edge in short-term affordability.64 Bearing 
in mind the decentralised character of renewable energy applications, a second 
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practical consideration is the difficulty of streamlining various administrative 
processes. Proponents of renewable electricity projects have run up against 
opaque authorisation procedures, varying certification standards, and 
incompatible certification and testing regimes.65 This reality prompted the 
European Council to request a “coherent framework” based on a new directive 
to increase the renewable energy capacity.66 
In response, a second renewables directive was proposed for 
consideration in early 2008.67 At its basis is a binding target of 20 percent 
renewable energy source electricity and a 10 percent binding target for biofuels 
in the transportation sector.68 Moreover, the Renewables Directive II aims to 
address many of the practical considerations brought to the forefront through 
consultations with relevant stakeholders and the EU Strategic Energy Review. 
First, it requires all Member States to have a “National Action Plan” that sets 
out renewable energy policy targets in various sectors and outlines national 
policies aimed at fulfilling those requirements.69 Second, it aims to standardise 
and expand the use of the guarantee of origin regime.70 At current, guarantees 
of origin are used by Member States for differing reasons, be it disclosure, 
recommended practices or to qualify for a national support scheme.71 
A guarantee of origin will now, beyond specifying the source, date of and 
authenticity of production, require a host of new information, including the 
location, type, capacity, and operational date of the installation, the country of 
issue, and the amount and type of investment aid granted to the installation.72 
Furthermore, guarantees of origin are to be recognised across the Community,73 
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registered domestically with a competent body,74 and fully transferable among 
Member States provided the transferor has achieved their immediate targets.75 
Third, administrative procedures are to be clarified and streamlined by 
having licensing procedures clearly defined and certification criteria determined 
objectively, clear guidelines established for inter-administrative cooperation, 
and a fast-track procedure for smaller projects.76 Furthermore, local and 
regional councils are to consider renewable energy development when 
planning, designing and refurbishing both industrial and residential areas.77 
Fourth, Member States are to provide to builders, planners, installers and 
architects information on support measures for renewable energy.78 Member 
States are also required to ensure that the cost and energy efficiency of 
equipment is made available by suppliers and to develop a certification 
programme for installers of small-scale projects.79 Finally, Member States are 
expected to develop infrastructure and to grant priority access for further 
expansion of renewable electricity production.80  
A few important caveats must be noted at this juncture. Firstly, there are 
notable shortcomings in this directive. Most glaring, despite having binding 
targets for 2020, the proposed directive does not have binding targets in the 
interim, nor does it set out penalties for failure to reach these targets.81 
Furthermore, because it is a directive and not a regulation, it is subject to 
national implementation, thus leaving immense room for variations of policies 
particularly regarding priority grid access.82 In this context, it is important to 
point to the EU’s lack of competence in certain matters strongly related to the 
development of renewable energy, in particular regarding land use and 
planning, which are vital areas for the implementation of all kinds of renewable 
energy installations. The Member States’ discretion is thus extensive and it is 
possible that, for example, planning regimes will function as barriers to the 
achievement of these targets. 
Secondly, even if this proposed directive passes the complex approval 
process in the EU, this is clearly not the last of the directives aimed at 
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promoting renewable energy in the EU. The consolidation of the internal 
market is still a process under construction,83 and this package should be 
viewed no differently. Realistically, it should be considered as a step in the 
right direction and a demonstration of Europe’s clear intention to use renewable 
energy source as a principle policy tool to achieving both energy security and 
environmental protection. 
However, whether it is progressive environmentalism or enlightened self-
interest as its basis, the EU has clearly forged a new direction for the energy 
sector. Renewable energy sources have an immense potential to positively 
contribute to Europe’s strategic as well as environmental concerns, provided 
that the market climate is welcoming to their arrival. Responding to a decade of 
fragmented progress in the renewable energy sector, the Renewables Directive 
has taken Europe in a new direction by attempting to craft the ideal market 
conditions for renewable energy development. Although much in this Directive 
may be commended, such as the monitoring, support and reporting initiatives, 
progress has not been made at the pace expected.  
A revamped and more robust renewable energy policy has been submitted 
to the European Parliament for its consideration. This proposal sets out 
additional monitoring and reporting requirements, as well as an increased 
renewable electricity consumption targets. However, it is lacking in terms of 
consumption targets or penalties for failing to reach the prescribed targets. This 
is a notable shortcoming, and one that will surely need to be resolved if the 
pace of renewable energy development is to quicken.  
 
 
7.3. Regulatory Frameworks in the Member States 
 
To reiterate, the EU Member States have considerable room to design their own 
energy policy. In the absence of Community legislation and in the wake of 
energy crises and environmental concerns, many Member States have taken the 
matter into their own hands and introduced legal and economic instruments 
aiming to diversify energy supply and increase the use of renewable energy 
sources. Some of the most prominent countries in this respect are Denmark, 
Germany and Spain, who had in place specific renewable energy legislation 
early on. The initiatives have grown over time, but the overall picture is still 
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shattered; some countries have a complete institutional framework in place for 
the energy sector, whereas others are a bit behind in this respect.84 
It is thus clear that the European Member States have, and will continue 
to play an indispensable role in transitioning the renewable energy policy from 
the EU blackboard to the boardroom. Although widespread goals are 
deliberated at the Community level, it is in the hands of the Member States that 
they gain their unique characteristics. And the Member States have indeed 
approached the renewable question with much diversity and employed varying 
strategies and initiatives dependent upon geographic, economic and social 
limitations. Of the renewable energy sources explored, ocean-based renewable 
energy systems are of particular importance to the question of ocean 
governance. This section focuses on initiatives taken by various Member States 
to expand the role played by ocean renewables in their respective jurisdictions. 
Eight states have been selected due to their advances in marine renewable 
energy sources, with each assessment focusing on the promotion of resources 
and regulatory framework for ocean-based renewable energy. Although each 
Member State confronts the subject matter differently, cumulatively many 
creative programmes have been implemented and much can be gained from 
a comparative analysis.  
 
 
7.3.1. Belgium 
 
Although little has transpired practically, in terms of extracting the potential of 
marine renewables in Belgium’s North Sea, it is nevertheless an important 
policy objective. Belgium has a renewable electricity target of 6 percent by 
201085 and a proposed target of 13 percent by 2020.86 As of yet, only 2.2 
percent of electricity consumption comes from renewable sources.87 
Previous attention has been focussed predominantly on the use of hydro 
and biomass (biogas, biowaste and sold biomass) but ocean-based renewables, 
particularly wave energy, is an ever-growing area of focus. Belgium employs 
a programme using tradable green certificates (TGC), with a guaranteed 
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minimum price set for electricity produced from renewables, to promote ocean-
based renewable energy sources.88 However, the TGC market is rather small 
and generally allows only cost-effective technologies to thrive, which is 
a worry, although market conditions are considered acceptable for continued 
expansion.89 
On 17 May 2004, Belgium passed a royal decree empowering the 
Minister of Energy with the ability to provide “domain concessions” for the 
creation and investigation of potential installations for offshore renewable 
energy such as wind and water. The decree is valid both for the territorial 
waters and the exclusive economic zone.90 Belgium thus has a designated zone 
for the location of renewable energy installations, as well as a specific regime 
outlining criteria for eligibility and a procedure for the granting of concessions. 
Belgium also has in place an research and development initiative for ocean 
renewable energy sources called the Sustainable Economically Energy Efficient 
Wave Converter (SEEWEC) that aims to integrate the commercial 
manufacturing of wave technologies into the market.91 Overall, Belgium may 
not have an abundance of ocean-based renewable resources, but they are taking 
focused strides to engage what resources they do have. 
 
 
7.3.2. Denmark 
 
Stemming from a change in the political character of the Danish government in 
early 2001, many of the progressive renewable energy initiatives undertaken in 
the 1990s were either abolished or allowed to run their course without 
renewal.92 Though this political chill has seemingly subsided, the Danish wave 
energy development programme has nevertheless not been reinstated, and no 
formal development plan has been designed to replace it.93 Denmark has 
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a renewable electricity target of 29 percent by 201094 and a proposed target of 
by 30 percent 2020.95 Currently, 17 percent of electricity consumption comes 
from renewable sources.96 Regardless of the political climate, renewables still 
play a crucial role in the Danish energy mix.  
Wind energy is the most widely used renewable energy source, 
accounting for 18.5 percent of the total 28.5 percent renewable electricity 
produced domestically.97 Ocean-based renewables are still only in the 
developmental phase, with most of the work being done by private developers. 
Denmark uses primarily a feed-in tariff system, coupled with a tendering 
programme for offshore wind projects. However, the current feed-in tariffs are 
ineffectual at procuring investment, and broad policy reform has been slow 
coming.98 
In 2007, Denmark reaffirmed its determination to double its production of 
renewable electricity production by 2020.99 This was followed in 2008 by 
a policy statement put out by the Minister of Climate and Energy proposing 
a new “Renewable Energy Act.”100 While ocean-based renewable energy 
sources are not the primary focus of this legislation, which mainly concentrates 
on wind and biomass, marine renewables will most surely be incorporated once 
they have passed the development phase. 
 
 
7.3.3. France 
 
The French are uniquely situated geographically, with a favourable wave 
climate on their Atlantic coast near the Bay of Biscay, and an equally 
favourable tidal climate in the Mediterranean basin. France has a renewable 
electricity target of 21 percent by 2010101 and a proposed target of 23 percent 
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by 2020.102 Renewable electricity currently accounts for only 10.3 percent of 
the total French electricity consumption,103 with hydro the primary 
contributor.104 
Although the use of hydro electricity is disproportionately high, ocean-
based renewables are quickly gaining recognition. France uses a pure feed-in 
tariff system for power plants with a capacity greater than 12 megawatts and 
a tendering procedure for smaller plants.105 As of March 2007, France also has 
set a 15 c€/KWh feed-in tariff rate for electricity produced from waves. While 
administrative barriers still persist to the integration of renewable energy 
sources, investment in France has been constant and could be maximised if 
these roadblocks were addressed.106 
France has also set up a test installation for wave energy production in the 
Pays de la Loire region on the Atlantic coast. With solidified funding secured in 
2007, the facility is expected to be operational by 2010.107 Although current 
wave and tidal projects are still in the research and development phase, the 
French government clearly has planned a role for ocean-based renewable 
energy sources to play in the country’s energy mix. 
 
 
7.3.4. Ireland 
 
Based on its prime geographic location, Ireland has one of – if not the highest – 
proposed return from ocean-based renewable energy sources. Ireland has 
a renewable electricity target of 13.2 percent by 2010108 and a proposed target 
of 16 percent by 2020.109 Presently, however, only around 3.1 percent of 
consumed electricity is however generated from renewable energy sources.110  
The development of Ireland’s ocean energy potential has been identified 
as a top priority area. A long-term multiphase initiative was launched in 2006, 
with the goal of large-scale commercial electricity production in, or around, 
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2015.111 Ireland previously used a tendering mechanism for the development of 
renewable energy sources but is set to replace this with a feed-in scheme in the 
near future.112 These recent developments will surely assist in the expansion of 
marine renewable energy sources in Ireland in the future.  
In March 2007, the Irish government reaffirmed its intentions to become 
a world leader in ocean-based renewables by proposing a target of 500 MW 
installed production capacity by 2020.113 Furthermore, with a specific national 
agency in charge of research and development (Sustainable Energy Ireland), 
numerous institutional development programmes and a support programme for 
scholarly research into ocean energy utilisation put in place by the Minister for 
Communications, Marine & Natural Resources,114 Ireland is keenly poised to 
capitalise on its wealth of ocean renewable energy. 
 
 
7.3.5. Portugal 
 
With almost half of the country bordered by the North Atlantic, Portugal is 
another Member State with immense ocean-based renewable potential of which 
they are moving quickly to capitalise upon. Portugal has a renewable electricity 
target of 39 percent by 2010115 and a projected target of at least 31 percent by 
2020.116 Currently, 20.5 percent of all electricity consumed is from renewable 
energy sources,117 with small-scale hydro being the primary contributor.118 
Although in the past the tremendous success of hydro gave Portugal great 
optimism, with much of the current market still dominated by hydro, that 
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optimism has been turned into pragmatism as Portugal aims to extract 
renewable resources more effectively. Portugal uses a feed-in tariff programme 
with a fluctuating rate of 76–191 €/MWh for wave energy dependent upon if it 
is pre-commercial or not.119 This is coupled with specific investment incentives, 
for example the investment subsidy programme PRIME,120 aimed at 
maximising the expansion of their renewable energy sector. The stability of the 
support programme for renewable energy sources in Portugal provides security 
for potential investors. However, complex licensing requirements have 
hampered the development of renewable energy. 
Portugal has made the expansion of their renewable energy sector a prime 
policy goal with the passing of Resolution No. 169/2005.121 The resolution 
outlines additional consumption targets, particularly for wind. The resolution 
also reinforces the target of 50 megawatts installed capacity by 2013 for 
renewable electricity produced from waves, originally set in place by 
Resolution No. 63/2003.122 Furthermore, Decree-Law No. 90/2006 established 
a new framework for the allocation of costs between providers of conventional 
versus renewable energy sources.123 More practically, Order-in-Council No 
736-A/2006 provided for the installation of the world’s first wave power plant 
(capacity 4MW) in public waters off the coast of Aguçadoura.124 With the 
establishment of a pilot zone in 2008, and a high level of both public and 
private support for, and development of, ocean-based renewable energy 
programmes, Portugal is primed to capitalise on its immense geographic 
potential.125 
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7.3.6. Spain 
 
Geographically speaking, Spain has a tremendous location to explore renewable 
energy sources, particularly ocean-based sources as over two thirds of the 
country borders water. Spain has a renewable electricity target of 29.4 percent 
by 2010126 and a proposed consumption target of 20 percent by 2020.127 At 
present, only 8.7 percent of the electricity consumed comes from renewable 
energy sources,128 with hydro and wind the most dominant sources.129 
With hydro reaching the cusp of its potential, the Spanish government has 
begun to expand the role of other renewables, including wave and tidal. Spain 
uses a feed-in tariff programme where producers may choose between the tariff 
rate, and placing a premium on top of the cost of conventional electricity for 
sale.130 Coupled with other incentive programmes (soft loans, tax incentives, 
etc.), investors have a broad array of programmes to utilise. This diversity has 
provided a great atmosphere for investment, however, if feed-in tariffs are 
reduced, the growth in capacity could dissipate. 
A comprehensive promotion programme for renewable energy sources 
was introduced in 1997 as a part of the Electricity Sectoral Act (ESA).131 Under 
the ESA, a special regime for renewable energy production and remuneration 
was created. However, it took until 2004 for the practicalities of how this 
framework would operate to be worked out and implemented.132 The system 
has been amended numerous times, most recently by Royal Decree 661/2007, 
which set in place a hybrid feed-in tariff system for ocean power. Specifically, 
it sets a general tariff of 6.86 c€/KWh for the first two decades, descending to 
6.51 c€/KWh thereafter. However, producers also have the ability to negotiate 
a specific tariff rate for their installation.133 The Spanish government has also 
installed a simplified authorisation procedure for marine installations.134 Spain 
does not, as of yet, have binding consumption targets for ocean-based 
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renewable electricity, but the existing legislative framework still seems to 
provide a stable landscape for investment and development. 
 
 
7.3.7. Sweden 
 
Although Sweden has only a marginal potential for wide-scale employment of 
ocean-based renewable energy systems, based on the research initiatives 
currently underway, the Swedish government considers the exploration of all 
available renewable energy sources a priority. Sweden initially set a renewable 
electricity target of 60 percent by 2010135 and a proposed revised target of 49 
percent by 2020.136 Renewable electricity consumption currently accounts for 
39.8 percent of the national total; the highest percentage in the EU.137 The 
renewable energy market in Sweden is dominated by hydropower, which 
accounts for almost half of electricity production, the other half coming from 
nuclear. Further development of large-scale hydropower is, however, to 
a significant extent prohibited by law, and other renewable energy sources, 
primarily wind power, are thus considered the only option. To promote 
renewable energy production, Sweden currently uses a TGC programme.138  
In 2002, the Swedish government established a planning goal for 
an annual wind power production of 10 TWh by 2010.139 Raising this goal to 16 
TWh by 2016 has been discussed.140 Beyond embracing the readily available 
hydro and wind resources, Sweden has implemented a progressive research 
programme into wave and tidal sources. The most telling project is a research 
facility for wave power, set to run from 2009–2014, aiming to extract energy 
from relatively small waves.141 With the TGC programme paying immediate 
dividends, a clear vision for the future, and pragmatic research initiatives 
underway, Sweden will continue to lead the EU in renewable electricity 
consumption into the future. 
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7.3.8. United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is unquestionably blessed with one of the best 
environments for wave and tidal electricity generation. Exploration and 
development of this potential has been articulated to be a priority of the highest 
order.142 UK has a renewable electricity target of 10 percent by 2010143 and 
a proposed target of 15 percent by 2020.144 Reaching the targets would imply 
a substantial increase from the 1.3 percent share currently held by renewable 
electricity.145 
Despite strong support for renewable energy sources, the UK’s electricity 
market is so liberalised that renewables have not truly found a stable foothold in 
the economy. However, with the passing of the original Renewable Obligation 
Order (RO),146 which requires suppliers to purchase a designated amount of 
renewable energy, that trend has begun to shift.147 The UK uses this obligatory 
programme in conjunction with tradable green certificates, tax exceptions for 
renewables, and a “buy-out” fine for non-compliance.148 With the obligatory 
targets of renewable energy consumption determined until 2027,149 investors 
may well find the UK a welcome market for expansion. 
The UK has also created the novel concept of the Renewable Energy 
Zone,150 which allows the government to grant exploitation and construction 
licenses for offshore installations beyond the territorial sea.151 Separately, the 
Scottish Government installed a Marine Supply Obligation as part of its RO, 
which provides an expansive support regime for both wave and tidal energy 
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systems.152 With numerous concentrated research initiatives for wave and tidal 
energy underway across the UK, commercialisation of these technologies has 
accelerated. Although the UK seems to be lagging behind some in terms of 
renewable energy consumption, the country is clearly ahead of most in terms of 
legislation pertaining to renewable energy broadly and ocean-based renewables 
particularly.  
 
 
7.3.9. Concluding Analysis  
 
The variety of programmes employed by Member States to promote renewable 
electricity consumption speaks to their ingenuity as well as their dedication. 
Although understandably in the preliminary stages of development, ocean-
based renewable energy programmes are clearly on the policy agenda of many 
states across the EU. Although each jurisdiction has designed a promotion 
framework tailored to their particular domestic needs, best practices are 
observable. First, a market integration mechanism must be in place. Be it in the 
form of a feed-in tariff, TGC programme, or a consumption quota, a domestic 
support scheme to encourage investment into otherwise expensive technologies 
is a prerequisite to broader success. Second, a method of differentiating 
between conventional and non-conventional energy sources in the market is 
also necessary. Consumers must be informed of their broader energy options, 
and a certification system must be established for producers of renewable 
electricity to guaranty transparency and accountability. Third, domestic 
legislatures must work to quell negative investor sentiment and stabilise their 
domestic energy markets. A primary obstacle to mass dissemination of 
renewable energy technologies is their comparatively high cost. If a domestic 
energy market is steadied and specific entry points for renewables are created, 
investment will be fostered more readily, in turn driving down the costs. 
Finally, long-term renewable electricity consumption targets must be set in 
place, with a clear action plan for integration into the national energy mix. 
A long-term strategy, which effectively integrates renewables, helps guide 
industry as well as government in advancing an energy agenda while 
continually providing new avenues for investment. In the end, a balance must 
be struck between short-term energy needs and long-term renewable energy 
investment. 
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7.4. Scottish Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) – Case Study  
 
In a report prepared by the Marine Energy Group (MEG), Scotland was 
identified as having the potential for up to a tenth of its electricity consumption 
needs to be satisfied by ocean-based renewable energy resources by 2020.153 
Considering the scale of a proposed commercial project and the potential for 
a significant environmental impact, the Scottish Government was obliged to 
commission a strategic environmental assessment (SEA).154 The resulting 
report is a comprehensive overview of all probable environmental impacts and 
mitigation measures available, and is an ideal case study for future marine 
renewable projects. For clarity, the report will be discussed in four parts. First, 
the potential effects of these devices on the biological environment will be 
assessed. Second, the potential impacts of these devices on the human 
environment will be evaluated. Third, any additional considerations resulting 
from the placement of an ocean-based renewable energy project are discussed. 
Lastly, recommendations for future projects are outlined. On the whole, the 
Scottish SEA process provides a concrete framework for the assessment of 
environmental impacts and offers an approach that should be considered by 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 
7.4.1. Impacts on the Biological Environment  
 
Wave and tidal power devices differ greatly in terms of placement and design. 
However, generally speaking, their impact on biological ecology is relatively 
consistent. With devices anchored to the sea floor, having large submerged 
moving parts, and dispersed over a substantial area, the probability for 
ecological interference is high. When considering the potential biological 
impacts of a project, the SEA examined the effects on (i) marine birds, (ii) 
marine mammals, (iii) benthic ecology, and (iv) fish/shellfish. Each category is 
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discussed individually, with a focus on the impact of the project on that 
particular group and potential mitigation measure available.  
 
 
7.4.1.1. Marine Birds 
 
Scotland’s coasts are home to numerous bird species, some of which are among 
the world’s most important bird populations. Of the 54 currently listed species 
present in the SEA area, 38 are protected species under the EC Birds 
Directive.155 Furthermore, the potential impacts on these populations are 
numerous. In terms of the installation and operation of a project, the primary 
concerns are as follows: collision with the device, increased noise, habitat 
destruction, species displacement, increased sediment disturbance, and 
accidental water contamination from device failure.156 To mitigate these 
negative effects, the report recommended that proponents attempt to avoid 
sensitive sites or seasons, design devices to minimise collision or leakage, and 
conduct in-depth project-specific studies to plan a suitable mitigation strategy 
for the particular species affected.157 
 
 
7.4.1.2. Marine Mammals 
 
The Scottish marine environment contains many different species of marine 
mammals, including seals, whales, dolphins, porpoises and otters. Marine 
mammals, particularly seals, are protected under the EC Habitats Directive,158 
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the UK’s Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981,159 and the Conservation of Seals 
Order (Scotland) 2004.160 Moreover, the potential impacts on marine mammals 
are noticeably similar to birds, in that collision with the device, increased noise, 
habitat destruction, species displacement, increased sediment disturbance, and 
accidental water contamination from device failure are all initial concerns. 
Further, underwater placement and operation of a device are of particular 
concern for marine mammals as noise increases sonar disruption and can 
potentially create a barrier to movement.161 Again, avoidance of sensitive sites 
and seasons, as well as a project-specific study, was highly recommended. The 
report also suggested that proponents should consider “soft starting,” a process 
which gradually increases operational production to allow mammals’ time to 
deviate course, as well as the use of a marine mammal observer to monitor 
noise levels underwater.162 
 
 
7.4.1.3. Benthic Ecology  
 
The flora and fauna that occupy the seabed are referred to as benthic ecology. 
These fragile ecosystems are protected under the EC Habitats Directive163 and 
the UK’s Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.164 Potential impacts on this 
ecosystem stem primarily from the placement of the device on the seafloor, 
entrenchment of cables, contamination due to operational failure and change in 
tidal/wave flow. Attachment of a device to the seabed could smother benthic 
habitats, increase sediment suspension, and disrupt natural reefs. Operationally, 
the use of such technology could also alter wave and tidal patterns, having 
potential devastating and far-reaching effects. Avoidance of sensitive sites is 
again a prime recommendation,165 as well as minimising seabed attachment 
when possible,166 and conducting ongoing site-specific monitoring to minimise 
long-term alteration of coastal processes.167  
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7.4.1.4. Fish and Shellfish  
 
Scottish waters are home to a myriad of fish and shellfish species. Some of 
these species – the native oyster, basking shark and common skate – are found 
on the UK Biodiversity Action Plan Priority Species list, while others – the 
native oyster, common skate, spurdog, cod and haddock – are on the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List of 
Threatened Species.168 The principle impacts on vulnerable fish and shellfish 
species are the smothering or destruction of habitats upon installation, increased 
operational noise effecting fish navigation, higher risk of collision, water 
contamination from device failure, and interference with migration and 
spawning patterns.169 Similarly, avoidance of sensitive sites and seasons and 
a project-specific study are the primary mitigation measures available to 
proponents.170 
 
 
7.4.2. Impacts on the Human Environment  
 
While the biological concerns were generally centred on the method and 
location of installation, and subsequent operational effects, potential impacts on 
the human environment are centred more on aesthetic and commercial 
concerns. With devices submerged and often substantially offshore, the 
potential impact on the human environment seems relatively low. However, 
dependent upon the particular location of installation, marine renewable 
projects could have devastating effects on large industries. When considering 
the potential impacts of a marine renewable project on the human environment, 
the SEA assessed the effects on: (i) commercial fisheries, (ii) shipping and 
navigation, (iii) seascape, (iv) recreation and tourism, (v) marine and coastal 
historic sites, and (vi) onshore grid connection. Each category is discussed 
individually, with a focus on the impact of the project on that particular subject 
or industry and potential mitigation measure available to proponents. 
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7.4.2.1. Commercial Fisheries 
 
Commercial fishing is a vital industry in Scotland, as it is in many other 
nations. However, many of the methods of commercial fishing (trawling, 
dredging, long line, etc.) are particularly vulnerable to debris or protruding 
objects on the seafloor. Problematically, the bulk of commercial fish stocks also 
tend to be found in the exact areas with the highest potential for electricity 
generation.171 The potential impacts on commercial fishing are direct 
disturbance with fishing grounds, temporary/long-term displacement of 
traditional fishing grounds or migration patterns, destruction of the seabed 
during installation, and potential water contamination from device failure or 
vessel collision.172 Proponents have limited options to mitigate many of these 
concerns. However, if possible, it is recommended that proponents avoid 
project installation in prime fishing grounds, during prime seasons, and remove 
all seafloor debris post construction.173 Regardless of careful site selection, in 
many cases there will be an inevitable effect on commercial fisheries. 
 
 
7.4.2.2. Shipping and Navigation  
 
Scottish waters have immense shipping traffic. Recognised sea lanes that are 
essential to international navigation are protected under domestic law, and the 
Scottish Government is to refuse the licensing of any offshore energy 
installation that will substantially interfere with these vital sea lanes.174 
Important potential impacts on international shipping and navigation are 
increased travel time, displacement of shipping density, and risk of collision 
with installations or other vessels.175 The potential is high to mitigate many of 
the concerns of the shipping community. Through consultation with the 
shipping industry, sites may be selected which do not directly affect shipping 
lanes, devices may be designed which provide clearance for ships to pass over 
them, or safety lighting systems could be developed.176 However, some 
negative effects such as increases in shipping density, or travel times must be 
expected.  
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7.4.2.3. Seascape 
 
The seascape, broadly speaking, is the coastal landscape, adjacent waterways, 
and scenic views. Infringement on the visual character of a region could be 
viewed by residents and visitors alike as disastrous. Potential effects resulting 
from the installation of ocean-based renewable projects are entirely dependent 
upon the design of the device used and its proximity to the coastline.177 
Generally speaking however, the principle impact of ocean-based renewable 
projects is the interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the coastal 
environment. Proponents are encouraged to be selective in their location of 
projects aiming to maximise the potential distance of devices from the shoreline 
and to minimise the height and intrusiveness of devices possibly with the use of 
colour.178 On the whole, however, some infringement upon the seascape must 
be acceptable.  
 
 
7.4.2.4. Recreation and Tourism  
 
Scotland’s coastal area has been a destination for outdoors enthusiasts and 
tourists alike for generations. However, there is a growing concern that the 
construction of offshore renewable energy projects may hamper recreational as 
well as tourist activity to some extent. Potential impacts on recreational and 
tourist activity include installation noise, disturbance of natural habitats 
effecting wildlife watching, increased risk to recreational sailors of collision 
with the installation, and restrictions on access to particular areas.179 The SEA 
Report recommended that proponents complete installation in the tourist off-
season, avoid popular sailing or sport routes, and look to use devices which 
have little negative visual impact on the surrounding landscape.180 However, it 
was noted that it is difficult to calculate the public response to projects of this 
nature, as the installations may become a tourist attraction themselves. 
Moreover, because of the localised nature of recreational activities and the 
diverse areas available, it is not expected that marine renewable projects will 
deter people from engaging in those activities.181 
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7.4.2.5. Marine and Coastal Historic Environment  
 
Scottish waters are peppered with countless important historical sites, including 
archaeological remains and wreck sites. Numerous international conventions 
address the subject of historic remains, including the UNESCO Convention on 
the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001.182 However, the most 
notable is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention), which requires states to protect objects of historical 
significance.183 Furthermore, UK domestic law requires that wrecks be 
registered184 and also creates a safe-zone around submerged wrecks to regulate 
activity.185 The principle impact on these sites is the potential for direct 
disturbance/destruction of important historical remains during the installation of 
the project and entrenchment of cables.186 An initial site survey of the seabed, 
done in conjunction with experts, is a principle mitigation practice which 
should be followed. Moreover, proponents are also encouraged to follow the 
Code of Practice for Seabed Development,187 designed by the Joint Nautical 
Archaeology Policy Committee, when installing projects.188 
 
 
7.4.2.6. Onshore Grid Connection 
 
A prerequisite to power generation or transmission to consumers is the 
connection of the installation to the national grid. Any offshore wave or tidal 
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station is going to need additional infrastructure, including entrenched cables, 
an onshore power substation, land cables and overhead transmission lines; all of 
which could have harmful impacts on the surrounding environment. The key 
potential effects resulting from the development of the required onshore 
infrastructure are permanent alteration to the character of the landscape, 
disturbance/destruction of habitats during installation, disturbance/destruction 
of archaeological remains, and infringement on traditional land uses.189 
The most practical mitigation measure available to proponents is to conduct 
a detailed routing assessment at the onset of the project with the aim of finding 
the most direct and least intrusive route for transmission line placement.190 
Furthermore, the SEA Report recommended that this assessment be done in 
accordance with industry best practices for routing of overhead transmission 
lines.191 A pre-project routing assessment will allow the proponent to find 
an efficient transmission strategy, while avoiding sensitive sites, farms or 
habitats.  
 
 
7.4.3. Additional Environmental Impacts 
 
Not all potential impacts addressed under the SEA are conveniently 
compartmentalised as effecting either the biological or human environment. 
A potential impact may bridge the gap between these two distinct ecosystems 
or may be entirely unique to that industry. Regardless, the SEA assessed the 
effects of a marine renewable project on (i) military exercise areas, (ii) water 
quality, (iii) electric and magnetic fields (EMF), and (iv) decommissioning of 
offshore installations. Each subject area is discussed below, potential project 
impacts are outlined, and available mitigation measures are summarised. 
Although, classified as “additional,” these subject areas, particularly 
decommissioning, are important to minimising negative environmental impacts 
of renewable energy resource development.  
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7.4.3.1. Military Exercise Areas 
 
The Scottish military uses designated offshore locations for a variety of military 
purposes, including test firing, military manoeuvres and ammunition dumps. 
Offshore energy installation construction could disrupt military exercises either 
temporarily or, potentially, permanently.192 Construction of the installation 
would require a full cessation of activities in that area. The entrenchment of 
cables could result in the disruption of unexploded ordinances. The only 
mitigation measure available to proponents is to liaise with the Ministry of 
Defence to identify and avoid dangerous sites and to coordinate installation.193  
 
 
7.4.3.2. Water Quality 
 
One of the most vital concerns of an ocean-based renewable energy project is 
ensuring that water quality in the surrounding area will not be diminished 
during installation or operation. Protection and monitoring of water quality and 
aquatic environments is a key policy goal for the EU,194 as well as the Scottish 
government.195 Construction of an ocean-based renewable project could have 
potentially disruptive effects on water quality in the area, and proponents must 
be aware of this risk at the onset. Key environmental concerns pertaining to 
water are disturbing sediment, accidental release of a contaminant during 
construction or operation, disturbance of contaminated or sanative materials on 
the seabed, and a permanent change in sediment dynamics.196 Proponents are 
encouraged to use installation methods that minimise sediment disruption, use 
non-toxic materials during construction and operation, and to do 
a hydrodynamic study prior to commencement of the project.197  
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7.4.3.3. Electric and Magnetic Fields 
 
Cables used for the transmission of electricity from offshore installations will 
produce electric and magnetic fields. The severity of environmental effects is 
entirely dependent upon the type, composition, and location of the cables.198 
Usually, an electric and magnetic field is contained within the cables outer 
sheath. However, some interaction with the surrounding environment is to be 
expected. The key potential impact is an interference with marine species 
detection and location capabilities.199 A major practical limitation for 
proponents is minimising the negative effects on surrounding species. The SEA 
Report recommended that area-specific and species-specific surveys be done to 
calculate possible cumulative effects and to design species-specific mitigation 
measures when available.200 
 
 
7.4.3.4. Decommissioning of Offshore Installations  
 
The effective removal of an offshore installation is of equal, if not greater, 
importance than any installation or operational environmental concern. 
Internationally, decommissioning was introduced as a legal obligation in the 
LOS Convention201 and domestically by the Energy Act 2004.202 Except in 
specific circumstances, generally where the installation can serve a new use or 
where removal would be extremely costly, once decommissioned, all offshore 
installations must be removed.203 The standard of removal should draw upon 
internationally recognised guidelines204 and be determined on a case-by-case 
evaluation.205 Paradoxically, the decommissioning of an installation has many 
of the same effects and concerns as installation. Thus, many of the mitigation 
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strategies employed during the construction phase may be useful during the 
deconstruction phase as well.206 However, proponents can alleviate many 
decommissioning concerns by either using a device design that is easily 
removed or one that can serve an alternative purpose – as an artificial reef 
perhaps. 
 
 
7.4.4. Recommendations for Future Projects 
 
Cumulatively, four key recommendations may be offered for future ocean-
based renewable projects. First, prior to the installation of an offshore 
renewable energy source facility, it is essential for proponents do a site specific 
SEA. As the environmental conditions will be unique to any given location, 
a site specific SEA will inform the relevant parties of the particular 
environmental conditions that must be measured at the planning stages of 
installation.207 Furthermore, considering environmental concerns (be they 
biological, commercial, or human) at the early stages will also allow for the 
selection of a site which will minimise environmental impact, while 
maximising potential electricity return. Second, proponents must be open to 
selecting the appropriate device for the particular environment conditions. Not 
all wave and tidal devices are designed the same, have identical production 
capacities, or affect the surrounding environment in a similar fashion. Thus, 
proponents must be informed by a site specific SEA, and choose devices which 
aim to mitigate enumerated concerns. Furthermore, pressure must be put on the 
developers of ocean renewable technology, be it by industry or the legislature, 
to develop devices that have a minimal environmental impact. 
Third, proponents must devise a monitoring procedure to observe 
environmental conditions in and around the offshore installation continually. 
Many environmental concerns outlined in the SEA may take time to become 
evident. If a robust monitoring programme could be designed and implemented 
– possibly through consultation between industry and governmental experts – it 
may allow for otherwise devastating environmental impacts to be identified and 
addressed early on. This in turn allows proponents to minimise both negative 
environmental impacts and expenses. Lastly, proponents and developers alike 
must think of a practical decommission strategy prior to installation of any 
devices. Although counterintuitive at the planning stage, designing offshore 
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projects with decommissioning in mind will naturally lead to minimal impact of 
installations. Recognisably, the cost of such an approach may be initially higher 
– as a greater amount of research and expertise will be needed – but, in the long 
term, it will allow for more effective mitigation of environmental concerns. 
Furthermore, such an approach will naturally facilitate technologies which are 
minimally impacting and easily removed. On the whole, given the 
interconnected nature of ocean-based renewable energy projects and 
environmental integrity, it would be wise of proponents to lead the 
development of the industry’s legal framework, rather than simply reacting to 
it. 
 
 
7.5. Concluding Remarks  
 
The EU has shown progress in developing a comprehensive legislative 
framework to promote and govern renewable energy production broadly and 
ocean-based renewables specifically. Recognisably, this evolution has been in 
response to mounting geo-political pressure to curb climate change. But it also 
has strategic benefits for Europe, namely increased competitiveness, 
environmental protection and energy security. Renewable energy sources play a 
vital role in accomplishing these goals. By allowing Member States to craft 
localised energy consumption strategies which maximises the role played by 
renewable energy sources, the EU has begun the slow renovation of its oil 
dependent economy. 
However, the desired direction was not always clear. Early on, various 
renewable energy sources were developed at different rates across the EU, 
resulting in divergent growth and varying practices. The Renewables Directive 
addresses this uneven usage of renewables in Member States by adopting 
a comprehensive promotion programme for renewable electricity generation, 
which sets clear consumption targets for renewable electricity. The Directive 
also outlines administrative barriers to entry into the market and designs 
a functional support scheme to encourage renewable energy investments. The 
EU has thus taken hold of the global environmental standard and hoisted it 
high. Unfortunately, the practical outcome of the ambitious targets have been 
less than stellar, with Member States cumulatively missing consumption targets 
by half. A renewed directive, addressing some of the shortcomings of the initial 
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promotion programme, has been submitted for consideration and should be 
adopted by the summer of 2009.208 
Individual jurisdictions have also made impressive strides in developing 
a welcoming market for renewable energy sources. By combating domestic 
market conditions through feed-in tariffs, TGCs and consumption quotas, 
Member States are forging a healthy climate for investment in renewable 
technologies. Although much of the current focus commercially has been on 
wind, biomass and biofuels, ocean-based renewable energy sources are 
beginning to take hold in particular locations. However, governance of marine 
renewable programmes is a complex and ever-growing process, with 
a regulatory framework being a prerequisite to commercial projects. To this 
end, Member States have worked to answer primarily two key questions. First, 
how are acceptable locations for ocean-based renewable projects determined? 
Although particular methods vary, legislatures must have a mechanism in place 
to designate an area – possibly in the exclusive economic zone – for renewable 
energy production similar to the Belgian domain concession programme or the 
UK’s renewable energy zone, and a method to license and monitor operations 
within that area. Second, how is the electricity produced at these installations 
going to be delivered to consumers? In some instances a strong variable feed-in 
tariff would be sufficient, as is the case in Portugal, while other markets are so 
liberalised that renewable energy sources cannot compete without a mandated 
quota, as is the case in the UK. With the particular market conditions unique to 
each jurisdiction, the countermeasures employed must be market specific. 
Only Scotland has gone on to comprehensively address the environmental 
effects of a proposed commercial marine renewable installation. With its SEA 
of marine renewables, Scotland has set the standard for calculating the potential 
impact of an ocean-based renewable project on marine ecosystems. By 
assessing the potential effects of a project on the biological, human and 
commercial environments, and evaluating possible mitigation measures 
available, broad recommendations may be made for future projects. Most 
imperative is the need for a project-specific site survey, continued monitoring 
of environmental standards in the area, and decommission-friendly project 
design. 
On the whole, ocean governance is an indispensable element of marine 
renewable expansion and jurisdictions must take certain steps to promote and 
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administrate ocean-based renewables if they are to be positively integrated into 
the national energy mix. First, states must identify clear goals for renewable 
energy consumption in the short, medium and long term. Second, they need to 
determine the particular market factors negatively affecting the natural 
integration of renewables into the economy and design a domestic support 
scheme that aims to counteract those factors. Third, states must evaluate and 
mitigate the potential environmental impacts of marine renewable projects. 
Finally, periodic monitoring and evaluation of the programme must be 
conducted to maximise market efficiency.  
In the end, a comparative analysis of Europe’s marine renewable sector 
provides interested parties with a holistic approach to expand the presence of 
renewable energy sources in their domestic markets, a host of best practices and 
an ever-growing legal and regulatory framework. Early on, Europe was deftly 
aware of the geo-political realities affecting their economy. Their subsequent 
reaction, a rapid expansion of their renewable energy sector, has uniquely 
poised them to provide positive contributions to other developed economies. 
Competitiveness and environmental protection are not incompatible goals; they 
are both possible. What is needed is a restoration of the current energy dynamic 
to incorporate renewable energy sources more effectively, and in this respect, 
Europe is leading the way. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Role of Strategic Environmental Assessments in Energy Governance:  
A Case Study of Tidal Energy in Nova Scotia’s Bay of Fundy 
 
Meinhard Doelle 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The Bay of Fundy is a large estuary that separates portions of Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick on the Atlantic coast of Canada (Figure 8.1). The Bay is about 
300 km long and 100 km wide at its mouth. Due to its shape and location, it 
experiences extremely high tides, up to 16 meters in the upper Bay. In addition, 
the Bay of Fundy contains narrow passages which result in ocean currents of up 
to 6 m/sec during each tidal cycle. These features combine to provide some of 
the highest potential for tidal energy development anywhere in the world. 
 
Figure 8.1. Bay of Fundy Tidal Power Strategic Environmental Assessment 
Project Area 
 
Source: Jacques Whitford, Background Report for the Fundy Tidal Energy SEA (Dartmouth: 
Jacques Whitford, January 2008), pp. 1–3, available: <http://www.bayoffundysea.ca> (retrieved 
18 February 2009). 
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The potential for tidal power development in the Bay of Fundy region of 
the Atlantic coast of Canada has been recognised for decades. Not surprisingly, 
there have been attempts to develop offshore renewable energy in the area 
before. In the 1980s, barrage-based tidal power technology was piloted in 
Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. A combination of technical, economic and 
environmental concerns identified as a result of this pilot project prevented any 
large-scale development of the resource at that time.1 In recent years, offshore 
renewable energy has become of interest again. Much has changed since the 
last effort in the early 1980s.  
There have been considerable changes in the technologies considered 
since previous efforts in the 1980s. Pilot projects underway around the world 
are using new, open turbine technology that is expected to reduce cost and 
environmental impact significantly. This technology operates on principles 
similar to a wind turbine, except it is anchored or otherwise secured on the 
seabed in tidal waters. These turbines are able to take advantage of flows of 
water in both directions and offer power in predictable intervals during most of 
the tidal cycle.2  
The economics of tidal power have also changed as a result of recent 
increases and fluctuations in energy prices, and the projections for long-term 
energy supply and demand. Energy security is becoming a growing concern 
around the world. The environmental imperative for a switch from traditional 
non-renewable fossil fuel based sources of energy to renewable, low 
greenhouse gas emitting energy sources has become a pre-occupation of all 
levels of government in Canada. Finally, economic diversification has become 
critical for Maritime communities dependent on the exploitation of dwindling 
resources and on energy intensive manufacturing. 
All this adds up to considerable pressure to utilise all sources of 
renewable energy that are technically and economically within reach. Tidal 
energy is no exception. Numerous potential developers of tidal energy have 
been pushing governments in Canada to clarify the rules under which this 
industry will operate, and to allow pilots to be put into the water to demonstrate 
the viability of the new technologies. Some developers are already pursuing 
commercial scale developments. At the same time, utilities are busy trying to 
understand how tidal energy will fit into the existing and future energy mix, the 
capacity of the grid to utilise the power generated, and the role of tidal energy 
                                                 
1 See, for example, M. Conley and G. Daborn, eds., Energy Options for Atlantic Canada 
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 For background information on tidal energy technologies, see J. Whitford, Background Report 
for the Fundy Tidal Energy SEA (January 2008), paras 3.3–3.6, available: 
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in meeting increasing demand for greener power. A recent study has estimated 
the potential in the Bay of Fundy to be in the range of 300 megawatts of power, 
with the theoretical potential well in excess of 2000 megawatts.3 
Tidal energy is the latest in a string of significant new industries to arrive 
in Nova Scotia. Over the past 30 years, Nova Scotia has faced the arrival of the 
offshore oil industry, the aquaculture industry, the offshore natural gas industry, 
and the liquefied natural gas industry.4 In hindsight it is easy to see that all 
levels of government were ill prepared for the arrival of these industries, but 
much has been learned in the process about the need for environmental impact 
assessments, resource management, and integrated planning. Tidal energy 
provides an opportunity to put these lessons into practice. 
This contribution will consider the role of strategic environmental 
assessments (SEA) in improving government decision making in the face of 
new industries, using the arrival of the tidal energy industry in province Nova 
Scotia as a case study. Nova Scotia is considered a particularly suitable case 
study due to the considerable provincial jurisdiction over energy issues in 
Canada, the interest in tidal energy in the Bay of Fundy, and a recent strategic 
environmental assessment on offshore renewable energy carried out in Nova 
Scotia. 
In considering the governance approach in Nova Scotia to this new 
industry, the existing constitutional and regulatory context facing government 
decision makers when this new industry first appeared on their radars will be 
reviewed. The constitutional context is then briefly considered. As we will see, 
the jurisdictional context has not been formally resolved, though there appears 
to be political acceptance of provincial territorial jurisdiction in the Bay of 
Fundy.  
There is a complex system of federal and provincial regulatory processes 
that will apply to tidal energy projects; however, there is no regulatory process 
in place specifically designed for tidal energy. The federal and provincial 
regulatory contexts are considered separately below. It is this regulatory 
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framework that government decision makers had to work with when they were 
first approached to approve tidal pilot projects around 2005.  
Provincial officials quickly concluded that the existing decision-making 
framework was inadequate, and decided to initiate a SEA to guide future 
decision making on whether, where, and under what conditions tidal energy 
development should be approved. The tidal SEA was carried out without any 
legal foundation, and with limited federal engagement. It is the role of this SEA 
in improving decision making for new industries in Nova Scotia that is the 
focus of the final part of this contribution. 
 
 
8.2. The Constitutional Context 
 
The roles of the provincial and federal levels of government in Canada with 
respect to tidal energy projects will very much depend on whether the projects 
are located within the territory of a province or outside. Unfortunately, while 
international maritime boundaries are relatively well established as a result of 
the broad acceptance and adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea,5 some provincial maritime boundaries within Canada are 
still unresolved. In the case of Nova Scotia, a strong legal claim can be made 
that a portion of the Bay of Fundy is part of the territory of Nova Scotia, but the 
issue has not been formally settled either through negotiations or litigation.6  
Even if tidal development takes place entirely within the territory of the 
province of Nova Scotia, both the provincial and federal levels of government 
would have jurisdiction to deal with certain aspects of tidal energy projects. 
Provincial laws would apply to the production of electricity and to certain 
aspect of its export.  
Section 92A (1)(c) of the Constitution Act, 19827 provides the basis for 
provincial jurisdiction over the production of tidal power within the province. It 
provides that: 
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 92A (1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in 
relation to… 
 (c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in 
the province for the generation and production of electrical energy. 
 
The province also has jurisdiction over local works and undertakings under 
s. 92(10), property and civil rights under s. 92(13), and other matters of a local 
and private nature under s. 92(16). Relevant areas of federal jurisdiction would 
include navigation and shipping under s. 91(10), marine pollution,8 and inland 
and sea coast fisheries under s. 91(12).9 
As a result, permits to develop tidal energy within the territory of the 
province of Nova Scotia will require both provincial and federal permits. The 
existing regulatory framework as it applies to tidal energy is therefore explored 
in the following sections.10 
 
 
8.3. The Federal Regulatory Framework11 
 
Regardless of any claims to provincial territorial jurisdiction in areas with high 
potential for tidal development, it is clear that the federal government does have 
jurisdiction over aspects of tidal power development. Federal jurisdiction over 
navigation, fisheries, and inter-provincial undertakings are obvious examples. 
As a result, a number of federal actors will likely be involved in Fundy tidal 
power development decision making, most notably the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, the National Energy Board, the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, Transport Canada, 
and Natural Resources Canada. The following is a brief overview of federal 
regulatory regimes that are likely to be relevant. 
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issue, see Doelle et al., n. 9 above, p. 42. 
11 This section is an updated version of the author’s contribution to a regulatory summary in 
Doelle et al., n. 9 above, p. 49 
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8.3.1. Fisheries Act12 
 
Certain provisions of the Fisheries Act, administered by the Department of 
Fisheries, will be triggered in case of impact on fish or fish habitat, and in case 
of water pollution resulting from the construction, operation and 
decommissioning of tidal projects. Section 32 of the Fisheries Act applies in 
case of direct harm to fish, such as fish kill from the turning of the turbines. In 
such a case, an authorisation under s. 32 will be required. The project may also 
trigger s. 35(1) which prohibits carrying on “any work or undertaking that 
results in the harmful alteration, disruption or destruction (HADD) of fish 
habitat.” Such HADD is permissible if authorisation is obtained (s. 35(2)). 
Section 35 is a trigger for an environmental assessment under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) (discussed below). Section 36(3) may 
also be relevant if, in the construction, operation or decommissioning of the 
project, a deleterious substance is deposited in water frequented by fish. 
Finally, s. 37 allows the Minister to require the submission of certain 
information in case of an alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat or 
if there is deposition of a deleterious substance in water frequented by fish. 
 
 
8.3.2. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act13 
 
CEAA, administered by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, will 
likely apply to a tidal energy project in the Bay of Fundy. The Act, according to 
section 5, generally applies to projects that involve federal proponents, federal 
funding, federal land, or certain federal regulatory decisions. Regulatory 
decisions that trigger an assessment under the Act are listed in the Law List 
regulations.14  
The application of the Act is limited to projects. Projects are defined in 
section 2 of the Act to include undertakings in relation to a physical work. Any 
tidal development that includes the construction, operation and potential 
decommissioning of a physical work would be considered a project as defined. 
Not all proposed projects require an assessment under the Act. There are 
a number of specific exemptions for emergencies and national security that are 
not likely to apply to tidal energy projects.  
The other key requirement is a federal decision maker who is required to 
exercise a power, duty or function listed in section 5 with respect to the project. 
                                                 
12 Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. 
13 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 [hereinafter CEAA]. 
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 See Law List Regulations (SOR/94-636). 
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If a federal authority became the proponent of a tidal energy project, s. 5(1)(a) 
would trigger an environmental assessment (EA) under the Act. Federal 
funding would trigger an EA under s. 5(1)(b). If a federal authority sells, leases 
or otherwise disposes of federal lands or an interest in federal lands for the 
purposes of carrying out the tidal project (this may include the granting of 
rights to develop tidal power in areas within federal territorial jurisdiction), 
s. 5(1)(c) will trigger an EA. 
Tidal developments, even without federal proponents, federal funding or 
the use of federal land, would likely require one or more regulatory approvals 
listed on the Law List. Regulatory requirements for tidal development that are 
included on the Law List and that would therefore trigger a federal EA include 
s. 35 of the Fisheries Act and s. 5 of the Navigable Waters Protection Act.15 
There are three main process options under CEAA. They range from 
a screening level of assessment, to a comprehensive study and a panel review. 
Legal requirements for screenings are limited, making screenings the most 
flexible approach. Comprehensive studies involve more substantive 
requirements, mandatory public engagement and some oversight of the process 
by the Minister of the Environment. Panel reviews are independent and involve 
mandatory public hearings. 
There are opportunities for joint environmental assessment processes 
involving the federal and provincial governments. CEAA provides for joint 
panel reviews with other jurisdictions as well as substitution in case of other 
federal processes suitable to carry out the purposes of CEAA. In case of 
screenings and comprehensive studies, coordination is generally less formal. 
 
 
8.3.3. Species At Risk Act (SARA)16 
 
SARA, under the shared responsibility of Environment Canada and the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, applies to all federal land as defined in the 
Act, including the territorial sea and internal waters of Canada.17 SARA is 
designed primarily to protect listed species at risk on federal lands. It does so 
through some general prohibitions against activities harmful to species listed 
under section 15 as extinct, extirpated, endangered, threatened or of special 
concern. The listing process and the general prohibitions associated with it 
                                                 
15
 Law List Regulations (SOR/94-636), Schedule 1, item 6(e) and 11(a). Both the Fisheries Act 
and the Navigable Waters Protection Act are discussed below. 
16
 Species At Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29 [hereinafter SARA]. 
17
 Id., s. 2(1), definition of “federal land.” 
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work in combination with a permitting process that can override the general 
prohibition for certain activities. 
Depending on jurisdictional issues and the project’s technology and 
implementation, s. 32(1), s. 33 and s. 58 all potentially apply. Section 32 
generally prohibits harming or killing of listed species. Section 33 deals with 
harm to the residence of listed species, and section 58 seeks to protect critical 
habitat. SARA essentially requires consideration of any potential impact of 
a project on listed species, their residences and habitats, and requires designing 
projects to avoid any negative impacts.  
Depending on the circumstances, proponents may be able to enter into 
an agreement or obtain a permit pursuant to s. 73 with respect to activities 
otherwise prohibited. Section 73 gives the Minister limited discretion to allow 
activities otherwise prohibited due to their risk to listed species. Species listed 
under SARA that potentially could be affected include the Grey Whale, Blue 
Whale (Atlantic Population), North Atlantic Right Whale, Atlantic Walrus, 
Leatherback Seaturtle, Piping Plover (melodus), Atlantic Salmon, Peregrine 
Falcon (anatum subspecies), Northern Wolffish (Anarhichas denticulatus), and 
Spotted Wolffish (Anarhichas minor).18 
Specifically, section 32(1) will apply if the construction or operation 
results in the death, harm, harassment, capture or taking of an individual of 
a species that is listed as an extirpated species, an endangered species or 
a threatened species. Section 33 will come into play if the project damages or 
destroys the residence of one or more individuals of a wildlife species that is 
listed as an endangered species or a threatened species. Section 58 will apply in 
cases where critical habitat has been identified in a recovery strategy of a listed 
species. It provides for the protection of critical habitat through a general 
prohibition in combination with more specific provisions depending on whether 
the listed species is found in a national park, federal land or provincial or 
private land. 
It should be noted that because SARA is relatively new legislation, the 
critical habitat and residences of all the marine species that could be affected by 
a Fundy tidal energy project have not yet been identified and recovery plans do 
not yet exist. This means that as such a project proceeds, attention will have to 
be paid to the ongoing development of recovery plans and the identification of 
residences and critical habitat. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See online: <http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca> (retrieved 20 November 2008) 
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8.3.4. Navigable Waters Protection Act (NWPA)19 
 
The NWPA, currently administered by Transport Canada, will apply because 
the Bay of Fundy is a navigable water and, pursuant to s. 5, a permit is required 
for a work that is built or placed in, on, over, under, through or across any 
navigable water. Theoretically, if the project was not considered to “interfere 
substantially with navigations,” it could meet the terms of an exception to the 
approval requirement under s. 5(2). It should be noted that ministerial approval 
under s. 5(1)(a) of the NWPA is a CEAA Law List trigger (see discussion 
above).20 
 
 
8.3.5. National Energy Board Act (NEBA)21 
 
The National Energy Board (NEB) is generally responsible for energy projects 
of an interprovincial or international nature. Specific to tidal power projects in 
the Bay of Fundy, if a project crosses provincial boundaries, extends beyond 
the territory of a province, or includes an interprovincial (s. 58.4) or 
international (s. 58.1) power line, a certificate (s. 58.16) or permit (s. 58.11) 
must be obtained from the National Energy Board pursuant to Part III.1 of the 
NEBA.22 It is unlikely that the NEBA will apply to the construction and 
operation of most tidal energy project projects. If infrastructure improvements 
are needed to export some or all of the electricity generated from the tides of 
the Bay of Fundy to New England, a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity would be required. These permits and certificates may be subject to 
“terms and conditions respecting the matters prescribed by the regulations as 
the Board considers necessary or desirable in the public interest” (s. 58.35). In 
the issuance of permits the board may consider “the impact of the construction 
or operation on the environment” as well as “the effect of the power line on 
provinces other than those through which the line is to pass” (s. 58.14). 
Complexities regarding overlapping authority or interests between 
provincial powers and the NEB have, in some cases, been dealt with through 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs). For example, provincial energy bodies 
in both Alberta and British Columbia have an MOU with the NEB.23 Similarly, 
                                                 
19 Navigable Waters Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22 [hereinafter NWPA]. 
20
 Law List Regulations, n. 14 above, Schedule 1, item 11(a). 
21 National Energy Board Act, R.S.C, c. N-6 [hereinafter NEBA]. 
22
 The Supreme Court of Canada considered the limits of federal jurisdiction in Westcoast 
Energy v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] S.C.J. No. 27, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322.  
23
 The NEB-BC MOU is available: <http://www.ogc.gov.bc.ca/documents/ 
newsreleases/OGC%20and%20NEB%20MOU.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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the NEB, the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 
(C-NLOPB) and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (C-
NSOPB), together with executives from the Newfoundland, Labrador and Nova 
Scotia Departments of Energy and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), have 
formed the Oil and Gas Administrators Advisory Council (OGAAC)24 to deal 
efficiently with issues in their sector. A cooperative approach in the tidal energy 
sector can help address some of the complexities in identifying the respective 
roles of federal and provincial energy agencies and departments, but there are 
limits to the ability of the two levels of government and their agencies to avoid 
dealing with jurisdictional issues through cooperation.25 
 
 
8.4. The Provincial Regulatory Framework26 
 
As discussed, provincial jurisdiction over the Bay of Fundy remains 
unresolved. It is not surprising therefore, that there are only limited signs that 
the province has applied its regulatory regime below the low water mark in 
marine waters around Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia Environment Act, for 
example, has until recently not been applied to activities in the Bay of Fundy. 
There is some indication that this is changing. Tidal energy developments, for 
example, have been added as undertakings requiring approval under the 
provincial environmental assessment process.27 
Other provincial laws may apply but no formal steps have been taken to 
date to clarify their role. Some of the key provincial regulatory provisions that 
may have relevance for tidal power are briefly summarised below, all with the 
understanding that their actual application depends on the constitutional issues 
briefly raised above (i.e., is the area within or outside the province) and 
decisions at the provincial level to extend their application to marine waters 
below the low water mark. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
The Alberta MOU is available: <http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rpblctn/ctsndrgltn/ 
mmrndmndrstndng/lbrtnrgtltbrd200601-eng.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
24
 See Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-7, s. 5.4 
25
 See Doelle et al., n. 10 above, p. 42. 
26 This section is an updated version of the author’s contribution to Doelle et al., id., p. 45. 
27
 Environmental Assessment Regulations, O.I.C. 95-220 (March 21, 1995), N.S. Reg. 26/95, as 
amended up to O.I.C. 2008-414 (August 6, 2008), N.S. Reg. 348/2008, Schedule A, Section 
D(2)(a).  
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8.4.1.  Nova Scotia Environment Act (NSEA)28 
 
Part IV of the NSEA requires an environmental assessment for certain tidal 
energy projects. Tidal energy projects over 2 MW are listed as Class I 
undertakings in Schedule A of the regulations. There are also general categories 
under energy in the list of Class II undertakings that may apply to tidal power 
projects. 
Class I and II undertakings have to be registered with the Minister in 
accordance with the Environmental Assessment Regulations. No work can be 
commenced on a project that falls within Class I or II until the Minister has 
granted an approval following the conclusion of the EA process (s. 32(1)). 
Section 47 of the NSEA would also likely apply if the undertaking is also 
subject to the environmental assessment or other review requirements of 
a municipality or the federal government (as discussed above, a likely scenario 
for this project). Section 47 allows the Minister to enter into an agreement with 
the other government to carry out a joint assessment. 
Part V and VI of the NSEA dealing with approvals and releases will also 
be applicable. Part V requires an approval for any activity so designated by 
regulations. It establishes the process for granting approvals, imposing terms 
and conditions and for changes to approvals. Part VI prohibits activities that 
may cause an adverse effect unless authorised by an approval under Part V. 
These provisions combine to require approvals of listed activities and other 
activities that may have adverse environmental effects. Most importantly, an 
approval can be used effectively to ensure implementation of any conditions 
and mitigation measures identified during the EA of a particular project. While 
tidal power projects may not meet the description of activities currently listed 
under Part 9 of Division V of the activities designation regulations for approval, 
the Minister would have the discretion under Division VI of the regulations to 
add tidal power projects to the list.  
 
 
8.4.2. Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act (FCRA)29 
 
This Act, which inter alia deals with the approval of aquaculture operations, 
provides a rare example of the application of provincial laws to marine waters 
below the low water mark. Depending on the precise location of the tidal 
resource to be developed, there may be geographic and ensuing conflicts 
involving existing property interests. At present, licenses or leases to carry on 
                                                 
28 Nova Scotia Environment Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 5. 
29 Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act, S.N.S. 1996, c. 25. 
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aquaculture are issued by the Minister pursuant to the FCRA (Part V). Under s. 
52(1)(a) a lease “shall be granted for a specific geographic area…”. The initial 
term of the lease is ten years “with a right of renewal by the licensee, at the 
Minister’s option, for further terms of five years each” (s. 52(2)(a)). By s. 51(3) 
or s. 52(2)(g) the lease can be terminated for various unmet conditions.  
There is at least a theoretical potential for conflicting uses involving 
aquaculture and tidal projects. Relevant to this are s. 52(3) and s. 44(3) which 
both acknowledge the aquaculture lease-holder’s exclusive right to the water 
column and sub-aquatic land described in the license. There does not appear to 
be a provision considering a circumstance arising during a license term where 
a grantee would be asked to change the location of the operation. There are 
provisions allowing the Minister to impose certain conditions and restrictions 
on a lease (s. 56) and for the Minister to terminate a lease in the event of 
a breach of terms or conditions of the lease (s. 52 and s. 58) and for the Minister 
to decide between two competing aquaculture lease applications. However, 
there is no explicit discussion of ministerial discretion to move an aquaculture 
lease in the event of competing interests between aquaculture and other marine 
interests. 
Obviously, more specific data are required in terms of development-
friendly tidal power areas and existing aquaculture leases. But this potential 
conflict may not materialise if tidal energy is developed in areas with high 
current velocities that are unsuitable for aquaculture projects. Similar potential 
conflicting uses will have to be explored for other existing and potential uses of 
the Bay of Fundy, such as fishing, tourism, recreation, biodiversity, and 
potential for other resource extraction activities. 
 
 
8.4.3. Endangered Species Act (ESA)30 
 
The key obligations under the ESA apply only to listed endangered or 
threatened species. The Act essentially prohibits interference with such species 
unless specifically authorised in the ESA or through a permit or approval. 
Sections 13 and 14 of the Act include the key provisions on prohibitions and 
permits with respect to listed species. 
Listed species that may be affected by the use of coastal lands for a tidal 
power project include the Piping Plover (Charadrius melodius) and two species 
of flora indigenous to Southwestern Nova Scotia bogs and wetlands, the thread-
leaved sundew, eastern mountain avens. Consistent with the application of the 
                                                 
30 Endangered Species Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 11 [hereinafter ESA]. 
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Act to the low water mark, marine species such as leatherback turtles, right 
whales and other endangered species found in the Bay of Fundy are not listed.31  
Other provincial statutes may also apply depending on where related 
infrastructure, such as transmission lines or service infrastructure, makes 
landfall. They include the Provincial Parks Act, the Beaches Act, and the 
Wilderness Areas Protection Act.32 
 
 
8.4.4. Energy Resources Conservation Act (ERCA)33 
 
The purposes of this Act suggest that it may be able to play a role in the 
strategic development of Nova Scotia’s tidal power resources. The Act aims to 
regulate and ensure efficient practices in the exploration for and development, 
production, transmission and transportation of energy resources (s. 3(b)); 
provide for the economic, orderly and efficient development in the public 
interest of energy resources (s. 3(d)); appraise the reserves and production 
capacities of energy resources (s. 3(e)); and appraise the need for energy 
resources and appraise markets outside the province for the province’s energy 
resources (s. 3(f)). 
It is important to note that Section 3 does claim jurisdiction beyond the 
low water mark. It states that, “This Act applies to all Nova Scotia lands, which 
means the land mass of Nova Scotia including Sable Island, and includes the 
seabed and subsoil off the shore of the land mass of Nova Scotia, the seabed 
and subsoil of the continental shelf and slope and the seabed and subsoil 
seaward from the continental shelf and slope to the limit of exploitability.” 
The ERCA authorises the creation of regulations pertaining to development of 
energy resources in Nova Scotia, which could include tidal energy. To date this 
legislative authority has primarily been employed to create regulations for the 
offshore and onshore oil and gas sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For the most up-to-date list of wildlife species protected under the ESA in Nova Scotia as 
established by the Species at Risk Working Group (pursuant to s. 9), available: 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/natr/wildlife/endngrd/specieslist.htm> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
32 Provincial Parks Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 367; Beaches Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 32; and 
Wilderness Areas Protection Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 27. 
33 Energy Resources Conservation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 147, s. 1; S.N.S. 2000, c. 12, S.N.S. 
2001, c. 15. 
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8.4.5. Electricity Act34 
 
The Electricity Act has changed the landscape of Nova Scotia’s electricity 
sector. First, it authorises regulations regarding “renewable energy standards” 
in the form of a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) system. This system 
mandates electricity providers to supply a certain proportion of electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources. It includes a target of 5 percent by 
2010 and 10 percent by 2013.35 Second, the Act mandates Nova Scotia Power 
Inc. (NSPI) to develop an Open Access Transmission Tariff. This will open the 
Nova Scotia electricity market to more inter-provincial and international import 
and export, while also allowing “any competitive supplier” to supply electricity 
to NSPI or one of the six municipal electricity suppliers. This means that a tidal 
project whether privately or publicly owned and operated will be able to sell 
electricity generated to NSPI or to any of the municipal suppliers, all of whom 
would be mandated to comply with the RPS. 
 
 
8.4.6. Public Utilities Act (Utilities Act)36 
 
The Utilities Act primarily deals with the procedural activities of the Utility and 
Review Board (UARB) and its regulatory powers over NSPI. This act may be 
implicated in a number of ways depending on the specifics of the construction 
process, as well as the parties involved. Currently, the power of the UARB does 
not appear to extend to the market for tidal power produced by private 
producers independent of NSPI. In the context of the UARB rate hearings in 
2004, the Board found that the Utilities Act did not authorise the Board to 
consider the appropriateness of rates offered by NSPI to independent energy 
producers.37 For tidal power in Nova Scotia, this would suggest that the market, 
not the government, currently controls the price to be paid to producers (at least 
for provincial markets). Given that NSPI is still essentially a vertically 
                                                 
34 Electricity Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 25. 
35
 Renewable Energy Standard Regulations, O.I.C. 2007-42 (January 22, 2007, effective 
February 1, 2007), N.S. Reg. 35/2007, as amended by O.I.C. 2007-569 (October 30, 2007), 
N.S. Reg. 416/2007. 
36 Public Utilities Act, R.S N.S. 1989, c. 380 [hereinafter Utilities Act]. 
37
 Rather it is solely concerned with charges to be paid by customers. See Nova Scotia Utility 
and Review Board, In the Matter of The Public Utilities Act -and- In the Matter of Nova Scotia 
Power Incorporated and complaints from seven individuals concerning the rates and conditions 
set out by NSPI in its solicitation for renewable energy under 2 megawatts, NSUARB 118 
(2004), available: <http://www.canlii.org/ns/cas/nsuarb/2004/2004nsuarb118.html> (retrieved 
20 November 2008). 
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integrated monopoly, it controls the price, subject only to UARB oversight as to 
whether NSPI has paid more than necessary for its power. Increasing the 
percentage of renewable energy required under the existing RPS might be 
a way to influence the price NSPI would be willing to pay for tidal power. If the 
RPS is sufficiently high that NSPI cannot meet it using wind alone, it would be 
required to purchase tidal power even if the price was higher than wind power. 
Other factors, such as the predictability of tidal power would likely also 
influence NSPI’s choice. An alternative would be to determine a fixed or 
minimum price for each form of renewable energy. This is generally referred to 
as the feed-in tariff approach. It would in effect allow the province to set the 
price to be paid by NSPI for tidal power produced.38 
 
 
8.4.7. Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act (EGSPA)39 
 
The EGSPA sets the overall goal of fully integrating environmental 
sustainability and economic prosperity. In the process, the province seeks to 
become an international leader in environmental sustainability while achieving 
economic prosperity above the Canadian average by the year 2020. The Act 
sets more specific targets that are relevant to the development of tidal energy, 
including goals with respect to greenhouse gas emissions and the use of 
renewable energy for the generation of electricity. The overall goals and 
specific targets may not directly translate into decisions on whether, where, 
when and under what conditions to encourage or permit tidal power 
development, but they are likely to provide important context for future 
decisions on this new industry. 
This part this contribution has reviewed the existing regulatory context 
which faced federal and provincial decision makers when tidal development 
proposals first came to their attention. A few regulatory updates since 
implemented, some to begin to prepare for the arrival of this new industry, 
others for other reasons, have also been included in this analysis. In the next 
section, we consider the most significant departure at the provincial level from 
past approaches, the initiation of a SEA to consider whether, where and under 
what conditions offshore renewable energy development should be encouraged 
and approved in the Bay of Fundy. This review of the SEA process will take 
place in three stages. First, key literature on SEA is briefly highlighted, 
followed by an overview of the Bay of Fundy SEA process. This is followed 
                                                 
38
 See J. Lipp, “Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and 
the United Kingdom,” Energy Policy 35 (2007): 5481–5495. 
39 Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act, S.N.S. 2007, c. 7. 
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with an overview of the outcomes of the SEA process. Finally, a preliminary 
evaluation of the Bay of Fundy SEA in light of key conclusions from the 
literature on what constitutes an effective SEA process is provided. 
 
 
 
8.5. The SEA Process 
 
Strategic environmental assessments in Canada are not new. Federally, there 
has been a Cabinet Directive in place on SEAs for well over a decade,40 and 
under the EARP Guidelines Order,41 there was provision for non-project EAs. 
Some provinces, including Nova Scotia, also allow for environmental 
assessments of policies, plans and programmes. In short, SEA is not without 
precedent in Canada. At the same time, it is still very difficult to grasp the 
concept of SEA, as it means different things to different people and is practised 
very differently across jurisdictions. Some definitions, such as the one in the 
Cabinet Directive, see it primarily in the context of major Cabinet decisions. 
Others view SEA as an overriding concept that covers all environmental 
assessments that go beyond individual projects.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Privy Council Office and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, The Cabinet 
Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (Ottawa: 
Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1990); Privy Council Office and 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, The Cabinet Directive on the Environmental 
Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 1999); and Privy Council Office and the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, The Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of 
Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 2004). 
41
 Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, S.O.R./84-467, 22 June 
1984. For a more detailed description of the EARP process, see R. Northey, The 1995 
Annotated Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1994), p. 21. 
42
 For an assessment of the federal cabinet directive on SEA, see S. Hazel, and H. Benevides, 
“Federal Strategic Environmental Assessment: Toward a Legal Framework,” Journal of 
Environmental Law and Practice 7 (1997): 349. See also F. B. Nobel, “Strategic Environmental 
Assessment,” in K. S. Hanna, ed., Environmental Impact Assessment: Practice and 
Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 93. 
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8.5.1. SEA Literature 
 
Dalal-Clayton and Sadler consider a number of definitions of SEA in their 2005 
book on international experience with strategic environmental assessments.43 
The authors note that early definitions were closely linked to project 
assessments, essentially broadening the scope of project assessments to include 
policies, plans and programmes. The focus of these early processes was on 
initiatives that were already proposed. According to the authors, more recent 
definitions take a broader perspective. First, the trend is toward the inclusion of 
environmental, economic and social considerations. Increasingly, SEA is seen 
as a tool for the development of policies, plans and programmes. For purposes 
of the discussion here, the concept of SEA incorporates at least the following: 
 
• An environmental assessment that goes beyond a single project to 
consider an industry sector, a region, or a particular policy, plan or 
programme. 
• A SEA can be reactive in response to the proposal of a particular 
project, e.g. the first proposal to introduce a new technology or 
a new industry, such as a liquefied natural gas facility or in-stream 
tidal energy technology. In such a case the assessment will need to 
extend beyond the individual project to look at the whole technology 
or industry sector or region. 
• A SEA can be reactive in response to a proposed policy, plan or 
programme initiated for economic reasons, such as the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas initiative. 
• A SEA can be proactive in response to an identified sustainable 
development or environmental challenge, such as a SEA leading to 
the development of an energy policy that encompasses a range of 
environmental, social and economic concerns related to climate 
change, air pollution and energy security. 
• A SEA can be proactive in response to a policy gap or an outdated 
policy identified in the context of a project EA. 
 
It is clear from this list that SEA can be used in a variety of contexts, with 
different needs and outcomes. Nevertheless, there appears to be general 
agreement on the basic steps and principles that should guide SEA processes. 
The steps proposed are certainly similar to project EAs. The basic principles 
                                                 
43 B. Dalal-Clayton and B. Sadler, Strategic Environmental Assessment (London: Earthscan, 
2005). 
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proposed, that SEA processes should be integrated, sustainability led, focused, 
accountable, participative, and iterative, are also familiar from project EAs.44 
Dalal-Clayton and Sadler propose a number of more specific principles for 
effective SEAs.45 The authors conclude that SEA should be focused on basic 
objectives and how to achieve them, that SEA should identify desired future 
outcomes and consider fully alternative ways of achieving these outcomes, that 
SEA should be objectives led, that SEA should be proactive, that it should be 
integrated, that its focus should be broad, and that it should be tiered.46 These 
are all principles familiar from literature on project EA.47 
There is now growing experience with SEA around the world.48 Dalal-
Clayton and Sadler provide a detailed review of SEA experience in developed 
nations, international institutions, economies in transition, and developing 
nations. SEA practice is starting to expand dramatically within the European 
Union as a result of its 2001 directive on SEA.49 Although some EU Member 
States had experience with SEA prior to the implementation of the directive in 
2004, it was limited. In the United States, experience with SEA goes back to the 
early days of the National Environmental Policy Act. While the experience with 
SEA goes back 35 years, its use has been limited in the United States. Other 
developed nations, including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, have also 
experimented with SEA.50 
International development institutions, such as the World Bank, regional 
development banks, the United Nations Development Programme, as well as 
international development institutions of several developed nations, have either 
started to implement SEA processes or carried out some SEAs on an ad hoc 
basis. SEA experience in economies in transition and developing nations is 
growing rapidly. Many economies in transitions began to implement SEAs in 
the 1990s, and several developing nations are now experimenting with SEA.51 
A recent report commissioned by the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency identified the following elements of an effective SEA 
process: 
                                                 
44
 See Doelle, n. 4 above, p. 29. 
45
 Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, n. 43 above, Box 2.4 at p. 15. 
46
 See F. B. Nobel, “Strategic Environmental Assessment,” in K. S. Hanna, ed., Environmental 
Impact Assessment: Practice and Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 93. 
47
 M. Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique 
(Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008), p. 29. 
48
 For a discussion of international instruments on SEA, see Doelle, n. 4 above, p. 41. 
49
 EC, Council Directive 01/42 of June 27, 2001, on the assessment of the effects of certain 
plans and programmes on the environment [2001] Official Journal L 197/30. See also Dalal-
Clayton et al., n. 43 above, p. 36. 
50
 Dalal-Clayton et al., n. 43 above, pp. 54, 88, and 109. 
51
 Id., pp. 128, 180, and 237. 
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1. The SEA should be applied early and proactively. 
2. The SEA should integrate the biophysical (or “environmental”), social 
and economic aspects, and be integrated within larger planning and 
decision-making processes. 
3. The SEA should take into account its place within the other “tiers” or 
levels of assessment – for example, a policy, plan or programme (PPP) 
decision will influence a project decision. Assessments of lower tier 
initiatives (plans or programmes) or project assessments may also 
influence improvements in a policy or other higher tier. Improved 
assessments at all levels, as well as the practical benefit that the overall 
assessment process is “streamlined”, are the benefits of tiering. 
4. The process must be guided by regulatory, policy and/or other form of 
guidance. “Guidance” suggests the need for a standard of assessment 
that must be met, as well as the need for consistency and the opportunity 
for improvement through ongoing strengthening and clarification of the 
guidance. 
5. The process must be flexible and adaptable. 
6. The process must be transparent and include opportunities for public 
involvement throughout. 
7. The most effective incentives or sources of motivation must be in place 
in order to ensure the process is adhered to. One of the lessons from 30 
years of project EA is that it is possible to mandate government decision 
makers to follow an EA process, but it is difficult to force an 
unmotivated, unwilling decision maker to implement the process so as 
to maximise its influence on future decisions and to actually make better 
decisions based on the results of the process. This means that in the 
design of SEA, careful thought will have to be given to the motivation 
for decision makers to use the results of the SEA to make better 
decision. 
8. The assessment must be followed up in terms of actual performance, as 
well as actual effects, compared with predictions, and in terms of 
improving future PPPs as well as improving the assessment process 
itself. 
9. The political will necessary for putting in place and implementing an 
assessment regime must exist. Much of the momentum for 
implementing an effective SEA process will only be realised when 
decision makers are shown the benefits of putting the above factors in 
place. Key decision makers should be participants in the design, 
establishment and implementation of the regime. By participating in the 
process, decision makers are more likely to see the benefits of following 
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the recommendations, understand the subtleties of the conclusions 
reached, and appreciate the risk of deviating from the results in terms of 
community and stakeholder support for future government decisions.52  
 
 
8.5.2. The Tidal SEA Process 
 
The Tidal SEA process was initiated as a result of a request by the Nova Scotia 
Department of Energy to the Ocean Energy and Environment Research 
Association (OEER). OEER is a not-for-profit corporation established in 2006 
with funding from the province of Nova Scotia. The members of the association 
are Acadia University, St. Francis Xavier University, and the NS Department of 
Energy. OEER is a collaboration between the provincial government and 
academic institutions in Nova Scotia interested in research on the 
environmental implications of ocean energy development around Nova Scotia. 
The Association funds research in two broad areas, one dealing with the 
environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas exploration, the other dealing 
with offshore renewable energy, particularly tidal energy.53 OEER was formally 
asked to carry out the SEA in April, 2007. The letter of agreement states as 
follows: 
 
The objective of the SEA is to assess social, economic and 
environmental effects and factors associated with potential development 
of renewable energy resources in the Bay of Fundy with an emphasis on 
in-stream tidal. The SEA will inform decisions on whether, when, and 
under what conditions to allow pilot and commercial projects into the 
water in the Bay of Fundy and under what conditions renewable energy 
developments are in the public interest over the long term.54 
 
The Minister asked OEER to complete its work on the SEA within 12 
months, and with a $250,000 budget. OEER then contacted the province of 
New Brunswick, who has claims similar to Nova Scotia over portions of the 
                                                 
52 D. Kirchoff et al., Law and Policy Options for Strategic Environmental Assessment in 
Canada, Report submitted to Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (January 2009), on 
file with author, forthcoming, online: < www.ceaa.gc.ca>. 
53 For general information on OEER and its mandate with respect to tidal energy research, see 
online: <http://www.offshoreenergyresearch.ca> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
54
 See OEER Association, Fundy Tidal Energy Strategic Environmental Assessment Final 
Report (Halifax: OEER Association, April 2008), p. 3, available: <http://www.bayoffun 
dysea.ca> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter SEA Report]. 
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Bay of Fundy not claimed by Nova Scotia. New Brunswick decided to carry out 
its own SEA process, but agreed to contribute funding for the background 
research, so that this work could include all of the Bay of Fundy and provide 
the scientific foundation for both SEA processes. The Nova Scotia SEA process 
was placed in the hands of a subcommittee of OEER made up of 15 individuals 
representing the governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Canada, 
fishing and environmental interests, academics with backgrounds ranging from 
engineering and biology to law, and a retired civil servant.55  
The SEA process designed by OEER consisted of the following key 
components: 
 
• An interactive website to provide information and seek input throughout 
the SEA process (www.bayoffundysea.ca). 
• A newsletter published regularly throughout the SEA process and 
posted on the SEA website. 
• Informal meetings with stakeholders on request. 
• Regular meetings of the OEER subcommittee to guide the process. 
• A consultant, Lesley Griffiths, hired to serve as the “process-lead” for 
the SEA process, including chairing public meetings and writing the 
final report under the direction of the OEER subcommittee. 
• Six community forums held in August 2007 in affected communities in 
Nova Scotia. 
• Two rounds of participant support funding for community based 
research and to provide opportunities for community groups to meet and 
discuss their perspectives about the potential arrival of this new industry 
in the Bay of Fundy. 
• A background report prepared by an environmental consulting firm on 
the current state of knowledge of the various proposed technologies, the 
receiving environment, the potential interactions between the 
technologies and the receiving environment, and the potential socio-
economic impacts of renewable energy development in the Bay of 
Fundy. 
• A round table of about 25 interested stakeholders that met with 
members of the OEER subcommittee approximately once a month 
between October 2007 and April 2008.56 
 
                                                 
55 Id., p. 5. 
56 Id. 
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Early efforts to engage Nova Scotians were designed primarily to identify 
key issues to be addressed through the SEA process. The OEER subcommittee 
decided that the scope of the SEA would be limited geographically to the Bay 
of Fundy and substantively to ocean renewable energy. The process remained 
open throughout to any issue relevant to informing decisions about whether, 
where and under what conditions offshore renewable energy should be 
permitted or encouraged in the Bay of Fundy. The main purpose of the various 
efforts early in the process to engage affected communities and key 
stakeholders was to identify what issues the SEA should focus on, while 
leaving it open to participants throughout the process to raise new issues and to 
bring up new concerns. 
The main vehicles for identifying issues of concern were some informal 
meetings with key stakeholders and the six community forums held in August, 
2007. The forums in particular provided important guidance to the OEER 
subcommittee and the process lead on the values, concerns and priorities of 
affected communities, and potentially affected industry sectors such as fisheries 
and tourism. To this end, participants in the forums were asked two questions: 
 
• What information is needed before decisions can be made about 
whether, where and under what conditions tidal energy should be 
permitted or encouraged in the Bay of Fundy? 
• What information are you aware of that may be relevant to this process? 
 
In parallel with the forums, OEER hired Jacques Whitford, an 
environmental consulting firm, to prepare a background report on the 
technologies, the receiving environment, and their potential interaction. 
Gathering the state of knowledge on offshore renewable energy technologies 
was a key component of this backgrounder. It also served as a baseline study on 
the Bay of Fundy region. The study sought to clarify the state of knowledge as 
well as provide an objective assessment of information and knowledge gaps. 
The backgrounder did not serve as an environmental impact statement, nor was 
it a draft SEA report.  
The backgrounder was intended to serve as a starting point for the SEA 
process. As such, it sought to identify the state of knowledge and to encourage 
participants to consider the implication of the state of knowledge for the SEA 
process. Inevitably, in case of an evolving technology proposed in a relatively 
undeveloped area, information on the technologies, the receiving environment 
and their interaction will be limited. A critical component of the backgrounder 
was therefore the objective assessment of information gaps to serve as a basis 
for discussing what decisions could be made with existing information and 
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what decisions had to be delayed until certain information gaps had been filled. 
Unfortunately, the backgrounder was delivered late. Due to the tight timeline 
for the overall SEA process, it was introduced part way through rather than at 
the beginning of the SEA consultation process.57 
Given the short time frame and the limited resources available to carry 
out the SEA, there clearly was no real opportunity to fill the information gaps 
identified. Some effort was, nevertheless, made to encourage community 
groups to supplement the information provided through the backgrounder. 
Limited participant funding was made available to a total of seven aboriginal, 
community, environmental and fisheries groups.58 Funding enabled community 
meetings and some community-based research on issues of importance to 
participating organisations. Topics covered included native fisheries in the Bay 
of Fundy, how to enable community benefits from tidal energy development, 
integrated resource management in the Bay of Fundy, research on submerged 
ice, and the gathering of local and traditional knowledge relevant to the SEA.59 
The Round Table commenced its work after the conclusion of the 
community forums. Interests represented on the Round Table include 
municipalities, fisheries, aquaculture, community development, environmental 
organisations, tourism, marine transportation, the local power utility, and tidal 
developers. It met a total of seven times between October 2007 and April, 2008. 
The Round Table first considered how decisions on tidal and other offshore 
renewable energy in the Bay of Fundy should be made. Members eventually 
settled on a set of sustainability principles adapted from principles proposed by 
Robert Gibson.60 It then reviewed the background report prepared by Jacques 
Whitford and discussed a range of specific issues of particular concern to 
members of the Round Table.61  
Given the time available, and diversity of interest and perspectives, 
a surprising level of consensus was reached. At the same time, it must be 
recognised that the limited time and resources, as well as the size of the round 
table, made a deeper level of agreement on the substance impossible. As 
a result, many of the SEA recommendations are general in nature. They will 
require ongoing engagement of stakeholders to become meaningful and clear, 
                                                 
57 J. Whitford, Background Report for the Fundy Tidal Energy SEA (January 2008), available: 
<http://www.bayoffundysea.ca> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
58
 See “SEA Participation Support Funds,” available: <http://www.bayoffundysea.ca> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
59
 For information on the funding programme and the results of funded initiatives, see online: 
<http://www.bayoffundysea.ca> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
60
 See R. B. Gibson, S. Hassan, S. Holtz, J. Tansey, and G. Whitelaw, Sustainability 
Assessment: Criteria and Processes (London: Earthscan, 2005), pp. 217–236. 
61
 For information on the Round Table, see online: <http://www.bayoffundysea.ca>. 
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and to ensure that some of the unresolved issues underlying these general 
recommendations are not forgotten as time passes. 
Following the conclusion of the Round Table process, the OEER 
subcommittee under the guidance of the process-lead, Lesley Griffiths, 
prepared the SEA report. The report was submitted to the provincial 
government on 1 May 2008. A final round of hearings in May of 2008 sought 
further feedback on this report. OEER submitted a community comment report 
that summarised the final feedback received by way of follow-up to the SEA 
report. In July, 2008, the province released its response to the SEA report.62 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the SEA was that halfway through the 
process, the province of Nova Scotia invited proposals to construct and operate 
a research facility to test in-stream tidal turbines in the Bay of Fundy. Around 
the same time, it invited developers of in-stream technology to apply to test 
their technologies in this research facility and to indicate desired location, water 
depth and current speed. It announced the successful bidder for the construction 
and operation of the research facility before the SEA was concluded. It also 
announced three developers who would be permitted to test their turbines in the 
research facility.63 
While the province made it clear that the results of this process were 
subject to the SEA, many participants in the SEA process were understandably 
sceptical that the SEA process would have an impact on whether, where and 
under what conditions the research facility would be permitted to proceed. 
A secondary concern with this parallel process was that it resulted in developers 
being less engaged in the SEA process than they otherwise might have been.  
 
 
8.5.3. SEA Outcomes 
 
The SEA report included 29 recommendations to the province of Nova Scotia. 
The recommendations were supported by all members of the OEER 
subcommittee and were generally supported by the round table. Time and 
resource constraints prevented formal endorsement by the round table of the 
specific language of some of the recommendations. The intent of 
                                                 
62
 NS Department of Energy, Bay of Fundy Tidal Energy: A Response to the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (Halifax: NS Department of Energy, July 2008), available: 
<http://www.bayoffundysea.ca> (retrieved 18 November 2008). 
63
 For information about the three pilot projects selected as a result of this process, see online: 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/renewables/public-education/tidal.asp> (retrieved 18 November 
2008). 
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recommendations was, however, supported by all members of the round table. 
The following summarises some of the key recommendations included in the 
report and offers some indication of the government response: 
 
• The report recommends that the province adopt and apply ten 
sustainability principles as a framework for decision making on 
renewable energy development in the Bay of Fundy. Specifically, 
the SEA recommends that (1) the resource remain under government 
ownership and management, (2) the resource be developed in a way that 
ensures net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, (3) federal and 
provincial governments should cooperate in the management of the 
resource, (4) decisions about commercial development should only be 
made incrementally and after technologies are proven to be 
environmentally sound, (5) effects on other users of the Bay of Fundy 
that cannot be mitigated must be fairly compensated, (6) net social and 
economic benefits over the long term should be ensured and maximised, 
(7) community development should be a priority, (8) decisions should 
be made in the context of an integrated management approach, and (9) 
decisions should be made in a transparent manner.  
o The government response seeks to demonstrate how some of the 
principles have been acted on, but falls short of endorsing the ten 
principles as a basis for decision making.64 
• The report recommends that pilot in stream tidal projects be permitted to 
proceed carefully and incrementally.  
o The government response accepts this recommendation. 
• The report seeks assurances for ongoing consultations and participation 
in decision making and for the development of a community 
participation and benefits strategy.  
o The government response accepts these recommendations to 
a limited extent, but does not provide any detail on how ongoing 
consultations will be carried out or that it intends to build upon 
the mechanisms developed through the SEA. The absence of any 
specific measures on socio-economic impacts generally and on 
maximising community benefits specifically is of concern given 
that this was clearly identified as a significant information and 
knowledge gap in the SEA. 
• The report recommends that the province develop legislation and amend 
existing legislation. The SEA proposes that the legislation should 
                                                 
64 NS Department of Energy, n. 62 above, p. 18. 
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encourage the development of marine renewable energy resources in 
a safe and environmentally sound manner. It should require interested 
parties to obtain licenses for the rights to develop the resource. Such 
licenses should be conditional on undertaking activity that will promote 
timely development. The legislation should provide for immediate 
disclosure of all environmental information and, after appropriate 
confidentiality periods, disclosure of technical information related to the 
resource. The legislation should provide for the province to receive 
revenues from the licensing and/or development of the resource and 
provide opportunities for affected communities to benefit from the 
development. Finally, the SEA proposes that the legislation provide 
incentives for the net reductions of greenhouse gases in the province. 
o The government response accepts in principle the 
recommendation for provincial legislation, but with few 
specifics in content or timing. The government response does 
outline the following possible elements of provincial tidal 
energy legislation: 
 Crown title in the resource in its natural state 
 licensing requirement for exploration 
 subject to regulatory compliance and plan approvals, 
the right of an explorer to move to commercial 
production 
 royalties and/or benefits representing the economic value 
of the resource in its natural state 
 operational oversight to ensure compliance with laws, 
permits, and obligations65 
• The report recommends that a research agenda be developed to fill 
knowledge gaps.  
o The government response identifies some specific initiatives that 
it plans to undertake to fill these gaps. 
• The report recommends that efforts be made to maximise local benefits 
from any development of renewable energy in the Bay of Fundy.  
o There is some reference to specific benefits in the government 
response, but no clear proposal. 
• The report recommends that the province place a high priority on 
conservation, efficiency and carbon credit trading.  
o The province points to its pending energy strategy and climate 
change action plan, but without any specific commitment to 
these priorities.66 
                                                 
65 Id., p. 16. 
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• Capacity of the power grid in Nova Scotia to accept power from tidal 
power projects is identified as an important issue in need of further 
study.  
o There is no formal acceptance of the recommendation. 
The response from the province instead explains what has been 
done to address this issue. Clearly, there is a difference of 
opinion on whether grid capacity will be an issue. 
• The potential for impacts on other users is identified as an issue. 
The report recommends an integrated approach to resource management 
in the Bay of Fundy.  
o The provincial response makes a general commitment. However, 
as with some other responses, the government focuses on what it 
has done rather than on what it will do.67 
 
In sum, the provincial response is generally positive, but it is not always 
clear whether the government fully supports the specific recommendations. 
The lack of clarity in the response is surprising given the direct involvement of 
officials from the Departments of Energy and Environment in the design and 
implementation of the process as well as the development of the 29 
recommendations. In some cases the response rephrases the recommendations 
without a clear indication of whether the government agrees or disagrees, or as 
to the nature of any disagreement. This may in part be a reflection of the ad hoc 
nature of the process. It may be a reflection of the limited time and resources 
devoted to the exercise, or it may indicate that key decision makers were not 
sufficiently involved in the process to fully concur with the process and the 
results. In addition to responding to the recommendations, the government 
highlighted the following measures: 
 
• The government committed to providing funding and finding other ways 
of encouraging the research needed to fill the information gaps 
identified through the SEA process. 
                                                                                                                                  
66
 The energy strategy and the climate change action plan were released on 9 January 2009. 
The province announced the creation of an independent agency to oversee an ambitious demand 
side management programme to encourage conservation of electricity in the province. There is 
little in either plan on carbon credit trading. For more information, see Government of Canada, 
“Climate Change,” available: <http://www.gov.ns.ca/nse/climate.change> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008). 
67 NS Department of Energy, n. 62 above, p. 36. 
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• The province has decided to proceed with a demonstration facility for in 
stream tidal and with a demonstration programme for other forms of 
renewable energy. 
• The government has committed to remove devices in case of adverse 
environmental effects. 
• The government has confirmed the need to ensure compensation 
agreements are developed with other users of the Bay of Fundy. 
• The government confirmed its desire to encourage collaboration with all 
affected jurisdictions and stakeholders.68 
 
It is too early to predict the long-term impact of the SEA on tidal energy 
governance. One of the most promising signs was how major stakeholders 
constructively engaged in the SEA process. Early and ongoing engagement 
likely played an important role in this. Opportunities for mutual learning were 
evident, even during the short duration of the process. For example, developers 
provided valuable insight into conditions for development for a variety of 
technologies. Members of the fishing industry offered valuable insight into 
local conditions, particularly some of the high current velocity passages. Other 
users were able to identify concerns over potential use conflicts. Exchanges on 
these issues at the round table allowed everyone to develop a better 
understanding of the range of potentially suitable sites. The long-term benefit of 
the SEA process may very well depend on whether the province is able to 
ensure continued engagement. If the engagement continues, it is likely that 
a cooperative approach to resource management and integrated planning in the 
Bay of Fundy will be possible. In the absence of empirical evidence as to the 
contribution of the SEA process to decision making on tidal energy, 
an evaluation against criteria from SEA literature will have to suffice for now.  
 
 
8.5.4. Evaluation of the SEA Process 
 
This section briefly evaluates the SEA process against criteria identified from 
the literature. The nine criteria applied are selected from the results of 
an international literature review on SEA appended to a September, 2008 
options paper prepared for the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.69 
Academics and practitioners have stated the criteria of effective SEA in many 
                                                 
68 Id., p. 5. 
69
 Kirchoff et al., n. 52 above. 
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different ways.70 The criteria cover the range of issues identified in the 
literature and are therefore used as a basis for the assessment of the NS Tidal 
Energy SEA. 
 
1. The SEA should be applied early and proactively. 
 
The tidal SEA process was applied both early and proactively. In contrast 
with a tidal SEA process carried out in Scotland,71 the NS process was applied 
prior to the pilot phase, before any tidal energy projects were approved in the 
Bay of Fundy. This was critical to the credibility of the process in communities 
around the Bay of Fundy. It also proved to be one of the greatest challenges, 
given that the province initiated a parallel process for the selection and approval 
of pilot projects half way through the SEA. 
 
2. The SEA should integrate the biophysical (or “environmental”), 
social and economic aspects, and be integrated within larger 
planning and decision-making processes. 
 
The SEA process did cover biophysical as well as social and economic 
aspects of the issue. However, the background study focused on the 
technologies and their interaction with the biophysical environment. 
The information available on the social and economic aspects of tidal energy 
development was limited. As a result, social and economic issues were raised, 
but few concrete recommendations were possible on how to address social 
concerns and how to maximise economic opportunities. 
The SEA process was an ad hoc process. Therefore, it was not formally 
integrated with planning and other decision-making processes. The extent to 
which the SEA process will be integrated with existing EA and regulatory 
decision-making processes remains to be seen. Larger planning processes are 
lacking in this region, and it is too early to tell whether the SEA process will 
motivate the initiation of coastal management or other integrated planning 
processes in the Bay of Fundy region. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 For a summary of some of these perspectives, see Doelle, n. 4 above, pp. 29, 192.  
71 For more information on the SEA carried out in Scotland, see The Scottish Government, 
“Wave Tidal SEA,” available: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-Industry/Energy/ 
19185/Resources/WaveTidalSEA> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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3. The SEA should take into account its place within the other “tiers” 
or levels of assessment. 
 
The tidal SEA process did take account of existing decision-making 
processes, such as the EA process and various regulatory processes. The results 
of the SEA process should improve EA and regulatory processes for pilot and 
commercial scale projects. The SEA process clearly sought to inform the future 
EA processes at the project level. It should make project EAs more efficient 
and allow key stakeholders to focus more quickly on key unresolved issues and 
information gaps. The constructive relationship among key stakeholders, if 
fostered on an ongoing basis, also bodes well for improved efficiency and 
effectiveness at the project EA level.  
 
4. The process must be guided by regulatory, policy and/or other forms 
of guidance.  
 
The process was an ad hoc process and, as such, not sanctioned under 
either the federal or provincial EA legislation. There were opportunities to 
sanction the process within the EA process under the Nova Scotia Environment 
Act. The opportunity was not pursued, mainly because the initiative for the SEA 
came from the Department of Energy, whereas the EA process is under the 
control of the Department of the Environment.  
 
5. The process must be flexible and adaptable. 
 
The process was flexible and adaptable within certain parameters. 
The flexibility of the process was limited mainly by funding and time. Both of 
these factors limited the ability to engage members of the public, efforts to 
achieve consensus on more controversial issues, and the ability of the SEA 
process to come to concrete conclusions on how to best maximise social and 
economic opportunities. 
 
6. The process must be transparent and include opportunities for public 
involvement throughout. 
 
The process was generally transparent. All relevant documents were 
available publically. All key documents were made available for public 
comment. The OEER subcommittee not only included members of key current 
users of the Bay of Fundy, but also members of local environmental 
organisations. All major interests were represented on the round table. Through 
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this process, all stakeholders had multiple opportunities to follow the process 
and provide input. 
There were two rounds of public forums in key communities around the 
Bay of Fundy and in Halifax, the capital of Nova Scotia. There was limited 
funding to allow interested groups to meet and consider their position with 
respect to this new industry. There were opportunities throughout to provide 
input into the process through the website. No issues were ever formally 
excluded from the process. In addition, members of the public had opportunities 
to feed into the process through representatives on the round table.  
Limitations of the process from a public engagement perspective include 
the special limitation to the communities around the Bay of Fundy and Halifax. 
With more time and resources, the process would have benefitted from broader 
engagement. First Nations participation was also limited, mainly due to 
confusion of the impact this process would have on the Crown’s duty to consult 
and accommodate and more established engagement processes.72 These 
limitations can be overcome as the SEA process becomes an established part of 
the overall governance approach. 
 
7. The most effective incentives or sources of motivation must be in 
place in order to ensure the process is adhered to.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the results of the process will be followed. 
The limited funding and short time frame provided somewhat limited 
opportunities to build the profile of the SEA process and its outcomes. It is not 
clear whether there has been sufficient investment into the process and the 
results by stakeholders and government decision makers to ensure its 
implementation. The ad hoc nature of the process also poses some risk that the 
results may be ignored.  
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 The problem that arose with respect to aboriginal engagement results from a set of Supreme 
Court of Canada cases that explored the scope of the Crown’s duty to consult with aboriginal 
communities. In one of the cases, Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project 
Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (SCC), the court concluded 
that affected aboriginal communities’ involvement in the environmental assessment process 
was sufficient to meet the Crown’s duty to consult. This decision has made aboriginal 
engagement in environmental assessment processes more difficult. For a good overview of the 
duty to consult issue, see R. F. Devlin, and R. Murphy, “Contextualizing the Duty to Consult: 
Clarification or Transformation?” National Journal of Constitutional Law 14 (2003): 167.  
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8. The assessment must be followed up in terms of actual performance, 
as well as actual effects, compared with predictions, and in terms of 
improving future policies, plans and programmes as well as 
improving the assessment process itself. 
 
It remains to be seen to what extent this will happen.  
 
9. The political will necessary for putting in place and implementing 
an assessment regime must exist. Much of the momentum for 
achieving it will be achieved when decision makers are shown the 
benefits of putting the above factors in place. Decision makers must 
therefore be participants in the design, establishment and 
implementation of the regime.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the political will is in place to ensure the 
SEA process actually guides future decisions about tidal energy in the Bay of 
Fundy. As discussed above, key in this regard will be whether future 
government decision makers were adequately engaged in the process to 
appreciate the substance and overall value of the recommendations. Once all 
participants develop a level of comfort with the process and the quality of the 
substantive outcomes, it will likely be easier to develop more specific rules on 
how the results of an SEA process should guide lower tier decision-making 
processes, such as project EAs and regulatory approvals. 
 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 
This study raises two important issues about the SEA process: 
 
1. How to design and implement an effective SEA process to improve 
decision making, particularly with respect to the arrival of new 
industries (i.e., process options, inter-jurisdictional challenges, scope, 
public engagement, decision making) 
2. How to position the SEA process within overall government decision 
making (i.e., how does it fit with higher tier planning and management, 
how will it feed into lower tier decision making, such as project EAs 
and regulatory approvals)  
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With respect to the first issue, it is too early for any final judgments about the 
effectiveness of the SEA process or its role in ensuring an effective governance 
approach to tidal energy in the Bay of Fundy, as most of the recommendations 
have yet to be implemented. It therefore remains to be seen to what extent the 
SEA will achieve its objective of ensuring decisions about this new industry are 
made in the long term best interest of the province of Nova Scotia.  
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the SEA process in Nova 
Scotia was a significant step forward in developing governance responses to 
new industries. It is encouraging that the province of Nova Scotia took a much 
more proactive approach to tidal energy than it did in response to the arrival to 
other industries in the past, such as aquaculture and offshore oil and gas. Based 
on this experience, a more formal SEA process could be developed to further 
improve decision-making processes for the future. 
The tidal SEA process was limited by its ad hoc nature, making its 
relationship to lower-tier decision making on in-stream tidal more difficult to 
define. This limitation is best addressed by providing a clear legislative 
foundation for SEA. Such legislation would presumably establish rules on when 
an SEA is to be carried out and on the process to be followed. Most importantly 
for purposes of the issue raised here, the legislation could define how, when and 
for how long the results of an SEA will have to be considered in future 
government decision making related to the subject matter of the SEA.  
The tidal SEA process was also limited in terms of the time and resources 
available. Knowledge gaps were identified but generally not filled. A number of 
issues, such as which approach to tidal energy is most likely to maximise long-
term benefits to Nova Scotia (particularly rural development benefits) were 
identified but not resolved.  
For these reasons alone, the implementation stage will be critical.73 This 
stage has to address knowledge gaps and continue the dialogue on values and 
priorities and how best to pursue them. For example, should the focus be on 
making the Bay of Fundy a testing, research and manufacturing site for tidal 
technology or on producing energy? Proper implementation will ensure that the 
constructive relationship developed among key stakeholders continues. This 
will require the same level of transparency and engagement on an ongoing 
basis, especially given the incremental nature of this industry. While the round 
table may be a bit too large to be effective, a smaller version of the round table 
would be an obvious mechanism for ongoing consultation, in combination with 
broader consultation at critical stages of development. 
                                                 
73 A key issue is how the results of this SEA process will feed into EA at the project level. 
Unfortunately, the SEA report is says little on this point. 
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As decisions are made about pilot projects, as experience is gained about 
the technical, social, economic and environmental feasibility of tidal energy, it 
will be critical that communities continue to feel as informed and as involved in 
decisions about whether, where and under what conditions tidal energy projects 
ought to be permitted in the Bay of Fundy. The pilots will play an important 
role in the decision-making process for this new industry. It will be critical that 
the pilots are utilised to fill in some of the information gaps, particularly gaps in 
the understanding of the interaction between the various technologies and the 
receiving environment and cumulative effects. 
The experience with the tidal SEA in Nova Scotia points to several 
possible improvements for SEA process design. The process would benefit 
from clear provisions on how the results of the SEA will feed into lower- and 
higher-tier decision-making processes, and the time frame during which the 
SEA can provide a sound basis for project-based decisions. The process also 
needs to include a firm commitment by government decision makers to respond 
to the recommendations of the SEA. In recognition of the reality that not all 
questions can be answered at the SEA level of assessment, government 
responses in the future will have to be more clear on whether and how 
knowledge gaps are to be filled and how outstanding questions will be 
answered.  
Continuity in terms of transparency of decision making and public 
engagement is also critical. It is clear that the tidal SEA in Nova Scotia has 
developed a new level of trust and expectation in terms of transparency and 
public engagement in decision making. The constructive relationships 
developed will be at risk if the expectations are not realised as the sustainability 
principles developed and other recommendations are applied to individual tidal 
projects.  
The role of government decision makers in the SEA process must be 
carefully considered. It needs to be designed to ensure independence and 
credibility of the process on the one hand, and active engagement of key 
decision makers on the other hand. As with project EAs, early triggering will be 
key. An effective way of addressing most of these issues might be to provide 
a legislative foundation for SEA at the provincial and federal levels. Initially, 
the legislation will have to retain considerable flexibility to be able to adjust to 
experience and unforeseen circumstances.  
Any effort to formalise SEA in Nova Scotia will have to address the 
jurisdictional challenge of how a provincially led SEA can and should feed into 
federal decision making, both in terms of higher- and lower-tier decisions. This 
will be relevant both in terms of possible future regional and integrated 
planning and management in the Bay of Fundy region, and in terms of future 
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decisions on tidal energy projects in the context of their potential impacts on 
fisheries, navigation, and other areas of federal jurisdiction. 
The absence of integrated management and planning is another challenge 
that will require further thought. It may be reasonable for purposes of deciding 
on whether to move ahead with pilot projects to assume the status quo of 
resource use and management will and should continue. It is more difficult to 
see how decisions about commercial-scale developments can be made in the 
absence of integrated planning, even with an incremental approach.  
This may point to a more general limitation of SEAs. In the end, 
decisions about the role of this new industry, and how to maximise long-term 
sustainable benefits to Nova Scotians and Canadians, cannot be made until an 
integrated management plan is in place for the Bay of Fundy. This would 
suggest that the main role of an SEA is to update integrated management plans, 
not to eliminate the need for integrated planning and management. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Canadian Arctic Offshore Oil and Natural Gas and European Union Energy 
Diversification: Towards a New Perspective? 
 
Jerome D. Davis, Kamrul Hossain, and Timo Koivurova 
 
 
9.1. Introduction  
 
Events shape and in turn are shaped by developments in Arctic ocean policy. 
Nowhere is this truer than of the ever-changing Arctic environment, which is in 
turn shaping and being shaped by a global demand for secure sources of future 
oil and natural gas supplies. As the polar ice cap progressively shrinks, and 
industry interest in the Arctic quickens, Canadians are confronting the 
challenges of developing their Arctic hydrocarbon resources. In Canada these 
conflicting objectives have led to innovative regulatory policies 
accommodating stakeholder desires on the one hand and environmental and 
economic considerations on the other. The European Union (EU) similarly has 
multiple objectives intersecting with its Arctic interests. Particularly prominent 
among these are securing its future sources of natural gas supplies, 
implementing its natural gas market reforms, and promoting its environmental 
objectives. A seemingly unrelated event, the development of an Atlantic Basin 
liquefied natural gas market, both makes the development of Arctic natural gas 
resources feasible and presents the EU with an additional source of natural gas 
supply. Examining a project envisaging the development of High Arctic 
offshore natural gas resources, the giant fields off Melville Island, demonstrates 
the potential of such resources while tracing the regulatory problems and 
promises which their development entails for EU policy.  
 
 
9.1.1. Background: EU Policy in the Arctic 
 
According to the US Geological Survey, the Arctic seabed contains as much as 
one fourth of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas deposits. In recent years, due 
to high oil prices in the world market, constant market demand, and the 
combination of the development of ship design technology and availability of 
modern equipment for drilling and other exploration and exploitation activities, 
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offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic are becoming increasingly 
attractive.1 More than 80 percent of current European oil and gas is produced 
offshore.2 The EU imports the major share of its energy demands, currently 
50 percent of its total consumption. Over the next 20 years this share is 
predicted to rise to 65–70 percent.3 Presently, oil imports to the EU are 
comprised as follows: 38 percent from Russia/CIS (constantly increasing in the 
past few years), 22 percent from the Middle East, 15 percent from Norway, 14 
percent from North America, and 11 percent from other countries.4 This 
statistic shows that 53 percent, the largest share of EU consumption, comes 
from the Arctic states (currently Russia and Norway), and this share is expected 
to rise in the future. However, from an EU perspective, seabed activities in the 
Arctic are not of direct relevance as none of the EU countries have direct geo-
physical links to Arctic marine waters.5 Yet, among other EU Arctic interests, 
the EU is concerned about Arctic energy supplies, especially hydrocarbon 
resources as these might constitute a strategic reserve for Europe’s future 
energy requirements.6 Thus regulatory and other cooperative institutions 
facilitating cross-border and other common interests and energy infrastructure 
investments are being incorporated into EU energy policy. To date these areas 
are not extensive (many of these involve sub-sea connections and other 
competitive offshore issues). However, EU interest in marine-based energy 
projects is growing.7 
                                                 
1A. Airoldi, The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and Actions (Copenhagen: Nordic 
Council of Ministers, 2008), p. 47. The implications of the climate policy for the energy sector, 
the dramatic increase of energy prices, and intensified concerns for the future security of supply 
have contributed to push energy issues to the top of the political agenda. 
2
 European Parliament, Energy Policy and Maritime Policy: Ensuring a Better Fit, Eur. Parl. 
Doc. SEC (2007) 1283 provisional version (10 October 2007), p. 3 [hereinafter Energy Policy 
and Maritime Policy]. 
3
 Airoldi, n. 1 above, p. 47. 
4
 Energy Policy and Maritime Policy, n. 2 above, p. 6.  
5
 In November 1983, in a hard-fought referendum, Greenland (which is officially an overseas 
territory of Denmark) voted to withdraw from the European Union. Since January 1985, 
relations with the EU have been regulated by an agreement reached between Greenlandic and 
Danish governments and the EU. D. Leonard, A New Deal for Greenland and the EU (London: 
The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), available: <http://fpc.org.uk/articles/345> (retrieved 16 Sep-
tember 2008). 
6
 European Commission, Strengthening the Northern Dimension of European Energy Policy, 
Communication from the Commission (Brussels, November 1999), available: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/energy.pdf> (retrieved 3 September 
2008). 
7
 Energy Policy and Maritime Policy, n. 2 above, p 3.  
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In early 2008, the European Commission adopted a document entitled 
“Climate Change and International Security.”8 This document highlights the 
increasing geopolitical importance of the Arctic in the EU policy. This is 
mainly due to rapid melting of the sea ice caps, which increases accessibility 
to Arctic waters. The consequences of this development may include: the 
possibility of new trade routes, accessibility to potential offshore resources 
in the Arctic, and potential competitive Arctic territorial claims that threaten 
international stability and geostrategic regional dynamics. The security 
concern for the whole of the region is justified. A potential conflict may arise 
from intensified competition over access to and control over energy 
resources. An expansion of competitive territorial claims in the region has 
especial significance as it is expected that Arctic offshore areas contain 
enormous amounts of hydrocarbon resources. An example of potential 
conflict may be seen in the laying of a flag on the seabed at the North Pole 
by Russia during the summer of 2007. Thus, instability in the Arctic is likely 
to increase for two reasons. Firstly, much of the world’s hydrocarbon 
reserves are expected to be in the region, one that is already vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change, and secondly, most of the oil and gas producing 
countries in the region already face significant social, economic and 
demographic challenges.9 Therefore, Europe’s ability to secure its trade and 
resource interests effectively requires close work with its northern partners. 
Moreover, the European Union is also closely connected to the Arctic 
through history, geography, economy and science.10 Therefore, for the EU, 
the Arctic region, once only of “peripheral” interest,11 is now vitally 
important, especially in the context of climate change and Arctic energy 
considerations. Thus the EU has to take a leading role in responding to the 
threat posed by rapid climate change and its consequences in the Arctic.12  
                                                 
8
 “Climate Change and International Security,” Paper from the High Representative and the 
European Commission to the Council, S113/08 (14 March 2008), available: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf> 
(retrieved 2 September 2008) [hereinafter Climate Change and International Security]. 
9
 Id., p. 5.  
10
 Dr. J. Borg, Member EC (Fisheries and Maritime Affairs), “The Arctic: A matter of concern 
to us all,” Paper presented at Common Concern for the Arctic, European Commission Speech 
08/415 (Ilulissat, Greenland, 9 September 2008). 
11
 Airoldi, n.1 above, p. 13. 
12
 The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international 
security because of its leading role in development and global climate policy and the wide array 
of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe’s 
strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction, and Europe’s role as a key proponent of effective multilateralism. 
Climate Change and International Security, n. 8 above. 
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Within the framework of the Integrated Maritime Policy, the EU took 
a step forward to enhancing Europe’s leadership role in maritime affairs. In 
addition to addressing a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach to all 
ocean-related issues, the EU policy focuses on the individual needs of the 
different oceans and seas surrounding the European continent. With regard to 
the Arctic, an integrated maritime policy has put especial emphasis on the 
diverse interests within the EU concerning issue areas such as environmental 
protection, biodiversity, energy, fisheries, and maritime transport. The Action 
Plan for Integrated Maritime Policy included preparation of a report by 2008 on 
Arctic Ocean strategic issues that would lay the foundation for decisions 
regarding European interests in the Arctic Ocean and the EU’s response to that 
end.13 The work of the Arctic Council in exploring an integrated approach to 
maritime issues complements the work of the EU.14 As a result, protecting the 
Arctic from environmental changes and ensuring sustainable regional 
development are significant EU policy goals. Any exploration of the Arctic’s 
resources should be conducted in a sustainable manner with the EU applying 
the principles of a level playing field and reciprocal market access in the Arctic. 
The scope of the synergy between Europe’s energy policy and maritime policy 
is wide and is likely to increase in the very near future. Europe’s energy 
situation and policy imply more reliance on oceans, seas and ports.15 There is 
already an existing framework in this respect, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and the work done by organisations such as the Arctic 
Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the EU’s Northern Dimension 
initiative. The EU wants to develop the system further, adapting it to new 
challenges and circumstances relating to both legal and practical realities. 
Prominent here is the goal of environmental governance ensuring sustainable 
development, equitable access to resources and meeting the societal needs of 
indigenous communities.16 
Thus the EU policy towards the Arctic has developed as one of 
cooperation and partnership with its northern neighbours. This cooperation and 
partnership has been given an institutional framework with the EU’s successful 
                                                 
13
 European Commission, Accompanying Document to the Integrated Maritime Policy, 
European Commission, SEC (2007) 1278, p. 30, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/ 
pdf/ActionPaper/action_plan_en.pdf> (retrieved 20 October 2008). For the final report on 
Arctic Ocean strategic issues, see n. 40 below. 
14
 Borg, n. 10 above. 
15
 Energy Policy and Maritime Policy, n. 2 above, p. 2. 
16
 Borg, n. 10 above. 
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adoption and implementation of its Northern Dimension initiative in 1999.17 
The EU Member States, the Russian Federation, Norway, Iceland and the 
European Commissions are parties to this initiative. Northern regional 
organisations are also significant actors in the Northern Dimension.18 This 
initiative also aims to strengthen transatlantic cooperation by allowing the 
United States and Canada to have observer status. The purpose of the 
Dimension is to cooperate actively on the basis of good neighbourliness, equal 
partnership, common responsibility and transparency.19 The Northern 
Dimension promotes partnership between the EU and other northern non-
Member States with regard to prosperity, sustainable development and well-
being in Northern Europe. It is now being jointly developed on the basis of 
Northern European consensus.20 Despite its broad geographical scope, the 
Northern Dimension is to be used as a political and operational framework for 
promoting the implementation of the EU-Russia Common Spaces initiative at 
regional, sub-regional and local levels in the North with the full participation of 
Norway and Iceland.21 This initiative focuses on identification of cross-cutting 
topics for cooperation and implementation. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy Instrument (ENPI) finances its activities, notably those focusing on 
cross-border cooperation,22 along the lines of the relevant EU-Russia financial 
                                                 
17
 Finland played an active role in promoting cooperation in the north after its accession to the 
EU. This resulted in a proposal for the Northern Dimension (ND) in 1997. The European 
Council, however, endorsed the concept in 1999. See Airoldi, n. 1 above, pp. 17–18.  
18
 These regional organisations include: the Council of the Baltic States (CBSS), the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), and the Arctic Council 
(AC). These northern regional organisations identify needs for development and cooperation in 
their respective areas and support project implementation in different ways. See Overview of 
Northern Dimension policy, European Commission, DG External Relations, available: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm> (retrieved 14 November 2008).  
19
 “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy,” Northern Dimension Summit 
(24 November 1996), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/pol_dec 
_1106.pdf> (retrieved 2 October 2008). 
20
 “Guidelines for the Development of a Political Declaration and a Policy Framework 
Document for the Northern Dimension Policy from 2007,” European Council documents, 
available: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/guidelines05.pdf> (retrieved 
24 November 2008), p. 1. 
21
 Id., p. 2. 
22
 Under the cohesion policy of the EU, cohesion among the regions and Member States was 
strengthened through economic, social and territorial cooperation. The programmes with 
particular relevance to the Arctic include: Sápmi Programme (cooperation in priority areas such 
as development of industry and commerce, research, development and education, regional 
functionality and identity), Northern Periphery Programme (cooperation in the northern EU 
regions of Sweden and Finland, a large share of Norway, including Svalbard, the Faroe Islands, 
Greenland, and Iceland, as well as part of Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland on sustainable development of natural and community resources, technical assistance to 
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cooperation arrangements.23 (A description of the EU Northern Dimension is 
appended to this paper as Annex One.)  
 
 
9.2. EU Policy and the Canadian Arctic: A Coincidence of Events and 
Interests – Towards a Different Perspective? 
 
What is striking about current EU Arctic policy is that it almost totally ignores 
the hydrocarbon potential of the North American Arctic continental shelf, in 
particular the Canadian Arctic shelf.24 While not yet significant, events on the 
Canadian Arctic/West Greenland continental shelves could prove of interest to 
EU policy makers.  
Following a review of the Atlantic Basin LNG market, this contribution 
briefly describes EU interest in this developing market. It analyses how the 
Melville Island project may fit in the patterns of LNG trade, directly or 
indirectly benefiting EU natural gas markets. (The details of the Melville Island 
project are further described in Annex Two.) The possible Danish/Greenlandic 
role within the Atlantic Basin, and possible policy perspectives for the EU, are 
also reviewed. Outlining the regulatory dilemmas facing the Canadian Arctic 
offshore suggests the consequences that must be considered for development of 
the Melville Island project. Overall, it would appear that exploitation of Arctic 
natural gas will supplement existing and future EU natural gas supplies, with 
a potentially significant contribution from Canada’s Arctic archipelago. 
However, potential obstacles such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) must be considered in evaluating the future development 
of these resources. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
support administration, and joint projects of community interests), and Kolarctic Programme 
(cross-border cooperation between EU regions and regions in neighbouring countries, as well as 
in Russia, on economic and social development, common challenges such as environmental 
protection and adapting to climate change, and people-to-people cooperation in the northern 
parts of Finland, Sweden and Norway and northwest Russia). Airoldi, n. 1 above, pp. 29–32. 
23
 Guidelines for the Development of a Political Declaration, n. 20 above, p. 4. 
24
 This is true as well of the EU External Policy which is devoid of any mention of the resources 
of the North American Arctic shelf. H. Turvo, EU’s External Relations related to Arctic 
Offshore Hydrocarbon Activities, Research Paper (University of Lapland: Arktikum, 2008). 
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9.2.1. A Different Point of Departure? 
 
Our point of departure juxtaposes disparate events and policies to argue for 
an increased EU interest in the Canadian Arctic offshore. The following events 
are indisputable: 
The European Union is seeking to diversify its sources of hydrocarbon 
supply, particularly those of natural gas currently primarily delivered by 
pipeline from adjacent countries. This concern has manifested itself in the EU 
Green Paper A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure 
Energy25 and by a Council Directive on EU security of supply.26 In addition, the 
extensive TENP-E programme not only promotes EU internal natural gas 
infrastructure, but also a series of trans-Mediterranean pipelines and a host of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) reception terminals, and sponsors the now almost 
defunct Nabucco pipeline, which aims to connect pipelines from Central Asia 
to the EU pipeline infrastructure. A recent speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, addressing natural gas supplies highlighted these concerns: “For 
Europe, the particular concern related to gas imports. As gas is mainly 
transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption.”27 
While the exact pace of development is uncertain, the retreat of the polar 
icecap currently appears irrefutable. This has opened in turn the West 
Greenland-Canadian Arctic offshore to commercial interests. While the degree 
to which the western channels to the Northwest Passage will be free of multi-
season icepack remains a matter of contention,28 it is clear that Arctic climate 
change will open up access to potential oil and natural gas reserves on the 
Eastern Canadian/ West Greenland continental shelf. This is also true for 
proven natural gas reserves in the High Canadian Arctic. 
Table 9.1 illustrates US Geological Survey estimates of the as yet to be 
discovered resource base in these areas. Table 9.1 also compares these 
                                                 
25
 European Commission, Commission Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, COM(2006) 105 final, March 2006. 
26
 Council Directive of 26 April 2006, concerning Measures to safeguard security of natural gas 
supply, 2004/67/EC. 
27
 B. Ferrero-Waldener, “Energy Security and Foreign Policy,” European Commission 
Speech/08/458 (New York, 24 September 2008), available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/ press 
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/458&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiL
anguage=en> (retrieved 18 October 2008). 
28
 J. R. F. Hodgson, J. G. Calvesbert, and M. Winterbottom, Arctic Shipping Impact 
Assessment: Scoping Study, Report Prepared for Transport Canada (Halifax: Dalhouise 
University, Marine Affairs Program, 31 March 2008). Even broken-up multi-year pack ice 
poses a threat to marine transport in the Arctic. 
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estimates with those of Western Siberia. Western Siberia has less than eight 
percent of the potential oil reserves of the North American offshore Arctic 
shelf, but almost twice the natural gas reserves (roughly 1.9 times) and more 
than two and a half times the natural gas liquids. The oil industry has evinced 
renewed interest in the Canadian Arctic. Between 2000 and 2008, exploration 
licensees in the Beaufort Basin have work commitments of CAD1.9 billion. In 
February 2008 the Canadian Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (INAC) invited bids for five parcels in the Beaufort Sea. All five 
parcels were awarded in June 2008. BP Exploration not only won three of the 
licenses, but made a work bid of CAD1.18 billion for a single offshore parcel, 
the highest bid ever for a single offshore Canadian license.29 Earlier, on the 
Alaskan shelf, a bidding round for 5,255 blocks (29.4 million acres) in the 
Chukchi Sea attracted a total of USD2.7 billion in bids. That industry was 
willing to bid that amount for drilling rights was remarkable. An earlier round 
in 1991 netted a paltry total of USD7.1 million.30  
 
Table 9.1. Offshore estimated undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves: North 
America/West Greenland 
a mmbl = million barrels of oil/NGL (natural gas liquids) 
b bcf = billion cubic feet (1 bcf = 28.316 million st m3) 
Source: US Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered 
Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (2008). 
                                                 
29
 O. R. McHugh, “DFO and LOMAs: Prospects for Successful Development of Offshore 
Petroleum,” (Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Marine 
Management, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., August 2008), p. 57. 
30
 See “Chukchi Sea Draws Record Bids,” Rigzone (6 February 2008), p. 1. 
Canada/US/West Greenland 
Provinces 
Oil 
mmbla 
Natural 
Gas 
bcf b 
Natural 
Gas  
Liquids  
mmbla 
Arctic Alaska 29,960 221,397 5,905 
Amerasia Basin 9,723 56,891 542 
NW Canada Interior Basin 23 305 15 
Sverdrup Basin 857 8,596 191 
W. Greenland/E. Canada 7,274 51,818 1,153 
N. Wrangel Chukchi 86 6,066 107 
Total (1) 47,923 345,073 7,913 
West Siberia (2) 3,660 651,499 20,329 
Ratio West Siberia to N. America/ 
W. Greenland (1)/(2) 
0.076 1.888 2.569 
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Figure 9.1. Melville Island and the Sverdrup Basin 
 
Source: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Land and Exploration Maps, Sverdrup Basin, 
available: <http://:www.ainci-incac/oil/act/lan/index_e.html> (retrieved 23 October 2008). 
 
Compared with the resources of the Beaufort Sea Melville Island and the 
Sverdrup Basin are more attached to the Atlantic Basin LNG market, a market 
which will increase in significance to the EU Member States. Whereas Table 
9.1 estimates the extent of undiscovered reserves in the Arctic, the Sverdrup 
Basin already possesses 12.2 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. It 
is therefore removed from the realms of U.S. Geological Service estimates of 
undiscovered reserves. The Sverdrup Basin is also interesting because there 
have been plans afoot to develop two giant gas fields located off Melville Island 
in the High Canadian Arctic, the Hecla and Drake Point fields, and ship cargoes 
of LNG to Atlantic markets. The Arctic Pilot Project was first advanced in 
1981. It has since been resurrected, but not as a pilot project. Its proposed 
successor, what we will term the “Melville Island project,” is considerably 
larger in scale. This project thus serves as a base for the arguments advanced in 
this contribution. Similarly, one should not discount the West Greenland/ 
Atlantic Canada shelf. It alone accounts for an estimated 51,818 billion cubic 
feet of undiscovered natural gas reserves (out of a total 60,414 billion cubic feet 
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for Greenland (Denmark) and Canada. It too has proven natural gas discoveries. 
Additionally, part of our argument involves using a Greenland port (Godhavn 
(Disko Island)) as a transhipment point and hub for future North American 
Arctic LNG trade with the consumer states of the North Atlantic.  
Any hydrocarbon development in the High Arctic will encounter 
problems in terms of the environment and the feasibility study on which it is 
based. In the Canadian Arctic, the regulatory problems are further complicated 
by the Canadian federal governmental system and treaty rights granted to the 
indigenous Inuit. The Melville Island project development in fact straddles two 
jurisdictions, that of the Beaufort Sea LOMA (and the native rights contained in 
this regulatory management area) and the offshore/internal sea areas of 
Nunavut. This provides us with the problem of how multiple overlapping and 
hierarchical regulatory regimes might be complicating progress in the 
development of Canadian Arctic hydrocarbon reserves.  
 
 
9.2.2. The Atlantic Basin LNG Market: Prospects for LNG from the High 
Canadian Arctic 
 
Almost unnoticed in the analyses of future EU dependence on Mediterranean, 
Central European and Russian sources of natural gas has been the rise of what 
is termed the Atlantic Basin LNG market. (See for example, Finon and 
Locatelli31 who devote one paragraph to EU’s LNG policy in an otherwise 
praiseworthy analysis of Russian-European gas interdependence.) While LNG 
trade is flexible, it can also be capital intensive; the fact that pipelines, 
particularly pipelines to the Yamal peninsula in northwest Siberia, are costly is 
often easily forgotten. The LNG supply chain involves large carriers each 
capable of carrying up to 140,000 m3 or more. Methane, carried in liquefied 
form (at -1600C), condenses to 1/600 of its gaseous state. (A LNG carrier of 
140,000 m3 capacity is therefore carrying 84 million m3 natural gas. Larger 
LNG carriers are on order.32) LNG trades are significant. For example, the 
Melville Island project could deliver 8.76 billion m3 of natural gas per year to 
European markets. To put this amount in perspective, the oft-hyped EU’s 
Nabucco pipeline, a line created to diversify European natural gas imports, at 
its peak will only deliver 16 billion m3 per year from Erzurum in Turkey to 
Baumgarten on the Austrian frontier. The Melville Island project can deliver 
                                                 
31
 D. Finon and C. Locatelli, “Russian and European gas interdependence: Could contractual 
trade channel geopolitics?” Energy Policy 36 (2008), pp. 423–442. 
32
 These include LNG carriers with a capacity of 200,000 m3.  
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a quantity of natural gas equivalent to 56 percent of this capacity, and it is the 
not largest potential project.  
What is of particular interest here is the development of the Atlantic 
Basin LNG market. The old pattern of integrated LNG trade where project 
owners would invest in liquefaction facilities, LNG carriers and reception 
terminals dedicated to a specific trade is being eclipsed by more flexible 
arrangements. Under the new scenario, assets are not specifically dedicated 
a specific LNG trade, and LNG carrier loads are often sold on a spot basis, to 
the highest bidder. LNG cargoes from Trinidad destined for Spain will be 
swapped with a cargo from Algeria destined for North America. (In this 
example, the Trinidad cargo will go to North American markets, while the 
Algerian cargo to Spain is ‘swapped’ with the cargo destined for North 
America.) Spot cargoes of LNG, previously non-existent, are becoming 
increasingly common. In recent years, over half the LNG cargoes for the North 
American market have been sold on a spot basis. This is the foundation of the 
Atlantic Basin LNG market. This market is perhaps best defined geographically 
by Weems and Rogers:  
 
Under our preferred definition Atlantic Basin LNG markets specifically 
include current LNG producing countries Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and LNG consuming 
countries Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US… as well as future LNG 
producers Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Norway, Russia, Venezuela, and 
possible future LNG consumers Brazil, Canadian East Coast, Germany 
and the Netherlands. 33 
 
The Atlantic Basin market shares several characteristics with the Pacific 
Basin market. First, there is a continued short-fall in LNG liquefaction plants 
vis-à-vis LNG carriers and reception terminals. This shortage will be 
aggravated by the rumoured postponement of the giant Russian 
Shtokmanovskoe field in the Barents Sea. Currently, it is thought that this 
shortfall will be made up by LNG supplies from the Middle East and Nigeria 
although this promises to be a costly alternative. Second, there is increasing 
arbitrage in the Atlantic Basin LNG market. LNG parties are increasingly 
capitalising on seasonal and other price differences among the various pricing 
regimes on both sides of the Atlantic. This includes the oil product price-linked 
                                                 
33
 P. R. Weems and D. R. Rogers, “Atlantic Basin LNG sees rapid growth: Mideast capacity 
plays a major role,” LNG Observer 4, no. 2 (1 April 2007), available: <http://www.ogi.com/ 
articles/print_screen.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=287875> (retrieved 18 October 2008). 
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natural gas prices characteristic of most European continental trade, commodity 
futures prices at the US Henry Hub delivery point, and prices obtained at the 
National Balancing Point in the UK market, among other lesser known spot 
markets. This in turn has led to some reception terminals basing their primary 
business on this hub trade. A bright future is seen for this market in that all the 
Atlantic Basin consumer nations will be experiencing increased demand. This 
will lead to increased competition for LNG supplies, perhaps including those 
from the Canadian Arctic/West Greenland Shelf.34  
 
 
Figure 9.2. Current and planned LNG reception terminals  
 
Source: P. R. Weems and D. R. Rogers, “Atlantic Basin LNG sees rapid growth,” LNG 
Observer 4, no. 2 (Tulsa, Oklahoma: PennWell Publications, April 2007), available: 
<http://www.ogi.com/artilcles/print_screen.cfm?ARTICLE_ID+287875> (retrieved 22 October 
2008). 
 
Figure 9.2 shows the locations of LNG reception terminals within the EU 
and Turkey, existing terminals, terminals under construction, and proposed 
terminals. The map under represents the number of proposed terminals. For 
example, LNG reception terminals planned for Eemshaven (Netherlands) and 
Wilhelmshaven (Germany) are not represented on the map. 
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How is the Melville Island project linked to the Atlantic Basin LNG 
market, more particularly to the EU gas markets? The Hecla and Drake Point 
fields are estimated to contain 8.7 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves. 
The total capital costs of project development (field development, pipeline to 
shipping facilities, and liquefaction plant) are estimated to be CAD(2005)2,807 
million with an annual operating cost of CAD(2005)121.4 million.35 The 
Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) has published a plan for five Arctic 
Class 7 icebreaking tankers which are estimated to cost CAD(2005)1,339 
million with annual operating costs of CAD(2005)412 million. In one scenario, 
these will carry 6.1 million tons of LNG to Godhavn (Disko Island) Greenland. 
Here the LNG will be transferred to two other less specialised 200,000 m3 LNG 
tankers and sold to a (non-existent) Canadian LNG receiving terminal.36 
Curiously, the authors of the report ignore the European LNG market. Yet with 
the addition of another 200,000 m3 capacity LNG tanker, European markets 
become accessible to Melville LNG. (Annex Two contains further details of 
this project and our modifications.) Given current price scenarios, it is 
calculated that the project will yield a positive net present value (NPV) at a 
discount rate of 15 percent, after deductions for royalties, taxes, capital costs, 
depreciation, and operating costs. 
How proximate is the Melville Island project to Atlantic Basin EU and 
American markets? Table 9.2 places the project in an Atlantic Basin context. 
The results are somewhat surprising. Distances from Melville Island to the two 
major American reception terminals, Cove Point, Maryland and Lake Charles, 
Louisiana, are longer than distances to Milford Haven, Wilhelmshaven and Le 
Havre in Western Europe. Shtokmanovskoe LNG would have an advantage in 
penetrating EU markets in terms of distance. (Nonetheless, prior to its 
cancellation/postponement Gazprom was planning to market some 
Shtokmanovskoe LNG to the US East Coast.) That Arzew, located in Algeria, 
has the best access to EU markets is hardly surprising, but the liquefaction plant 
at Arzew is working at close to capacity. Melville Island LNG can nonetheless 
compete with Arzew LNG in US markets, Arzew being a major LNG supplier 
to Cove Point and Lake Charles. As for LNG originating at Doha (Qatar) and 
Port Harcourt (Nigeria), anticipated to be major suppliers to the Atlantic Basin 
market, Melville Island LNG has a more proximate location in terms of all 
destinations in Table 9.2.  
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 L. Chan, G. Eynon, and D. McColl, The Economics of High Arctic Gas Development: 
Expanded Sensitivity Analysis (Calgary: Canadian Energy Research Institute, 2005), p. 16. 
36
 Id., p. 22. It should be noted that another scenario has seven Class 7 LNG carriers being 
delivering to the Atlantic Canadian coast. 
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Table 9.2. Melville Island Project: Proximity to European and North American 
markets 
 
From\To 
(nautical miles) 
Cove 
Point 
Lake 
Charles 
Milford 
Haven Wilhelmshaven 
Le 
Havre 
Melville Island 3709 5064 3156 3518 3404 
Shtokmanovskoe 4801 6093 2163 1854 2099 
Port Harcourt 5293 6131 4162 4611 4209 
Arzew 3742 4962 1366 1815 1413 
Doha 8465 9685 6089 6538 6136 
Source: Asia Maritime, “Distances.com,” available: <http://shippingdistance.com/index.php> 
(retrieved 17 October 2008). 
 
Thus we can preliminarily conclude that Melville Island LNG is 
marketable within the Atlantic LNG basin, and is reasonably proximate to EU 
LNG terminals. It promises to deliver 8.76 billion m3 of natural gas to reception 
terminals in the EU. If it does not enter into a long-term base load LNG chain 
relationship to North American or EU markets, it is likely that it will go to 
where the price differentials are favourable, particularly given the rising share 
of spot sales in LNG markets in the United States. In both respects, the EU 
market could well play a plausible role. 
 
 
9.2.3. Melville Island LNG: The Greenland Connection 
 
There are three reasons for reviewing the Greenland connection for the Melville 
Island project. Firstly, the Melville Island project proponent’s selection of 
Godhavn is critical to the role that the Melville LNG might play in the Atlantic 
LNG market. Secondly, Greenland’s offshore, together with that of the 
Canadian Labradorean offshore, constitutes a promising under explored natural 
gas area. Finally, the status of Greenland’s offshore resources is unclear. 
According to reports, Denmark, a Member State of the EU, exercises sovereign 
rights over those portions of the Greenland offshore which are beyond thirty 
nautical miles from Greenland’s baselines. The implications of this for the EU 
are not analysed here.37 
                                                 
37
 This is particularly interesting in light of the results of the referendum on Greenland’s 
autonomy on 25 November 2008. The referendum passed and will take effect on 21 June 2009. 
The proposals were to expand home rule in several areas, including the coast guard and 
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There are logistical reasons for the Melville Island’s proposed location of 
an LNG transit terminal at Godhavn, Greenland. Locating a transit terminal at 
Godhavn, an ice-free harbour on the West Greenland coast would enable 
shorter round trips for the LNG carriers to and from Melville Island, and a 
considerable savings in capital and operation costs. Such a solution could also 
give the project owners considerably more flexibility in selecting which 
markets their LNG would service.38 A further factor in favour of Godhavn as 
a transhipment hub to Europe rather than North America lies in the increasing 
self sufficiency of North American natural gas markets. Technological 
developments in North America have led to increased extraction of natural gas 
from shale formations. This could reduce the current anticipated North 
American demand for LNG making European destinations (and a Godhavn 
transit terminal) more attractive.  
As illustrated in Table 9.1, the US Geological Survey estimates natural 
gas reserves in the West Greenland-Atlantic Canada Province at 51.8 trillion 
cubic feet. Exploratory drilling on the both the West Greenland and Canadian 
Labrador margins is in the initial phases. Six wells have been drilled offshore 
West Greenland, with only one well discovering natural gas. A particularly 
promising exploratory effort is focussed around Disko Island where on land oil 
seeps and gas shows indicate the likely presence of hydrocarbons in 
a geological basin offshore.  
Efforts along the Canadian Labrador margins have been more successful. 
Twenty-eight offshore wells drilled thirty to forty years ago made five gas 
discoveries in two Labrador Mesozoic sedimentary basins: the Saglek and 
Hopedale basins. Two of the discoveries located close to each other, the North 
Bjarni and Bjarni fields, have estimated recoverable reserves of roughly 3 
trillion cubic feet. These and other gas finds in the area (most notably the 
Gudrid field) currently qualify as “stranded gas,” natural gas fields too small for 
LNG or pipeline transport to North American markets. Further natural gas finds 
could well be in the offing. Both the Canadian Newfoundland and the Danish 
Greenlandic authorities are in the process of submitting promising areas for 
licensing by oil companies.39 Exploration activities in this area will increase in 
the near future.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
participation in foreign policy making. How Danish sovereignty beyond 30 nautical miles from 
the Greenland baseline fits into this picture is unknown to the authors.  
38
 The Chan et al. evaluation acknowledges the value of “optionality” but did not undertake to 
analyse the issues of a Godhavn hub for Atlantic LNG trade. Chan et al., n. 35 above. 
39
 The Danish Greenlandic authorities have held three licensing rounds since 2000. 
The Canadian Newfoundland/Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board has called for interests in the 
Hopedale and Saglak basins. The deadline for bids in this last instance was August 2008.  
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9.2.4. The Regulation of Canadian Offshore Arctic Activities  – 
The Problem of Devolution? 
 
On 20 November 2008, in a Communication to the European Parliament and 
the Council,40 the European Commission signalled a more activist future role 
for the EU in the Arctic. The Communication is carefully balanced, 
emphasizing an increased role in Arctic transport, fisheries, climate change, and 
political and economic support of indigenous peoples (particularly in 
Greenland). The Communication is relatively muted in its discussion of EU 
interest in Arctic hydrocarbon reserves, emphasizing a role engaging 
indigenous peoples and preserving their way of life.41 Nonetheless, the EU 
move was widely interpreted as a manoeuvre for Arctic hydrocarbons. For 
example, The Canadian Press trumpeted that the EU was “staking [a] claim on 
Arctic resources,” adding that the initiative “is likely to irk other Arctic players, 
including Canada, Russia, Norway and the United States all of which have 
issued territorial claims in the polar region.”42  
What are the EU’s prospects in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago? 
The issue is politically sensitive, particularly as regards Ottawa’s relationship 
with the Canadian indigenous peoples. Canadian Arctic offshore oil and natural 
gas activities present a challenge for Canadian management of Arctic waters. 
The regime governing offshore activities is currently in the process of 
transition. 
The first set of changes stem from the Canadian federal government 
concluding land claim treaties with the Northern Canadian Inuit where Inuit 
were granted various property rights in vast areas in return for giving up their 
traditional rights throughout Canada.43As a result, the Northwest Territories 
(NWT), originally comprising the entire Canadian Arctic area, was subdivided 
in 1993 into two territories, the Northwest Territories, the western segment of 
the original Northwest Territories, and a new entity, Nunavut, comprising the 
previously eastern segment (including most of the Arctic island archipelago). 
A wholly new set of innovative consultative institutions was established in both 
territories. What is remarkable about Nunavut is not only the new Inuit 
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 EU Commission, Communication for the Commission to the European Parlament and the 
Coucil: The European Union and the Arctic Region, Brussels COM(2008) 763. 
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 Id., pp. 5–6. 
42
 “European Union joins the lineup, staking claim to Arctic resources,” The Canadian Press 
(22 November 2008), available: <http://www.canadaeast.com/rss/article/487158> (retrieved 
23 November 2008). 
43
 The Canadian government has signed over 20 land claims agreements. These agreements 
compensate the Aboriginal peoples for lands they inhabited before European settlers arrived in 
North America. 
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consultative boards that have been established (this is true of the Inuvialut in 
the Northwest Territories), but that the new Territory of Nunavut is virtually 
contiguous with the Settlement Lands granted in the Nunavut Land Claims 
Final Agreement Act and is meant to be an Inuit homeland.44 (“Nunavut” is 
translated as “Our Land”.) Each of these entities, but particularly Nunavut, is 
subject to ongoing political change increasing LNG project risk  
The offshore regime is also undergoing management change in another 
respect. In accordance with the Oceans Act, the federal Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans (DFO) has assumed responsibility for the implementation of 
integrated oceans management. The vehicles for application of this 
management form are large ocean management areas (LOMAs). To date, there 
are five LOMAs, with each covering vast areas: the Beaufort Sea, Placentia 
Bay/Grand Banks, Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Scotian Shelf, and the Pacific 
North Coast. Both of these developments have complicated the management of 
Arctic offshore resources. Further, missing among the five LOMAs is 
a management area covering the Sverdrup Basin and the majority of the 
Canadian Arctic Islands. This management area falls within Nunavut. This 
difference may have consequences for the Melville Island project. The Hecate 
field lies to the east of 110o W longitude which bisects the eastern Melville 
Island peninsula, and thus falls into the NWT Beaufort Sea LOMA. The Drake 
Point field lies offshore to the east of Melville Island in Nunavut. 
 
 
9.2.4.1. The Arctic Offshore and Inuit Land Claims 
 
Prior to the first Inuit land claims agreement with the Inuvialut in 1984, oil and 
natural gas development in the NWT were exclusively within the purview of 
the Oil and Gas Directorate of the federal Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC) and the National Energy Board (NEB). INAC and the NEB administer 
these activities in accordance with the Canada Petroleum Resources Act and 
the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act and their accompanying regulations.45 
The Inuvialut Final Agreement granted the Inuvialut simple fee title to certain 
lands in the NWT. These included subsurface rights under certain of these 
lands, including rights to oil and natural gas resources. To date the Inuvialut 
Final Agreement has not attenuated the role of INAC and the NEB. INAC 
                                                 
44
 The creation of the Territory of Nunavut was directly linked to the Nunavut Land Claims 
Final Agreement. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act of 1993 was passed on the same 
day as the Nunavut Act, which created the new territory of Nunavut. 
45
 S. Carpenter, C. A Law, and J. Olynyk, “Oil and Gas Developments in Western Canada in the 
New Millennium: The Changing Legal Framework in the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and 
Offshore British Columbia,” Alberta Law Review 39 (2001), p. 3. 
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remains responsible for granting exploration and production licenses. The NEB 
is responsible for all the stages in between (exploration activities, granting 
significant discovery and commercial discovery licenses, and approval of 
development plans).  
The Inuvialut Final Agreement created a series of institutions that 
imposed new conditions on resource development. Nevertheless it did not 
essentially alter the previous regime. These institutions, essentially 
management boards with Inuit representation, were grafted onto the existing 
legislation. The Inuvialut Final Agreement did not grant any comprehensive 
form for self-government, unlike Nunavut. Nor was the transfer of land 
ownership as sweeping as that which occurred when Nunavut was created in 
1993.  
The federal government in Ottawa has nominally delegated significant 
powers to the territory of Nunavut. However, there are two major interlinked 
stumbling blocks in the federal-territorial relationship of consequence for the 
development of the Melville Island Project and other Arctic hydrocarbon 
resources: disagreement over control of such resources and disagreement as to 
whether internal Arctic waters and revenues from offshore resources fall within 
the exclusive purview of territorial government jurisdiction. 
The Government of Nunavut (GN) and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated 
(NTI)46 and Ottawa have been unable to agree on the transfer of control of non-
renewable resources located in the territory and on the division of the economic 
rents involved with resource exploitation. The problem is complicated by the 
forthcoming devolution of provincial rights to Nunavut, rights which would 
give the GN and NTI control over land management and natural resources.47 
There is a difference of interpretation over what constitutes devolution. 
The Nunavut organisations essentially argue that Ottawa is delegating full 
provincial powers to Nunavut, a claim which would give the GN and the ITC 
(Inuit Tapirisat of Canada) full authority over all subsurface resources in the 
territory. These powers were first recognised by the British North American Act 
of 1867 and reaffirmed by the Canada Act of 1982. Ottawa maintains that 
jurisdiction over these resources may pass to Nunavut, but the “programmatic 
element” remains the prerogative of the federal government. 
 The Inuit of Nunavut are very dependent on the marine economy, a 
fact reflected in the Nunavut Final Land Claims Agreement. This cultural 
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 Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated is the entity charged with the corporate responsibility of 
managing the lands granted the Nunavut Inuit in 1993. It is reputed to have a more hawkish 
position on these issues than does the GN. 
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 See P. Mayer, Mayer Report on Nunavut Devolution (Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, June 
2007), available: <http://www.fasken.com/publications/Detail.aspx?publication=3322> 
(retrieved 3 November 2008), p. 21. 
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dependence, argue the GN and NTI, should give them control over internal 
waters (including subsurface resources). They also argue that Nunavut control 
over internal waters and seabed resources would enhance Canada's claim to the 
internal waters status of the Arctic archipelago. An argument of regulatory 
efficiency is also made, namely, that a seamless Nunavut land and internal 
waters administrative structure would contribute to regulatory clarity and 
consistency. In this respect, the Mayer Report on Nunavut Devolution refers 
specifically to Nunavut frustration with the lack of progress in developing 
offshore resources. It refers to the dispute over who was to exercise authority 
over seabed resources in the archipelago, in particular the Drake Point gas field, 
one of the two fields on which the Melville Island project is based. The Report 
states: 
 
The GN [Government of Nunavut] expressed its conviction during 
briefings that devolution of the seabed resources to the GN would 
immediately unlock the rich potential that exists there. During briefings 
on what was then Nunavut’s draft Mineral Exploitation and Mining 
Strategy, the GN’s Director of Petroleum Resources Division explained 
that the Drake Point gas field off the Northern tip of Melville Island has 
a complicated ownership structure [hindering its development].48  
 
It was alleged that the current system of regulation allowing for “significant 
discovery licenses” was delaying the development of the gas field and that 
a Nunavut administration could prompt a “resumption in oil and gas exploration 
and development activities in Nunavut.”49 
More recently, on 15 September 2008, a Land and Resources Devolution 
Protocol50 was signed by the GN and Ottawa, specifying the manner in which 
future devolution negotiations will be conducted. Notable in this Protocol are 
the principles regarding transfer of administration and control of oil and gas 
resource both on- and offshore. While acknowledging the ultimate objective of 
transferring these powers to the GN, the Protocol stated that the Government of 
Canada “is not prepared to negotiate seabed resource management during the 
initial phase of devolution negotiations” and negotiations over the status of 
these resources were to occur in a “future phase of devolution negotiations.”51 
The degree to which this protocol will defuse the situation remains to be seen. 
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More serious, perhaps, was the negative conclusion in the Mayer Report 
as to whether Nunavut was capable of handling the additional demands 
imposed by its devolution to provincial status. It was expected to be signed by 
the end of 2008, the ultimate product of negotiation has been a compromise in 
which both sides have agreed to take up some of the more sensitive issues at 
a later point in time. It is highly likely that an eventual devolution agreement 
will retain some federal control over the internal waters and subsurface rights. 
This is particularly the case for the National Energy Board, the competent 
technical entity for future offshore petroleum developments. While prediction 
here is uncertain due to constant policy shifts in the GN, the Devolution 
Protocol is unlikely to reduce Ottawa-Nunavut conflicts over the long term. 
 
 
9.2.4.2. The Arctic Offshore and the Creation of LOMAs 
 
While the designation of a LOMA may not be forthcoming for the Arctic 
archipelago as of yet, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the problems that 
negotiations leading to LOMAs are encountering with regard to the governance 
of offshore subsurface resources. Some of these problems are general in nature. 
DFO, the government agency responsible for establishing and administering 
LOMAs, is confronted with a high level of variation, both among the various 
LOMAs (for example, the Scotian Shelf LOMA is very different from the 
Beaufort Sea LOMA) and among the negotiating stakeholders. No fewer than 
38 organisations divided among five committees are engaged in the creation of 
the Beaufort Sea LOMA. In contrast to elsewhere in Canada, many of these 
organisations are consultative Inuit organisations. This problem is replicated 
with regard to coordination of government regulatory bodies. Many of these 
bodies have negotiated a wide network of memorandums of agreement without 
fully realising the implication of these agreements or the degree to which they 
overlap. This overlap could well lead to future conflicts. 
With regard to offshore subsea resources, there is a high degree of 
asymmetric information between the various competent authorities.52 Different 
bodies have different expertises. Thus, for example, the National Energy Board, 
the body concerned with the direct management of offshore hydrocarbon 
exploitation, has superior sources of information regarding these activities than 
many other authorities. The degree to which asymmetric information may lead 
to infighting among LOMA authorities remains unclear. A second problem is 
the multiple property rights regimes within each LOMA that have to be 
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reconciled. Indeed, one need only look at the Nunavut devolution controversy 
to see the nature of this problem.  
At present it is unclear what, if any, effect the lack of a Nunavut LOMA 
might have on any future approval and regulation of the Melville Island 
project.53 Nonetheless, the process of creating the integrated management 
systems within the individual LOMAs is progressing. Indeed, the Scotian Shelf 
LOMA and the Beaufort Sea LOMA planning processes are well underway. It 
remains to be seen how these integrated management systems will actually 
function in the future. 
 
 
9.3. Conclusion 
 
On 17 October 2008, an EU-Canada Summit was held in Quebec. EU President 
Sarkhozy and EU Commissioner Barroso met with Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper. The statement issued at the end of the meeting emphasized 
Canadian-EU cooperation in three areas: economic partnership, energy and the 
environment, and international peace and security.54 On further reading, the 
communiqué deals exclusively with the environment. Energy is shunted aside. 
The communiqué also mentions future cooperation in the Arctic, reiterating 
shared interests and objectives, including “protecting the environment and 
ensuring that Northerners can contribute to economic and social development in 
the region now and in future generations.”55 Scientific research and sustainable 
seal hunting were other measures mentioned in the communiqué, as was 
a report on Arctic cooperation in 2009. Nowhere was there mention of tapping 
the Canadian Arctic for its natural gas resources.  
Just 34 days later, however, the European Commission outlined an 
activist EU Arctic policy.56 What are the EU’s prospects with regard to Arctic 
hydrocarbon resources? 
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Our objectives in this contribution are straightforward and perhaps a bit 
novel. We have argued that while Canadian Arctic natural gas reserves cannot 
match Siberian volumes, exploitation of Arctic natural gas can serve as 
a significant supplement to existing and future EU natural gas relationships. 
This picture can only get better with the revival of exploration, not only in the 
Arctic Archipelago, but also in the Atlantic Canada-Greenland basin. The latter 
area, with some 34 wells in total, is far less explored than the Sverdrup Basin 
(with 124 exploratory wells). 
We have used the recently revived Canadian Arctic Pilot project as a leit 
motif in our argument. But it is hardly the only source of Canadian Arctic 
natural gas. Also available in the Arctic archipelago are the proven gas reserves 
at the King Christian Island group (some 3.5 trillion cubic feet). On the basis of 
their finds in the archipelago, the PetroCanada Group estimated an exploitable 
ultimate potential of 113 trillion cubic feet in 1979.57 With improved seismic 
technology, offshore drilling techniques, and receding Arctic ice, renewed 
exploratory activity will undoubtedly contribute to this figure.  
Arctic oil resources have been underplayed in this analysis. This has been 
largely due to the great EU concern over future natural gas imports into the 
Community, and the fact that there is an LNG project being considered in the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago. There are significant crude oil resources in the 
Sverdrup Basin. Bent Horn, a smallish field with 12 million barrels of 
recoverable resources, was exploited in the period 1985 through the late 1990s, 
but this is a minor development. More significant perhaps is Sverdrup’s 
undeveloped Cisco field with 584 million barrels of proven reserves.58 
However, there are no current development plans for the Cisco field. 
Expansion of Atlantic Basin LNG trade is widely anticipated. A transit 
terminal in Greenland would be ideal for proponents of the Melville Island 
project. While the possibility of a Greenland transit terminal was not considered 
in the original APP application 29 years ago, this was due to the limited amount 
of LNG spot trading then. Today, well over half the LNG cargoes delivered to 
North American markets are arranged on a spot basis. With North American 
and EU markets roughly equidistant, the Melville Island project proponents can 
                                                 
57
 Arctic Pilot Project (Canada), Application to the National Energy Board (Calgary: Petro-
Canada, 1981), Vol. 2, p. 49. The APP application comprises seven volumes: v. 1 Application, 
v. 2 Gas Supply and Markets, v. 3 Facilities, v. 4 Economics, v. 5 Public Interest, v. 6 Canadian 
economic benefits, and v. 7 Melford Point Alternative (1979). 
58
 Even more interesting is the production from the Amauligak field in the Beaufort Sea, with 
reserves estimated at 2.2 billion barrels. See K. J. Drummond, “Canada’s discovered oil and gas 
resources North of 600,” (Paper presented at the AAPG Annual Conference, Calgary, Alberta, 
19–20 June 2005), available: <http://www.searchanddiscovery.net/document/2006/06022 
drummond/index.htm> (retrieved 21 October 21). 
  249 
now arbitrage European (probably using National Balancing Point prices) with 
US natural gas prices. The CERI sensitivity study, the details of which are 
extensively discussed in Annex Two, has found that their Melville Island case 
study yielded positive NPVs discounted at 15 percent net of all costs, taxes and 
royalties at natural gas prices as low as USD5.53 per Mcf (Mcf = thousand 
cubic feet) (Henry Hub) in 2014 rising to USD5.66. per Mcf in 2040.59 As 
European prices are generally higher than those in North America, it is likely 
that much LNG will be delivered to European terminals, even in the absence of 
a dedicated project. Annex Two shows that the price differentials involved in a 
European solution to the Melville Island project are within the realm of reason. 
Outside the environmental aspects of such a trade, which were evaluated 
during the initial application,60 but will likely need to be intensively 
investigated again, there are three main obstacles to the Melville Island project 
that appear to be political. First, the conflict between Nunavut and Ottawa over 
the nature of the coming territorial devolution into something between a 
territory and a full fledged province will not accelerate the Melville Island 
project. This is particularly the case given that control of the subsea resources 
of the Drake Point field is disputed. A second reason, which is linked with the 
first, is the lack of qualified regulators for offshore activities should these fall 
under the Nunavut government’s competence. This could well make develop-
ment risk unacceptable for the project’s proponents. (In a somewhat unrelated 
example, given Greenland’s vote for ‘independence’ in a 28 November 2008 
referendum, this lack of qualified administrators can stall any development of 
Greenland resources.61) Finally, even where a LOMA planning pprocess has 
been completed, it is not clear how integrated management will function.  
With respect to these three obstacles, it is more than probable that they 
will not be significant hindrances to the Melville Island project. Disputes over 
the status of subsea resources have been postponed. Ottawa’s insistence on 
separating juridical devolution over the area’s resources from programmatic 
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devolution should keep the more complicated aspects of the offshore project 
within the capable hands of the NEB and INAC.62 And fears over how LOMAs 
will function may prove to be unjustified.  
A more serious obstacle could lie in the provisions of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Trade in oil and energy is covered by 
NAFTA Article 605. This article allows governments to restrict energy exports 
to other countries on the following grounds: (1) exhaustible resource 
conservation; (2) supply shortages; (3) stabilisation of prices; and (4) national 
security.63 Of more particular interest are the terms set out in Article 605 for 
energy trade “proportionality.” In the case of supplies being restricted in either 
the United States or Canada due to the first three reasons specified above, the 
“share of the total supply may not fall below the average level in the previous 
36 months.”64 The significance of this measure for third parties is obvious. 
Should a shortage of 25 percent be experienced in Canadian production, exports 
to the United States must be no lower than 75 percent of the level of the 
previous 36 months. Thus, in a period of shortage in North America, the 
exigencies of Canada-US bilateral trade in energy would cause diversion away 
from a third party, for example, an EU importer, to the US and Canadian 
markets. This would occur precisely at a time when shortages may also be 
serious in the importer’s home market. However, it may be possible for market 
participants to swap LNG diverted from Canada-EU trade to bilateral North 
American trade with cargoes originally destined for North American markets 
from other suppliers elsewhere in the world. 
This proportionality principle is highly contentious. It applies only to US-
Canada trade relations (Mexico having opted out). In that it has never been 
exercised, its status is still somewhat vague. However, actions undertaken 
within the purview of national security provisions of the accord are more tightly 
defined than those in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Watkins and 
Waverman believe that Canadian acceptance of the proportionality principle 
and US acquiescence in tightened national security provisions are an example 
of the give and take between the two countries in the formulation of the treaty.65 
Nonetheless, NAFTA provisions such as these must be taken into account in 
                                                 
62
 From time-to-time, plans are floated with regard to establishing joint Ottawa-territorial 
regulatory boards modeled on the Canada-Nova Scotia and Canada-Newfoundland Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Boards. The advantages and disadvantages of such a solution for the NWT 
and Nunavut, with separate boards or one joint board, are beyond the scope of this contribution. 
63
 See G. C. Watkins and L. Waverman, “How might North American Market Have Performed 
with a Free Trade Agreement in 1970?” The Energy Journal 14, no. 3 (1973), p. 157. 
64
 Id., p. 159. 
65
 Id. 
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examining the relevance of the Arctic archipelago for future EU security of 
supply of oil and natural gas.  
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Annex One: The Northern Dimension and EU Energy Policy 
 
Energy efficiency and renewable energy were high on the agenda of the new 
Northern Dimension (ND) initiative in which the Arctic and sub-Arctic areas, 
including the Barents region, are defined as EU priority areas.66 EU energy 
demand is linked to delivery to its regional market. Therefore it is in the EU 
interest to ensure that traditional energy suppliers in the North (Norway and 
Russia) will be able to continue to deliver. One of the key sectors in the EU’s 
Northern Dimension,67 energy, is a function of a growing interdependence 
between the EU and Russia. In a recent speech, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the 
European Commissioner for External Relation and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, highlighted this interdependence. She stated that Russia remains a very 
significant partner for the EU. Since the EU markets absorb around two-thirds 
of Russian gas exports, the EU revenues are vital to Russia’s economic 
growth.68 Based on this inter-dependence, the EU has interests in the 
development of energy production in the Arctic. As the EU energy policy 
requires it to bring its neighbour progressively closer to the EU’s internal 
market, the Northern energy agenda comprises three components: security of 
supply, competitiveness, and protection of the environment. In relation to EU 
Arctic interests, energy policy becomes a major driver, as is mitigation of 
climate change.69 The focus of EU energy policy includes: harmonisation of 
regulations governing energy trading (including investment and dispute 
settlement), setting environmental requirements, developing a stable framework 
for public and private investments in the energy sector, encouraging more 
efficient production and use of energy, and the developing gas network 
supporting a sustainable supply and use of energy.70 To achieve these goals, the 
EU has developed variety of instruments such as the Trans-European (Energy) 
Networks Programme,71 the Energy Framework Programme,72 and the TACIS 
                                                 
66
 Airoldi, n. 1 above, p. 22. 
67
 Strengthening the Northern Dimension of European Energy Policy, n. 6 above. 
68
 Ferrero-Waldner, n. 27 above.  
69
 Airoldi, n. 1 above, p. 48. 
70
 Strengthening the Northern Dimension of European Energy Policy, n. 6 above. 
71
 The Trans-European Networks Programme (TENS), adopted by the Council in 1995, co-
finances studies that support and foster energy network development and interconnections 
necessary for supplying the market and enhancing security of supply, taking account of the 
need to link island, landlocked, and peripheral regions with the central regions of the 
Community and to establish or improve interconnections with third countries. Id., Annex II. 
72
 The Energy Network Programme has supported Energy Policy activities in Latvia and Poland 
through its international cooperation programme, Synergy. Id., Annex II. 
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(Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) project in 
northwest Russia.73 In addition, EU funds are supplemented by other 
cooperative instruments contributing to regional economic development such as 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, regional development 
banks, the Nordic Investment Bank, and other national and regional 
programmes.74 
Due to EU enlargement, international cooperation in the Barents and 
Baltic regions has opened up the possibility of energy company investment. 
However, feasible legislation and a favourable economic environment are pre-
conditions for such investment. Thus, EU northern energy policy has 
emphasised strengthening energy cooperation with Russia through the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The Common Strategy for Russia 
specifically mentions the Northern Dimension as a forum in which Russian-EU 
regional and cross-border cooperation can be strengthened. Current EU policy 
envisages Russian ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), a treaty 
which Russia signed but has as yet failed to ratify. Russian ratification of the 
ECT will modernise the current regulatory framework and will build new 
relationships in competition and standards. It will also attract private sector 
participation in Arctic investment and encourage development in new 
infrastructure and technological capacity.75 The EU Commission has already 
proposed extending the “motorways of the sea” as part of the development of 
a common energy import infrastructure.76 
Given that its future energy supply is secured at the corporate level, 
a coherent external energy policy regarding the liberalisation of the EU energy 
markets is needed at the Council of Ministers level. The enhancement of an EU 
dialogue with Russia is one of the main arguments favouring such a policy. 
Here, diversification of sources, routes and suppliers is crucial to ensuring EU’s 
energy security. Energy cooperation with major producers, transit countries and 
consumers must receive support from all Member States. An external European 
energy policy, based on the principle of solidarity, could provide and effective 
response to possible future external crisis situations.77 Whether an overall EU 
                                                 
73
 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS (or Commonwealth of Independent States)) is 
a programme that has taken both a sector specific and regional approach to the provision of 
technical assistance to Russia. It has supported several projects in northwestern Russia, 
concentrating primarily on energy efficiency and environmental issues. Id., Annex II. 
74
 See Id.  
75
 See, in general, Strengthening the Northern Dimension of European Energy Policy, n. 6 
above. 
76
 Energy Policy and Maritime Policy, n. 2 above, p. 4. 
77
 O. Geden, C. Marcelis, and A. Maurer, “Perspectives for the European Union’s External 
Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France,” 
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approach to possibly significant future gas supplies from the Arctic will be able 
to take priority over the commercial interests of individual companies remains 
to be seen.78 
                                                                                                                                  
Working Paper FG1, 2006/17 (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006), 
available: <http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3521> (retrieved 
5 October 2008). 
78
 Airoldi, n. 1 above, p. 48. 
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Annex Two: The Melville Island LNG Project 
 
This description of the Melville Island project relies on several earlier studies 
previously made on a similar project, the Arctic Pilot Project (APP). Chief 
among these are those submitted with the initial APP application to the 
Canadian National Energy Board (NEB).79 There are other publications of 
interest here, for example, the submission of the Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee.80 Most of the estimates here are based on Chan et al.81 which in 
turn is highly dependent on the early APP submission to the NEB. Costs have 
been adjusted to 2005 levels.  
Figure 9.3 illustrates the basic installations of the Melville Island project. 
As can be seen, the Hecla and Drake Point gas fields straddle the northeastern 
Melville Island peninsula. Both fields are essentially offshore fields, although 
both have portions extending under the Melville Island land mass. The two gas 
fields are to be linked together with a 162 kilometre natural gas pipeline 
running south following the island’s natural features to a liquefaction plant, 
storage tanks facilities, and LNG carrier berthing facilities on and offshore the 
Bridport Inlet on the south side of the island. 
The following project description focuses on the development of the two 
fields, the pipeline connections, and the land and offshore liquefaction, storage, 
and berthing facilities. The proposed LNG carrier routes and environmental 
impact assessments are then described. The detailed project description will be 
limited as to its specifics as all available literature deals with the APP as it 
appeared in 1979–1981. It was a significantly smaller project then, roughly 
a third the size of the project contemplated here. Chan et al. in their 2005 study 
rely on the earlier project specifics but have dimensioned the project to 
accommodate the higher capacity envisaged. Nonetheless, many of the 
essentials are probably the same (e.g., location and nature of the pipeline, 
liquefaction and storage facilities). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 Arctic Pilot Project, n. 57 above. 
80
 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, n. 60 above; The Working Group, Final Report by 
the Working Group on the Arctic Pilot Project in Greenland Waters (Calgary: Working Group 
on the Arctic Pilot Project, 11 April 1984). 
81
 Chan et al., n. 35 above. 
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Figure 9.3. The Melville Island Project 
 
 
Source: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Land and Exploration Maps, ‘Sverdrup Basin,’ 
available: <http://:www.ainci-incac/oil/act/lan/index_e.html> (retrieved 23 October 2008). Map 
has been adjusted to highlight Melville Island. Arrows and captions are authors’ rendition.  
  
 
Financial Assumptions 
 
Table 9.3 sets out the financial assumptions behind the project. 
 
Table 9.3. Financial assumptions behind Chan et al. analysis 
 
Net present value of project assumes a 15% (after royalty and tax) discount 
rate 
Analysis assumes 75% equity financing 
Corporate income tax is included (also NWT and Nunavut corporate taxes) 
All costs are in 2005 Canadian dollars 
Mobilisation and demobilisation costs are included in capital costs of project 
components 
Drilling costs are separated from other project capital costs. These can be 
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depreciated at 30% per annum. 
All non-drilling facility capital costs qualify for decline balance depreciation 
at 25% per annum 
Crown royalties range from 1 to 5% per month until payout. After payout, 
the royalty is the greater of 30% net revenue or 5% of gross revenue. 
All prices are determined at the delivery point by netback calculation from 
nearest city gate (i.e., Strait of Canso, Nova Scotia) 
Price forecasts are developed from forecasts of Henry Hub prices 
Throughput prices are made on a volumetric basis using Canadian dollars per 
Mcf 
Full Flow Through Analysis is assumed 
Start up in 2009, 2014, and 2019 
Source: Chan et al., n. 35 above, pp. 8–9. 
 
 
Project Planning Assumptions 
 
The estimated costs of project design and regulatory phases are CAD210 
million. The estimated length of time for regulatory filing, regulatory 
proceedings, design and construction is four years prior to field production.82 
 
 
Assumptions Behind the Development of the Hecla and Drake Point Fields 
 
The Arctic Pilot Project estimated marketable field reserves at 5.1 Tcf for the 
Drake Point field and 3.6 Tcf for the Hecla fields, for a total of 8.7 Tcf for the 
two fields (Figure 9.4). Other estimates have been somewhat lower (The 
Canadian Gas Potential Committee and the Geological Survey of Canada 
estimate a recoverable amount of 8.4 Tcf at the high end and 6.495 Tcf at the 
lower end.) The energy content of the natural gas is 1,000,000 Btu per thousand 
cubic feet. The gas is sweet and “essentially free of heavy ends.”83 Chan et al. 
assume a target production of 1billion cf/d over a 20-year period.84 
 
 
                                                 
82
 This is a very short period of time for all of these tasks to be successfully performed. It is 
much more likely to take five or six years to accomplish these ends given the difficulty of the 
project. However, in this study we assume that the four year figure is accurate. 
83
 Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 7. 
84
 Id. 
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Figure 9.4. The Hecla and Drake Point Fields 
 
Source: Arctic Pilot Project, Vol. II, (1979) p. II-A-2, Figure 3. 
 
The plan is to develop the larger Drake Point field first and to tie the 
Hecla field into production at a later point in project development. To bring 
both fields into production, it is assumed that 20 wells will be necessary (Table 
9.4). (Chan et al. do not specify in what order the wells are to be drilled or 
when the Hecla field will come on stream.)  
 
Table 9.4. Estimated field development costs 
 
Estimated drilling capital costs: 20 wells at CAD17.5 million/well or CAD350 
million 
Flowlines: CAD 18 million 
Pipelines: 22 kms @ 20 inch diameter or CAD15.9 million 
   8 kms @ 8 inch diameter or CAD2.8 million 
Dehydration plant (1000 MMcf/d throughput): CAD90 million 
Total field capital cost: CAD458 million 
Annual field operating costs: CAD33 million 
Source: Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 11. 
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Assumptions Behind the Cross-island Transmission Line to Bridport Inlet 
 
Gas metering and processing are to take place at Drake Point, where the gas 
will be fed into a 161 kilometre transmission line to Bridport Inlet. There is to 
be a winter road paralleling the pipeline, which follows the contours of the 
island, including those of a riverbed as it approaches the liquefaction facilities 
at Bridport Inlet. There are also three tentative camp locations along the 
pipeline route. The original APP pipeline proposal called for a 22 inch diameter 
line for 32 MM cf/d. To accommodate the 1000 MM cf/d planned for in this 
project, the pipeline diameter was increased to 36 inches. The 161 km 
transmission line at a later point in the project would be connected to a 36 inch 
lateral to the Hecla field. A 22,000 horsepower compression station is 
anticipated. The date of installation of the compression station or the 
construction of the Hecla lateral is not specified.  
Capital costs of the transmission line are estimated to be CADS million. 
Annual operating costs are estimated at CAD4.4 million.  
 
 
Assumptions Behind the Liquefaction, Berthing and Storage facilities at 
Bridport Inlet 
 
The liquefaction facilities anticipated are considerably larger than those of the 
APP to take advantage of economies of scale. (Liquefaction technology has 
improved significantly over the last thirty years, lowering costs and minimising 
the possibility that the liquefaction facilities will perform significantly below 
the anticipated load factor.) To account for the increased volume, a two-train 
barge facility is anticipated. The design and costs of the liquefaction plant, 
storage tanks, living quarters, berthing facilities, and other site requirements are 
critical to the success or failure of the project. 
Site development represents the largest single capital cost for the facility 
(Table 9.5). Roughly half of the costs for site development are related to 
construction of the dock, with the remainder split between onshore site 
preparation, piping and mechanical equipment, utilities and communications, 
and accommodation and site buildings.85 The APP exercised considerable 
ingenuity in the planning of siting and LNG facilities.86 Chan et al. arrived at 
                                                 
85
 Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 18. 
86
 Among other things, the natural gas was to be utilised for virtually all required power and 
heating, and water warmed by the process of liquefaction was to be used to create season-round 
ice-free berthing facilities for the LNG carriers. 
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their estimates by adjusting the APP estimates upwards so as to conform to 
2005 costs. 
 
 
Table 9.5. Liquefaction and site estimates 
 
Project development: CAD9 million 
Site development: CAD955 million 
 LNG liquefaction plant: CAD657 million 
 Barge for LNG plant: CAD77 million 
 LNG storage barges (2@100,000m3 LNG apiece): CAD283 million 
 Barge tow-in costs: CAD29 million 
 Total capital costs: CAD2,011 million 
 Annual operating costs CAD84 million 
Source: Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 17. 
 
 
Shipping Estimates 
 
To date no LNG carrier with an Arctic Class 7 icebreaking capacity has been 
constructed. The specifics of the proposed LNG carrier fleet are not elaborated 
in the project proposal. For example, it is not known whether these proposed 
vessels will be equipped with azimuth propeller pods, which enable a vessel to 
use its stern configuration for icebreaking and retain its prow designed for 
optimal speeds in non-ice filled waters. (Another advantage of this 
configuration is that the propeller placed at the stern of the ship can create 
a strong current along the underwater hull of the carrier enabling it to break the 
ice better.) The return journey to and from the Strait of Canso in Nova Scotia is 
5,258 nautical miles. It is estimated that seven carriers will make the return 
voyage every 21.5 days, 345 days per year. The capital cost of the LNG carriers 
is estimated to be CAD268 million apiece or CAD1,875 million for seven 
vessels as opposed to CAD1,340 million for five vessels (the Greenland 
transshipment example). Annual operating costs are CAD44 million per vessel 
or CAD308 million for seven vessels and CAD220 million for five vessels.  
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Estimates of the Godhavn Transit Terminal  
 
Chan et al. have developed the Greenland transhipment alternative to reduce the 
number of Arctic Class 7 icebreaking tankers required from seven to five. 
These vessels would operate on the first leg of the voyage from Melville Island 
to Godhavn. The second leg (to the Strait of Canso) would be serviced by two 
200,000 m3 capacity LNG carriers at CAD206 million per vessel, with annual 
operating costs of CAD33 million apiece. Capital costs of berthing, and storage 
by the transit terminal are estimated at CAD381 million. Annual operating costs 
are not mentioned in the Chan study. Differences between the Strait of Canso 
and a European alternative are briefly mentioned in the study: “Delivery to 
other ports, such as to Europe, would require additional tankers and may result 
in the establishment of a hub for Atlantic LNG trade.”87  
 
 
 
Sensitivity of the Godhavn Transit Alternative 
 
The fundamental difference between the two scenarios is that the Melville 
Island-Godhavn-Strait of Canso scenario has capital costs of CAD257 million 
more than the Melville Island-Strait of Canso alternative, but annual operating 
costs of CAD17 million less.  
Chan et al. undertook a sensitivity study of the two alternatives along 
several parameters (Table 9.6). Perhaps most significant was how the two 
alternatives compared under differing price scenarios (Table 9.7). 
 Based on Chan et al., Table 9.7 compares the cost of the two alternatives 
based on start date. It is assumed that production would start earliest in 2014 
(not 2009 as assumed in Chan et al.). 
 Interestingly, as shown in Table 9.7, project economies improve 
drastically when one takes A’, B’, and C’ into account. Here the initial price to 
2015 is CAD7.37 per Mcf (Mcf = thousand cubic feet) rather than is the case 
with scenarios A, B, and C (CAD5.85 per Mcf).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87
 Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 29. 
  262 
Table 9.6. CERI Price Forecasts for Melville Island Natural Gas 
  
Forecast A: Constant at CAD5.85 /Mcf until 2015, then increases to CAD13.89/Mcf in 2040 
Forecast A’: Constant at CAD7.37/Mcf until 2025, then increases to CAD13.89/Mcf in 2040 
Forecast B: Constant at CAD5.85/Mcf until 2015, then increases to CAD10.10/Mcf in 2040 
Forecast B’: Constant at CAD7.37/Mcf until 2015, then increases to CAD10.10/Mcf in 2040  
Forecast C: Constant at CAD5.85/Mcf until 2015, then increases to CAD7.55/Mcf in 2040 
Forecast C’: Constant at CAD7.37/Mcf until 2015, then increases to CAD7.55/Mcf in 2040 
 
aAll prices at Henry Hub. A differential of CAD1.37/Mcf is calculated between prices at 
Henry Hub and prices at the Strait of Canso 
Source: Chan et al., n. 35 above, pp. 14–15. 
 
Table 9.7. The two Melville Island alternatives compared at NPV 15% 
 
 
LNG 
(million CAD) 
Greenland transfer 
(million CAD) 
NPV@ 15% Price Forecast A 
 Production start 2014 
 Production start 2019 
 
29 
439 
 
2 
409 
NPV@15% Price Forecast B 
 Production start 2014 
 Production start 2019   
 
(235) 
(92) 
 
(261) 
(119) 
NPV@15% Price Forecast C 
 Production start 2014  
 Production start 2019 
 
(427) 
(461) 
 
(451) 
(483) 
NPV@15% Price Forecast A’ 
 Production start 2014 
 Production start 2019 
 
570 
846 
 
535 
817 
NPV@15% Price Forecast B’ 
 Production start 2014  
 Production start 2019 
 
300 
300 
 
266 
267 
NPV@15% Price Forecast C’ 
 Production start 2014   
 Production start 2019 
 
105 
(98) 
 
70 
(128) 
Source: Chen et al., n. 35 above, p. 35. 
 
While the seven LNG carrier option is preferable to the Greenland 
transshipment option, the differences between the two are not terribly 
significant. Both are dependent on rising natural gas prices to be profitable. 
However, natural gas prices have evolved considerably since 2005, the date of 
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publication of CERI report. Mcf prices of USD8.00 to USD10 per Mcf 
(CAD12.71 to CAD15.25 per Mcf) are not that uncommon today. 
 
 
The European Option 
 
Chan et al. consider the European option, but dismiss it: “While the optionality 
provided by alternative delivery points is considered valuable, quantification of 
this advantage is not examined within the scope of this study.”88 This rejection 
is prompted by two factors: the 2003 imported prices of pipeline natural into 
Europe as reported by the International Energy Agency and additional 
transportation costs. “With additional transportation [required], it is 
hypothesised the delivery of Arctic gas to European markets would not be 
competitive with the sources of gas currently serving those markets.”89 The 
authors of this contribution beg to differ on both counts.  
With regards to the price of pipeline gas into the EU, current reported 
prices are approximately USD370 per thousand m3. This translates into prices 
of USD10.53 (CAD13.38) per thousand cubic feet. Furthermore, the prices 
quoted are border prices. As is well known, transmission costs in the EU are 
high relative to costs elsewhere, for example, North America. Arctic LNG can 
be sold directly to coastal urban centres thereby saving on the costs of 
transmitting pipeline gas from the edges of the EU market.  
Regarding the cost of additional transportation, it is curious that Chan et 
al. consider the major American LNG ports—Everett, Massachusetts; Cover 
Point, Maryland; Elba Island, Georgia; and Lake Charles, Louisiana—but 
eschew these for a non-existing terminal in Nova Scotia. Similarly, they 
downplay the possibilities of European markets, even though European 
terminals may be more proximate to Melville Island than the US terminals (see 
Table 9.2).90 Adding one LNG carrier to the two conventional LNG carriers 
operating out of Godhavn expands the range of possible markets to be supplied 
to those within a radius of 3,496 nautical miles (6,992 nautical miles return). 
                                                 
88
 Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 16. 
89
 Id. 
90
 “Regasification facilities in Nova Scotia are assumed to be developed by third parties. The 
four existing terminals in the US at Everett, MA, Cover Point, MD, Elbas Island, GA, and Lake 
Charles, LA, are unlikely to accept regular shipments from Canada’s North since they are 
already fully contracted for periods of up to 20 years,” Chan et al., n. 35 above, p. 23. 
The Repsol receiving terminal at Saint John, New Brunswick, to the degree that it has spare 
capacity, would be a substitute for the Strait of Canso. Utilising this terminal might add two to 
three days to LNG carrier round trips. 
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This radius would include the terminals at Milford Haven and Le Havre. The 
additional LNG carrier increases the capital expenditure of the project by 
3.5 percent and operational costs by 6.5 percent. To determine the differences 
which these costs make in terms of the return on the over-all project, the 
authors conducted a simplified sensitivity study. Taking capital investment, 
operational costs, and throughput of the two variations and calculating the price 
which would return 15 percent on the capital invested (ignoring royalties, 
taxation, depreciation, and financing costs), we calculated the impact of the 
transport differential between Le Havre and the Strait of Canso. Deliveries to 
the Strait of Canso would cost USD119 per ton LNG or USD3.27 per Mcf 
(USD115.60 per thousand m3) while deliveries to Le Havre would run 
USD129.22 per ton LNG or USD3.54 per Mcf (USD139.22 per thousand m3).91 
The transport differential between existing facilities at Le Havre and non-
existent facilities in the Strait of Canso calculated in this manner is USD0.265 
per Mcf. While others might disagree, we feel that this is not a terribly 
significant differential given the price at which LNG is now trading on world 
markets. 
The disappearing polar ice may make further economies possible. For 
example, one might be able to reduce the number of Arctic Class 7 LNG 
carriers required to four. With such an adjustment, the price of delivery to EU 
markets would be even lower than in the arguments presented here. Finally, it 
may not be necessary to invest in LNG carrier capacity as bare boat charters of 
LNG carriers are reportedly on the rise. 
This analysis does not in any way attempt to minimise the risk of 
engaging in the Melville Island project or argue that European firms should be 
lining up to invest in the Melville Island project. Rather it is intended to point 
out that there could well be a future for the European natural gas industry in the 
Canadian Arctic, in even as remote a place as Melville Island. 
 
                                                 
91
 We are assuming an exchange rate of CAD1 = USD 0.75. Delivered amounts are respectively 
6,138,000 tons LNG per annum (Strait of Canso) versus 6,006,000 tons LNG per annum 
(Le Havre) due to LNG boil off during transport. These figures appear to be very low because 
taxation, financing costs, royalties, and depreciation are not taken into account and the figures 
are in USD rather than CAD. Changing these assumptions could very easily double our figures, 
which would approximate those in the Chan et al. sensitivity analysis replicated in Table 9.7. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Canada, the European Union and Regional Fisheries Management in the 
North Atlantic: Conflict, Cooperation and Challenges 
 
Erik Franckx∗, Koen Van den Bossche, and David L. VanderZwaag** 
 
 
10.1. Introduction 
 
Canada and the European Union (EU) cooperate in four regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs) applicable to areas of the North Atlantic. 
They include the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO),1 
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT),2 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO),3 and the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC).4 
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 The research support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
through the project, “Strengthening Canada’s Regional Fisheries Management Arrangements in 
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like to thank Dr. Johanne Fischer, Executive Director, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization, for her comments on this paper. Professor VanderZwaag also acknowledges the 
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1
 Established by the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, 
which entered into force on 10 October 1983, NASCO provides a forum for consultation and 
cooperation in the salmon stocks that migrate beyond areas of fisheries jurisdiction of coastal 
states of the Atlantic Ocean north of 36oN latitude. North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organisation (NASCO), “About NASCO,” available: <http://www.nasco.int> (retrieved 
20 November 2008) [hereinafter NASCO].  
2
 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), responsible 
for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas, was 
established by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, which 
entered into force in 1969. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT), “Introduction” at <http://www.iccat.int/en/introuction.htm> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter ICCAT]. 
3
 NAFO, founded in 1979 as a successor to the International Commission of the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), has management responsibility for many fisheries resources of the 
Northwest Atlantic, except for salmon, tunas/marlins, whales and sedentary species. Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), “About NAFO,” available <http://www.nafo.int/ 
about/frames/ about.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
4
 NEAFC, established pursuant to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North 
East Atlantic Fisheries which entered into force in November 1982, recommends measures to 
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This chapter focuses on the role of Canada and the EU in two of the 
RFMOs dealing with straddling fish stocks, NAFO and NEAFC, through 
a three-part format. The first section highlights the well-known conflict 
between the EU and Canada over the setting of quotas within NAFO for 
Greenland halibut. The famous Estai incident involved the arrest by Canada of 
a Spanish trawler in the NAFO Regulatory Area outside Canada’s 200 nautical 
mile (nm) fisheries zone. Spain’s subsequent litigation against the European 
Commission and Council for agreeing to a lowered total allowable catch (TAC) 
for Greenland halibut is also described. The second section addresses two main 
dimensions of cooperation. Global instruments and initiatives guiding regional 
cooperation in the North Atlantic are first described. The complexities of 
cooperation in relation to fisheries at the EU level are then discussed, including 
competences on the external level and the European Community’s (EC) role in 
regional fisheries organisations. The third section reviews four ongoing 
challenges in regional fisheries management: putting the precautionary 
approach into practice; implementing the ecosystem approach; reaching 
consensus on allocation criteria; and ensuring effective compliance and 
enforcement. The chapter concludes with some key questions raised for 
discussion at the Brussels Workshop on EU Canada Relations in Law of the Sea 
and Ocean Governance, 4–5 December 2008. 
 
 
10.2. Conflict 
 
10.2.1. The Estai Incident  
 
Canadian and European fisheries relations infamously came to the forefront of 
affairs during the Estai incident. The Spanish vessel, Estai, was arrested for 
fishing Greenland halibut (turbot) outside Canada’s 200 nm fisheries zone off 
Newfoundland in March 1995. The arrest might be described an act of 
exasperation because of the failure of NAFO to adequately regulate the 
harvesting of turbot and growing concern over the unsustainable fishing 
                                                                                                                                  
Contracting Parties for the rational exploitation of fish stocks in the Convention Area taking 
scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), “About NEAFC,” available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/about/neafc-faq.htm> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter 
NEAFC].  
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practices of Spanish and Portuguese vessels in the NAFO Regulatory Area.5 
Canada had lost patience over the excessive use of the NAFO objection 
procedure as the EU sought to exceed NAFO recommended quotas, garnering 
some 48 EU objections between 1985 and 1991.6 With the accession of Spain 
and Portugal to the European Economic Community, the problem of Portuguese 
and Spanish overcapacity was exported to the waters off Canada7 as Spain’s 
distant-water fleets had not been given many fishing opportunities within the 
Community waters. At the same time, its fleets were evicted from third country 
waters following the worldwide emergence of 200 nm limits.8  
NAFO attempts to set Greenland halibut quotas for 1995 was the matter 
of contention. The NAFO’s Fisheries Commission had set a total allowable 
catch (TAC) of 27,000 tonnes with 60.37 percent allocated to Canada, 12.59 
percent to the EU and the remainder principally to Russia and Japan. The EU 
objected and established a unilateral quota of 69 percent of the TAC.9 The 
soaring Spanish catch of turbot from 13 tonnes in 1989 to over 40,000 tonnes in 
1994 was a matter of concern to Canada.10 The misreporting of fish catches in 
1993 and 1994 by both Spanish and Portuguese vessels and the apparent lack of 
effective sanctioning by Spanish and Portuguese authorities for the infractions 
                                                 
5
 For a general review and critique of NAFO, see T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and A. Sydnes, 
“The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)” in T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and 
A. Sydnes, eds, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and 
Regional Fisheries Management Regimes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 63–97. NAFO 
was established pursuant to the 1978 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. This convention was approved by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3179/78 of 28 December 
1978 Concerning the Conclusion by the European Economic Community of the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Official Journal L 378 
(30 December 1978) 1. NAFO’s Regulatory Area is that part of the area of the NAFO 
Convention Area not falling under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of coastal states. 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 27/2005 of 22 December 2004 Fixing for 2005 the Fishing 
Opportunities and Associated Conditions for Certain Fish Stocks and Groups of Fish Stocks, 
Applicable in Community Waters and, for Community vessels, in Waters Where Catch 
Limitations are Required, Article 3 (d), Official Journal L 12 (14 January 2005) 1. 
The Northwest Atlantic Area is defined in Article 1 of the Convention. 
6
 Counter-Memorial of Canada (Jurisdiction) in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. 
Canada), The Hague, International Court of Justice (February 1996), p. 13 [hereinafter 
Counter-Memorial of Canada]. 
7
 D. Day, “Tending the Achilles’ Heel of NAFO: Canada Acts to Protect the Nose and Tail of 
the Grand Banks,” Marine Policy 19 (1995): 257–270, p. 265. 
8
 R. R. Churchill, “The EC and its Role in Some Issues of International Fisheries Law,” in 
E. Hey, ed., Developments in International Fisheries Law (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), p. 522.  
9
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, pp. 19–20. 
10
 Id., p. 18. 
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heightened Canadian concern.11 
Canada readied itself for unilateral enforcement actions through both 
legislative and regulatory measures. On 12 May 1994 the Canadian Parliament 
adopted Bill C-2912 amending the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.13 
The amendments recognised straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland as threatened with extinction and emphasised the urgent need 
for all fishing vessels to comply in both Canadian fisheries waters and the 
NAFO Regulatory area with sound conservation measures.14 Bill C-29 
prohibited persons onboard certain classes of vessels from fishing for stated 
straddling stocks in contravention of prescribed conservation measures. It also 
authorised regulations to be passed stipulating vessels and stocks subject to the 
legislation, as well as setting conservation measures.15 On 3 March 1995 
Canada amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations16 providing for 
enforcement action against Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing for 
straddling stocks in the NAFO Regulatory area in contravention of prescribed 
conservation measures and included a prohibition on fishing for Greenland 
halibut. 
Canada subsequently initiated enforcement action of its newly-amended 
regulations. Canadian fisheries protection officers boarded and inspected the 
Estai on 9 March 1995. The ship was seized, and the master was arrested in 
violation of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and Regulations. The master 
was released on March 12th upon payment of CAD8,000 in bail, and the vessel 
was released on March 15th upon provision of a CAD500,000 bond.17 
Spain was unable to challenge Canada’s enforcement actions in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In a case filed with the ICJ on 28 March 
1995, a majority of the Court, in a decision handed down on 4 December 1998, 
agreed with Canada’s position that the Court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of the case.18 Canada had deposited a new optional clause 
declaration with the ICJ on 10 May 1994 excluding from the Court’s 
jurisdiction disputes concerning Canadian conservation and management 
measures taken with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area 
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 Act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, S.C. 1994, c. 14. 
13
 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-33. 
14
 Act to amend, n. 12 above, Section 5.1. 
15
 Id., Section 5.2. 
16
 Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations (Amendment), SOR/95-136. 
17
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, p. 21. 
18
 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, p. 432. 
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and the enforcement of such measures.19 
In Jose Pereira E Hijos S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General),20 corporate 
owners and the captain of the Estai instituted a civil action before the Federal 
Court of Canada with the statement of claims being filed on 28 July 1995 and 
amended on 30 April 2003. Various damages were sought, including 
CAD150,000 in general damages for each plaintiff, with key allegations being 
that the arrest of the ship in international waters was illegal and that there was 
an unlawful trespass by servants/agents of the federal Crown. A central 
argument by the plaintiffs was that the arrest was unlawful because supporting 
Canadian regulations were not enacted for valid conservation and management 
measures agreed to by NAFO Contracting Parties.  
In a January 2007 decision, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed 
a damage award by the trial judge and denied all damage claims.21 The Court 
found that the Canadian Parliament’s intention was for Canada to take 
enforcement actions in the NAFO Regulatory Area regardless of whether or not 
Contracting Parties had reached agreement on conservation measures. The 
Court also indicated there was no demonstration that the Canadian government 
had acted in bad faith in enacting the regulations. 
In April 1995, Canada and the EU reached an agreement dousing the 
flames lit by the Estai incident.22 Canada agreed to repeal its regulatory 
targeting of Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area (effective 1 May 1995), and both parties agreed to jointly submit to the 
NAFO Fisheries Commission a submission to strengthen NAFO conservation 
and enforcement measures.23 Both parties also agreed to implement on 
a provisional basis various control and enforcement measures, including 
a commitment to ensure independent and qualified observers aboard all vessels 
fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area.24 
                                                 
19
 Canadian Declaration of 10 May 1994, in Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, Annex 2. 
20
 Jose Pereira E Hijos S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 1011, 17 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1. 
21
 2007 FCA 20, 26 C.E.L.R. (3d) 169. 
22
 See D. Freestone, “Canada and the EU Reach Agreement to Settle the Estai Dispute,” 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 10 (1995): 397–411. 
23
 Council Decision 95/586/EC of 22 December 1995 Concerning the Conclusion of the 
Agreement Constituted in the Form of an Agreed Minute, an Exchange of Letters, an Exchange 
of Notes and the Annexes Thereto Between the European Community and Canada on Fisheries 
in the Context of the NAFO Convention, Official Journal L 327 (30 December 1995) 35–45 
[hereinafter EC/Canada Agreement]. It was signed by the Commission pursuant to Council 
Decision 95/546/EC of 17 April 1995 on the Signature and Provisional Application of the 
Agreement Between the European Community and Canada on Fisheries in the Context of the 
NAFO Convention, Official Journal L 308 (21 December 1995) 79. 
24
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, p. 81. For further reviews of the Estai incident, see 
T. L. McDorman, “Canada’s Aggressive Fisheries Actions: Will They Improve the Climate for 
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10.2.2. Consequences of the Estai Incident Observable at the EU Level 
 
Consequently, in September 1995, NAFO approved a formula for the allocation 
of Greenland halibut quotas. Accordingly, the EU fisheries Council established 
for 1995, an EC quota of approximately 19 percent of the NAFO TAC.25 This 
TAC was challenged before the European judicial institutions.  
In Case T-196/99,26 for example, Spain bought a claim to the European 
Court of First Instance (ECFI) seeking a declaration that the Commission and 
Council were liable under Article 288 of the EC Treaty27 for losses suffered by 
it following the adoption of the 1995 TAC for Greenland halibut. With respect 
to the alleged illegality of the Council’s action in adopting Regulation 
3366/94,28 Spain argued that by not lodging an objection, the Council neglected 
the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) set out in Article 33 
of the EC Treaty. The Council was accused of misusing its discretion because it 
refrained from objecting to the 1995 TAC for Greenland halibut on the basis of 
the objectives set out in Article 33 of the EC Treaty. Failure to oppose the TAC 
particularly compromised the objective of ensuring rational development of 
agricultural production and a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community.29 The ECFI noted that the Council’s decision to accept the TAC 
and its acquiescence by implication concerned a measure for conserving marine 
                                                                                                                                  
International Agreements?” Canadian Foreign Policy 2 (1994): 5–28; J. A. Beesley and 
M. Rowe, “Sound Basis in International Law for Canada’s Actions in the ‘Turbot War’,” 
Canadian International Lawyer 1 (1995): 177–180; G. L. Lugten, “Fisheries War for the 
Halibut,” Environmental Policy and Law 25 (1995): 223–229; P. M. Saunders, “And Now That 
the War Is Over ... Looking Back at the Canada-European Union Fisheries Confrontation of 
1995,” The Canadian Law Newsletter 31 (1996): 15–37; and D. R. Teece, “Global Overfishing 
and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can International Law Protect the High-Seas 
Environment?” Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 8 (1997): 89–
125. 
25
 Regulation (EC) No. 1761/95 of 29 June 1995 Amending, for the Second Time, Regulation 
No. 3366/94, L 171 Official Journal 1 (21 July 1995).  
26
 Case T-196/99, Area Cova, SA and Others v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, 2001 ECR II-3597 [hereinafter Case T-196/99]. 
27
 This is the contractual liability stipulation which states that the Community shall make good 
any damage caused by its institutions in the performance of their duties.  
28
 Regulation 3366/94 recorded that the maximum catch level for Greenland halibut in NAFO 
Sub-areas 2 and 3 in 1995 was as yet unallocated among NAFO Contracting Parties, that the 
NAFO Fisheries Commission was to convene a meeting to decide the allocation, and that 
catches of Greenland halibut would be authorised in 1995 and counted against the quotas 
decided for Member States. Council Regulation (EC) No. 3366/94 of 20 December 1994 
Laying Down for 1995 Certain Conservation and Management Measures for Fishery Resources 
in the Regulatory Area, L 363 Official Journal 60 (31 December 1994).  
29
 Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 64. 
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resources. Such a measure forms an integral part of the CAP as it is intended, in 
particular, to ensure the rational development of resources30 and the availability 
of supplies.31  
 The applicants also alleged that the defendants had misused their powers 
by adopting a bilateral fisheries agreement with Canada and Regulation 
1761/95. Those measures were said to be taken on the basis of EC powers in 
the area of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in order to achieve objectives 
different from the CFP objectives particularly that of normalising commercial 
relations between Canada and the Community.  
The ECFI recognised that the measures were designed to put an end to the 
fishing conflict between Canada and the EC, but stated that their form, subject-
matter and reasoning, did fall within the context of the CFP for the following 
reasons: Firstly, it was in the interest of EC fishermen to ensure the safety of 
their fishing operations. Secondly, since Canada is represented in several 
international fishing organisations and assumes a significant role there, the 
safeguarding of good relations with that country was important in the interests 
of managing fishing resources at the world level. Maintaining good 
international relations was considered legitimate in the context of all EC 
policies. The institutions must always take account, when legislating in the 
context of a specific policy, its effects on the other activities of the Union, 
particularly that of public interest.32 
The applicants also claimed to have had a legitimate expectation of 
a favourable outcome of the dispute between Canada and the EC and in the 
maintenance of the fishing opportunities which they had enjoyed before it. The 
ECFI noted that “the allocation of quotas cannot in principle create a situation 
of legitimate expectation for economic operators.”33 
It was also alleged that the conservation measure was disproportionate 
vis-à-vis the damage caused to Community vessel owners and manifestly 
                                                 
30
 Treaty Establishing the European Community [consolidated version], Official Journal C 325 
(24 December 2002) 33-184 [hereinafter EC Treaty], Article 33 (1) (a). 
31
 Id., Article 33 (d); Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 76. 
32
 Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 158. 
33
 Id., para. 121. In this case, the ECFI refers to quotas. In this context, however, this concept is 
not to be understood as referring to the fishing opportunities allocated to the Member States and 
derived from a TAC. Rather it refers here to that part of the TAC allocated to the Community as 
a whole. In particular, it is pointed out that economic operators cannot have a legitimate 
expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the EC institutions in 
the exercise of their discretion will be maintained, especially in an area such as the CAP, in 
which the institutions have wide discretion. That applies even more strongly in the context of 
international negotiations, which imply concessions on either side as well as the negotiation of 
a compromise accepted by all the Contracting Parties. Id., paras 122–124. 
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inappropriate with regard to the objective pursued.34 The ECFI pointed out that 
the fixing of a TAC at a level avoiding the worsening or the diminution of 
a fish stock also served the interests of EC fishermen because it allowed the 
safeguarding of resources in the long term. The other CAP objectives had not 
been sacrificed.35 On the contrary, an approach by the Council taking into 
account only the objective of ensuring a higher standard of living for certain 
fishermen in the short term would have involved a serious risk of making the 
objectives of ensuring the rational development of resources and availability of 
supplies impossible. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Id., para. 78. On the conformity of a Community legislative instrument with the principle of 
proportionality see Case C-161/96, Südzucker Mannheim v. Hauptzollamt Mannheim, 1998 
ECR I-281 [hereinafter Case C-161/96], para. 31. In Case C-535/03, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) observed that the principle of proportionality is a general principle of Community 
law and, in the field of fisheries, is embodied in Article 34 (2) of the EC Treaty. That provision 
entrusts the Community legislature with the task of implementing the CAP as formulated in 
Article 33. In particular, a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and the 
availability of supplies needs to be assured, while excluding any discrimination between 
Community producers. The ECJ reiterated that the Community legislature enjoys a wide 
discretion in this field, corresponding to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 34–
37 of the EC Treaty. See Case C-535/03, Unitymark Ltd, North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation 
v. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2006 ECR I-2689 [hereinafter Case C-
535/03], paras 53–54.  
35
 In pursuing the objectives of the CAP, the EC institutions must secure the permanent 
harmonisation made necessary by any conflicting objectives taken individually and, where 
necessary, give any one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the 
economic factors or conditions in view of which their decisions are made. One condition must, 
however, be met, that such harmonisation does not have the effect of rendering impossible the 
realisation of the other objectives. As stressed by the ECFI or ECJ in the following cases: 
Joined Cases T-466/93, T-469/93, T-473/93, T-474/93 and T-477/93, O’Dwyer and Others v. 
Council, 1995 ECR II-2071, para. 80; Case C-179/95, Spain v. Council, 1999 ECR I-6475, 
para. 28; and Case C-324/96, Petridi v. Simou and Others, 1998 ECR I-1333, para. 30. 
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10.3. Cooperation 
 
10.3.1. Global Instruments and Initiatives Guiding Cooperation in the 
North Atlantic 
 
While various FAO instruments may also guide regional cooperation,36 Canada 
and the EU have been particularly influenced towards greater cooperation by 
the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement37 and the December 2006 UN Sustainable 
Fisheries Resolution.38 With the EC ratifying the UN Fish Stocks Agreement on 
19 December 2003 and Canada on 3 August 1999,39 the EC and Canada 
committed to strengthening regional fisheries management organisations in 
light of modern sustainability principles like precaution and the ecosystem 
approach, as well as enhancing regional compliance and enforcement 
arrangements.40 Canada and the EC have subsequently played substantial roles 
in achieving modernisation amendments to the NAFO Convention41 and the EU 
                                                 
36
 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations’ (FAO) instruments include the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; International Plans of Action relating to the 
incidental catch of seabirds (IPOA–Seabirds), the conservation of sharks (IPOA–Sharks), 
the management of fishing capacity, and the prevention /deterrence of illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing (IPOA–IUU); and the International Guidelines for the Management of 
Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas. The instruments are available through the FAO website: 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/publications/en> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
37
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 8 September 1995, I.L.M., 34, 
15421580 (1995), entry into force 11 December 2001, available: <daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement> (retrieved 14 November 2008) 
[hereinafter 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
38
 UN General Assembly, Sustainble fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, A/RES/61/105 (6 March 2007). 
39
 Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratification, available: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratification.htm> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
40
 For an overview of the Agreement’s key provisions, see T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and 
A. Sydnes, “The Fish Stocks Agreement,” in Henriksen, et al., n. 5 above, pp. 11–59. 
41
 On 28 September 2008, NAFO adopted the Amendment to the Convention on Future 
Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (GC Doc. 07/4), but the amended 
text needs to be ratified by at least three-fourths of the NAFO Contracting Parties. The amended 
text is available at <http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/about.html> (retrieved 20 November 
2008). 
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influenced amendments to the NEAFC Convention.42 They have also 
cooperated in enhancing regional compliance and enforcement arrangements 
although many challenges remain.43 
The 2006 UN Sustainable Fisheries Resolution impelled regional fisheries 
management organisations to adopt and implement various measures to protect 
vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) from bottom fishing activities. 
The identification of VMEs and the determination whether bottom fishing 
could cause significant adverse impacts to such ecosystems was set as 
a priority.44 In areas where VMEs are known to occur or likely to occur, 
RFMOs were urged to close such areas and to ensure conservation and 
management measures were established to prevent significant adverse 
impacts.45 RFMOs were also asked to require their members to address 
                                                 
42
 A “new” NEAFC Convention was adopted through 2004 and 2006 amendments, available 
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the North-East Atlantic, available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/about/docs/new_convention.pdf> and also <http://www.neafc.org/ 
system/files/%252Fhome/neafc/drupal2_files/london-declarlation_and_new_convention.pdf> 
(both retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter “New” NEAFC Convention]. For the version 
of the convention before 2004 and 2006 amendments, see Convention on Future Multilateral 
Co-operation in the North-East Atlantic, London, 18 November 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129, 
Official Journal L 227, 12 August 1981, entry into force on 17 March 1982, available: 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=86901:cs&lang=en&list=86901:cs,87372:cs,87022:cs,8
7021:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=4&pgs=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter NEAFC Convention]. Amendments to the NEAFC 
Convention were adopted in 2004 and 2006 by the NEAFC Commission. And even though 
Contracting Parties have agreed to use the convention so amended on a provisional basis, 
pending ratification, these amendments have not been taken into consideration by the present 
overview unless specifically mentioned in the text. The NEAFC Convention replaces the North-
East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of January 1959 following the extension of states’ 
jurisdiction over living resources in their adjacent waters to up to 200 nm. For a historical 
overview of the development of regional fisheries management and RFMOs in the North 
Atlantic, see S. S. Gezelius, “The Arrival of Modern Fisheries Management in the North 
Atlantic: A Historical Overview,” in S. S. Gezelius and J. Raakjær, eds, Making Fisheries 
Management Work: Implementation of Policies for Sustainable Fisheries (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2008), pp. 27–40. 
43
 M. Arbuckle, B. Atkinson, and G. Valentina, Performance Review Panel Report of the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC (6 November 2006), available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/system/files/performance-review-final-edited.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter the NEAFC Performance Report]. This document was a result of the 
agreement by NEAFC members to regularly assess NEAFC performance in relation to the 
NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above. Section 3.6 et seq of the NEAFC Performance Report 
especially examines the role of NEAFC in a regional and international context. Section 4.6 
concludes that there is room for improvement in the relationship between NEAFC and the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR). 
44
 UN General Assembly, n. 38 above, para. 83(b). 
45
 Id. at para. 83(c). 
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encounters with VMEs by vessels flying their flag. Vessels encountering 
vulnerable areas, such as cold water corals and sponge grounds, should be 
required to cease bottom fishing and to report the encounter so appropriate 
measures can be adopted for the relevant site.46  
Canada and the EU, spurred on by the UN Resolution, jointly drafted 
a proposal for bringing NAFO into conformity with the VME protection 
commitments. The proposal was adopted in revised form at the Inter-sessional 
Meeting for the NAFO Fisheries Commission in May 2008,47 and a new 
chapter on bottom fisheries in the NAFO Regulatory Area was added to the 
2008 NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures.48 The provisions, inter 
alia, called for the mapping of sites where VMEs are known or likely to occur49 
and assessments of proposed bottom fishing activities in VME areas.50 The 
Fisheries Commission is authorised to adopt a range of measures to prevent 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, including prohibiting or restricting bottom 
fishing activities and requiring changes in gear design and/or deployment.51 
Contracting Parties are required to have their flagged vessels cease bottom 
fishing when VMEs are encountered and to report encounters.52 The terms of 
reference for an ad hoc working group of mangers and scientists on VMEs were 
also included in the provisions.53 The working group is to provide advice to the 
Fisheries Commission on VME protection and to develop operational 
procedures relating to encounters with VMEs.54 
 
                                                 
46
 Id. at para. 83(d). 
47
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission Inter-Sessional Meeting, 30 April–7 May 2008, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/04, Annex 22. 
48
 NAFO, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Conservation and Enforcement Measures, 
available: <http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/regulations.html> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter NAFO C&E Measures], NAFO/FC Doc. 08/1 (Revised), Chapter Ibis. 
49
 Id., Article 4(1). 
50
 Id., Article 4(2)(3). 
51
 Id., Article 4(5). 
52
 Id., Article 5. 
53
 Id., Article 4(4) and Annex 1 to Chapter Ibis. 
54
 Id. 
  276 
10.3.2. Cooperation at the EU Level 
 
10.3.2.1. The Community’s Competences on the External Level 
 
Although Member States’ vessels have, through the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,55 a right to fish on the high seas, high seas’ 
fishing is extensively regulated by the CFP. Negotiations with third countries 
for access of Member States’ vessels to the fishing zones of third states, and 
vice versa, are entirely within EC competence. The transfer of competence from 
the Member States to the EC is therefore not confined to Community vessels 
fishing in Community waters, but to wherever these vessels operate.56 The EC 
has one of the largest fishing fleets in the world. A significant part of the EC 
fishing sector depends on access to non-EC resources, i.e., those which are 
shared with third states in the waters under their jurisdiction or international 
waters. 
The process of transfer of external relations powers to the EC has been 
particularly marked in the fisheries sector. In the absence of specific provisions 
in the EC Treaty,57 the general system of EC law on its external relations is 
relevant.58 As an international organisation created by a treaty, the EC has legal 
personality.59 This means that in its external relations the EC enjoys the 
                                                 
55
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
56
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Exploitation of Fisheries Resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, Article 1 
(1), L 358 Official Journal 59–80 (31 December 2002) [hereinafter Regulation 2371/02]. This 
does not mean that there are no situations where Member States’ fishing vessels can conduct 
high seas fishing for species or stocks for which neither the EC nor a regional fisheries 
organisation have yet prescribed catch restrictions.  
57
 The EC Treaty does give explicit powers to the EC to act on the international level, but these 
relate only to restricted fields such as commercial agreements, association agreements with 
third states, and the environment. The only express treaty-making power relevant to fisheries is 
found in Article 133(3) of the EC Treaty (ex Article 113 of the EEC Treaty) on the common 
commercial policy, which indirectly authorises the EC to enter into treaties with third states 
relating to trade in fishery products. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], Article 113; EC Treaty, n. 30 above, 
Article 133 (3).  
58
 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Officier van Justitie v. Kramer, 1976 ECR 1279, para. 16 
[hereinafter Kramer Case]. 
59
 Article 281 (ex Article 210 of the EEC Treaty) of the EC Treaty lays down the EC’s legal 
personality. The legal personality of an international organisation may also be inferred from the 
powers or purposes of the organisation and its practice, as confirmed by the International Court 
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capacity to enter into international commitments, i.e., to conclude treaties.60 
The EC’s treaty-making powers are thus of two kinds: those expressly 
conferred on it by the EC Treaty and those that may be implied from its 
provisions.61 
The most radical expansion of the EC’s external fisheries competences 
has stemmed from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Starting 
with Case 22/70, the ECJ developed the parallelism doctrine, which means that 
the EC’s external treaty-making competence mirrors its internal legislative 
competence.62 In the Kramer Case, the ECJ pointed out that the competence to 
legislate on the internal level in fisheries matters flowed from Article 43 of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty (Article 37 of the EC Treaty). 
According to the parallelism doctrine, the EC thus enjoys treaty-making powers 
                                                                                                                                  
of Justice (ICJ) in the Reparation for Injuries Case. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174.  
60
 The authority to do so in a specific field not only arises from an express conferment by the 
treaty, but may equally flow implicitly from other EC Treaty provisions, from an act of 
accession, and from any measure adopted within the framework of those provisions by the EC 
legislature.  
61
 Kramer Case, n. 58 above, paras 19–20. 
62
 This theory was further developed in Opinion 1/76:  
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers 
within its internal system for attaining a specific objective, the Community has 
authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of 
that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection. 
Opinion 1/76, European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 ECR 741, 3rd 
Recital.  
As regards the exclusiveness of this competence, the ECJ has observed that: 
[e]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy [emphasis 
added] envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, 
whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting 
individually or collectively, to undertake such obligations with third States which 
affect those rules. 
Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities, European Agreement on Road Transport, 1971 ECR 263, para. 17 [hereinafter 
ERTA Case].  
Although previously considered unclear and controversial, the ECJ has clarified to some degree 
the exact scope of the implied powers, see: Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the 
International Labour Organization Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 1993 
ECR I-1061; Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International 
Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property - Article 228 (6) of 
the EC Treaty, 1994 ECR I-5267; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or One of its 
Institutions to Participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment, 
1995 ECR 521. 
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in relation to fisheries.63 On the basis of Articles 5 (Article 10 of the EC Treaty) 
and 116 EEC Treaty,64 the ECJ held that: 
 
Member States participating in the [North-East Atlantic Fisheries] 
Convention and in other similar agreements are now not only under a 
duty not to enter into any commitment within the framework of those 
conventions which could hinder the Community in carrying out the tasks 
entrusted to it by Article 102 of the Act of Accession, but also under a 
duty to proceed by common action within the fisheries Commission. It 
further follows therefore that as soon as the Community institutions have 
initiated the procedure for implementing the provisions of the said 
[article], and at the latest within the period laid down by [it], those 
institutions and the Member States will be under a duty to use all the 
political and legal means at their disposal in order to ensure the 
participation of the Community in the Convention and in other similar 
agreements.65 
 
In Case C-258/89,66 it was argued that the EEC has no authority to 
independently adopt TACs and quotas with respect to international waters. In 
this case Spain accepted the result, i.e., the existence of external Community 
                                                 
63
 Documents Concerning the Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the 
Treaties, Part 2 Adjustments to the Treaties, Article 102 [hereinafter 1972 Act of Accession]. 
Support was found in the 1972 Act of Accession, in Regulation 2141/70 and moreover in the 
very nature of things that:  
the rule-making authority of the Community ratione materiae also extends – in so far 
as the Member States have similar authority under public international law – to fishing 
on the high seas. [I]t followed from the very duties and powers which EEC law had 
established and assigned to the EEC institutions on the internal level that the 
Community had authority to enter into international commitments for the conservation 
of the resources of the sea. 
Kramer Case, n. 58 above, para. 30/33. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 of 20 October 
1970 on the Establishment of a Common Structural Policy for the Fishing Industry, L 236 
Official Journal 1–4, Article 1 (27 October 1970) [hereinafter Regulation 2141/70]. 
64
 Under Article 116 of the EEC Treaty it is provided that:  
[f]rom the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, in respect of all 
matters of particular interest to the common market proceed within the framework of 
international organisations of an economic character only by common action. 
EEC Treaty, n. 57 above, Article 116. This article was not withheld in the EC Treaty. 
65
 Kramer Case, n. 58 above, paras 44–45.  
66
 Case C-258/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Spain, 1991 ECR 
I-3977.  
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powers, but not the premise of the existence of internal Community powers. It 
was contended that independent authority to limit catches on the high seas 
could not be vested in the Community, since the Member States had no such 
powers that they could have transferred to the Community.67 Advocate General 
Darmon set aside this argument by observing that the de facto freedom which 
states in practice grant to their fishermen by not laying down rules in respect of 
the conservation of stocks on the high seas did not in any way challenge the 
fundamental principle that the State is empowered, from the point of view of 
public international law, to impose any restrictions on catches on the high 
seas.68 Spain also contended that a unilateral limitation by the Community of 
fishing activities on the high seas would be detrimental to its fishermen without 
being effective since certain non-Member States do not impede upon the 
freedom of their fishing fleets. The ECJ considered catch restrictions outside 
the Community zone essential in light of the actual CFP objectives. It found 
that consideration solely of the stock in Community waters would scarcely be 
effective and would undermine the objective of conserving the species 
concerned, since those species would not be subject to any quotas once they 
moved outside the Community zone.69 
 
 
10.3.2.2. EC Participation in Regional Fisheries Organisations 
 
Due to the EC’s exclusive external competence, it is generally not possible for 
the Member States to participate as separate members in RFMOs. Since the 
inception of the CFP, the EC has therefore gradually replaced its Member 
States in most RFMOs. The EC is a contracting party to eleven RFMOs and is 
in the process of joining others.70  
                                                 
67
 Id., Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, paras 52–53.  
68
 Id., para. 54. 
69
 Id., Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, paras 12–13. In Case C-405/92, the ECJ took any 
doubt away by pointing out that: 
[w]here the high seas are concerned, the Community has the same rule-making 
authority in matters within its jurisdiction as that conferred under international law on 
the State whose flag the vessel is flying or in which it is registered. It has in particular 
competence to adopt for vessels flying the flag of a Member State or registered in a 
Member State, measures for the conservation of fishery resources of the high seas. 
Case C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, 1993 ECR I-
6133, para. 12. 
70
 The RFMOs to which the EC is a contracting party are: ICCAT, NAFO, NEAFC, the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), NASCO, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 
(GFCM), the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC), Fishery 
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At present the RFMOs cover practically all the high seas. There are 
a wide variety of RFMOs. Some were set up under FAO while others were 
created independently. Some cover all the biological resources in a given zone; 
others focus on one stock or a group of stocks. The area covered by an RFMO 
may be limited to the high seas or to EEZ, or may include both.  
Member States can retain or become members of RFMOs under 
exceptional circumstances. This is the case where other states are not 
favourably disposed towards EC membership such as the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),71 which was established by the 1949 
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa 
Rica.72 The EC is a contracting party to the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP),73 whose operation has been entrusted 
to the secretariat of the IATTC. In 1999, the EC signed the AIDCP.74 Contrary 
to the AIDCP, accession of new members to the 1949 Convention (IATTC 
convention) is limited to states. However, an amendment process was launched 
in 1999 with the adoption of the so-called Guayaquil Protocol, so that regional 
economic integration organisations could become members. However, the entry 
into force of this protocol, proved to be long.75 Therefore the EC agreed to 
allow Spain, the only EC Member State whose vessels operate in the area, to 
become a member of IATTC. Spain’s accession was on a temporary basis and 
                                                                                                                                  
Committee for the Eastern and Central Atlantic (CECAF), the South-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (SEAFO), and the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WFCPC). On the changing 
role of RFMOs and the Community participation therein, see generally Commission of 
European Communities, Community Participation in Regional Fisheries Organisations, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(1999) 613 (Brussels, 8 December 1999).  
71
 See more, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) website at  
<http://www.iattc.org/> (retrieved 14 December 2008). 
72
 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
Washington, 31 May 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 3. This convention entered into force on 3 March 1950 
[hereinafter 1949 Convention]. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) has 
been given competence to regulate highly migratory fish stocks in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. 
IATTC membership comprises fourteen coastal and fishing states with interests in the region. 
73
 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), Washington, 15 
May 1998, entry into force 15 February 1999, available: <http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/ 
AIDCP-(amended-Oct-2007).pdf > (retrieved 22 April 2009). 
74
 Council Decision 1999/337/EC of 26 April 1999 on the Signature by the European 
Community of the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme, L 132 
Official Journal 1–27 (27 May 1999); Council Decision 1999/386/EC of 7 June 1999 on the 
Provisional Application by the European Community of the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Programme, L 147 Official Journal 23 (12 June 1999).  
75
 At the time of writing, the protocol had been signed by just eight IATTC members, and 
ratified by only four among them. It will only enter into force once all IATTC parties have 
ratified it. 
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on account of “unique circumstances.” It was also without any precedent-
creating authority and could not affect the EC’s exclusive competence in 
fisheries matters.76 Even under this exceptional regime, it took until 2003 for 
Spain to receive the nihil obstat from all other members to accede to IATTC. 
IATTC adopted a new IATTC Convention text in June 2003 to replace the 1949 
Convention, and the EC signed this so-called Antigua Convention on 22 May 
2006.77 
It is also possible for both the EC and the Member States to be members 
of an RFMO when the issues addressed concern shared competences. For 
instance, the conservation and rational use of marine living resources in the seas 
surrounding Antarctica takes place within the framework of the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)78 and 
within the broader framework of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).79 The 
main instruments within the ATS are the Antarctic Treaty,80 the Convention for 
the Conservation of the Antarctic Seals,81 and CCAMLR. The EC is a member 
of the CCAMLR Commission, the Convention’s regulatory body, alongside 
several EC Member States. The EC and its Member States share competences 
due to its broad scope, but also because it is part of the ATS and therefore 
subject to the sensitive “agreement to disagree” on the sovereignty situation.82  
                                                 
76
 Council Decision 1999/405/EC of 10 June 1999 Authorising the Kingdom of Spain to 
Accede to the Convention Establishing the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission on 
a Temporary Basis (IATTC), L 155 Official Journal 37–38, 5th Recital (22 June 1999). 
According to this Decision, Spain is required to denounce the 1949 Convention on the date of 
the Community’s accession thereto.  
77
 The Antigua Convention (Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific, Antigua, 
Guatemala, 18 February 2002) will enter into force after the deposit of the seventh instrument 
of ratification by a current contracting party to IATTC. Council Decision 2006/539/EC of 
22 May 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community of the Convention for 
the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission established by the 1949 
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, L 224 
Official Journal 22 (16 August 2006). 
78
 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 20 May 
1980, 19 I.L.M. 837 (1980). This convention entered into force on 7 April 1982. 
79
 See Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty website at <http://www.ats.aq> (retrieved 
15 December 2008). 
80
 The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, DC, 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. This convention 
entered into force on 23 June 1961. 
81
 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, London, 1 June 1972, 11 I.L.M. 251. 
This convention entered into force on 11 March 1978. 
82
 See E. J. Molenaar, “CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries,” International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal and Law 16 (2002): 465–499. At the 18th annual CCAMLR meeting in 
1999, the division of competence between the EC and its Member States was implicitly 
challenged by means of a notification by the EC Commission to engage in an exploratory 
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A similar situation arises in connection with FAO fishery advisory bodies 
such as the Fishery Committee for the Eastern and Central Atlantic (CECAF),83 
the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC),84 and the 
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM).85 The rationale for 
the continued participation of EC Member States within these bodies 
predominantly appears to be due to the development and cooperation objectives 
of these bodies, which is an area in which the EC and its Member States share 
competence.86 Scientific research in fisheries is another issue where 
competence is shared, hence the Member States continued membership of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) alongside the EC. 
The Community has a sizeable fleet conducting bottom fishing activities 
in certain high seas areas not covered by a RFMO. Through Regulation 
734/2008 on the protection of VMEs in the high seas from the adverse impacts 
of bottom fishing gears, the Community now protects vulnerable high seas 
marine ecosystems from the destructive effects of such activities.87 Prior to this 
Regulation, the Community had only adopted measures to close bottom fishing 
in areas within Community waters and on the high seas within the framework 
of all existing RFMOs empowered to regulate bottom fisheries. This regulation 
seems to end the stalemate in the sensitive political debate regarding the scope 
of the Community’s conservation competence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
fishery for Patagonian toothfish on behalf of a Portuguese vessel, even though Portugal was not 
a party to the CCAMLR Convention at that time. Strong objections during the meeting and 
afterwards, by both EC Member States and third states, compelled the EC Commission to 
inform the CCAMLR Executive Secretary that it intended to suspend the exploratory fishery for 
technical reasons. Council Regulation (EC) No. 601/2004 of 22 March 2004 Laying Down 
Certain Control Measures Applicable to Fishing Activities in the Area Covered by the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, L 97 Official Journal 
16 (1 April 2004). 
83
 Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic, Instituted by FAO Council Resolution 
1/48 (June 1967). 
84
 Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission. Established by FAO Council Resolution 4/61 
(November 1973). 
85
 Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, 
Rome, 24 September 1949, 126 U.N.T.S. 239. This agreement entered into force 20 February 
1952. 
86
 Molenaar, n. 82 above, p. 160. 
87
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 734/2008, of 15 July 2008 on the Protection of Vulnerable 
Marine Ecosystems in the High Seas From the Adverse Impacts of Bottom Fishing Gears, 
L 201 Official Journal 8–13 (30 July 2008).  
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10.3.2.3. The EC and Negotiation of Conservation Agreements  
 
The European Commission is responsible for the negotiation of fisheries 
agreements, whereas the Council, after consulting Parliament, concludes it.88 
Such an agreement is binding on the EC institutions as well as on its Member 
States.89 The general practice is for the Commission to negotiate in line with 
negotiating mandates received from the Council. Before taking effect, the 
agreements must be adopted by the Council in the form of a regulation based on 
Articles 37 and 300 of the EC Treaty.90 
In areas outside EC competence, Member States retain their right of 
individual action and the right to enter into treaties. In situations where the EC 
has treaty-making competence but such competence is not exclusive, it is 
shared with the Member States.91 A classic example of this is to be found in the 
LOS Convention.92 For the purpose of the LOS Convention, conservation and 
management of fisheries resources were identified as exclusive EC powers, as 
were some environmental protection and other competences. The remaining 
matters were areas where legislative powers were retained by the Member 
                                                 
88
 EC Treaty, n. 30 above, Article 300 (1) & (3). This basic procedure varies both in terms of 
voting rules within the Council and the extent of parliamentary involvement according to the 
subject matter of the agreement and the procedures applicable to the adoption of internal 
measures. For an early account see P. M. Leopold, “The External Relations Power of the EEC 
in Theory and Practice,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 26 (1977): 54–80. 
Generally see M. Koskenniemi, International Law Aspect of the European Union (The Hague, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998); A. Dashwood, and C. Hillion, The General Law of 
EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000).  
89
 EC Treaty, n. 30 above, Article 300 (1) & (7). 
90
 Note that this requires prior consultation with the Parliament. 
91
 Competence will be shared according to Macleod et al., where that consequence flows from 
the EC Treaty article conferring power on the EC; 2) the EC has potential competence that 
could be exclusive when exercised but which has not yet been exercised; 3) the subject matter 
of the treaty falls partly within the field of the EC’s exclusive treaty-making powers and partly 
outside; 4) the EC’s treaty-making powers derive from internal EC rules which set minimum 
standards; and 5) in certain limited areas, such as intellectual property, where EC and Member 
State competence can co-exist without either displacing the other. I. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry, 
and S. Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 56–63 & 63–67; R. R. Churchill, “The EC and its Role in Some Issues of 
International Fisheries Law” and E. Hey, “The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention,” 
both in E. Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999), pp. 536–537.  
92
 A. W. Koers, “Participation of the European Economic Community in a New Law of the Sea 
Convention,” American Journal of International Law 7 (1979): 426–443; K. R. Simmonds, 
“The European Economic Community and the New Law of the Sea,” Hague Recueil 218, no. 1 
(1989): 108–157; R. Simmonds, “The Community’s Declaration Upon Signature of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Common Market Law Review 23 (1986): 521–544. 
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States. It was thus not possible for the Community and the Member States to 
assume independently of each other, the obligations and rights enshrined in the 
LOS Convention. Therefore, the practice has arisen of concluding “mixed 
agreements” to which both the EC and its Member States are parties. They need 
the signature and ratification by each Member State, in addition to the formal 
conclusion by the EC. With respect to the negotiation, conclusion and 
implementation of such mixed agreements, the ECJ has prescribed an 
obligation on the EC and the Member States to ensure close cooperation 
between them.93 
Several issues other than conservation have caused some controversy in 
determining whether the EC has treaty-making powers, and if so, the 
exclusivity of these powers. The precise scope of the EC’s exclusive external 
competence has traditionally been a subject of dispute between the 
Commission’s broad interpretation viewpoint and the Council’s restrictive 
viewpoint, and it has been the task of the ECJ to clarify the matter.94  
An illustrative example of this tension in relation to the Community’s 
membership in fisheries organisations and some of the procedural difficulties 
which may arise are evident in Case C-25/94.95 In this case, the Commission 
requested that the ECJ annul the decision96 giving Member States the right to 
vote in the FAO concerning the adoption of the draft Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
                                                 
93
 Ruling 1/78 Delivered Pursuant to the Third Paragraph of Article 103 of the European 
Atomic Energy Commission Treaty, Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, 1978 E.C.R. 
2151, paras 34–36; Opinion 2/91, n. 62 above, para. 36; Opinion 1/94, n. 62 above, para. 108.  
94
 Member States are reluctant to leave international relations to the exclusive competence of 
the Community. The development of subordination clauses and mixed agreements has been 
quite deliberately aimed in practice at stunting the use of exclusive Community competence. 
Mixed agreements need to be signed and ratified by all Member States, thus it normally takes 
several years before they can enter into force. In order to speed up the entry into force of the 
parts of mixed agreements that deal with pure EC competences, the EC often makes use of so-
called interim agreements under EC competence. Interim agreements exclude, therefore, the 
articles under Member State competence. As a result, interim agreements can enter into force as 
soon as the Community has concluded the agreement. Interim agreements do not need to be 
signed and ratified by the individual Member States. See M. Cremona, “The Doctrine of 
Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External Relations of the European 
Community,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2 (1982): 393–428; D. O’Keeffe and 
H. G. Schermers, Mixed Agreements (The Hague: Deventer, Kluwer, 1983), p. ix; A. Rosas, 
“The EU and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood & Hillion, n. 88 above, pp. 200–220. 
95
 Case C-25/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union, 
1996 ECR I-1469. 
96
 Decision of the Fisheries Council of 22 November 1993.  
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Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.97 The FAO provides for a system of 
alternative exercise of the rights attached to membership between the EC and 
its Member States. This allows the Commission to speak and vote where an 
agenda item is within exclusive competence of the Community. If an agenda 
item contains matters containing elements both of national and Community 
competence, the Commission can only represent the EC on the issues that fall 
within its exclusive competence. Registration of vessels is a Member State 
competence. During negotiations on the draft agreement, the clauses relating to 
registration and flagging were removed. Subsequently, the Commission is 
considered having the right to vote. The ECJ pointed out that:  
 
[w]here it is apparent that the subject-matter of an agreement or 
convention falls partly within the competence of the Community and 
partly within that of its Member States, it is essential to ensure close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, 
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of 
the commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from 
the requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community.98 
 
In addition, “the Community institutions and the Member States must take all 
necessary steps to ensure the best possible co-operation in that regard.”99 
The ECJ concluded that the Council was wrong in maintaining that the draft 
agreement concerned an issue not within the exclusive competence of the 
Community. Accordingly, it was for the Commission to vote for the adoption of 
the draft agreement.100  
 
                                                 
97
 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 24 November 1993, U.N.T.S., 2221 (2003): 91–
129, entry into force 24 April 2003, available: <www.fao.org/legal/treaties/012t-e.htm> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement]. 
98
 Case C-25/94, n. 95 above, para. 46; Ruling Ruling 1/78, n. 93 above, paras 34–36; Opinion 
2/91, n. 62 above, para. 36; Opinion 1/94, n. 62 above, para. 108. 
99
 Opinion 2/91, n. 62 above, para. 38. 
100
 Case C-25/94, n. 95 above, para. 50. 
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10.4. Challenges 
 
10.4.1. Integrating the Environmental Dimension into the CFP 
 
As discussed above, EC internal competences premises action on the external 
level. Thus, the competence of the EC to act in the international arena is 
a question of Community law rather than of international law. During the 2002 
CFP reform there was a general consensus that the CFP was failing to achieve 
its objectives of conserving fish stocks, protecting the marine environment, 
ensuring the economic viability of European fleets, and providing good quality 
food to consumers. A 1999 survey in the North East Atlantic confirmed that 40 
out of the 60 main commercial fish stocks were outside safe biological limits. 
The most severely depleted species was cod. The European Commission’s 2001 
Green Book painted a very bleak picture of EC fish stocks.101 The Commission 
then considered the possibility of reviewing the whole of the CFP framework. 
The 2002 CFP reform set broader objectives and resulted in several significant 
changes. Firstly, noting that the CFP traditionally dealt with environmental 
matters in a reactive way rather than integrating environmental concerns into all 
management considerations in a proactive matter,102 the Commission concluded 
that the CFP needed to equip itself with the necessary tools of proactive 
management of environmental concerns. Initially, the fundamental element of 
environmental integration in fisheries was identified as the change in attitude of 
management through the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management. Secondly, the environmental policy principles needed to be 
applied to fisheries management. With the exception of the precautionary 
principle in the management of single fish stocks, limited work had been 
carried out to ascertain their implications to fisheries management.103 
                                                 
101
 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Future of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, Volume I, Communication from the Commission, COM(2001) 135 (Brussels, 
20 March 2001). 
102
 Commission of the European Communities, Elements of a Strategy for the Integration of 
Environmental Protection Requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy 5, Communication 
from the Commission, COM(2001) 143 final (Brussels, 16 March 2001) [hereinafter 
COM(2001) 143 final]. 
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 Commission of the European Communities, Partnership for Integration, A strategy for 
Integrating Environment into European Union Policies, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(1998) 333 (Brussels, June 1998); COM(2001) 143 final, n. 102 above, pp. 21–22. On 
21 June 1998, the Council endorsed a Community Strategy on Biological Diversity. This 
strategy called for the generation of sector-based action plans. With regard to the fisheries, the 
objectives were twofold: firstly, to conserve commercially fished species of marine fish in order 
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The new Regulation 2371/02 provides the legal basis to adopt measures 
to reduce negative impacts on the environment. It is explicitly stated that the 
CFP must provide for coherent measures concerning the “limitation of the 
environmental impact of fishing.”104 To this end, it sees the precautionary 
approach when taking protection and conservation measures as an appropriate 
tool.105 The gradual implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to 
fisheries management is further envisaged.106 Sustainable exploitation is 
explicitly linked with minimising the effects on marine ecosystems.107 
However, the Regulation, as opposed to the precautionary approach, does not 
provide a definition of the ecosystem approach.  
The conservation measures to be adopted in the pursuit of sustainable 
fishing activities may include measures for each stock or group of stocks aimed 
at limiting fishing mortality and the environmental impacts of fishing activities. 
However, the Regulation is specific about technical measures, stating that they 
must be adopted to reduce the impact of fishing activities on marine ecosystems 
and non-target species.108 Focusing on conservation, the recent trend is for a 
multi-annual approach to management and recovery plans. For stocks at or 
within safe biological limits, multi-annual management plans will be adopted to 
ensure the objective of sustainable exploitation. For stocks outside safe 
biological limits,109 the adoption of multi-annual recovery plans is an absolute 
                                                                                                                                  
to achieve sustainability of stocks, fishing opportunities and food supply and, secondly, to 
reduce the impact of fishing operations on non-target species and marine habitats. It therefore 
envisaged the application of the precautionary approach to the setting of TACs. Commission of 
the European Communities, A European Community Biodiversity Strategy, Communication 
from the Commission, COM(1998) 42 (Brussels, 4 February 1998); Commission of the 
European Communities, Application of the Precautionary Principle and Multiannual 
Arrangements for Setting TACs, Communication from the Commission, COM(2000) 803 final 
(Brussels, 1 December 2000). 
104
 Regulation 2371/02, n. 56 above, Article 1 (2) (b). 
105
 Id. 
106
 Id., Article 2(1), which reads: “For this purpose, the Community shall apply the 
precautionary approach in taking measures designed to protect and conserve living aquatic 
resources, to provide for their sustainable exploitation and to minimise the impact of fishing 
activities on marine eco-systems. It shall aim at a progressive implementation of an eco-system 
based approach to fisheries management.” 
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 Article 3(e) reads “sustainable exploitation means the exploitation of a stock in such a way 
that the future exploitation of the stock will not be prejudiced and that it does not have 
a negative impact on the marine eco-systems.” 
108
 Id., Article 4(g)(iv). 
109
 According to Article 3(l) of Regulation 2371/02, “safe biological limits” means indicators of 
the state of a stock or of its exploitation inside which there is a low risk of transgressing certain 
limit reference points. 
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priority.110 During the years following the CFP reform, the Council commenced 
implementation of multi-annual plans by adopting three recovery plans for 
stocks with a status “outside safe biological limits.”111 Recovery plans targeting 
species outside Community waters have also been adopted, e.g., the Greenland 
halibut recovery plan, managed by NAFO.112  
 
 
10.4.2. Putting the Precautionary Approach into Practice 
 
10.4.2.1. NAFO and the Precautionary Approach 
 
If measured by the number of fish stocks subject to a directed fishing 
moratorium because of their depleted status, NAFO’s record of precautionary 
fisheries management can only be described as poor. For 2008, eight groundfish 
stocks were subject to a directed fishing ban. Those stocks included: 3L, 3M 
and 3N cod; 3LN redfish; 3LNO and 3M American plaice; and 3L and 3NO 
witch flounder.113 
NAFO has moved to formally adopt the precautionary approach on two 
main fronts. At the 2004 annual meeting, the Fisheries Commission adopted the 
                                                 
110
 Id., Article 5(2). 
111
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 Establishing Measures for the 
Recovery of Cod Stocks, L 70 Official Journal 8–11 (9 March 2004); Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 811/2004 of 21 April 2004 Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Northern Hake 
Stock, L 150 Official Journal 1–11 (30 April 2004); Council Regulation (EC) No. 2166/05 of 
20 December 2005 Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Southern Hake and Norway 
lobster Stocks in the Cantabrian Sea and Western Iberian Peninsula and Amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 850/98 for the Conservation of Fishery Resources Through Technical Measures for 
the Protection of Juveniles of Marine Organisms, L 345 Official Journal 5–10 (28 December 
2005). 
112
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2115/2005 of 20 December 2005 Establishing a Recovery Plan 
for Greenland Halibut in the Framework of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, 
L 340 Official Journal 3–6 (23 December 2005). Council Regulation (EC) No. 643/2007 of 11 
June 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No. 41/2007 as Concerns the Recovery Plan for Bluefin 
Tuna recommended by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, L 
151 Official Journal 1–16 (13 June 2007). See also Council Regulation (EC) No. 1559/2007 of 
17 December 2007 Establishing a Multi-annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean and Amending Regulation (EC) No. 520/2007, L 340 Official 
Journal 8–24 (22 December 2007). 
113
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/01 (Revised), Annex I.A, Annual 
Quota Table. Bans on fishing capelin and shrimp in NAFO area 2NO were also in force.  
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NAFO Precautionary Approach Framework.114 The Framework provides 
guidance for setting fishing mortality and stock biomass reference points115 and 
suggests management strategies according to five zones (safe, overfishing, 
cautionary, danger, and collapse).116 In September 2007, NAFO Contracting 
Parties agreed to give the precautionary approach a legal foundation through an 
amended Convention.117 Article III of the modernised Convention requires 
Contracting Parties individually and collectively to apply the precautionary 
approach in accordance with Article 6 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.118 
However, practical implementation of the precautionary approach has 
been thwarted in at least four main ways. Firstly, the Scientific Council has not 
been able to determine reference points for many stocks partly due to limited 
scientific data as well as stocks whose reference points have not been 
determined. These stocks include white hake in Divisions 3NOPs,119 capelin in 
Divisions 3NO,120 redfish in Divisions 3LN and in Divisions 3O,121 thorny 
skate in Divisions 3LNO,122 and witch founder in Divisions 3NO.123 
Secondly, there has been the all too common political over-riding of 
scientific advice. For example, at the 29th meeting of the Fisheries Commission 
in September 2007, the Commission set various TACs for 2008 above the 
recommended scientific advice. A few instances are as follows: 
 
• Redfish in Division 3M, TAC of 8,500 tonnes (above the Scientific 
Council’s advice of not exceeding 5,000 tonnes) 
• White hake in Divisons 3NO, TAC of 8,500 tonnes (even though the 
                                                 
114
 NAFO/FC, NAFO Precautionary Approach Framework, Doc. 004/4/18, available: 
<http://archive.nafo.int/open/key-documents/fcdoc04-18.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
The Fisheries Commission also agreed to initially test implementation of the Precautionary 
Framework on two stocks (yellowtail flounder in Divisions 3LNO and shrimp in 3M) starting in 
2005. See NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission Meeting, 26th Annual Meeting, 
September 13–17, 2004, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, FC Doc. 04/17. 
115
 The Framework discusses setting fishing mortality limit and buffer reference points, as well 
as stock biomass limit and buffer reference points. 
116
 For example, in the safe zone, managers may choose to establish TACs based on socio-
economic considerations; for the collapse zone, fishing mortality should be set as close to zero 
as possible. 
117
 Amendment, n. 41 above. 
118
 Id. 
119
 See NAFO, Report of Scientific Council Meeting, 7–21 June 2007, SC 7-21, p. 23. 
120
 Id., p. 24. 
121
 Id., pp. 26, 28. 
122
 See Scientific Council Meeting, 1–15 June 2006, SC 1-15, p. 19. 
123
 Id., p. 15. 
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Scientific Council advised such a level was “unrealistic”) 
• Thorny skate in Divisions 3LNO, TAC of 13,500 tonnes (even though 
the Scientific Council advised thorny skate in Divisions 3LNOPs should 
be managed as a unit and the TAC should not exceed 11,000 tonnes)124 
 
At the 30th annual meeting of the Fisheries Commission, further divergencies 
from the following of scientific advice for 2009 stood out. The Fisheries 
Commission TACs for thorny skate, white hake, and redfish in 3M and shrimp 
in Divisions 3LNO were not consistent with scientific advice.125 
Even though Greenland halibut in Subarea 2 and Divisions 3KLMNO has 
been subject to a fifteen year rebuilding plan, the Fisheries Commission has 
also set quotas higher than recommended by the Scientific Council. For 
example, for 2009, the Council recommended a TAC of 10,471 tonnes but the 
Commission adopted a TAC of 16,000 tonnes.126 The quota was set despite the 
Scientific Council’s documentation that catches from Greenland halibut in 
2004–2007 exceeded the rebuilding plan TACs by 27, 22, 27 and 42 percent 
respectively.127 
The preparedness of Contracting Parties to set substantial quotas even 
when scientific information is lacking represents a third practical constraint on 
precautionary, as exemplified by management of the redfish stock in Division 
3O. Even though the Scientific Council acknowledged that stock dynamics and 
recruitment patterns are poorly understood and TAC advice was impossible,128 
the Fisheries Commission established TACs of 20,000 tonnes for 2008 and 
2009.129 
A fourth precautionary pitfall has been the considerable bycatch 
occurring even for the commercial fish stocks subject to moratoria. A 2005 
report estimated especially high bycatch removals for four stocks closed to 
                                                 
124
 NAFO, Meeting Proceedings of the General Council and Fisheries Commission, September 
2007 – August 2008, pp. 82–87. 
125
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, Thirtieth Annual Meeting, 22–26 September 
2008, Vigo, Spain, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/22, pp. 4–8 and Annex 7. Inconsistencies were a thorny 
skate TAC of 13,500 tonnes (6,000 tonnes scientific advice), white hake TAC of 8,500 tonnes 
(scientific advice that such a TAC is not sustainable), redfish in 3M TAC of 8,500 tonnes 
(scientific advice that TAC should not to exceed 5,000 tonnes), and shrimp in 3LN TAC of 
30,000 tonnes (25,000 tonnes scientific advice) [hereinafter NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting]. 
126
 Id., pp. 4, 8. 
127
 NAFO, Report of the Scientific Council Meeting, 5-19 June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 08/19, 
p. 5. 
128
 NAFO, n. 119 above, p. 119. 
129
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Annex I.A, Annual Quota Table; NAFO Thirtieth 
Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 8. 
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directed fishing.130 Bycatch removals, expressed as a percentage of current total 
biomass, were thought to be 70–89 percent for 3NO cod, 15–27 percent for 
3NLO American plaice, close to 30 percent for 2J 3KL witch founder, and 8.6–
18.9 percent for 3NO witch flounder.131 Although bycatch restrictions have 
been imposed for fish stocks under moratoria,132 the efficacy of these 
restrictions remains to be seen. 
 
 
10.4.2.2. NEAFC and the Precautionary Approach 
 
The “New” NEAFC Convention also states that the NEAFC Commission is to 
ensure that Recommendations are based on the best scientific evidence 
available and that the precautionary approach is applied.133 It is not always 
clear, however, to what extent the precautionary approach has been translated in 
NEAFC management measures. The memorandum of understanding between 
NEAFC and OSPAR acknowledges and provides for the development of 
a common understanding of the application of the precautionary approach 
principle.134  
The TAC adopted in 2009 for mackerel was consistent with ICES advice. 
In addition, the Contracting Parties agreed to implement a long-term 
management plan for the mackerel stock in the North East Atlantic for 2010 
and subsequent years, which is consistent with the precautionary approach.135 
The 2009 TAC for Norwegian (Atlanto-Scandian) herring was set at 1,643,000 
tonnes and also consistent with ICES advice. A long-term management plan 
was also agreed to.136  
                                                 
130
 A Rosenberg, M. Mooney-Seus, and C. Ninnes, Bycatch on the High Seas: A Review of the 
Effectiveness of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (Toronto: WWF-Canada, 2005). 
131
 Id., p. 131. 
132
 Article 11 of the NAFO’s C&E Measures, n. 48 above, establishes a bycatch retained on 
board limit of 1,250 kg or 5% of the total catch (whichever is greater). If a vessel exceeds the 
5% bycatch in one haul, the vessel must move a minimum of 10 nm from any position of the 
previous tow. If after moving, the next haul still exceeds the bycatch limit, the vessel must 
leave the Division and not return for at least 60 hours. 
133
 ”New” NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above, Article 4 (2) a & b.  
134
 Memorandum of Understanding between the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) and the OSPAR Commission, available: <http://www.neafc.org/about/docs/ 
opsar_mou.pdf> (retrieved 12 December 2008) [hereinafter NEAFC/OSPAR MoU]. 
135
 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries Consultations between the Faroe Islands, 
the European Community, Norway on the management of Mackerel in the North-East Atlantic 
in 2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/mackerel_2009_agreedrecord_ 
signed.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008)  
136
 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries consultations on the management of the 
Norwegian Spring Spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) Herring Stock in the North-East Atlantic for 
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Implementing the precautionary approach seems especially problematic 
in relation to three fish stocks. For 2009 the TAC for blue whiting was set at 
590,000 tonnes instead of the precautionary limit of 384,000 tonnes 
recommended by ICES.137 For pelagic redfish, no precautionary reference 
points have been set and no consensus on stock structure exists, yet substantial 
fishing continues. ICES considers that the current landings of 64,000 tonnes is 
far above its advice of 20,000 tonnes. ICES advises that a management plan be 
developed and implemented which takes into account the uncertainties in 
science and the properties of the fisheries. Conditions set for directed fishing 
activities for orange roughy, namely restricting catches of any Contracting 
Party to 150 tonnes and ensuring vessels operate with a historical fishing 
record, are deemed precautionary but without a clear rationale.138  
NEAFC was criticised at its 2008 meeting for having a different approach 
to the impact assessments for exploratory and existing fisheries. For new 
fisheries “particular care shall be taken in the evaluation of risks of the 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, in line with the precautionary approach.” 
For existing fisheries a more lax approach seems to be suggested as there is no 
mention of the precautionary approach but instead the notification that 
assessments should take account of the history of bottom fishing in the areas 
proposed.139  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/herring_2009.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter 2009 agreement on the allocation of herring].  
137
 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries consultations between the European Community, 
the Faroe Islands, Norway on the management of blue whiting in the North-East Atlantic in 
2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/bluewhiting_2009.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter 2009 agreement on the allocation of blue whiting].  
138
 In ascertaining the “robustness” of the process of multilateral cooperation in North East 
Atlantic fisheries, the NEAFC Performance Report Document, n. 43 above, noted at page 33 
that there were no long-term objectives or plans in place to detect whether the current “30% 
reduction in TAC in relation to the orange roughy is sufficiently precautionary or not.” Even 
though Annex 1 of the NEAFC Performance Report lists the orange roughy as one of the 
species for which NEAFC may request recurring scientific advice from the ICES, there are no 
long-term precautionary plans in place.  
139
 NEAFC, NEAFC Recommendation XVI: 2008, Recommendation By The North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission In Accordance With Article 5 Of The Convention On Future 
Multilateral Cooperation In North-East Atlantic Fisheries At Its Extraordinary Meeting On 1-2 
July 2008 To Adopt The Following Recommendation On Bottom Fishing Activities In The 
NEAFC Regulatory Area, available <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/%252Fhome/neafc/ 
drupal2_files/16-rec_bottom_fishing_ em_2008.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008).  
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10.4.3. Implementing the Ecosystem Approach 
 
10.4.3.1. NAFO and the Ecosystem Approach 
 
While a considerable focus of NAFO continues to be on single stock 
assessments and establishing TACs and other controls for fish stocks not under 
a moratorium,140 NAFO has been trying to alter its course towards 
an ecosystem approach in multiple ways. Amendments to the NAFO 
Convention in September 2007 committed parties to apply an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management in the Northwest Atlantic,141 with established 
safeguarding of marine ecosystems as an objective142 and the preservation of 
marine biological diversity as a key principle.143 
Various institutional mechanisms have been forged to advance marine 
ecosystem research and understanding. In the early 1990s, the Scientific 
Council established a Standing Committee on Fisheries Environment 
(STACFEN). STACFEN has published numerous studies on how biological 
resources are influenced by environmental factors, including climate change.144 
The Scientific Council has established a Working Group on Ecosystem 
Approach to Fisheries Management which first met in May 2008 and has been 
tasked with identifying VMEs, furthering research on regional ecosystems in 
the NAFO Convention Area, and developing ecosystem indicators.145 A Joint 
NAFO-ICES Joint Working Group on Deep Water Ecology has been formed to 
increase sharing of information and cooperative research on deep water 
ecosystems. A March 2008 meeting of the Working Group advanced 
understanding of coral species’ distributions throughout the North Atlantic.146 
NAFO has progressed in protecting some vulnerable marine ecosystems. 
In 2006, the Fisheries Commission agreed to close four seamounts to demersal 
fishing gears in the Regulatory Area, namely: Orphan Knoll, Corner 
                                                 
140
 For a good overview of NAFO’s regulatory approaches and constraints, see 
A. A. Rosenberg, R. J. Trumble, J. M. Harrington, O. Martens, and M. Mooney-Seus, High 
Seas Reform: Actions to Reduce Bycatch and Implement Ecosystem-Based Management for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (Toronto: WWF-Canada, 2006). 
141
 Amendment, n. 41 above, Preamble. 
142
 Id., Article II. 
143
 Id., Article III (e). 
144
 See NAFO Science, “Ecosystem Considerations,” available: <http://www.nafo.int/science/ 
ecosystem_html> (retrieved 23 November 2008). 
145
 See NAFO Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management, available: 
<http://www.nafo.int/science/ecostem/eawg/wg-ea.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
146
 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Report of the ICES-NAFO Joint 
Working Group on Deep Water Ecology (WG DEG), 10–14 March 2008, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, ICES CM 2008/Acom: 45 [hereinafter WGDEG Report]. 
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Seamounts, Newfoundland Seamounts, and New England Seamounts.147 In 
2007, the Commission agreed to establish a Coral Protection Zone, closing all 
fishing activity involving bottom contact gear for a large area of Division 3O 
from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012.148 
Further advances towards protecting VMEs were made in 2008. The 
Scientific Council identified on a broad scale basis eight additional candidate 
VMEs,149 and a preliminary map of the bottom trawl fishing “footprint” for 
2003–2007 was produced.150 An Ad Hoc Working Group of Fishing Managers 
and Scientists on VMEs was established to further discussions and 
recommendations for protecting VMEs.151 At its annual meeting in September 
2008, the Fisheries Commission agreed to extend protection from demersal 
fishing gears to the Fogo Seamounts as of 1 January 2009, and to adopt an 
Interim Exploratory Fishery Protocol and an Interim VME Encounter 
Protocol.152 
Even though NAFO has been taking numerous steps towards 
an ecosystem approach with its various governance implications,153 the 
reformatory swim is far from over with four challenging issues becoming 
apparent. These challenges include fully fleshing out and ensuring VME 
protection, casting the management net to cover a broader range of species, 
bolstering the conservation of sharks and sea turtles, and furthering marine 
ecosystem research.154  
                                                 
147
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 28th Annual Meeting, 18–22 September 2006, 
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, NAFO/FC Doc. 06/14 at 9. Pursuant to Article 14(5) of 
NAFO’s E&C Measures, n. 48 above, the closure is to be effective from 1 January 2007 until 
31 December 2010. 
148
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 29th Annual Meeting, 24 September 2007, 
Lisbon, Portugal. NAFO FC Doc. 07/24 at 11 [hereinafter NAFO Twenty-ninth Annual 
Meeting]. The Protection Zone has been given force through Article 15 of NAFO E&C 
Measures. These measures will be discussed later in this study.  
149
 Report of the Scientific Council Meeting, 5–19 June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 08/19, pp. 38–
41. 
150
 Id., p. 34. 
151
 See Report of the AD Hoc Working Group of Fishing Managers and Scientists on 
Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (WG FMS), 8–12 September 2008, Montreal, Canada, 
NAFO/FC Doc. 08/8. 
152
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 44. 
153
 For a summary of the vast array of measures flowing from the ecosystems approach, see 
S. M. Garcia, A. Zerbi, C. Aliaume, T. Do Chi, and G. Lasserre, “The Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries: Issues, Terminology, Principles, Institutional Foundations, Implementation and 
Outlook,” FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 443 (Rome: FAO, 2003). 
154
 These four central challenges, of course, are not the only limitations in achieving 
implementation of the ecosystem approach. Other challenges include, lack of compliance with 
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Fully Fleshing Out and Ensuring VME Protection under NAFO 
 
Further designation and protection of VMEs in the NAFO Conservation Area 
remains a central challenge for further implementation of the ecosystem 
approach. At the September 2008 meeting of the Fisheries Commission, the 
Commission considered eight potential VME candidates but decided for most 
sites additional high level habitat mapping would be required to identify VME 
boundaries with greater certainty.155 The Commission requested the Scientific 
Council to refine its information on coral concentrations as soon as possible in 
2008 so as to provide information on sponge concentrations by 30 June 2009 
and to provide information on corals and sponges in canyons as soon as 
practicable or at least provide a progress report by 30 June 2009.156 Only the 
Fogo Seamounts were added to the closed area list. Whether Canada and 
Greenland should move to protect VMEs in the Baffin Bay/Davis Strait region 
remains to be seen.157 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the September 2008 meeting 
were quick to criticise the lack of agreement protecting all the candidate VME 
areas. The EU, in particular, was accused of backtracking on deep-sea 
protection.158 The failure to fully implement the 2006 UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries was lamented, specifically the need to 
implement protective measures for identified VMEs by 31 December 2008.159 
NGOs expressed serious concern over the apparent view of some NAFO 
Contracting Parties that historically fished areas should not be closed as 
ecosystem damage had already occurred.160 
The Exploratory Protocol for New Fishing Areas, agreed to by the 
Fisheries Commission in September 2008, also addressed VMEs, but its 
effectiveness in practice remains to be seen. The Protocol requires Contracting 
Parties to submit harvesting, mitigation, catch monitoring, and data collection 
plans to the Executive Secretary before allowing bottom fishing activities in 
new areas to commence. A mitigation plan must include measures to prevent 
significant adverse impact to VMEs that may be encountered. A catch 
                                                                                                                                  
management measures, fisheries on juveniles, and illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 
fishing. See Rosenberg et al., n. 130 above. 
155
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 6. 
156
 Id., pp. 9–10 and Annex 13. 
157
 See WGDEG Report, n. 146 above, which documents coral distributions in the region. 
158
 See The Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, European Union Backtracks on Deep-Sea 
Protection (10 October 2008), available: <http://www.save_the_highseas.org/display.cfm 
?ID=179> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
159
 Id. 
160
 Id. 
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monitoring plan must include recording/reporting of all species caught, 100 
percent satellite tracking, and 100 percent observer coverage, and a data 
collection plan is required for identifying VMEs/species. No prior impact 
assessment process exits, but the Executive Secretary is required to forward the 
planning information to all Contracting Parties and the Scientific Council. 
Exploratory fishing trip reports must be submitted by parties to the NAFO 
Scientific Council.  
The adequacy of the Encounter Protocol in protecting VMEs is also 
questionable. The Protocol will require fishing vessels encountering indicator 
species of corals and sponges to “move away” at least two nm if a catch per set 
brings up more than 100 kg of live coral and/or 1,000 kg of live sponges.161 
Such high catch thresholds have been criticised,162 but the Protocol notes the 
provisional basis of these thresholds and the possibility for adjustment in light 
of recent experience.163 
 
 
Casting the Management Net to Cover a Broader Range of Species 
 
A further ecosystems approach challenge is to extend protective management 
measures to a broader range of species, especially marine species at risk. NAFO 
currently manages only 11 of some 25 commercial species.164 
The existing shortcoming is exemplified by the spotted wolffish and 
northern wolffish stocks. While Canada has listed these two species as 
threatened under its Species at Risk Act165 and has required within the EEZ 
allowable harm permits for takings and live releases if possible,166 the two 
wolffish species remain unprotected in the NAFO Regulatory Area outside 
Canadian fisheries jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
161
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, Annex 13.4, para. 3. 
162
 See Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, n. 158 above. 
163
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, Annex 13.4, para. 3. 
164
 NAFO, “NAFO Fishery,” available: <http://www.hafo.int/fisheries/fishery-.html> (retrieved 
20 November 2008).  
165
 Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29.  
166
 See D. L. VanderZwaag, and J. Hutchings, “Canada’s Marine Species at Risk: Law and 
Science at the Helm, but a Sea of Uncertainties,” Ocean Development & International Law 36 
(2005): 219–259, p. 229. Also see D. Kulka, C. Hood and J. Huntington, “Recovery Strategy 
for Northern Wolffish (Anarhichas denticulatus) and Spotted Wolffish (Anarhichas minor), and 
Management Plan for Atlantic Wolffish (Anarhichas lupus) in Canada” (St. John’s: DFO 
Newfoundland and Labrador Region, 2007), pp. 70–71. Following publication of the recovery 
strategy, conservation conditions have been included within fisheries licenses. David Millar, 
Regional Manager, Species at Risk, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, pers. comm. (23 April 2009). 
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Bolstering the Conservation of Sharks and Sea Turtles 
 
The management of sharks and sea turtles, two relatively high profile marine 
species, might be described as rather secondary to the NAFO agenda. NAFO’s 
C&E Measures devotes just one article (Article 16) to the conservation of 
sharks with four main commitments: Parties are required to report data for all 
catches of sharks167; Parties are required to impose a shark finning ban whereby 
their vessels must not have onboard shark fins totalling more than 5 percent of 
the weight of sharks onboard up to the first point of landing168; Parties are 
urged to encourage the live release of sharks caught in non-directed fisheries169; 
and Parties are also encouraged to undertake research into non-selective fishing 
gears and the identification of shark nursery areas.170 
The conservation of sea turtles is addressed through a 2006 resolution of 
the Fisheries Commission aimed at reducing sea turtle mortality in NAFO 
fishing operations.171 The resolution urges Parties to enhance the 
implementation of existing turtle mitigation measures and to provide sea turtle 
catch and release data to the NAFO Secretariat.172 
Various management challenges surround the future management of 
shark and sea turtles. For sharks, those challenges include ensuring catch data is 
fully reported, revisiting whether the 5 percent weight of shark fins onboard is 
a workable conservation measure, and determining whether shark bycatch or 
other fishing requirements should be imposed.173 For turtles, the adequacy of 
reporting on fisheries interactions with sea turtles in the NAFO Convention 
Area needs to be assessed,174 and the question of whether catch mitigation 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 16(1). 
168
 Id., Article 16(3). 
169
 Id., Article 16(6). 
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 Id., Article 16(7)(8). 
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 Resolution of the Fisheries Commission of NAFO to Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in NAFO 
Fishing Operations (22 September 2006) 1/06, available: <http://www.nafo.int/publications/ 
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 Id., paras 2 and 5. 
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 It should be noted that at the September 2007 Fisheries Commission meeting, the United 
States proposed a prohibition on possessing porbeagle sharks in the Regulatory Area, but no 
consensus was reached and the proposal was withdrawn. NAFO Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting, 
n. 148 above, s. 8.14. The bycatch of porbeagle sharks in pelagic longline fisheries has been a 
concern. The NAFO President was requested in September 2008 to write to ICCAT, urging 
ICCAT to take necessary conservation measures to protect the porbeagle stock. NAFO Thirtieth 
Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, s. 10. 
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 Reporting appears to be quite limited, with Canada, Denmark and Portugal providing 
updates on sea turtle-fisheries interactions and the United States submitting an update on its 
Northwest Fisheries Observer Program, Sea Turtle Training Module. NAFO Secretariat, Update 
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measures should become mandatory remains to be discussed. 
 
 
Furthering Marine Ecosystem Research 
 
While NAFO is transitioning towards an ecosystem approach, building 
scientific information and understanding of marine ecosystems is a great 
challenge. The relative paucity of scientific information was highlighted by the 
Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management in its May 
2008 Meeting. The report acknowledged that very little is known about deep-
water benthic communities, seamount fish communities and marine mammal 
distributions in the NAFO Regulatory Area.175 The need to increase data 
collection and mapping of sponge habitats was emphasised,176 as was the need 
for more data on non-commercial species.177 The report also noted the ecology 
of canyons in the NAFO Regulatory Area is not well documented.178 
The Fisheries Commission has highlighted the need for more information 
on the role of seals in the marine ecosystem of the Northwest Atlantic. The 
Commission has requested the Scientific Council to provide an overview of 
present knowledge, including the impact of seals on fish stocks, at the 
Commission’s next annual meeting in 2009.179 At the September 2008 Meeting 
of the Commission, the EU announced it would start implementing a research 
programme in the summer of 2009 on mapping the seabeds. The EU welcomed 
the cooperation of other Parties in such an endeavour.180 
 
 
10.4.3.2. NEAFC and the Ecosystem Approach 
 
NEAFC not only focuses on conserving and managing target species, but also 
envisages to minimise bycatch of fish and non-fish species and other impacts 
on the broader marine environment. At its 2003 meeting, NEAFC reviewed 
recent trends in the international management of marine resources, including 
                                                                                                                                  
on Sea Turtle-Fisheries Interactions, NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, pp. 6–7, 
20, September 2008, FC Working Paper 08/24 and FC Working Paper 08/24 (Addendum). 
175
 NAFO, Report of the NAFO Scientific Council Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries Management (WGEAFM), Scientific Council Meeting – June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 
08/10, pp. 6-7, 20. 
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 Id., p. 16. 
177
 Id., p. 37. 
178
 Id., p. 41. 
179
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 10 and Annex 5, item 14.  
180
 Id., p. 9. 
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the ecosystem approach. In 2005, the Working Group on the Future of NEAFC 
examined how to strengthen NEAFC’s role in addressing overall ocean 
management. The ecosystem approach is now a permanent agenda item at 
annual meetings. The "new" NEAFC Convention reflects the ecosystem 
approach by stating that the Commission when making recommendations in 
accordance with Article 4 or 6 of the Convention, shall in particular: 
NEAFC 
take due account of the impact of fisheries on other species and marine 
ecosystems, and in doing so adopt, where necessary, conservation and 
management measures that address the need to minimise harmful 
impacts on living marine resources and marine ecosystems; . . . 
take due account of the need to conserve marine biological diversity.181 
 
In addition, it is provided that:  
 
The Commission shall provide a forum for consultation and exchange of 
information on the state of the fishery resources in the Convention Area 
and on the management policies, including examination of the overall 
effects of such policies on the fishery resources and, as appropriate, 
other living marine resources and marine ecosystems.182 
 
NEAFC has made some progress in protecting deep-sea species and 
habitats from the effects of trawl fishing. An area adjacent to Rockall Bank was 
first closed to trawl fishing in 2001. In 2002, NEAFC set a limit on the catch of 
many, though not all, deep-water species taken in bottom trawl fisheries on the 
high seas of the NEAFC area. The limit, however, specified that the fishing 
effort was not to exceed the “highest level put into deep-sea fishing in previous 
years” despite ICES’ advice that most deep-water fish species are exploited 
well beyond safe biological limits in the region. In 2003, the NEAFC 
Commission reviewed scientific information from ICES concerning deep-sea 
species. From March 2004, a temporary freeze on efforts in deep-sea fisheries 
was introduced for the rest of the year in the NEAFC Regulatory Area.183 
A 30 percent reduction in deep-sea fisheries effort was agreed for 2005 
onwards following ICES advice. At its 26th annual meeting in November 2007, 
NEAFC adopted management measures limiting for each Contracting Party the 
                                                 
181
 “New” NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above, Article 4(2)(c-d). 
182
 Id., Article 4(3). 
183
 C. M. Johnston, Scoping Study: Protection of vulnerable high seas and deep oceans 
biodiversity and associated oceans governance (Peterborough: Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee, 2004). 
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effort for 2007 for directed fishing of deep-sea species. The effort could not 
exceed 65 percent of the highest level put into deep-sea fishing in previous 
years for the relevant species. This measure entered into force on 16 February 
2008.184 
In July 2008, NEAFC recommended mapping existing bottom fishing 
areas within the Regulatory Area for bottom fishing activities.185 Contracting 
Parties were required to submit relevant information. The deadline was 
1 September 2008, but only the Russian Federation and Iceland had submitted 
such information. From 1 January 2009, all bottom fishing activities in new 
bottom fishing areas, or with bottom gear not previously used in the area 
concerned, will be considered as exploratory fisheries and shall be conducted in 
accordance with an exploratory bottom fisheries protocol. Exploratory bottom 
fishing activities are to be subjected to an assessment procedure, with the 
understanding that particular care will be taken in the evaluation of risks of the 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, in line with the precautionary approach. 
New bottom fishing activities will be based upon the results of exploratory 
bottom fisheries. It will be the task of NEAFC to authorise bottom fishing and 
to establish conservation and management measures to prevent significant 
adverse impacts on VMEs. Contracting Parties and vessels flying their flag will 
be required to cease bottom fishing activities where, in the course of fishing 
operations, evidence of VMEs is encountered. The encounter, including the 
location and the type of ecosystem in question, must be reported to NEAFC so 
that appropriate measures can be adopted.186 This proposal was based on 
a Norwegian proposal, which, to a large extent, is based on a proposal by 
Canada and the EU in NAFO.  
NEAFC has only recently made progress in imposing restrictions on the 
impact of deep-water trawling in the North East Atlantic on seamounts, 
coldwater corals, and sensitive bottom ecosystems in the region. Consequently, 
destructive deep-sea bottom trawl fisheries could continue to expand in the 
North East Atlantic.  
Five vulnerable habitats were closed to demersal fishing gear for 2005–
2007 and in November 2006, NEAFC closed parts of the Hatton and Rockall 
Banks, the Logachev Mounds and the West-Rockall Mounds to fishing from 
January 2007–December 2009. These and additional areas had been proposed 
by the EC in 2005 based on recommendations from ICES. These closures, 
                                                 
184
 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), NEAFC Recommendation XV: 2008, 
available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/current_measures/docs/15-rec_deepsea_species 
_2008.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
185
 NEAFC, Extraordinary Meeting in London on 1–3 July 2008.  
186
 NEAFC Recommendation XVI, n. 139 above. 
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while being a positive step forward for offshore marine conservation, were 
viewed by NGOs as exemplifying the short-term fishing interests of some of 
the Convention’s parties soon after they were designated. NEAFC 
Recommendation VII recommended that with respect to certain vulnerable 
deep-sea habitats, bottom trawling and fishing with static gear was to be 
prohibited in the following areas: a) the Hecate and Faraday seamounts and 
a section of the Reykjanes Ridge; b) the Altair seamounts; and c) the Antialtair 
seamounts. These measures apply for the period 1 January 2008–31 December 
2008.187 Recommendation IX, also resulting from the 26th annual meeting held 
in November 2007, entailed measures to close certain areas to protect deep-
water coral reefs.188  
At its 2003 meeting, NEAFC also reviewed recent trends in the 
international management of marine resources, including cooperation with 
other regional and global organisations. NEAFC works closely with other 
RFMOs in the North Atlantic, namely NAFO189 and the International Baltic Sea 
Fishery Commission (IBSFC), as well as ICES. The NEAFC Secretariat 
initiated the North Atlantic Regional Fisheries Management Organization 
(NARFMO) and has organised annual meetings since 2001.  
NEAFC and the OSPAR Commission (in charge of the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic) have 
delivered a breakthrough initiative by announcing plans to promote mutual 
cooperation towards the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
in the North East Atlantic. For the first time in the North East Atlantic, the 
Commissions in charge of fisheries management and protection of the marine 
environment are working together. Previously they could have been seen as 
working towards diverse goals but now a converging vision of a healthier North 
East Atlantic has encouraged them to sign a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), in which both have agreed to cooperate towards the protection of 
marine ecosystems. The MOU, which has applied since September 2008, 
covers not only national maritime areas, but also areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.190 
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 NEAFC, Recommendation VII, available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/index.html> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
188
 NEAFC, Recommendation IX: 2008, available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/ 
current_measures/9_deep-water-corals_08.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
189
 NEAFC sets TAC for oceanic redfish for both NAFO and NEAFC. 
190
 NEAFC/OSPAR MoU, n. 134 above. 
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10.4.4. Reaching Consensus on Allocation Criteria 
 
10.4.4.1. NAFO and Allocation Criteria 
 
The NAFO Convention provides very general and limited guidance regarding 
allocation of fishing opportunities in the Regulatory Area that relates to 
adjusting current fisheries, reopening closed fisheries, opening new fisheries, 
and ensuring new members receive an appropriate share. Article XI(4) of the 
Convention essentially calls for a balancing between the interests of Parties 
exercising traditional fishing and coastal state interests:  
 
Proposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the 
Regulatory Area shall take into account the interests of Commission 
members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that Area, and, in 
the allocation of catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap, 
Commission members shall give special consideration to the Contracting 
Party whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on fishing for 
stocks related to these fishing banks and which has undertaken extensive 
efforts to ensure the conservation of such stocks through international 
action, in particular, by providing surveillance and inspection of 
international fisheries on these banks under an international scheme of 
joint enforcement.191 
 
A Working Group on the Allocation of Fishing Rights, formed in 1997, 
held a number of meetings culminating in a meeting in March 2003 at Miami, 
Florida, where consensus could not be reached on allocation criteria.192 Four 
key criteria emerged from the discussions, albeit not formally endorsed. They 
include: 
 
• historical fishing in accordance with NAFO rules during a representative 
reference period; 
• contribution to research and data collection on the stock concerned; 
                                                 
191
 The NAFO Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, 24 October 1978, U.N.T S., 1135, 370-388, entry into force 1 January 1979, full text 
available: <http://www.nafo.int/about/overview/convention/convention.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter NAFO Convention]. 
192
 NAFO, Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Fishing Rights to the Contracting 
Parties of NAFO, March 26–27, 2003, Miami, Florida, U.S.A., NAFO/FC Doc. 03/02, full text 
available: <http://archive.nafo.int/open/mp/2003-04/fc_allocation-mar.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008). 
  303 
• needs of coastal communities that are dependent on fishing for the stock 
concerned; and/or 
• contribution to the NAFO conservation and enforcement measures.193 
 
The challenge of fisheries allocation is especially apparent in relation to shrimp. 
For shrimp in Division 3M, NAFO parties have not been able to agree on 
a quota allocation scheme due to differing opinions on the extent to which 
historical fisheries should influence a quota allocation and which reference 
period should be used.194 As a result, a rather unsatisfactory scheme continues 
whereby Contracting Parties are allocated a certain number of fishing days by 
a specific number of vessels (see Table 10.1).195 
 
Table 10.1. Effort allocation scheme for shrimp fishery in the NAFO 
Regulatory Area Divison 3M (2008) 
 
Contracting Party Number of Fishing Days Number of Vessels 
Canada  456 16 
Cuba  100 1 
Denmark 
– Faroe Islands 
– Greenland 
 
1,606 
515 
 
8 
14 
European Union  3,2931 331 
France (in respect of St. Pierre 
et Miquelon)  100 1 
Iceland  N/A N/A 
Japan  100 1 
Korea  100 1 
Norway  1,985 32 
Russia  2,100 N/A 
Ukraine  100 1 
USA  100 1 
1 This includes fishing entitlements transferred from Poland (100 fishing days with one vessel), 
Estonia (1,667 fishing days with eight vessels), Latvia (490 fishing days with four vessels) and 
Lithuania (579 fishing days with seven vessels) following their accession to the EU. 
 
                                                 
193
 Id., Annex 11, Draft Guidelines for future allocation of fishing opportunities for the stocks 
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Iceland has consistently objected to the effort allocation scheme as it 
could lead to overfishing.196 Allocation of shrimp in Division 3L continues to 
be controversial. Objectors such as Denmark, in respect of the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland since 2002,197 have questioned the allocation scheme for the 
shrimp, which has been rolled over since 1999 without consensus on the basis 
for division of shares.198 
 
 
10.4.4.2. NEAFC and Allocation Criteria 
 
NEAFC uses a wide range of methods to allocate fishing opportunities, 
particularly by means of TACs and national quotas.199 NEAFC’s focal species 
are redfish, mackerel, herring, haddock, blue whiting and deep-sea species.200 
The Contracting Parties to the Convention have, in many instances, been unable 
to take the necessary steps to effectively implement the Convention due to the 
lack of agreed allocation arrangements in many key fisheries.201 Prior to 2006, 
no agreement was reached on the allocation of blue whiting.202 Lack of 
consensus on stock structure led to the absence of management measures for 
oceanic redfish in 2005. Agreement on the sharing out of Atlanto-Scandian 
herring had to wait until 2008.203 Recently, Greenland expressed its great 
                                                 
196
 NAFO, n. 47 above, pp. 4–5. 
197 Objections Lodged by Contracting Parties (1994–2007). Copy provided to the authors by the 
NAFO Secretariat. 
198 NAFO, n. 47 above, pp. 5–6. 
199
 “New” NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above, Article 7. 
200 These include ling, tusk, blue ling, great silver smelt, orange roughy, grenadiers, black 
scabbardfish, sea breams, alfonsinos/golden eye perch, squalid sharks, and greater forkbeard.  
201
 Decisions are made by simple majority or, where the Convention requires a qualified 
majority, by a two-thirds majority of votes of all Contracting Parties present and casting 
affirmative or negative votes. Each Contracting Party has one vote. A quorum of two-thirds of 
Contracting Parties is required. In the event of a split of votes on any matter subject to a simple 
majority, the proposal is rejected. Recommendations become binding on the date determined by 
the Commission. In an emergency, votes may be taken by post or other means of 
communication. Any Contracting Party may object to a recommendation (for management 
measures only) within 50 days of the date of notification. Since 2004 (the amended 
Convention), Contracting Parties are required to provide a written statement identifying the 
reason for the objection, their intentions, and alternative conservation and management 
measures. Management of all stocks is discussed in the plenary meeting. 
202
 Recommendation adopted by postal vote on blue whiting by Denmark in respect of the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, the EC, Iceland, and Norway. 
203
 Recommendation from the 26th Annual Meeting November 2007, Recommendation by the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in North East Atlantic Fisheries at its annual Meeting in 
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disappointment for not having been allocated a share of the Atlanto-Scandian 
herring stock for 2009. Greenland believes it should be entitled to a share of 
this stock. It finds support in Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which 
states that the track record in the relevant fisheries should be taken into account 
when allocating fishing opportunities from straddling stocks. Greenlandic 
vessels have conducted fisheries for the stock in the years since its recovery 
when no international management has been in place.204  
 
2009 allocation of blue whiting205  
 
European Community 
Faroe Islands  
Iceland  
Norway 
165,628 tonnes 
141,870 tonnes 
95,739 tonnes 
139,806 tonnes 
 
2009 allocation of herring206  
 
European Community 
Faroe Islands 
Iceland 
Norway 
Russian Federation 
106,959 tonnes 
84,797 tonnes 
238,399 tonnes 
1,002,230 tonnes 
210,633 tonnes 
 
A recommendation to guide the expectations of new members to NEAFC 
was discussed during the May 2003 meeting of the NEAFC Working Group on 
the Future of NEAFC.207 It was agreed that stocks regulated by NEAFC are 
fully allocated, and fishing opportunities for new Members are likely to be 
limited to new fisheries. New Contracting Parties will participate on same basis 
as existing Contracting Parties in future allocation of stocks unregulated at the 
time of application. In addition, new Contracting Parties that were previously 
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties may request part of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                  
November 2007 to adopt conservation and management measures for the Norwegian Spring-
spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) Herring in the NEAFC Regulatory Area in 2008.  
204
 NEAFC, Report of the 27th Annual Meeting of the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission, 10–14 November 2008, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/ 
27neafc_annual_2008_vol1_main-report.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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 2009 agreement on the allocation of blue whiting, n. 137 above. 
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 2009 agreement on the allocation of herring, n. 136 above.  
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 E. J. Molenaar, “Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 18, 
no. 4 (2003): 457–480.  
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cooperative quota. Such allocations will be considered on case-by-case basis.208 
Reaching agreements on TACs and management measures is a major 
challenge to NEAFC because allocations for the NEAFC Regulatory Area are 
adopted by NEAFC only if there is coastal state agreement regarding allocation 
amongst the coastal states. The successful resolution of allocation issues, which 
is crucial for successful management, requires moving away from the ad hoc 
negotiations amongst coastal states towards management systems driven by 
transparent objectives and implementation processes.209  
Another challenge is that of clarifying ICES advice on stock status for 
mackerel and redfish.210 Information collected and advice provided by ICES is 
utilised differently for different fisheries that are regulated under the 
Convention. In the case of pelagic stocks, the information is utilised in the first 
instance by coastal states in order to reach agreements on TACs and allocations 
within the Convention and Regulatory Areas. Though not involved in this 
initial process, NEAFC in following agreed allocations, will then take steps to 
develop and implement management measures to support these decisions. 
However, a different process is followed for pelagic redfish and deep-sea 
species whereby the TACs and allocations are set directly by NEAFC and may, 
or may not, be endorsed by coastal states.211  
 
 
10.4.5. Ensuring Effective Compliance and Enforcement 
 
In order to facilitate the comparison of the compliance and enforcement 
provisions of the NAFO and NEAFC systems, a similar structure will be 
adhered to when analysing each RFMO. An introductory section describes the 
                                                 
208
 NEAFC, Guidelines for the expectation of future new Contracting Parties with regard to 
fishing opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area (November 2003), available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/becomingacp> (retrieved 15 November 2008). These guidelines were 
agreed at the 22nd Annual Meeting of NEAFC in November 2003. 
209
 K. Hoydal, “A note by the Permanent Committee on Management and Science” (PECMAS) 
on the advice provided by ICES as seen from NEAFC’s perspective, PECMAS, 18–19 October 
2007. 
210
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NEAFC Commission and led to the new conservation and enforcement scheme that entered into 
force 1 May 2007. 
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structure, membership, and objectives of each RFMO and is followed by 
an analysis of reporting and verification provisions. The inspection, boarding 
and observer schemes, as well as other enforcement mechanisms, are 
subsequently addressed. This is followed by a section highlighting the strengths 
and weaknesses of each system. Finally, a brief review of how each RFMO 
implements the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement212 and the 1995 UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement213 is undertaken.214 This section concludes by indicating the 
ways in which NAFO and NEAFC have recently intensified their cooperation 
efforts aiming to arrive at a more effective compliance and enforcement system. 
 
 
10.4.5.1. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
 
Structure, Membership and Objectives 
 
NAFO consists of the General Council, the Scientific Council, the Fisheries 
Commission, and the Secretariat situated in Canada.215 NAFO has the following 
membership: Canada, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of Faeroe Islands and 
Greenland), the EC, France (in respect of St. Pierre and Miquelon), Iceland, 
Japan, Korea (Republic of), Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the 
United States.216 The organisation has no provisions on Cooperating Non-
Contracting Parties.217 
The Contracting Parties agreed to maintain in force and to implement 
                                                 
212
 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, n. 97 above. 
213
 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, n. 37 above. 
214
 The point of departure for this analysis is E. Franckx, Fisheries Enforcement. Related Legal 
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[hereinafter FAO Legislative Study 71]. This analysis was mainly updated on the basis of two 
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20 November 2008). 
217
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Chapter VI, Article 47 et seq. All Non-Contracting 
Parties’ vessels sighted in the Regulatory Area are presumed to be undermining the 
effectiveness of NAFO regulation. See also n. 272 below. 
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within the Regulatory Area a scheme of joint international enforcement.218 This 
scheme includes provisions for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by 
the Contracting Parties and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis 
of evidence resulting from such boarding and inspection.219 
 
 
Reporting and Verification 
 
Reporting and verification is undertaken by three primary methods: catch 
reporting, vessel register, and reporting of each offloading for transhipment of 
fish. A Contracting Party must ensure that each vessel of that party with fish on 
board, on entering the Regulatory Area, has a record in its fishing logbook of 
the amount of each species of fish on board.220 Moreover, as regards fish taken 
subject to Fisheries Commission measures, a Contracting Party must guarantee 
that all vessels of that party fishing in the Regulatory Area record their catches 
and the estimated cumulative catch on a daily basis and that the records must 
correspond to the smallest geographical area for which a quota has been 
allocated.221 This will show the disposition of the catch, including any fish 
off-loaded while the vessel is operating in the Regulatory Area, as well as catch 
retained aboard the vessel for the duration of at least twelve months.222  
For all fish taken subject to Fisheries Commission measures, Contracting 
Parties are requested to ensure that all vessels of that party fishing in the 
Regulatory Area either record their cumulative production by species and 
product form in a production logbook, or stow in the hold all processed catch in 
such a way that each species is stowed separately.223 A stowage plan has to be 
maintained showing the location of the products in the hold. Furthermore, the 
Contracting Party, within thirty days following the calendar month in which the 
catches were made, has the duty to report provisional monthly catches by 
species and stock area to the Executive Secretary,224 whether or not that party 
has quota allocations for the stocks from which catches were obtained.225 
The Executive Secretary, within ten days following the monthly deadlines for 
receipt of the provisional catch statistics, collates the information received and 
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circulates it to Contracting Parties.226 
It is the responsibility of the Executive Secretary to establish and 
maintain a register of all vessels of more than fifty gross tons that are 
authorised to fish in the Regulatory Area.227 Each flag Contracting Party has to 
notify the Executive Secretary of all vessels of more than fifty gross tons 
engaged in fishing or in processing fish in the Regulatory Area.228 The format 
for the register of vessels requires twenty different entries and is made in 
electronic form.229 The Executive Secretary makes this register available to all 
Contracting Parties in a systematic fashion and in accordance with applicable 
confidentiality requirements. 
When the transhipment of fish takes place while the vessel is operating in 
the Regulatory Area, a report has to be made at least 24 hours in advance. 
The report should include the date, the time, the geographical position of the 
vessel, and total round weight by species to be transhipped in kilograms.230 
The verification of the reports, as will be seen, is a competence of the 
observers. 
 
 
Inspection and Boarding Schemes 
 
In order to improve and maintain compliance with the conservation and 
enforcement measures for their vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area, 
Contracting Parties acquiesce to a scheme of 100 percent observer coverage and 
to oblige all vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area to be equipped with satellite 
tracking devices.231 Each Contracting Party has the primary responsibility to 
obtain, for placement on its vessels, independent and impartial observers 
performing only the duties explicitly provided for in the C&E Measures.232 
Their salaries are normally covered by the sending Contracting Party. 
Moreover, each Contracting Party has to provide to the Executive Secretary a 
list of the observers they will be placing on vessels in the Regulatory Area.233 
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 Id., Article 24(4). 
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 Id., Article 19(1). 
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Observers monitor the vessels’ compliance with the relevant conservation 
and enforcement measures.234 Their duties are as follows: 
 
1. To record and report upon the fishing activities of the vessel and verify 
the position of the vessel when engaged in fishing. The observer 
monitors the functioning of, and reports upon any interference with, the 
satellite system. In order to better distinguish fishing operations from 
steaming and to contribute to an a posteriori calibration of the signals 
registered by the receiving station, the observer maintains detailed 
reports on the daily activity of the vessel 
2. To observe and estimate catches with a view to identifying catch 
composition and monitoring discards, by-catches and the taking of 
undersized fish 
3. To record the gear type, mesh size and attachments employed by the 
master 
4. To verify entries made to the logbooks 
5. To collect catch and effort data on each haul 
6. To carry out the scientific work as requested by the Fisheries 
Commission235 
 
The vessel on which an observer is placed has to provide suitable food 
and lodging during the observer’s deployment. Vessel masters have to ensure 
that all necessary cooperation is extended to observers in order for them to 
carry out their duties including providing access, as required, to the retained 
catch, and catch which is intended to be discarded.236 
The use of arms in relation to the inspections is prohibited and, in 
particular, the inspectors are requested not to carry arms. The principle of not 
carrying or using arms shall not be deemed to limit the performance of 
inspections by a Contracting Party of vessels flying its own flag.237 
A serious infringement is considered to have occurred where a NAFO 
inspector finds an apparent infringement of the following prohibitions: 
 
1. Fishing on an “Others” quota without prior notification to the Executive 
Secretary, or more than seven working days after the Contracting Party 
for the inspected vessel has been notified by the Executive Secretary 
                                                 
234
 In this case, the NAFO C&E Measures with amendments as adopted at the Fisheries 
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that fishing under an “Others” quota for that stock or species was closed 
2. Directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for 
which fishing is prohibited 
3. Directed fishing for stocks or species after the date on which the 
Contracting Party for the inspected vessel has notified the Executive 
Secretary that vessels of that party will cease a directed fishery for those 
stocks or species 
4. Fishing in a closed area or with gear prohibited in a specific area 
5. Mesh size violations 
6. Fishing without a valid authorisation issued by the flag Contracting 
Party 
7. Mis-recording of catches 
8. Interference with the satellite tracking system 
9. Catch communication violations 
10. Preventing an inspector or an observer from carrying out his or her 
duties 
 
The inspector must attempt to communicate with an inspector of the 
Contracting Party for the inspected vessel.238 The master of the inspected vessel 
has the duty to provide the use of the vessel’s radio equipment and operator for 
messages to be sent out and received for this purpose.239 The inspector also 
immediately reports to the Executive Secretary. 
Whilst awaiting the arrival of the inspector of the Contracting Party for 
the inspected vessel, the inspector may require the master to cease all fishing 
which appears to the inspector to contravene the measures referred to above. 
The inspector may also seal the vessel’s hold awaiting port inspection.240 In 
2006, an enhanced follow-up with regard to certain serious infringements 
(namely points 2 and 7 above) was elaborated whereby the flag state may be 
required to order the vessel to proceed immediately to a port in order to be 
inspected.241 
When a port call is made in the port of a Contracting Party by a vessel 
that has been engaged in fishing for stocks subject to conservation measures, 
the Contracting Party whose port is being used has to ensure that its inspector is 
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239
 Id. 
240
 Id., Article 36(6). 
241
 Id., Article 36(7). Article 36(7) explains that this is only applicable where justified, and the 
inspection must be made by the contracting flag state vessel’s inspector in the presence of 
another Contracting Party’s inspector. Where the vessel’s home port is a long way away, the 
Article lists ports in the Regulatory Area where the vessel will be inspected by authorised 
officials. 
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present and that, on each occasion when catch is offloaded, an inspection takes 
place to verify the species and quantities caught.242 The Contracting Party is to 
ensure that the interference in the offloading activity is minimised and that the 
quality of the catch is not adversely affected.243 The quantities landed by 
species and the quantities retained on board, if any, are to be cross-checked 
with the quantities recorded in logbooks, catch reports on exit from the 
Regulatory Area, and reports of any inspections carried out under this 
scheme.244 Additionally, inspections have to include verification of mesh size 
of nets on board and size of fish retained on board.245 
 
 
Other Enforcement Provisions/Schemes 
 
NAFO has adopted a wide range of measures for the conservation and 
management of the stocks in the Regulatory Area. These include setting total 
allowable catches and member nation quota allocations,246 technical 
conservation measures such as minimum fish sizes,247 minimum mesh sizes,248 
and changing gear requirements.249 Fishing vessels have to record their catches 
on a daily basis and record their cumulative production by species in 
a production logbook. 
Where a NAFO inspector cites a vessel for having committed an apparent 
infringement of reporting and gear requirements, the inspector will immediately 
report this to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary in turn 
immediately has the duty to ensure, for information purposes, that an inspection 
                                                 
242
 Id., Article 44(1). 
243
 Id. Chapter IV, Article 28(9), in stating the general provisions for inspection and 
surveillance, notes that quality of catch is maintained by avoiding any damage to packaging, 
wrapping, or other containers. Where cartons and other containers are opened as part of the 
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repacking, and eventual re-storage. 
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 Id., Article 44(4). Annex XIV describes and notes the applicable mesh sizes, gauges, 
gauging procedure, and usage in the Regulatory Area. For accuracy, pictorial representations of 
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 Id., Annex 1.A lists the TACs and quotas for the calendar year for stocks such as cod, 
redfish, etc. 
247
 Id., Article 14. 
248
 Id., Article 13. 
249
 Id. See also with respect to some of these measures n. 245 above and accompanying text. 
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vessel authorised by the Contracting Party is present in the Regulatory Area.250  
Contracting parties engaged in surveillance or inspection activities in the 
Regulatory Area must aim at ensuring equal treatment between all Contracting 
Parties having vessels operating in the Regulatory Area through an equitable 
distribution of inspections. A ratio between the number of inspections and 
fishing activity of the inspected Contracting Party, based on, inter alia, catch 
levels, fishing days, and compliance records of that particular state, will, as far 
as possible, have to be followed in this respect.251 Moreover, inspection vessels 
operating in the Regulatory Area have to maintain contact, as far as possible on 
a daily basis, and with due regard to radio security, in order to exchange 
information on boardings/sightings or other relevant information and to 
coordinate their activities.252 Furthermore, Contracting Parties engaged in 
inspection or surveillance activities in the Regulatory Area have the duty to 
prepare reports of inspection activity, based on a calendar year, outlining details 
of boardings, sightings, and apparent infringements.253 
Each Contracting Party has to ensure that each of its vessels operating in 
the Regulatory Area is equipped with a satellite-tracking device allowing the 
continuous tracking of its position by the Contracting Party.254 Automatic 
communication should occur at least every two hours to a land-based 
monitoring centre of the flag state.255 To this end the satellite tracking device 
must allow for automatic communication at least once every six hours when 
operating in the Regulatory Area to a land-based fisheries monitoring centre of 
data relating to the following: 
 
1. The vessel identification 
2. The most recent geographical position of the vessel (longitude, latitude) 
with a position error which has to be less than 500 metres, with 
a confidence interval of 99 percent 
3. The date and time of the fixing of the said position of the vessel 
                                                 
250
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 36 lists a gear requirement infringement as 
a serious infringement, therefore making security and continuity of evidence an imperative, 
hence the need to minimise the possible delay in reporting these infringements. 
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 Id., Article 28(6). 
252
 Id., Article 28(3). 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 18, in general, and NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 
above, Article 29(1), in particular. This stipulation comes with an annual time limit by the first 
of November. By this time, Contracting Parties are to notify the Executive Secretary of 
provisional participatory plans. According to Article 29(3) of the NAFO C&E Measures, this 
will ensure coordination of operations between Contracting Parties. 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 25(1). 
255
 Id., Article 25(1). This Article 25(1) stipulation operates to maintain compliance with 
vessels in adherence to the conservation and enforcement measures in the Regulatory Area. 
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The flag state has to keep these records for three years.256  
Each Contracting Party has to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
its land-based fisheries monitoring centre receives these data.257 The land-based 
monitoring centre of the flag state subsequently has to transmit this information 
to the Executive Secretary, but not later than 24 hours after having received 
these communications.258 Upon the request of the Contracting Party, this 
information can also be sent directly from the vessel to the Executive Secretary. 
Moreover, the land-based fisheries monitoring centre of each Contracting Party 
ought to be equipped with computer hardware and software enabling automatic 
data processing and electronic data transmission. Each Contracting Party is 
obliged to provide for back-up and recovery procedures in case of system 
failures.259 
NAFO has set up a system of blacklisting of flag of convenience illegal, 
unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing vessels.260 It works with a provisional 
list that enumerates vessels that have been identified as having been engaged in 
fishing activities contrary to the convention regime. Enquiries are subsequently 
made into the reasons why these vessels were fishing without permission, and if 
there is no suitable explanation, the vessel is transferred permanently to the 
IUU list.261  
NAFO previously had a system of port inspection in place whereby a 
vessel which had been engaged in fishing for stocks subject to the conservation 
and enforcement measures could offload in a port of a Contracting Party. 
However, this system has created numerous difficulties within the surveillance 
and inspection scheme. NAFO is currently working on a revised port control 
system. This is discussed below under “Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO 
and NEAFC.” 
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 Id., Article 25(2). 
257
 Id., Article 25(1 & 2). 
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 Id., Article 25(6). As previously noted, in n. 250 above, this is to ensure speedy reporting 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 25(2). 
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 For more information on IUU lists, see NAFO website at <http://www.nafo.int/about/ 
frames/about.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). See also “Common/Similar Initiatives by 
NAFO and NEAFC” section in this chapter below. 
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Strengths of the NAFO System 
 
Membership. Even though any state can become member of the NAFO 
founding document, membership of the Fisheries Commission itself is 
restricted to Contracting Parties either participating in fisheries in the 
Regulatory Area, or parties with evidence that they expect to participate in such 
fisheries during the year of the annual meeting or during the following calendar 
year.262 In the latter instance, however, the evidence must be judged satisfactory 
by the General Council, where Contracting Parties are represented and have one 
vote.263 The ability of the General Council264 to review and determine the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission at each annual meeting indicates that 
this body exercises some degree of control in membership management. As in 
the NEAFC system, if new members seek to obtain membership in the Fisheries 
Commission, “such new members should be aware that presently and for the 
foreseeable future, stocks managed by NAFO are fully allocated, and fishing 
opportunities for new members are likely to be limited.”265 Under the NEAFC 
system this has been reviewed as “appropriate,”266 but doubts abound as it has 
been argued to be the reason for continued unregulated fisheries in the 
convention area.267 
Open System in Theory. Participation in the Convention is open to any 
state subject to notification in writing to the depository. However, the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission is limited to parties that either 
participate in the fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, or provide evidence 
that they are going to participate in such fisheries in the near future.268 
Currently it is quite difficult to be admitted as a member of the Fisheries 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 13(1). 
263
 Id., Article 14(1). 
264
 Note that each Contracting Party in accordance with Article 4(1) of the NAFO Convention is 
a member of the General Council. 
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 NEAFC Performance Report, n. 43 above, Appendix XI, p. 91. In 2003, the NEAFC 
Commission adopted these guidelines for states seeking membership as Contracting Parties of 
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overexploited. See also n. 208 above, and accompanying text. 
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 NEAFC Performance Report, Section 3.5.2.1, p. 49. 
267
 M. W. Lodge, D. Anderson, T. Løbach, G. Munro, K. Sainsbury, and A. Willock, 
Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of 
an Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 
available: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/10301_rfmo0807.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008), pp. 17 and 36. 
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 See n. 262 above, and accompanying text. 
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Commission due to limited resources in a limited area.269 The fact that the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission is reviewed annually by the General 
Council means that there is still a possibility of interested states obtaining 
membership as NAFO does not, in theory, operate a closed membership 
system. 
Full Observer Vessels Coverage. Even though this certainly is 
an achievement of NAFO, the substantial costs involved to make such a system 
operational should not be underestimated: It costs an estimated USD26 million 
per year for Canada and USD362 million per year for the EC.270 
Satellite Fishing Vessels Tracking and Real-time Reporting. As noted in 
the aforementioned point, the costly nature of full observer vessel coverage has 
lead to a system where states are allowed 25 percent coverage by observers 
supplemented by more detailed and frequent electronic reporting.271 
Port State Inspection. NAFO has developed its port state inspection 
system, in line with NEAFC developments, making it one of the more 
progressive systems that can serve as example for others. 
Non-Contracting Party Vessels. NAFO has established a scheme to 
promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party vessels with the conservation 
and enforcement measures. Contracting Parties have to report to the NAFO 
Secretariat all sightings made by inspectors of Non-Contracting Party fishing 
vessels engaged in fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area.272 Such 
reports must include all information derived from the inspector’s observations 
concerning the Non-Contracting Party fishing vessel’s activities. The inspector 
will attempt to inform the Non-Contracting Party fishing vessel that it has been 
sighted engaging in fishing activities, that a surveillance report has been 
completed,273 that there may be consequences for the vessel, and that this 
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 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 29, Annex 5. Fisheries Commission’s 
Request for Scientific Advice on Management in 2010 and Beyond of Certain Stocks in 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 47(3). 
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information will be distributed to all NAFO Contracting Parties and to the flag 
state of the vessel. 
In the event that a Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been sighted and 
reported as engaged in fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area is 
boarded by inspectors, the findings of the inspectors must be transmitted to the 
Executive Secretary.274 The Executive Secretary will transmit this information 
to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this information 
and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.275 
In addition, Contracting Parties agree to bring to the attention of any state 
not a party to the NAFO Convention any matter relating to fishing activities in 
the Regulatory Area undertaken by nationals or vessels of that state276 that 
appear to affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.277 
The Contracting Parties further agree to confer when appropriate upon the steps 
to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects. However, it should be noted 
that the absence of a formal framework for cooperation brings into question the 
effectiveness of such a system for Non-Contracting Parties.278 
Traditional Rights. Proposals adopted by the Fisheries Commission for 
the allocation of catches in the Regulatory Area take into account the interests 
of members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that area. In the 
allocation of catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap,279 Fisheries 
Commission members must give special consideration to the Contracting Party 
whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on fishing for stocks 
related to these fishing banks and which have undertaken extensive efforts to 
ensure the conservation of such stocks through international action,280 in 
particular by providing surveillance and inspection of international fisheries on 
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 Id., Article 48(1). 
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 Note that these acts are presumed to be illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
activities under Article 47 of the NAFO C&E Measures. 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 11 (4). 
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 Id. In relation to the Flemish Cap, the Fisheries Commission restricts shrimp fishing in 
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the interest of conservation and stock control. NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 14. 
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Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 4. 
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these banks under an international joint enforcement scheme.281 
Review of Performance. NAFO has recently undergone a review of its 
performance. Contrary to the NEAFC recent practice, this was an internal 
review. It nevertheless also constitutes a recommended best practice.282 
 
 
Weaknesses of the NAFO System 
 
Objection Procedure in the Convention. If any Fisheries Commission member 
presents to the Executive Secretary an objection to a proposal, within sixty days 
of the date of transmittal, the proposal will not become a binding measure on 
that member. This procedure, albeit not often relied upon, still is used between 
two and four times each year.283 
Absence of Dispute Settlement Procedure. The present NAFO Convention 
does not include a dispute settlement procedure, however, an amendment to the 
NAFO Convention adopted in 2007, but not yet in force, contains an elaborated 
dispute settlement provision.284 
Absence of Enforcement Powers. Compared to its member states, NAFO 
has no autonomous powers in case of infringements of reporting and gear 
requirements. Before any action can be taken, the consent of the flag state is 
required.285 
Absence of Conventional Provision on Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties. Even though the NAFO conservation and enforcement measures 
contain some provisions for cooperation, other than the stipulation that states 
should adhere to their obligations,286 the present amendment to the Convention 
on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries is 
without a provision on cooperation between Non-Contracting Parties. Although 
the amendments are not yet in force, this was a missed opportunity. Article 16 
only addresses the issue of Non-Contracting Parties in general and specifically 
approaches the issue without examining the issue of cooperation with Non-
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Chapter IV. 
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Contracting Parties.  
There are, however, some conventional provisions which impact on this 
issue in an indirect manner.287 Examples of the indirect applicability of the 
Convention’s provisions are evident when one notes that Non-Contracting 
Parties can consent to boarding288; the vessel can establish that it applied all 
relevant conservation and enforcement measures in order to land or transship 
fish289; the flag state can report back after the placing of the vessel on the 
provisional list on the measures it has taken290; the flag state can, after the IUU 
listing of a vessel, report back to the Standing Committee on International 
Control that it has taken effective action to stop the vessel from further IUU 
fishing activities, either through sanctions or adjustment of the fishing 
licence291; the flag state can exchange information with NAFO regarding 
vessels on the IUU list in order to help detect control and prevent false 
import/export certificates292; and the flag state can, after being so requested, 
agree to fully cooperate with NAFO and implement its conservation and 
enforcement measures.293 Nonetheless no advantages for the non-contracting 
state formally ensue from any of these actions. 
 
 
Implementation of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
As called for under the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, NAFO requires 
high seas fishing vessels to report their fishing areas, catches, and landings. 
Their reports are inspected under a 100 percent observer scheme.294 When 
a fishing vessel has been sighted committing an infringement, the flag state has 
to be informed. The flag state has to react as if the infringement had been 
committed in waters under its jurisdiction.295 
NAFO generally complies with the provisions of the 1993 FAO 
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Compliance Agreement. For example, NAFO’s objective is to promote the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of fishery resources in the Northwest 
Atlantic.296 All vessels operating in the NAFO area have to register with the 
Executive Secretary.297 
 
 
Implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The Fisheries Commission seeks to ensure consistency between any proposal 
that applies to a stock or group of stocks occurring both within the Regulatory 
Area298 and within an area under the fisheries jurisdiction of a coastal state, or 
any proposal that would have an effect through species inter-relationships on 
a stock or group of stocks occurring in whole or in part within an area under the 
fisheries jurisdiction of a coastal state.299 The Fisheries Commission also seeks 
consistency between any measures or decisions taken by the coastal state for 
the management and conservation of that stock or group of stocks with respect 
to fishing activities conducted within the area under its fisheries jurisdiction.300 
The appropriate coastal state and the Fisheries Commission accordingly 
promote the coordination of such proposals, measures and decisions.301 
The NAFO Contracting Parties agree to maintain and implement within 
the Regulatory Area a scheme of joint international enforcement.302 This 
scheme includes provisions for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by 
the Contracting Parties and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis 
of evidence resulting from such boardings and inspections. A report of such 
prosecutions and sanctions imposed is included in an annual statement 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Preamble and Article 2(1). 
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regarding the actions that were taken during the last year.303 
The Contracting Parties agree to bring to the attention of any state not 
a party to this Convention any matter relating to fishing activities in the 
Regulatory Area undertaken by nationals or vessels of that state that appear to 
affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.304 
The Contracting Parties further agree to confer when appropriate upon the steps 
to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects.305 Furthermore, in 1997, 
NAFO adopted a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party 
vessels with its conservation and enforcement measures.306 In the event that any 
Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been sighted and reported as engaged in 
fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area consents to be boarded by 
NAFO inspectors, the findings of NAFO inspectors are transmitted to the 
NAFO Secretariat.307 The NAFO Secretariat will transmit this information to all 
NAFO Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this 
information and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.308 As 
well as providing the Non-Contracting Party’s vessels with a copy of the 
findings of the NAFO inspectors, the flag state of the boarded vessel is also 
forwarded a copy of the NAFO inspectors report.309 
As regards the call for port state enforcement provisions under the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, NAFO has had a system of port state enforcement in 
place, but it is presently under reconsideration. This is discussed below under 
“Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC.” 
 
 
10.4.5.2. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
 
Structure, Membership and Organization 
 
The NEAFC covers the North East Atlantic, including dependent seas, and the 
200 nm zones, with the exception of Baltic Sea and the Belts, as well as the 
Mediterranean Sea and its dependent seas. These areas mostly correspond with 
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FAO Statistical Area 27.310 
NEAFC has a relatively simple structure. There is the NEAFC 
Commission itself, which is composed of all members, and a Secretariat. There 
is no internal scientific body. However, in 2003, NEAFC concluded 
a memorandum of understanding with ICES311 by virtue of which scientific 
advice is received, against payment that represents about 20 percent of the 
annual budget of NEAFC. The NEAFC Commission is also empowered to set 
up subsidiary bodies, if this is considered “desirable” for the exercise of its 
duties and functions.312 
The current membership is made up of the following: Denmark (in 
respect of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), the EU, Iceland, Norway, and the 
Russian Federation.313 In 1982, when the NEAFC Convention entered into 
force, there were 13 members, but most of them are currently EU Member 
States. These Member States include Bulgaria (EU membership 2007; 
discontinued membership in the NEAFC Commission in 1995), Estonia (EU 
membership 2004; joined the NEAFC Commission in 2003 and discontinued its 
membership in 2006), Finland (EU membership 1995), Poland (EU 
membership 2004; discontinued membership in the NEAFC Commission in 
2006), Portugal (EU membership 1986) and Sweden (EU membership 1995). In 
1990, the German Democratic Republic unified with Germany. Since 
Greenland withdrew from the EC in 1985 it has been represented by 
Denmark.314 
The organisation has specific provisions for what it calls Cooperating 
Non-Contracting Parties.315 A Non-Contracting Party seeking that status must 
submit a request containing the following information: data on historical 
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fisheries, current fishing activities, and details on research programmes it has 
conducted in the Regulatory Area and the results which it is willing to share 
with NEAFC.316 It must also accept to respect the NEAFC Scheme317 and other 
recommendations, communicate to NEAFC the measures it takes to ensure 
compliance, and annually communicate catch and effort data.318 On the 
recommendation of the Permanent Committee on Control and Enforcement 
(PECCOE), the NEAFC Commission decides on the granting of such status on 
an annual basis. If granted, the states involved can participate in the plenary and 
scientific meetings of the NEAFC as an observer. At present Belize, Canada, 
Cook Islands, Japan, and New Zealand fall within this category.319 
The objective of NEAFC is to perform its functions in the interests of the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources of the convention 
area.320 Consequently, NEAFC is empowered to recommend a wide variety of 
conservation and management measures.321 The responsibility for enforcing 
management measures adopted under the NEAFC rests with the Contracting 
Parties. They are required to take such action, including the imposition of 
adequate sanctions for infractions, as may be necessary to implement any 
recommendations adopted by the NEAFC Commission.322 However, in 1999, 
a Scheme of Joint International Inspection and Surveillance was adopted, 
closely following the models provided by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
and NAFO. 
 
 
Reporting and Verification 
 
Each Contracting Party ensures that all fishing vessels flying its flag and 
conducting fishing activities in the Regulatory Area keep a bound fishing 
logbook and, where appropriate, a production logbook and storage plan.323 
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The Contracting Party makes sure that its fishing vessels communicate catch 
reports to their land-based fisheries monitoring centre or directly to the 
Secretary if the Contracting Party so wishes. 
A Contracting Party is required to report the quantities on board when 
entering the Regulatory Area. This report shall be made no more than twelve 
hours and at least two hours in advance of each entry into the Regulatory 
Area.324 Moreover, a report on weekly catches must be transmitted at the latest 
at the end of the seventh day after the entry into the Regulatory Area. When 
fishing trips take more than seven days, the master of the fishing vessel is 
obliged to transmit by the latest on Monday at noon the catches taken in the 
Regulatory Area during the preceding week ending Sunday midnight. This 
report must include information on the number of fishing days since the 
commencement of fishing, or since the last catch report.325 
Further, the Contracting Party is requested to report the quantities on 
board when exiting the Regulatory Area. This report has to be made no more 
than eight hours and at least two hours in advance of each exit from the 
Regulatory Area. It must include, where appropriate, the number of fishing 
days and the catch taken in the Regulatory Area since the commencement of 
fishing, or since the last catch report.326 Finally, the Contracting Parties have to 
report the quantities on-loaded and off-loaded for each transhipment of fish 
during the vessel’s stay in the Regulatory Area.327 
Each Contracting Party has the duty, within thirty days following the 
calendar month in which the catches were landed, or transhipped, to report to 
the Secretary provisional monthly statistics of catches of fisheries, whether or 
not that party has quota allocations for the stocks from which catches were 
obtained.328 The Secretary, within ten days following the monthly deadlines for 
receipt of the provisional catch statistics, collates the information received and 
circulates it to the Contracting Parties.329 These reporting obligations also apply 
to regulated resources caught in areas under national fisheries jurisdiction.330 
Additional requirements relate to inspection activities reports. Each 
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Contracting Party is obliged to report to the Secretary by 1 October of each year 
for the period 1 July to 30 June the number of inspections conducted by it under 
the NEAFC. The report should specify the number of inspections on the vessels 
of each Contracting Party and, in the case of infringement, the date and position 
of the inspection of the named vessel and the nature of infringement.331 The 
Contracting Party also has the duty to report the number of air hours flown and 
the number of days at sea on NEAFC patrol, the number of sightings, and the 
number of surveillance reports established, as well as the follow-up of such 
reports. 
 
 
Inspection and Boarding Schemes 
 
Each Contracting Party assigns inspectors to the NEAFC Scheme. Each 
inspector carries special documentation of identity as a NEAFC inspector 
issued by the respective Contracting Party and is obliged to hold and produce 
this document of identity when boarding a fishing vessel.332 
Each Contracting Party notifies the Secretary before 1 January of each 
year of the names of the inspectors and special inspection vessels, as well as the 
type of aircraft and the details of their identification, which they are assigning 
to the NEAFC Scheme for that year.333 Modifications by Contracting Parties to 
such notifications must be communicated to the Secretary giving one month’s 
notice.334 The Secretary in turn circulates such notifications within fifteen days 
of receipt to all Contracting Parties.335 
Any vessel assigned to the NEAFC Scheme and carrying assigned 
inspectors, as well as the boarding craft deployed by that vessel, carries a 
special flag or pennant to indicate that inspectors on board may carry out 
inspection duties in accordance with the NEAFC Scheme. Aircraft assigned to 
the NEAFC Scheme must have their international radio call sign clearly 
displayed.336 
Furthermore, each Contracting Party has the duty to keep a record for 
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their assigned inspection vessels and aircraft of the date and hour of the start 
and termination of their duties under the NEAFC Scheme and to provide this 
information to the NEAFC Secretary. The Secretary promptly informs the other 
Contracting Parties.337 
Special rules apply when more than ten fishing vessels of any one 
Contracting Party are engaged in fishing activities on regulated resources in the 
Regulatory Area at the same time. The Contracting Party is required, during 
that time, to have an inspection vessel in the Regulatory Area, or to cooperate 
with another Contracting Party to jointly operate an inspection vessel.338 
The NEAFC Scheme sets out a series of general inspection and 
surveillance principles to guide the inspection process. Each Contracting Party 
ensures that assigned inspectors from another Contracting Party are allowed to 
carry out inspections on board those of its fishing vessels to which the NEAFC 
Scheme applies. Furthermore, it has the duty to adopt measures obliging the 
masters of the fishing vessels to cooperate with the assigned NEAFC inspectors 
and to ensure their safety throughout the inspection.339 
Moreover, each Contracting Party ensures that inspections carried out by 
that party are carried out in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance 
with the NEAFC Scheme. The number of inspections is based upon fleet size, 
taking into account the time spent in the Regulatory Area. In its inspections, 
each Contracting Party aims at ensuring equal treatment between all 
Contracting Parties with fishing vessels operating in the Regulatory Area 
through an equitable distribution of inspections.340 
Inspectors have to avoid the use of force except when and to the degree 
necessary to ensure their safety. When carrying out inspections on board fishing 
vessels, inspectors cannot carry any firearms.341 In addition, without limiting 
the capability of inspectors to carry out their mandates, inspections have to be 
made so that the fishing vessel, its activities, and the catch retained on board do 
not suffer undue interference and inconvenience.342 
The NEAFC Scheme also establishes the parameters of the inspection 
procedure. No boarding can be conducted without prior notice by radio being 
sent to the fishing vessel or without the fishing vessel being given the 
appropriate signal using the International Code of Signals, including the 
identity of the inspection platform, whether or not such notice is acknowledged 
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as received.343 There can be no more than two inspectors in an inspection party 
from one Contracting Party boarding a fishing vessel of another Contracting 
Party.344 Additionally, each Contracting Party has to ensure that its inspection 
platforms manoeuvre at a safe distance from the fishing vessels according to 
good seamanship.345 
An inspector has the authority to examine all relevant areas, decks and 
rooms of the fishing vessels, catch (whether processed or not), nets or other 
gear, equipment, and any relevant documents that the inspector deems 
necessary to verify the compliance with the measures established by NEAFC 
and to question the master or a person designated by the master.346 The fishing 
vessel to be boarded cannot be required to stop or manoeuvre when fishing, 
shooting, or hauling. The inspectors may order the interruption or delay in the 
hauling of the fishing gear until they have boarded the fishing vessel and in any 
event no more than thirty minutes after receiving the signal.347 In addition, 
inspectors ought not to interfere with the master’s ability to communicate with 
the authorities of the flag state during the boarding and inspection.348  
The duration of an inspection may not exceed four hours, or until the net 
is hauled in and the net and catch are inspected, whichever is longer. In the case 
of an infringement being detected, the inspectors may stay on board for the time 
necessary for the completion of the inspection. However, in special 
circumstances relating to the size of a fishing vessel and the quantities of fish 
retained on board, the duration of the inspection may exceed the limits 
stipulated above. In such a situation, the inspecting party shall in no case stay 
longer on board the fishing vessel than the time required to complete the 
inspection. The reasons for exceeding the limit stipulated above have to be 
recorded in the inspection report.349 
In carrying out their inspection, the inspectors may request of the master 
any assistance required.350 Moreover, the report of the inspection may be 
commented upon by the master and must be signed by the inspectors at the end 
of the inspection. A copy of the inspection report has to be given to the master 
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of the fishing vessel.351  
During an inspection, the master of a fishing vessel is requested to 
facilitate prompt and safe boarding. The master is to cooperate with and assist 
in the inspection of the fishing vessel conducted pursuant to these 
procedures,352 and not obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the inspectors in the 
performance of their duties. Moreover, the master has to allow inspectors to 
communicate with the authorities of the flag Contracting Party and the 
inspecting Contracting Party. Further, the master must provide them access to 
relevant areas, decks and rooms of the fishing vessel, catch (whether processed 
or not), nets or other gear, equipment, and any relevant documents.353 
The NEAFC Scheme also establishes procedures for reporting 
infringements, with special procedures provided for serious infringements. If 
the inspectors find that there are clear grounds for believing that a fishing vessel 
flying the flag of another Contracting Party has engaged in any activity contrary 
to NEAFC recommendations, they are required to note the infringement in the 
inspection report and to take all necessary measures to ensure security and 
continuity of the evidence for subsequent dockside inspection.354 An 
identification mark may be affixed securely to any part of the fishing gear that 
appears to the inspector to have been in contravention of applicable 
measures.355 
In order to facilitate Contracting Party action on the infringement, 
inspectors immediately are obliged to attempt to communicate with an 
inspector or designated authority of the Contracting Party of the inspected 
fishing vessel.356 In addition, the Contracting Party inspecting a fishing vessel 
ought to communicate in writing the details of an infringement to the 
designated authorities of the Contracting Party of the inspected vessel within 
the working day following the inspection whenever possible.357 The original of 
the inspection report, together with any supporting documentation, is to be 
forwarded promptly to the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party of 
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the inspected fishing vessel as well as a copy to the Secretary.358 
A serious infringement means: 
 
1. Fishing without a valid authorisation issued by the flag Contracting 
Party 
2. Fishing without or after attainment of a quota 
3. Use of prohibited fishing gear 
4. Serious mis-recording of catches 
5. Repeated failure to comply with the communication procedure 
6. Landing or transshipment without authorisation of the port state 
7. Preventing an inspector from carrying out his duties 
8. Directed fishing for a stock that is subject to a moratorium or for which 
fishing is prohibited 
9. Falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of 
a fishing vessel 
10. Concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to 
an investigation 
11. Multiple violations that together constitute a serious disregard of 
conservation and management measures 
12. Engaging in transshipment or joint fishing operations with vessels of 
a Non-Contracting Party which has not been accorded the status of 
a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party 
13. Supplying any provisions, fuel or other services to vessels that have 
been placed on the IUU list359 
 
If a NEAFC inspector considers that there are clear grounds for believing 
that a fishing vessel has committed a serious infringement, the inspector must 
promptly notify the flag Contracting Party of that infringement as well as the 
Secretary.360 The flag Contracting Party is obliged to respond to the notification 
without delay and to ensure that the fishing vessel concerned is inspected 
within 72 hours by an inspector duly authorised by that flag Contracting 
Party.361 In order to preserve the evidence, the inspector is required to take all 
necessary measures to ensure security and continuity of the evidence whilst 
minimising interference with and inconvenience to the operation of the 
vessel.362 Moreover, the inspector is entitled to remain on board the fishing 
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vessel for the period necessary to provide information to the duly authorised 
inspector concerning the infringement or until the response of the flag 
Contracting Party requires the inspector to leave the fishing vessel.363  
The flag Contracting Party, if evidence so warrants, requires the fishing 
vessel to proceed immediately to a port designated by that Contracting Party for 
a thorough inspection under its authority and in the presence of a NEAFC 
inspector from any other Contracting Party that wishes to participate.364 
Additionally, the flag Contracting Party may authorise the inspecting 
Contracting Party to bring the fishing vessel without delay to a port designated 
by the flag Contracting Party.365 If the fishing vessel is not called to port, the 
Contracting Party must provide due justification in a timely manner to the 
Secretary and to the inspecting Contracting Party. The Secretary has to make 
such justification available on request to any Contracting Party.366 Where 
a fishing vessel is required to proceed to port for a thorough inspection in 
accordance with control measures,367 a NEAFC inspector from another 
Contracting Party may, subject to the consent of the Contracting Party of the 
fishing vessel, board the fishing vessel as it is proceeding to port, may remain 
on board the fishing vessel as it proceeds to port, and may be present during the 
inspection of the fishing vessel in port.368 
The appropriate authorities of a Contracting Party notified of 
an infringement committed by a fishing vessel of that party are requested to 
take prompt action to receive and consider the evidence of the infringement 
and, conduct any further investigation necessary for the follow up to the 
infringement and, whenever possible, inspect the fishing vessel concerned.369 
Each Contracting Party has to designate the appropriate authorities mandated 
for receiving evidence of infringement and has to inform the Secretary of the 
address of those authorities.370 The Secretary then shall subsequently inform all 
other NEAFC Contracting Parties.371  
The NEAFC Scheme makes provisions for mutual recognition of 
inspectors. In the interest of uniformity, each Contracting Party is required to 
consider and act on reports from inspectors of other Contracting Parties under 
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the NEAFC Scheme on the same basis as reports from its own inspectors.372 
Contracting Parties must also cooperate in order to facilitate judicial or other 
proceedings arising from a report submitted by an inspector under the NEAFC 
Scheme.373 
 
Other Enforcement Provisions/Schemes 
 
The NEAFC Scheme includes specific provisions to facilitate enforcement 
concerning fishing vessels, including provisions for IUU fishing vessels and 
port state measures. Each Contracting Party notifies, in computer readable 
form, to the Secretary prior to 1 January of each year if possible, or in any case 
before the vessel’s entry into the Regulatory Area, all fishing vessels authorised 
to fish in the Regulatory Area and notably whether the vessel is authorised to 
fish one or more of the regulated resources. Each Contracting Party is requested 
to notify any modifications to this information without delay.374 
Each Contracting Party is required to implement a vessel monitoring 
system (VMS) for its fishing vessels exceeding 20 metres between 
perpendiculars or 24 metres overall length which fish, or plan to fish, in the 
Regulatory Area. The Contracting Party must require its fishing vessels, fishing 
in the Regulatory Area, to be equipped with an autonomous system capable of 
automatically transmitting messages to a land-based fisheries monitoring centre 
(FMC), thereby allowing a continuous tracking of the position of a fishing 
vessel by the Contracting Party of that fishing vessel.375 This system became 
operational on 1 January 2000.376 
To this end, each party ensures that the satellite device enables a fishing 
vessel to communicate to the Contracting Party the following data: 
 
1. The vessel identification 
2. The most recent geographical position of the vessel with a position error 
of less than 500 metres and with a confidence interval of 99 percent 
3. The date and time of the fixing of the said position of the vessel 
4. Where applicable, data relating to the catch on board 
5. Where applicable, data relating to transhipment377 
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Moreover, each Contracting Party guarantees that the master of a fishing vessel 
flying its flag ensures that the satellite-tracking devices are at all times fully 
operational and that all the information is transmitted. In the event of 
a technical failure or non-operation of the satellite-tracking device fitted on 
board a fishing vessel, the device must be repaired or replaced within one 
month. After this period, the master of a fishing vessel is not authorised to 
commence a fishing trip with a defective satellite-tracking device. In case 
a device stops functioning and a fishing trip lasts more than one month, the 
repair or the replacement has to take place as soon as the vessel enters a port. 
The fishing vessel is not authorised to continue or commence a fishing trip 
without the satellite-tracking device having been repaired or replaced.378 Each 
Contracting Party also has to make sure that a fishing vessel with a defective 
satellite-tracking device communicates, at least daily, their reports by other 
means of communication (radio, fax, or telex).379 
Contracting Parties, for the purpose of this scheme, cooperate with the 
Secretary in order to establish a database delimiting the Regulatory Area by 
latitude and longitude coordinates.380 This occurs without prejudice to each 
Contracting Party’s position concerning the delimitation of sea areas under their 
sovereignty and jurisdiction.381 
NEAFC has set up a system for blacklisting flag of convenience IUU 
fishing vessels.382 When vessels are observed in the area fishing without a valid 
licence, they are added to the ‘A’ list, i.e., a provisional list of IUU vessels.383 
Enquiries are subsequently made into the reasons why these vessels were 
fishing without permission, and if there is no suitable explanation, the vessel is 
transferred permanently to NEAFC’s ‘B’ list.384 Vessels can only be removed 
from this list by decision of the NEAFC Commission at its annual meeting. The 
listing system seems to be reaping its first rewards, with recent instances where 
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listed vessels have been scrapped. This issue is discussed below under 
“Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC.” 
NEAFC has also adopted port state control measures. It has a special 
system in place to control the landings or transshipments of foreign vessels in 
ports of Contracting Parties. First, the Contracting Parties have to designate 
ports were such landings will be allowed.385 The master of a foreign vessel 
intending to call into such a port must notify the competent port authorities at 
least three working days in advance.386 The port state subsequently forwards 
this information to the flag state of the vessel.387 When the flag state confirms 
by return copy388 that the vessel in question had sufficient quota for the species 
declared, that the quantities of fish on board have been duly reported and 
considered in the calculation of any catch or effort limitations that may be 
applicable, that the vessel in question had authorisation to fish in the areas 
declared, and finally, that this information was verified according to VMS, the 
fish can be landed or transshipped.389  
 
 
Strengths of the NEAFC System 
 
Membership. The Convention lists individual parties eligible to participate in 
the Convention and the NEAFC Commission. Importantly, this list includes the 
EU. Any state not referred to in this list (Member States of the EU excepted) 
may accede to the Convention subject to the approval of three-fourths of all the 
Contracting Parties.390 In 2003, the NEAFC Commission adopted the 
Guidelines for the Expectation of States Considering Applying for Membership 
of NEAFC and Possible Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory 
Area.391 According to these Guidelines, new entrants “should be aware fishing 
opportunities for new Contracting Parties will not be allocated on stocks 
already regulated.” Further, new entrants will only be entitled to allocations 
from unregulated stocks on the same basis as other Contracting Parties.392 
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Three such applications have been made, of which two were rejected (Ukraine 
and Lithuania), and only one (Estonia), was accepted. The Performance Review 
Panel considered this process to be “appropriate.”393 However, others have 
stated that this is instead an incentive to engage in unregulated fishing.394 
Scope. The NEAFC Commission may also adopt recommendations 
concerning fisheries conducted within the national jurisdiction of a Contracting 
Party, but only if the Contracting Party in question specifically requests and 
approves the recommendation.395 
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. The Performance Review Panel 
was of the opinion that the criteria to become a Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Party are transparent, appropriate, and applied accordingly. In contrast to other 
RFMOs, NEAFC expressly foresees the possibility of granting cooperation 
quotas to Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties.396 Such quotas have been 
accorded in practice. According to the Recommendation for Conservation and 
Management Measures for Pelagic Redfish in the Irminger Sea and Adjacent 
Waters in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008, 123 tonnes of redfish will be 
available to Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, as was the case in 2007.397 
Moreover, NEAFC has created opportunities for Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties to participate in the supply chain as the general prohibition to engage in 
transhipment or joint shipping operations, normally considered to be a serious 
infringement with vessels of Non-Contracting Parties, does not apply here. 
These vessels, when sighted in the Convention area, are not automatically 
presumed to be undermining NEAFC. The rules applicable to vessels of other 
non-Contracting Parties are distinguished by the rules applicable to Cooperating 
Non-Contracting Parties, hence the ‘A’ and ‘B’ list system.398 
Non-Contracting Party Vessels. NEAFC has been an example for other 
RFMOs for the development of a scheme for Non-Contracting Party fishing 
vessels. A Non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been sighted engaging in 
fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, is presumed to be undermining the 
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effectiveness of recommendations established under the Convention.399 In the 
case of any transhipment activities involving a sighted Non-Contracting Party 
vessel inside or outside the Regulatory Area, the presumption of undermining 
the effectiveness of recommendations established under the Convention applies 
to any other Non-Contracting Party vessel that has engaged in such activities 
with that vessel.400 Information regarding such sightings must be transmitted 
immediately to the Secretary.401 The Secretary has to transmit this information 
to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this information 
and to the flag state of the sighted vessel as soon as possible.402 The Contracting 
Party which sighted the Non-Contracting Party vessel has to attempt to inform 
such a vessel that it has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in the 
Regulatory Area and is accordingly presumed to be undermining the 
recommendations established under the Convention and that this information 
will be distributed to all Contracting Parties and to the flag state of the vessel.403  
In the event that any Non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been 
sighted and reported as engaged in fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, 
consents to be boarded by NEAFC inspectors, their findings are to be 
transmitted to the Secretary.404 The Secretary has the duty to transmit this 
information to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this 
information and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.405 
The Non-Contracting Party vessel that is boarded must be provided with a copy 
of the findings of the NEAFC inspectors.406 
Port Inspections. Contracting Parties shall ensure that their vessels do not 
receive transhipments of fish from a Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been 
sighted fishing in the NEAFC area.407 When such a vessel enters a port of any 
Contracting Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party officials 
knowledgeable about the recommendations established under the 
Convention.408 The vessel is not to be allowed to land or tranship any fish until 
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to fisheries in the Regulatory Area. 
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this inspection has taken place.409 Such inspections include the vessel’s 
documents, log books,410 fishing gear,411 catch on board,412 and any other 
matter relating to the vessel’s activities in the Regulatory Area. 
Landings and transhipments of all fish from a Non-Contracting Party 
vessel which has been inspected shall be prohibited in all Contracting Party 
ports if such inspection reveals that the vessel has on board species subject to 
recommendations established under the Convention. This is the procedure until 
it is established that the fish were caught outside the Regulatory Area or in 
compliance with all relevant recommendations established under the 
Convention.413 
Information on the results of all inspections of Non-Contracting Party 
vessels conducted in the ports of Contracting Parties, and subsequent action, 
have to be immediately transmitted through the Secretary to all Contracting 
Parties and as soon as possible to the relevant flag state(s).414 
Each Contracting Party annually reports to the Secretary by mid-
September for the period 1 July to 30 June the number of inspections of 
Non-Contracting Party vessels it conducted under this Scheme in its ports, the 
names of the vessels inspected and their respective flag state, the dates and 
ports where the inspection was conducted, and the results of such 
inspections.415 
As a part of the existing comprehensive NEAFC Control and 
Enforcement Scheme, new measures have been adopted. A new measure, which 
entered into force on 1 May 2007, effectively closes Contracting Party ports to 
landings of frozen fish which have not been certified by the flag state of the 
vessel intending to land.416 Additionally, the coastal state can also limit the 
number of ports where frozen fish is allowed to be landed in order to streamline 
these inspections.417 
Vessels without Nationality. Where there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a vessel, which has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in 
the Regulatory Area, is without nationality, a NEAFC Contracting Party may 
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also board and inspect the vessel.418 Where evidence warrants, a NEAFC 
Contracting Party may take such action as may be appropriate in accordance 
with international law.419 Contracting Parties are encouraged to examine the 
appropriateness of domestic measures to exercise jurisdiction over such 
vessels.420 
Review of performance. NEAFC has recently undergone a review of its 
performance.421 In 2006, a panel consisting of internal NEAFC representatives 
and external experts submitted its final report, which was discussed by the 
organisation at a special meeting in 2007. This clearly constitutes 
a recommended best practice in the management of the Regulatory Area.422 
 
 
Weaknesses of the NEAFC System 
 
Objection Procedure. Any Contracting Party may object to a recommendation 
within 50 days of the date of notification of that recommendation.423 In the 
event of such an objection, any other Contracting Party may similarly object 
within 40 days after receiving notification of that objection.424 If any objection 
is made within this further period of 40 days, other Contracting Parties are 
allowed a final period of 40 days after receiving notification of that objection in 
which to lodge objections.425 A recommendation does not become binding on 
a Contracting Party that has objected thereto.426 If three or more Contracting 
Parties have objected to a recommendation, it will not become binding on any 
Contracting Party.427 Except when a recommendation is not binding on any 
Contracting Party, a Contracting Party which has objected to a recommendation 
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may at any time withdraw that objection. It then becomes bound by the 
recommendation within 70 days, or as from the date determined by the NEAFC 
Commission, whichever is the later.428 If a recommendation is not binding on 
any Contracting Party, two or more Contracting Parties may nevertheless at any 
time agree among themselves to give effect thereto. In this event, they must 
immediately notify the NEAFC Commission accordingly.429 The use of such 
an objection procedure could well undermine the conservation of the 
resource.430 
Formal Absence of Dispute Settlement Procedure. In 2004, 
an amendment was proposed concerning a dispute settlement procedure 
whereby states would be obliged to explain their reasons for using the objection 
procedure. Even though these amendments were adopted in 2005, they have not 
yet entered into force.431 
Lack of Convention Basis for Non-Contracting Parties Rights and 
Obligations. The “new” 2007 Convention does not intend to enumerate the 
rights and obligations of non-Contracting Parties. At present, these rights are 
scattered throughout the NEAFC Scheme,432 the Non-Contracting Parties 
Scheme,433 and the 2003 Guidelines for the Expectation of Future New 
Contracting Parties with Regard to Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC 
Regulatory Area.434 All of these measures are without a Convention basis. 
Vessel Monitoring System. Even though the database of the vessel 
monitoring system is quite innovative and forms an essential element in the 
NEAFC monitoring scheme, the Performance Review Panel is of the opinion 
that the quality of the information deserves enhanced control and that the use of 
this state of the art technology by NEAFC is underutilised.435 
Inspections. The Performance Review Panel noted that one Contracting 
Party was obviously not participating in the system since it had so far not 
deployed inspectors or inspection vessels in the Regulatory Area, even though 
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it is so required under the Convention system.436 
 
 
Implementation of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
The preamble of the “new” 2007 Convention explicitly “recognises” the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.437 NEAFC inspectors remain under the 
operational control of the authorities of their Contracting Parties. However, 
they have the powers of inspection, seizure and search, as defined in the 
NEAFC Scheme of Joint International Inspection, as well as surveillance 
implementation under the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.438 
In determining the extent to which Contracting Parties recognise the 
Compliance Agreement, the current NEAFC Scheme enjoins Contracting 
Parties to ensure that stated measures to be taken, whether administrative action 
or criminal proceedings, are in conformity with the Contracting Party’s national 
law against the natural or legal persons responsible where there has been a 
derogation from NEAFC measures.439 The measures taken are to be in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of national law, be capable of 
effectively depriving the beneficiaries of any economic benefit, or provide 
sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of such infringements, thus 
discouraging future infringements.440 
High seas fishing vessels have to report their catches in the NEAFC area. 
Each entry and exit has to be reported. These reports are inspected by the 
observers and by port inspectors.441 NEAFC also includes high seas 
conservation and management measures with a stated objective of NEAFC 
performing its functions in the interests of the conservation and optimum 
utilisation of the fishery resources of the convention area.442 All vessels 
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operating in the NEAFC area have to register with the Secretary.443 
The NEAFC Scheme consists of new technologies in fisheries monitoring, and 
establishes control measures, rules on reporting IUU activities, as well as port 
state control measures. These features are designed to ensure adequate high sea 
fisheries management as called for under the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement. 
When a vessel has been sighted committing an infringement, the flag state 
is informed. The appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party are notified of 
the infringement committed by the fishing vessel and have to take prompt 
action to receive and consider the evidence of the infringement.444 The 
Performance Review Panel concluded that the NEAFC “Contracting Parties 
largely fulfil their duties as Flag States.”445 
 
 
Implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
As with the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the preamble of the “new” 
NEAFC Convention explicitly “recognises” the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.446 
The Contracting Parties agree to maintain in force and to implement 
within the Regulatory Area the NEAFC Scheme. The latter includes provisions 
for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by the Contracting Parties447 
and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis of evidence resulting 
from such boarding and inspection.448 A report of such prosecutions and 
sanctions imposed shall be included in an annual statement regarding the 
actions that were taken during the preceding year.449 
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As regards Non-Contracting Parties, the Contracting Parties agree to 
bring to the attention of any Non-Contracting Party any matter relating to the 
fishing activities in the Regulatory Area of the nationals or vessels of that state 
that appear to affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the 
Convention.450 The Contracting Parties further agree to confer, when necessary, 
in order to assess steps to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects. 
NEAFC adopted a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party 
vessels with the conservation and enforcement measures established by 
the NEAFC.451 Further, when a non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been 
sighted and reported as engaged in fishing, enters a port of any NEAFC 
Contracting Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party 
officials.452 
NEAFC aims to make its information and decision making processes 
accessible for Contracting Parties and observers. Observers were only allowed 
to attend meetings in 2001. However, the Performance Review Panel noted that 
discussions on allocations are often not open to all Contracting Parties and 
observers. It stressed the need for improvement in ensuring transparency 
between participating coastal states in quota allocation and management 
measures.453 In addition, the current lack of access to information by NGOs 
should be reversed, especially prior to NEAFC Commission meetings.  
 
 
10.4.5.3. Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC 
 
A recent noteworthy positive development is that both NAFO and NEAFC have 
tried, albeit not concurrently, to pay very close attention to the achievements of 
the other. Several examples are provided viz. 
Since 2002 both organisations have been cooperating with respect to the 
management of pelagic redfish in the Irminger Sea, a straddling fish stock 
between the two convention areas. NEAFC receives the scientific advice and 
establishes the management measures, including the allocation of the total 
allowable catch in the NAFO area. For control purposes, however, catches are 
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reported to both the NAFO Fisheries and NEAFC Commissions.454 
Additionally, NAFO and NEAFC have recently joined forces to establish 
an overarching North Atlantic list of IUU vessels. Vessels on the list of IUU 
vessels of the NEAFC are automatically transferred to the NAFO list and vice 
versa. The underlying rationale is that because both Regulatory Areas are 
adjacent, there are straddling stocks in their respective Regulatory Areas and as 
IUU fishing is a global phenomenon, the vessels listed under one convention 
system are presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the Regulatory 
Area of the other.455 NEAFC Recommendation XI of 2008 expands this kind of 
cooperation to CCAMLR and South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
(SEAFO). Further, the Recommendation adds that delisting is only possible if 
the organisation originally listing the vessel decides to do so.456 Thus, as noted 
by the NEAFC Performance Report, NEAFC could well serve as a useful 
reference to other RFMOs in this respect as it demonstrates a positive 
development in fisheries management.457 
A third, more recent example of common initiatives, is NAFO’s newly 
adopted port state control scheme, which was inspired by NEAFC practice in 
the Regulatory Area. NAFO’s former port state control provisions required 
vessels that had been fishing for stocks subject to conservation and enforcement 
measures to call in the port of a Contracting Party to be inspected when 
offloading their catch. Even though the interference of the inspectors in the 
offloading activity was minimal, the quality of the catch had to remain 
unaffected, but this was compromised by the fact that such inspections took 
time. The ensuing reports were then forwarded to the port state, upon request, 
and to the Executive Secretary. A 2007 discussion paper proposed 
an amendment and, after many adaptations, was finally adopted at the thirtieth 
annual meeting of the NAFO Fisheries Commission in late September 2008. 
The new system very much resembles the successful port state control system 
adopted by NEAFC a year earlier. It is based on the following measures: the 
master has to present prior notification to the port state, which is forwarded to 
the flag state. No authorisation to land or tranship the cargo in port will be 
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granted without the flag state of the Non-Contracting Party vessel confirming 
the legal status of the catch.458 All the documents involved are posted on the 
secure part of the NAFO website.459 The scheme even moves beyond the port 
state measures which are presently being developed in FAO on some points. 
The objective of the drafters of these new NAFO provisions on port state 
control was clearly to reflect as closely as possible the port state control 
mechanism of NEAFC.  
 
 
10.5. Conclusion 
 
While Canada and the EU are well known for sparring over fisheries interests 
and allocations in the NAFO Regulatory Area, Canada and the EU have 
displayed considerable cooperation since the famous Estai incident. Both have 
played substantial roles in achieving modernization amendments to reflect the 
ecosystem and precautionary approaches in regional fisheries management 
agreements. Both have cooperated in enhancing regional compliance and 
enforcement arrangements in NAFO. 
Canada and the EU continue to face four major challenges in regional 
fisheries management. Putting the precautionary approach into practice has 
been problematic with quotas for some stocks set above precautionary scientific 
advice or without precautionary reference points. Implementing the ecosystem 
approach might be described as “just leaving port” with still very limited 
scientific understandings of marine ecosystems and limited protections given to 
vulnerable marine ecosystems. Reaching consensus on allocation criteria for 
shared fish stocks continues to be a thorny issue in both NAFO and NEAFC. 
Achieving effective compliance and enforcement remains a challenge with 
various constraining realities including exclusive flag state jurisdiction to 
prosecute regulatory offences beyond national maritime zones and the slow 
entry into force of dispute settlement procedures.  
Clearly Canada and the EU have not reached an end point in 
strengthening cooperation within regional fisheries management. Various 
questions remain to be traversed: 
 
• Should scientific advice be subject to political override? 
• How might the role of scientific advice be strengthened within RFMOs? 
• How might the ecosystem approach be bolstered at the regional level? 
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• What initiatives, if any, should be considered for further crystallising 
fisheries allocation criteria? 
• Should the closer cooperation between NAFO and NEAFC be extended 
to other RFMOs? 
• How much reliance on state of the art information technology is 
desirable? 
• Should the fundamental changes in the compliance and enforcement 
strategies of RFMOs be reflected in their conventions?  
• How might cooperation with non co-operating non-Contracting Parties 
be enhanced? 
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Workshop Discussion Summary 
 
Ocean Resources 
 
Susan Rolston 
 
 
Maria Pettersson, Department of Social Science, Luleå University of 
Technology (for Freedom-Kai Phillips, Dalhousie University), and Meinhard 
Doelle, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, 
presented papers offering perspectives on ocean renewable energy in the EU 
and Canada respectively. Jerome Davis, Department of Political Science, 
Dalhousie University (with Timo Koivurova and Kamrul Hossain, Arctic 
Centre, University of Lapland), presented their paper using the Melville Island 
Project in the Sverdrup Basin in the Canadian Arctic as an example of the 
potential for development and diversification of natural gas resources in the 
EU.  
Following the paper presentations, Giordano Rigon, DG Energy and 
Transport, European Commission, commented upon EU energy policy. At 
present, the Council has endorsed an energy policy that calls for a 20% 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% increase in energy efficiency, 
and a 20% increase in renewable sources by 2020. The continued reliance on 
oil and gas resources means that both diversification of supply and indigenous 
resource development are critical. Arctic resource development, particularly 
those within 200 nautical miles of the coast, with appropriate environmental 
protection standards, is a particularly important source to consider. Renewable 
energy resources, particularly tidal and wave, in offshore marine areas must be 
developed in tandem with maritime policy to ensure adequate environmental 
protection and integrated economic development. 
Much of the discussion focussed on the moral argument that states should 
not invest or develop Arctic oil and gas resources because of the environmental 
costs (climate change) of their exploitation and use. It was noted, however, that 
the Melville Island Project would provide relatively inexpensive natural gas 
compared to other projects elsewhere and that there is limited environmental 
impact in transporting LNG as the carriers use natural gas for propulsion and 
would not cause oil pollution in the event of an accident. It was also noted that 
there is an equity question that must be considered as the relatively poor coastal 
communities in the Arctic are looking to exploit these resources to develop 
economically. In some cases, Arctic coastal residents see climate change as 
opening new opportunities for their communities. Regulations developed under 
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OSPAR might serve as a model for development of Arctic offshore oil and gas 
resources. 
At the Workshop, a fifth session included papers on marine biodiversity 
and fisheries issues. David VanderZwaag, Marine & Environmental Law 
Institute, Dalhousie University, Canada, and Erik Franckx, Department of 
International and European Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel presented the joint 
paper on Canada, the EU and Regional Fisheries Management in the North 
Atlantic (with Koen van den Bossche, Centre for International Law, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel). 
Discussion following the fisheries presentations focussed on the role of 
science in fisheries management and comparisons between managing shipping 
and fisheries. With regard to science, it was suggested that fishers often 
mistrust the scientific advice provided by fisheries managers, arguing that 
scientists use measurement tools inappropriately. It was noted that in The 
Netherlands, fishers are placed aboard marine research vessels, enhancing the 
fishers’ acceptance of the data. NAFO has adopted an interim exploratory 
fisheries protocol that involves the fishing industry in the identification process 
of vulnerable marine ecosystems, e.g., corals. Other collaborative processes 
between fishers and managers include among others the Eastern Scotian Shelf 
Integrated Management Process (ESSIM) and other large ocean management 
area processes in Canada. 
In comparing the shipping and fisheries management regimes it was noted 
that the outcome based management regime (shipping) was generally more 
successful than the input/output model used for fisheries management. The 
fisheries management regime reflected the primacy that social and economic 
pressures place on managers in the international (FAO), national and regional 
(RFMOs) spheres. An exhaustible resource (unlike shipping), fishers will shift 
practices (e.g., opting for flags of convenience) in order to maintain fishing 
effort despite measures put in place by national governments (flag state 
measures). Unlike shipping, there are no enforcement measures against fishing 
vessels (e.g., liens on vessels), only measures directed to managing the fishing 
activity. Measures such as the FAO Compliance Agreement are directed to the 
flag state, but states are not joining, thus it is seen as ineffective.   
Technologies for monitoring ships on the high seas (e.g., long range 
satellite tracking systems) are difficult to translate into monitoring of fishing 
activity as the mere presence of a fishing vessel is not sufficient information for 
managing fishing activity. Generally much more frequent reporting would be 
required to determine fishing activity patterns, particularly on the high seas. 
Such technologies often do not work well in the poor sea and weather 
conditions that fishing vessels regularly work in. Private/public air surveillance 
programmes such as those in place in Canada might be a cost effective 
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alternative for fisheries, shipping and environmental surveillance patrols. Both 
NAFO and NEAFC have cooperated in enforcement and compliance initiatives, 
and the tuna RFMOs have had some success in managing their stocks. A black 
listing system (i.e., IUU vessels as well as transhipment and resupply vessels) 
has been efficient in closing ports to flag states that do not respond to RFMO 
management initiatives. FAO has identified criteria against flag states that do 
not enforce their flag duties. Some states, e.g., Norway, have developed their 
own black lists for “non-cooperating” states; the EU is expected to adopt such a 
measure in the future. 
Finally, the EU and the RFMO review processes were discussed with the 
complication of needing Member State agreement on fisheries policy being 
noted. The EU fisheries policy will be reviewed in 2009. 
Erik Molenaar, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht 
University, and Phillip Saunders, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, 
Dalhousie University, made a joint presentation on governance of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Following the presentations, Gäel de Rotalier, DG Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, European Commission, spoke on the work the EU is undertaking in 
the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UN 
General Assembly Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Working 
Group. Credible measures need to be put in place to protect high seas 
biodiversity and planning, governance and legal issues need to be settled. The 
EU is calling for a new international agreement to operationalise biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use in areas beyond national jurisdiction using the 
ecosystem and precautionary principles as default mechanisms. With regard to 
marine protected areas, criteria for the identification of areas that need to be 
protected have to be developed as must the applicable measures to be taken by 
competent organisations (e.g., IMO, RFMOs). The EU proposal has not been 
well received by many states, suggesting that high seas biodiversity is best 
protected through measures adopted through RFMOs (regarding fisheries) and 
the IMO (regarding shipping). Developing countries are particularly interested 
in genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, regarding them as 
part of the common heritage of humankind. Canada and the EU have had 
limited discussions on this matter. The EU has called for immediate action to 
promote an integrated approach in existing agreements and within the CBD. 
Discussion following the presentations and commentary focussed on 
opportunities for further regime building, particularly outcome-based 
approaches useful for areas beyond national jurisdiction (e.g., targets for marine 
protected areas). Compliance must also be considered in any new regime, 
particularly the control of extractive industries, as well as the integration of new 
science findings into any new legal instrument in a timely manner. 
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The opportunity for managing biodiversity through regulation of companies 
under national laws was seen as being limited to intellectual property aspects. It 
was suggested, however, that challenges remain in determining the boundaries 
between the international law of the sea (i.e., UN Law of the Sea Convention) 
and the international law relating to patents and intellectual property. 
Determining why companies would be interested in working in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction was also raised as opportunities in the area are generally 
considered to be speculative although they are perceived as being economically 
valuable. Any new integrated ocean management regime must deal with 
bioprospecting for marine genetic resources. Given the lack of a responsible 
international organization, there was general discussion about prospects for 
moving the issue under an existing organization (e.g., International Seabed 
Authority). However many states (e.g., the United States) are not interested in 
new institutions; regional management organizations might be a more 
appropriate mechanism (e.g., CCAMLR or UNEP Regional Seas models). 
Despite the perceived need for sectoral implementation of measures, it was 
suggested that there is a need for an overarching international instrument that 
was negotiated with the full participation of developing states. 
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Chapter 11 
 
The Challenge of Maritime Security against Terrorism:  
A Dialogue Between the European Union and Canada 
 
Kamrul Hossain, Hugh M. Kindred, and Mary R. Brooks 
 
 
11.1. Introduction 
 
For centuries the principal threat to maritime security has been piracy at sea. Its 
suppression has been the object of customary international law throughout the 
history of maritime navigation. The law against piracy was eventually codified 
first in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,1 and subsequently in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (LOS Convention).2 
However, the concept of piracy was narrowly defined3—in general as attacks 
on ships at sea from other vessels for the private gain of the pirates—despite the 
fact that it was declared a universal crime under both conventions. 
Today, maritime security involves a broader concept of piracy at sea as 
well as many other threats to marine navigation. Maritime security risks now 
also include drug smuggling, human trafficking and threats to marine bio-
security, such as the introduction of alien diseases and organisms. Amongst the 
wide range of threats, terrorism against shipping has become a primary concern, 
especially since 11 September 2001. Unlike traditional pirates (who are still an 
active security risk), the perpetrators of terrorist attacks on shipping do not 
necessarily operate from vessels other than the ships they are attacking. Indeed, 
their attacks may be to use the targeted ship as the means to deliver a bomb to 
their selected destination or to employ the ship itself as a weapon. Most 
important, the perpetrators may not necessarily act with a view to any personal 
gain for themselves.  
The expanded range of security threats poses serious risks to the safety of 
the ships, the ports they sail to, and the persons aboard them, as well as added 
danger to the cargoes they are carrying. After the terrorist attacks of 
                                                 
1
 Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, Articles 15–22. 
2
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, (1982) 
2 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOS Convention], Articles 100–107. 
3
 See Z. Keyuan, “Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in East 
Asia: Issues and Trends,” Singapore Year Book of International Law 9 (2005):1–17, p. 8. 
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11 September 2001, the global perception of these threats led the international 
community to consider ways to combat them. As a result, new instruments and 
rules have been developed, not necessarily to replace the existing law but rather 
to supplement it and make it more suitable and effective in the new 
circumstances. These developments at the international level are ongoing and, 
moreover, require action at a national level to implement them. In this process, 
at both the multilateral and the regional/national levels, the European Union 
(EU) and Canada have been active. Their participation internationally and their 
law and policy making individually are the subject of this contribution, in 
which a comparative analysis will be made of their attempts to address the 
common problems of maritime terrorism. 
The current regulatory response to the worldwide threat of maritime 
terrorism is a multilateral platform developed primarily from 2001 through 
2005 by the complementary efforts of several international organisations 
operating in different global sectors. The backbone of this platform is the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code4 promulgated by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The preventive measures of this 
Code are backed up by new penal proscriptions and penalties that IMO added to 
an amended convention to suppress criminal acts against world shipping. The 
ISPS Code to promote the security of ships and ports is also supported by 
a variety of protective measures taken by the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) towards cargoes, the International Labour Organization (ILO) regarding 
seafarers and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
respecting freight containers. 
In addition to these multilateral initiatives, some countries have taken 
significant unilateral steps to protect their trade and shipping through national 
legislation and regulations. One of these is the United States (US), which has 
legislated a number of regulatory requirements with both domestic and 
international effect. Some of these measures, especially those mandated by the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act 20025 (MTSA) and the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act 20066 (SAFE Port Act), exceed the 
                                                 
4
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Amendments to the Annex to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 [SOLAS] made by the Conference of 
Contracting Governments in Resolution 1, Annex Art.7 which inserted a new Chapter XI-2 on 
Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security [SOLAS Annex XI-2], which, in turn, 
imported the ISPS Code adopted by Resolution 2, 12 December 2002 (in force 1 July 2004), 
SOLAS/CONF.5/31. 
5
 Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (codified at 
46 USC§2101) [hereinafter MTSA]. 
6
 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 
(codified at 46 USC§901) [hereinafter SAFE Port Act]. 
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regulatory demands of the multilateral platform. Given the major role the 
United States plays in world trade and shipping, the extra-territorial effects of 
its national security regulations add another dimension to the international 
regime. 
Both the EU and Canada have had to respond to these maritime security 
developments. Each, in fact, participated in the preparation and implementation 
of the multilateral platform of maritime security, although by differing means 
and extent of application. In addition, both have had to react to the extra 
demands of American authorities in pursuit of their national requirements on 
any trade to US destinations. Hence, this chapter will first briefly explore the 
current international maritime security regime before, second, examining the 
extent of its implementation by EU and Canada. Third, the chapter will 
investigate how the EU and Canada are individually pursuing port and shipping 
security beyond the present multilateral platform, taking into account their 
cooperative arrangements with the United States. Finally, the chapter will 
engage in a dialogue comparing the similarities and differences in the 
approaches of the EU and Canada in order to understand if there are 
opportunities for strengthening maritime security. 
 
 
11.2. Current Maritime Security Regime 
 
11.2.1. The Multilateral Platform 
 
The centrepiece of the multilateral regime of maritime security is the ISPS 
Code, which was promulgated by IMO in 2002 and brought into force nearly 
universally on 1 July 2004. Although this Code provides a highly 
comprehensive platform for the security of merchant ships and the marine 
facilities at which they call, it does not operate as a complete regime for lack of 
attention to the seafarers who work them, the freight containers they move and 
to the cargoes they carry in international trade. Other international organisations 
with sectoral responsibilities for these activities have also taken steps to bolster 
security measures. Thus the multilateral platform of marine security currently 
comprises rules and guidelines established by IMO, WCO, ILO and ISO, as 
will now be explored. 
 
 
 
  354 
11.2.1.1. ISPS Code for Ships and Ports  
 
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 transformed the international security 
situation into a much more comprehensive set of problems. In respect of 
maritime security, it was quickly realised that a ship itself can be used as an 
instrument or a threat of terrorist activities; the mere prevention of potential 
attacks against ships, persons and property at sea is, therefore, not sufficient. In 
effect, the international community recognised that terrorism at sea, from 
whatever motives, poses a serious threat not only to the international trade and 
transport system but also to the security of international society as a whole. 
Hence, the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO gave urgent consideration to 
the need for new practical measures to safeguard the world’s ships, ports, 
offshore terminals, and other marine facilities against threats from terrorist 
attacks. The Committee determined that the risks to shipping required 
a regulatory regime covering both ships and the ports they visit.7 As a result, 
the ISPS Code was developed, and given international legal force by 
incorporation in the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS) under Chapter XI.8 As Chapter XI previously covered ship safety and 
security, it was split by the introduction of these amendments into two new 
chapters—Chapter XI-1 and Chapter XI-2—the former including special 
measures to enhance maritime safety while the latter provides special measures 
to enhance maritime security. The ISPS Code itself is found in Chapter XI-2. 
There are two parts in the ISPS Code. Part A covers mandatory 
requirements for maritime security measures while Part B provides guidelines 
on how those requirements could be met. Although Part B is not mandatory, 
some national governments have chosen to make it compulsory.9  
In addition to addressing international maritime security concerns about 
terrorism, the Code establishes clear and identifiable roles and responsibilities, 
and provides a platform for the collection and exchange of security intelligence. 
Overall, the Code is designed to improve security as it recognises that the 
ship/port interface is a vulnerable node in the transport system. The Code 
                                                 
7
 See T. A. Mensah, “The Place of the ISPS Code in the Legal International Regime for the 
Security of International Shipping,” WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 3 (2003): 17–30, p. 24. 
8
 IMO, n. 4 above. See also: International Maritime Organization (IMO), “IMO Adopts 
Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures,” (2002), available: <http://www.imo.org/ 
Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689> (retrieved 3 December 2008), 
“International Ship & Port Facility Code (ISPS) What it is exactly – and what is it meant to do,” 
available: <http://www.iaasp.net/2003%20PDF’s/ISPS%20Code.pdf> (retrieved 4 December 
2008) and “ISPS Code for ITIC Members,” available: <http://www.itic-insure.com/downloads/ 
publications/isps_code/ISPS_background_info.doc> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
9
 See “ISPS Code for ITIC Members,” n. 8 above. 
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provides both “identity” and “transparency” to the players in the international 
shipping network.10 Contracting governments, as part of their overall maritime 
security risk management programmes, establish designated authorities within 
government to fulfil their security responsibilities under the Code but may also 
delegate the undertaking of certain of the responsibilities to non-governmental 
Recognised Security Organisations.  
Under the ISPS Code, there are three designated levels of security—
Normal (Level 1), Increased (Level 2), and High (Level 3). Level 1 assumes 
a normal situation and requires the implementation of minimum security 
measures. Level 2 indicates that there is a heightened risk of a security incident 
requiring enhanced security measures, and Level 3 signals that there is 
a probable or imminent risk of a security incident. The contracting government 
has the right to decide the extent and application of Part A of the Code to a port 
facility within its territory that is only occasionally required to serve ships 
arriving or departing on an international voyage.11 Paragraph 5 of Part B of the 
Code requires a Declaration of Security (DOS) to be issued when the 
contracting government of the port facility or the ship deems it necessary. It is 
expected that a DOS will be necessary when an arriving ship has a different 
security level (for example 3) than the port at which it will call (which may 
have a 2).12  
The Code applies to ships engaged on international voyages and all port 
facilities that serve the ship for such voyages. Ships subject to the ISPS Code 
are passenger ships (including high speed passenger craft); cargo ships 
(including high speed craft) of 500 gross tonnes or more; and mobile offshore 
drilling units. By 1 July 2004, the date on which the ISPS Code became 
operative, every shipping company had to obtain an International Ship Security 
Certificate (ISSC) from an authorised shipping society. A ship lacking a valid 
ISSC would, by definition, be in violation of ISPS Code requirements.13 
Furthermore, every ship subject to the ISPS Code must have installed a Ship 
Security Alert System, which is a covert alarm that alerts authorities ashore.  
By itself, a legal regime cannot physically prevent acts of terrorism 
against ships or port facilities.14 Co-operative action is necessary and that, it 
was recognised, must involve not only governments and shipowners but also all 
                                                 
10
 Mensah, n. 7 above, p. 26.  
11
 SOLAS Annex XI-w, n. 4 above, Part A, paragraph 3.2.  
12
 Mensah, n. 7 above, p. 26.  
13
 See “Establishment of U.S. Antiterrorism Maritime Transportation System,” American 
Journal of International Law 98 (2004): 588–590, p. 589. See also Germanischer Lloyd AG, 
“Information on ISPS Code Certification,” (2004), available: <http://www.tis-gdv.de/tis/ 
tagungen/workshop/2004/eggers2.pdf> (retrieved 5 December 2008), p. 5.  
14
 Mensah, n. 7 above, p. 29. 
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other persons and entities that play a role in trade by sea. The ISPS Code 
mandates such cooperation. The Code provides an integrated mechanism for 
promoting and enhancing overall maritime security, which, in turn, ensures the 
effective implementation of the SOLAS Convention as well as other 
international and national rules and regulations for preventing unlawful acts 
against or involving ships.15 
 
 
11.2.1.2. SUA Convention against Maritime Terrorists 
 
As a complement to the prevention of terrorism against ships and ports under 
the ISPS Code, the IMO also addressed the prohibition of maritime terrorism. 
In 1985, after the Achille Lauro incident,16 both IMO and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolutions calling for measures 
against acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of the ships’ crew 
and passengers.17 In response, the IMO took the initiative to prepare and 
conclude the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).18 At the same time it 
adopted a similar set of provisions in a Protocol for the protection of fixed 
platforms located on the continental shelf.19  
The primary purpose of the SUA Convention is to ensure that appropriate 
action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against shipping, 
whether for private or political gain.20 The proscribed acts include seizure of the 
vessel by force; violence against persons on board; and the placing of shipboard 
devices likely to damage or destroy the vessel.21 The Convention also obliges 
                                                 
15
 Id. 
16
 On 3 October 1985, a group of Palestinian guerrillas hijacked the Italian cruise ship, Achille 
Lauro, in Egyptian territorial waters; it was considered a milestone event in modern vessel 
security concerns. See Keyuan, n. 3 above, p. 8, note 30. See also Mensah, n. 7 above, pp. 18–
19. 
17
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Assembly Resolution 544 (14) adopted on 
20 November 1985 and UNGA Res. 40/61 adopted on 9 December 1985 respectively.  
18
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
done 10 March 1988 (in force 1 March 1992), 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (1992), 27 I.L.M. 627 (1988), 
available: <www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=910> (retrieved 4 December 2008) [hereinafter 
Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts]. 
19
 Protocol for the Protection of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 27 I.L.M. 
685 (1988). 
20
 Keyuan, n. 3 above, p. 10. 
21
 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts, n. 18 above, Article 3(1). 
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contracting governments either to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders.22 
The most important aspect of this Convention is that even if terrorist acts 
cannot be suppressed under the LOS Convention, they may now be punished 
under the SUA Convention. 
While the 1988 SUA Convention overcame many of the limitations of the 
law of the sea against piracy, more recent incidents, especially the attacks of 11 
September 2001, have demonstrated that it was still too restricted in scope to 
deal with modern maritime terrorism. Hence, in 2005, IMO concluded 
an amending Protocol to the SUA Convention23 that enlarged the bans on 
criminal acts and terrorist attacks on shipping.24 The Protocol prohibits the 
carriage of persons known to have committed an offence under the SUA 
Convention.25 It also strengthens the international response to the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction by criminalising their illicit shipment by sea. 
The Protocol additionally provides ship-boarding provisions to enhance the 
collective ability to take action against such traffic.26 
 
 
11.2.1.3. WCO Guidelines for Cargoes 
 
In light of the development of integrated supply chains in the delivery of 
international trade, the World Customs Organization27 has moved to simplify 
the customs procedures that impede the flow of goods across national frontiers 
by means of the International Convention on the Simplification and 
                                                 
22
 Id., Article 10. And see Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988 to the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, available: 
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686> (retrieved 
3 December 2008).  
23
 Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO/LEG/CONF/15/22, 1 November 2005, 
available: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58425.pdf> (retrieved 3 December 
2008). Similar amendments were made simultaneously to the 1988 Protocol concerning attacks 
against fixed platforms. 
24
 The Protocol particularly criminalises the use of explosives, radioactive material and 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons on or against shipping in a manner that is likely to 
cause serious injury or death when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population or to compel a government or international organisation to act in 
a desired way. Id., Article 2(bis). 
25
 Id., Article 3(bis). 
26
 Protocol of 2005, n. 23 above. 
27
 Formally called the Customs Co-operation Council. 
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Harmonization of Customs Procedures (as amended by Protocol),28 ordinarily 
known as the Revised Kyoto Convention of 1999. Building on this foundation, 
the WCO has since taken steps on several regulatory levels to enhance the 
efficiency and security of international trade. It began with the 2002 Resolution 
of the Customs Co-operation Council on Security and Facilitation of the 
International Trade Supply Chain,29 which set out a programme of action for 
both the organisation and individual member states.  
Pursuant to this action plan, the WCO subsequently elaborated a number 
of guidelines and frameworks for specific trade facilitation and security tasks, 
of which the most significant ones are mentioned here. First, the High Level 
Guidelines for Co-operative Arrangements between Members and Private 
Industry to Increase Supply Chain Security and Facilitate the Flow of 
International Trade, promulgated in 2003,30 supply directions for the 
enhancement of co-operation between traders and national customs authorities. 
Then in June 2004, the WCO published a companion set of Customs Guidelines 
on Integrated Supply Chain Management,31 which mandated an integrated and 
secure control chain between national customs based on the best practices of 
risk management, and recommended requirements for a Unique Consignment 
Reference for Customs Purposes32; the latter is intended to provide continuity 
of the audit trail of a shipment from origin to destination.33  
                                                 
28
 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, 
Brussels, 26 June 1999 (in force 3 February 2006), available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ 
kybodycontent.htm> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
29
 Resolution of the Customs Co-operation Council on Security and Facilitation of the 
International Trade Supply Chain, 2002, available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20 
Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Resolutions/Security_Facilitation_Int_Trade_Supply_Chair
.pdf> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
30
 See n. 28 above, Annex VII to Doc. SP0122E1, Doc. No. TF0004E3 (2003). See also the 
International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, Brussels, 
27 June 2003 [hereinafter the Johannesburg Convention], available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ 
files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Conventions/Internconvmutualadmineng2003.p
df> (retrieved 3 December 2008). 
31
 World Customs Organization website at <http://www.wcoomd.org> (retrieved 3 December 
2008). 
32
 Recommendation of WCO Concerning a Unique Consignment Reference (UCR) for Customs 
Purposes, and accompanying Guidelines, 26 June 2004, available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ 
pftoolsuchrecomm.htm> (retrieved 3 December 2008). 
33
 WCO also sought to encourage the widest use of electronic transmissions of customs data, 
appropriately protected by security technology, by the adoption of a revised Recommendation 
Concerning the Electronic Transmission and Authentication of Customs and Other Regulatory 
Information, 24 June 2005, available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/ 
PDFandDocuments/Recommendations/RecommendationsIT_16_June_1981_eng.pdf> 
(retrieved 3 December 2008). 
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In June 2005, a WCO Resolution adopted these guidelines in the 
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE 
Framework).34 This Framework is built on the concept of customs-to-customs 
networking and customs-to-business partnering. It emphasizes harmonisation of 
electronic customs information, consistent use of a risk management approach 
to security, and operation of non-intrusive detection equipment. When these 
principles of customs operations are coupled with a Seal Integrity Programme 
for Secure Container Shipments, the security of the supply chain for cargo 
movement across borders is assured.35 Incorporated into the SAFE Framework 
is the idea that any business operator that is party to an international supply 
chain in any way, and is approved by its national customs organisation as 
complying with WCO or equivalent security standards, may be designated 
an authorised economic operator (AEO) and thus receive faster processing and 
less attention from customs. Pursuant to this concept, the AEO Guidelines were 
prepared and adopted by WCO Resolution in June 2006 as an additional 
appendix to the SAFE Framework.36 It should be noted that there is often no 
link between those operating with authority under the ISPS Code and those 
acting under authority granted by a country’s adoption of WCO guidelines. 
 
 
11.2.1.4. ILO Convention for Seafarers 
 
Commensurate with the work of the IMO on ship security, the International 
Labour Organization recognised the need to review the security status of ships’ 
crews both for their own safety and that of the ports they may visit. Hence, 
the ILO undertook a revision of its existing principles on seafarers’ credentials 
and prescribed a new model document in the Seafarers’ Identity Documents 
Convention (Revised), 2003.37 The security of this document is assured, so far 
                                                 
34
 Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade [hereinafter SAFE 
Framework], available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFand 
Documents/Conventions/Framework%20of%20Standards%20to%20Secure%20and%20Facilita
te%20Global%20Trade.pdf> (retrieved 4 December 2008). And see speech of Michael 
Schmitz, Director of Compliance and Facilitation, WCO, to the United Nations Security 
Council, 23 February 2007, available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/speeches/default.aspx?lid 
=1&id=57> (retrieved 3 December 2008). 
35
 SAFE Framework, id., Appendix to Annex 1. 
36
 Resolution of the Customs Co-operation Council on the Framework of Standards to Secure 
and Facilitate Global Trade, June 2006, available: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ 
files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Resolutions/Framework_of_Standards_to_Secu
re_and_Facilitate_Global_Trade_(june_2006).pdf> (retrieved 4 December 2008), para. 3.3. 
37
 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. C185, Seafarers’ Identity 
Documents Convention (Revised), 2003, Geneva, 19 June 2003 (in force 9 February 2005), 
  360 
as possible, by the use of durable materials and security features that inhibit 
tampering or falsification and a machine readable zone of information. 
The identity of the holder is established by a photograph and customary 
personal data together with a biometric template based on a fingerprint 
inscribed as a bar code.38 
 
 
11.2.1.5. ISO Standards for Secure Freight Containers  
 
A crucial component in the security of cargo stuffed in a container is the 
integrity of the seal on its lock. The International Organization for 
Standardization has taken steps to ensure such integrity by setting standards for 
high security container seals. Its published standard establishes uniform 
procedures for the classification and acceptance or withdrawal of mechanical 
freight container seals.39 Further, the ISO is working towards the introduction 
of a standard for electronic container seals. This project includes work on the 
transmission and identification of a seal and a system for verifying the accuracy 
of its use, along with data protection and authentication of the electronic 
device.40 
 
 
11.2.2. United States’ National Initiatives 
 
On 25 November 2002, the United States implemented the ISPS Code by 
passing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA),41 with 
effect on 1 July 2004, the same day the ISPS Code came into force. In addition 
to the base requirements of the ISPS Code noted previously, the MTSA 
instituted additional ones aimed at further reducing the vulnerability of US 
marine container supply chains. Since its implementation, there have been 
                                                                                                                                  
available: <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convode.pl?C185> (retrieved 4 December 2008), 
Annex 1. 
38
 Two fingerprints are used to create a biometric template, which is then loaded into a chip in 
the Seafarer’s Identity Document and may be read as an international barcode: see DDCOM, 
“Seafarers identity becomes clearer: New international labour Convention for seafarers’ ID 
documents comes into force,” World of Work Magazine 53 (2005), p. 35. 
39
 ISO/PAS 177712:2006 in ISO, ISO Standards Handbook: Freight Containers, 4th ed. (2006). 
40
 Freight containers – Mechanical seals, ISO/PAS 17712:2006, available: <http://www.iso.org/ 
iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=42791&ICS1=55&ICS2=180&ICS
3=10> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
41
 See MTSA, n. 5 above. 
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a number of refinements to the initial requirements,42 and coverage has been 
expanded under the SAFE Port Act 2006,43 discussed later. However, complete 
implementation of the US maritime security regime is highly unlikely as the US 
Coast Guard is hard pressed to recruit and train an adequate number of 
inspectors, let alone meet other requirements of the SAFE Port Act 2006.44  
One addition to the base regime is the 96-hour rule, which requires all 
vessels that will call at a US port to provide the US government with a detailed 
notice of arrival 96 hours in advance of their arrival at their first US port of call. 
This information enables the US government to determine if the vessel poses 
a threat to US interests and to allocate its security resources to those vessels it 
deems warrant closer scrutiny.  
A second addition, the 24-hour rule, requires both liner companies and 
non-vessel operating common carriers to provide the US government with 
a notice about each cargo container and its contents 24 hours in advance of its 
loading in a foreign port. This rule enables the US government to identify 
marine containers that are suspicious prior to being loaded and to target them 
for additional inspection. These two rules form a part of the programme known 
as the Container Security Initiative (CSI); the CSI places US customs officers 
in foreign ports and enables US Customs and Border Protection to optimise the 
advantages offered by the Department of Homeland Security’s risk assessment 
tool—the Automated Targeting System.  
The extraterritorial nature of this second rule in particular is quite wide-
ranging. As of 5 October 2007, 58 CSI ports accounted for 85 percent of all 
traffic bound for the United States.45 A majority of the largest container ports in 
the world are members of the Container Security Initiative, including 23 EU 
ports and three Canadian ports.46 Exceptions, however, include some of the 
largest container ports in the world—Dalian, Guangzhou, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 
Qingdao, Tianjin and Xiamen in China as well as other large container ports in 
Egypt (Port Said), India (Jawaharlal Nehru), Indonesia (Tanjung Priok), Japan 
                                                 
42
 Government Accountability Office, Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers 
Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, D-05-404 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2005). 
43
 See SAFE Port Act, n. 6 above. 
44
 Government Accountability Office, Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of 
the SAFE Port Act (GAO-07-754T) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2007). 
45
 US Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative Ports, available: 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1165872287564.shtm> (retrieved 4 December 
2008). 
46
 The official US CSI web site indicates the three Canadian ports are Vancouver, Montreal and 
Halifax, while the Canadian Department of International Trade web site reports four, including 
Saint John. 
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(Osaka), the Philippines (Manila), Saudi Arabia (Jeddah) and Vietnam (Ho Chi 
Minh).47 
In addition to the MTSA and the CSI, the United States has more recently 
initiated the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) under the umbrella provided by the 
SAFE Port Act of 2006. This programme, established by the Department of 
Homeland Security in December 2006, focuses on freight screening in foreign 
ports. SFI programme funding is from the US budget and its initial phase 
deployed nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports, some deemed high 
risk—Port Qasim (Pakistan), Puerto Cortes (Honduras), and Port Salalah 
(Oman)—and others in significant trade originating markets—Southampton 
(United Kingdom), the Gamman Terminal at the Port of Busan (Korea), and 
Singapore.48 Marine containers at these ports are scanned for radiation before 
being loaded for the United States. Unlike the Automated Targeting System, in 
the case where an alarm is sounded, both host country officials and the 
Department of Homeland Security are simultaneously notified. Again security 
of cargo (and by implication vessel) are addressed outside the United States and 
before the vessel sails. 
The United States has also implemented a number of other programmes 
to ensure better management of cargo security. They are not specifically 
directed at shipping but they are mentioned here as they may have impacts 
indirectly on vessels when cargo is laden on board. One initiative often 
discussed in the security literature is C-TPAT, the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism. Only American companies can belong (the sole exception 
being some Mexican maquiladoras and, recently, foreign manufacturers who 
are invited), but it has extraterritorial application by implicating the shipping on 
which cargoes bound for the United States are carried. C-TPAT membership is 
supposed to increase the probability of faster processing at borders for the cargo 
of members. This implies that non-members face greater likelihood that their 
marine containers will be stopped and inspected.49 What C-TPAT has done, 
however, is encourage US multinational companies to ensure that the security 
efforts of their supply chain partners are better than those of non-partners. 
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 See US Customs and Border Protection, n. 45 above. 
48
 US Department of Homeland Security, “DHS and DOE Launch Secure Freight Initiative,” 
Press Release (7 December 2006), available: <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_ 
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 According to US Customs and Border Protection (website at <http://www.cbp.gov> 
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Given its US-centric approach, several countries, including Canada, have 
adopted their own programmes that mirror the C-TPAT requirements.50 
A second initiative aims to interdict shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). Known as the Proliferation Security Initiative, it operates 
cooperatively through inter-state partnership arrangements to establish best 
practices and to coordinate readiness and action in response to an apprehended 
security incident. A Statement of Interdiction Principles was adopted in Paris 
on 4 September 2003, one of which urges participating states “to seriously 
consider providing consent ... to the boarding and searching of its own flag 
vessels by other states” when they are reasonably suspected of moving WMD 
cargoes.51 
 
 
11.3. Maritime Security in the EU and Canada 
 
11.3.1. EU Practices and Policies 
 
11.3.1.1. Introduction 
 
The EU has a great interest in maritime affairs. According to the EU 
Commission, there is a clear case for an integrated European maritime policy.52 
Twenty out of 25 constituent states are coastal states, and the total coastline of 
the EU is over 65,000 km in length. Of note, the offshore marine area of the 
EU—encompassing territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental 
shelves of its Member States—is larger than the land territory of the EU. 
European maritime areas account for over 40 percent of the gross national 
product of the EU.53 Oceans, therefore, play a vital role in the EU’s economic 
and social life, and this maritime dimension has increased especially after the 
2004 enlargement. On the one hand, this maritime orientation creates 
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opportunities but, on the other hand, incurs significant challenges. It is argued 
that the scale of these challenges, and the types of action needed to address 
them, is better tackled at the supranational level than by individual member 
states. However, the EU has certain constitutional limitations. Individual 
Member States exercise sovereign rights. Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community requires the Community to act within the limits of 
the powers conferred upon it by the treaty and the objectives assigned to it in 
the treaty. In areas that do not fall within its exclusive jurisdiction, 
the Community may take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. Any 
action by the Community also shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the treaty.54 This means that the Community action must 
conform to the principles of both subsidiarity and proportionality. An integrated 
European maritime policy therefore has to align with these principles.55 
The Commission needed to develop the overall framework for a marine 
strategy for the European Union in collaboration with the existing regional 
conventions. In order to draw up the strategy, the Commission established 
a consultation process open to participation from all relevant stakeholders (e.g., 
Member States and candidate countries, key non-EU neighbouring countries, 
international commissions and conventions, industry and non-governmental 
organisations). On 24 October 2005, after two years of intensive stakeholder 
consultations, the Commission presented the European Marine Strategy 
(EMS).56 The Strategy suggests the need for a comprehensive and integrated 
Community policy on oceans and seas by putting an end to sector-by-sector 
approaches to maritime affairs. The Strategy resulted in the adoption of 
a proposed Maritime Strategy Directive (MSD). While most of the Member 
States recognised the need for a co-ordinated marine strategy, some of them 
were not ready to accept additional binding commitments.57 The need for 
“an all embracing Maritime Policy,” however, has become one of the strategic 
objectives of the Commission for 2005–2009.58 The proposed MSD defines 
common objectives and principles, but leaves Member States free to plan and 
implement measures at national and regional levels taking into account the 
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diverse regional conditions. The proposed MSD highlights the development of 
strategies for the integrated management of all human activities in marine 
regions. Member States are encouraged, amongst themselves and with third 
countries sharing the same marine region, when appropriate, to act within the 
framework of existing regional seas conventions.59 Finally, on 14 May 2008, 
the European Community adopted the Marine Strategy Framework Directive.60 
In March 2005, the European Commission began work towards the 
adoption of a Green Paper on Maritime Policy. The proposals were outlined in 
the communication “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: 
A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas.”61 This was actually the first step 
towards a coherent and integrated oceans policy in Europe along the lines of 
other countries, such as Australia, Canada, Portugal, and the United States. 
The EU, thus, has attempted to develop a comprehensive integrated, coherent 
and holistic ocean management system. On 7 June 2006, the EU Commission 
adopted its Green Paper on Maritime Policy with the intention of generating 
wide-scale discussion on the need for and formation of a EU approach to 
maritime policy.62 Subsequently, on 10 October 2007, the Commission adopted 
“An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union,”63 the so-called Blue 
Book, with an accompanying document containing an action plan for the 
integrated maritime policy.64 
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11.3.1.2. EU Legislation on Maritime Security 
 
Maritime security related legislation at the Community level began after the 
amendments to the SOLAS Convention were adopted in 2002. Since the 
objectives of the IMO amendments, which introduced the ISPS Code, cannot be 
realised by the Member States individually, the EU adopted Regulation 
No. 725/2004 to incorporate the provisions of the SOLAS amendments and the 
ISPS Code. The Regulation defines maritime security as “the combination of 
preventive measures intended to protect shipping and port facilities against 
threats of international unlawful acts.”65  
There are two objectives in Regulation No. 725/2004. First, it is aimed at 
introducing and implementing Community measures to enhance the security of 
ships used in international trade and of associated port facilities in the face of 
threats of intentional unlawful acts. Second, the Regulation provides a basis for 
the harmonised interpretation, implementation and Community monitoring of 
the special measures to enhance maritime security in accordance with the 
SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.66 However, unlike IMO rules, the 
Regulation also applies to some domestic shipping, i.e., between ports within 
the same Member State.67 According to Article 3 of the Regulation, Member 
States had to apply Part A of the ISPS Code in full for international shipping by 
1 July 2004 and to Class A domestic passenger shipping by 1 July 2005.68 
The Member States, based on a mandatory security risk assessment, were 
required to decide by 1 July 2007 how to apply the provisions of the regulations 
to other categories of ships operating domestic services. While the ISPS Code 
applies to ships, companies and port facilities, according to Article 7, 
Regulation 725/2004 does not apply to ships of war and troop ships, cargo ships 
of less than 500 gross registered tonnes, ships not propelled by mechanical 
means, wooden ships of primitive build, fishing vessels, or vessels not engaged 
in commercial activities. Moreover, in the implementation of the ISPS Code, 
the EU has taken a more stringent position than IMO requires. For example, in 
Article 3(5), the EU made much of Part B of the ISPS Code mandatory; as the 
IMO does not make these provisions mandatory, some argue that 
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implementation of the ISPS Code in European ports is impressive and that all 
players concerned are doing their best to make it a success.69  
Regulation 725/2004 is complemented by Directive 2005/65/EC,70 which 
goes beyond port facility boundaries in laying down security measures that 
shall be observed in ports. Member States must ensure that the port security 
measures introduced by the Directive are closely coordinated with measures 
taken pursuant to Regulation 725/2004.71 In addition, Member States shall 
ensure that when port security assessments are carried out, they take into 
account, as a minimum, the detailed requirements listed in Annex I of the 
Directive.72 Member States are required to introduce a system of security levels 
for ports or parts of ports as defined in Regulation 725/2004.73 Enhancement of 
port security measures and clearance are delineated in Directive 2005/65/EC, 
which in Annexes I (port security assessment) and II (port security plan) 
provides detailed requirements about control mechanisms, clearance systems, 
luggage and cargo controls, background checks for personnel, and so on. 
Moreover, Regulation 725/2004 implements IMO’s SOLAS regulation on Ship 
Security Alert System in EU law. 
For the EU, violations are penalised by the respective Member States. 
Article 14 of Regulation 725/2004 states that Member States decide the 
penalties for violations of its provisions. Thus, according to EU laws, although 
enforcement of legislation lies with the Member States, the Commission retains 
the right and the duty to inspect whether proper implementation of Regulation 
725/2004 within the Member States is observed.74 Member States of the EU are 
expected to ensure cooperation with the Commission’s inspectors. 
The “Member State shall ensure that, upon request, Commission inspectors 
have access to all relevant security related documentation,” which includes the 
national programme for implementation of Regulation 725/2004 and its 
associated data and monitoring reports.75 The European Maritime Safety 
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Agency, created by EC Regulation 1406/2002, provides technical assistance, 
making technical experts available to participate in the Commission’s 
inspection programme.76  
Another step the EU has taken is the adoption of “security amendments” 
to the Community Customs Code77 to protect the customs territory of the 
Community and to provide the EU with a common risk management system. 
The goal is a harmonised application of customs controls in order to minimise 
the risks to the Community and its citizens and to the Community’s trading 
partners78 via commonly agreed standards and risk criteria for the selection of 
goods and economic operators by the Member States.79 The regulations cover 
entry, exit, transit, transfer and end-use of goods moved between the customs 
territory of the Community and third countries, as well as the presence of goods 
that do not have Community status. By international agreement, custom 
controls for the correct application of the Community legislation may be carried 
out in a third country as well.80 
 
 
11.3.1.3. EU Policy Development  
 
The EU Commission has highlighted a clear need for future policy development 
in the field of maritime security. In 2006, the Commission planned to launch 
a wider debate on the concept of a “common European maritime area,” one 
where both the ship and the goods could be reliably tracked throughout its 
journey, thereby reducing the need for individual state controls in purely intra-
Community trade.81 As stated previously, in 2007, the EC published 
a Communication on an Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union.82 
The Communication, inter alia, placed importance on a maritime surveillance 
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system, on maritime data and information infrastructure, and on the visibility of 
maritime Europe. All these efforts are intended to ensure overall security in 
European waters. An integrated approach, the Commission stated, is required 
“to meet the challenge of transnational security threats,” for which a higher 
degree of coordination is a necessary pre-requisite.83  
An example of such integration is the development of a network of vessel 
tracking and e-navigation systems for European coastal waters and the high 
seas, including satellite monitoring and long range identification and tracking 
(LRIT). The Marine Strategy Framework Directive, discussed previously, 
defined European marine regions and sub-regions.84 It is argued that LRIT 
systems across the European marine regions using satellite communications 
will have highly beneficial effects on shipping in the European Community. 
This is particularly important for “motorways of the sea” traffic where a ship 
sails between two Member States.85 To this end, the Commission has 
undertaken responsibility to promote cooperation between the coast guards and 
similar agencies of Member States, and to take steps towards greater 
interoperability of surveillance systems and the establishment of a European 
Marine Observation and Data Network86 to enhance maritime safety and 
security.  
In addition, the EU Green Paper on maritime policy strongly urges 
Member States to ratify, as soon as possible, existing international maritime 
conventions, including the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, so as to 
provide a legal framework for the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. As 
some Member States have concluded bilateral boarding agreements with the 
United States, coordinated action at the EU level towards such initiatives is 
highly desirable.87 
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11.3.1.4. EU Cooperation with the United States 
 
The EU has further designed its maritime security policy to enhance 
cooperation with third countries, especially with the United States, in the fight 
against terrorism. The US initiatives relating to maritime security measures 
were discussed above. The measures require bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. For example, the US Coast Guard’s International Port Security 
Program has worked closely with the European Union to establish a strong 
relationship to further improve practices in ports located both in the EU and in 
the United States.88 There has been in place between the United States and the 
EU, since 1997, an Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
in Custom Matters (CMAA). On 22 April 2004, the two parties signed a further 
Agreement that extended the scope of their 1997 Agreement by expanding 
customs cooperation to ensure that general customs control takes due account 
of security concerns.89 The EU Council, by Decision 2004/634/EC, encouraged 
Member States to expand the CSI to all the Community ports through 
arrangements with the United States. As is the case elsewhere in the world, 
Community ports participating in the CSI station US customs officials at the 
port. These measures are, however, subject to conformity with the EU Treaty 
and compatibility with the CMAA as expanded by the 2004 Agreement.90 By 
2007, the CSI had been implemented in 23 EU ports, and no further ports have 
been added since, signalling that further interest on the part of the US 
government in expanding the initiative is unlikely.91 
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While the EU remains committed to working closely with the United 
States in order to counter terrorism, concern remains that some of the import 
measures applied on security grounds may be used as a disguised form of 
protectionism or as a non-tariff barrier.92 The European Commission, Member 
States, and trading partners of the European Union are especially concerned 
about the US legislation. The CSI programme’s stated intention of scanning 
100 percent of inbound containers could incur trade-dampening costs. 
A detailed quantitative analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of 100 percent 
container scanning confirms that the impacts on costs, delays and security will 
be severe.93 Furthermore, 100 percent scanning runs counter to a risk-based 
management perspective: 
 
… some European customs officials have told us that the 100 
percent scanning requirement is in contrast to the risk-based strategy 
behind CSI and C-TPAT, and the WCO has stated that implementation 
of 100 percent scanning would be ‘tantamount to abandonment of risk 
management’.94 
 
In addition to the potential for major trade disruptions, the additional 
administrative burden for EU businesses and taxpayers, and the SAFE Port Act 
standards for container security and/or smart box technology are expected to 
negatively impact the competitiveness of EU suppliers.95 In addition, the 
presence of naturally occurring radioactive materials is expected to be 
disruptive.96 According to the EC Ambassador at the World Trade 
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Organization, Eckart Guth, these measures will not necessarily increase 
security, but will increase transaction costs for exporters and customs services 
worldwide. They will affect the smooth circulation of trade.97 
 
 
11.3.2. Canadian Practices and Policies 
 
11.3.2.1. Canadian Legislation on Maritime Security 
 
As one of the G8 countries, Canada is a major trading nation. Much of its trade 
is carried by sea; indeed, of Canada’s non-US trade in 2007, 64.4 percent was 
carried by the marine mode.98 Although Canada only has a small number of 
ocean-going merchant vessels on its national shipping registry, its flag is flown 
by a significant number of bulk carriers operating in the St. Lawrence 
Seaway/Great Lakes system. These maritime interests add to Canada’s concern 
for safe and secure shipping. It is no surprise, therefore, that Canada has long 
pursued a policy of engagement in the work of the IMO and its programmes for 
safer ships and cleaner seas, including participation in the IMO’s work on 
maritime security. 
Canadian marine policy is also strongly influenced by US intentions and 
practices. This influence results directly from Canada’s close associations with 
its powerful neighbour to the south. Canada has multiple social and political 
relationships with the United States, which include a range of both competitive 
interests and co-operative regulatory arrangements in their coastal waters and 
over the resources of their marginal seas. Most significant, Canada has two 
trade agreements of relevance—the Canada-US Trade Agreement, signed in 
1988, and the North American Free Trade Agreement, concluded five years 
later. Neither of these agreements includes maritime shipping within their 
remit, but both led to considerable increases in trading activity so that by 2005, 
in excess of 85 percent of Canada’s international trade was with the United 
States. Added to the exchange of trade is very substantial foreign direct 
investment; in fact, in a number of sectors Canada and the United States make 
things together. As a result, after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the 
United States, Canada reflected on its own security risks as well as negotiating 
with the United States about their joint continental concerns. The combination 
of these human, diplomatic and economic interests induced Canada to take 
                                                 
97
 See Guth, n. 92 above.  
98
 Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2007 Annual Report (Ottawa: Transport 
Canada, 2008), Table EC7. 
  373 
vigorous action against the threat of maritime insecurity, which included rapid 
implementation of the international ISPS Code and additional maritime 
regulations that closely match the national initiatives of the United States. 
The provisions of the ISPS Code are applied in Canada by government 
regulations99 made pursuant to the Marine Transportation Security Act.100 Their 
application is fulsome; indeed the Canadian regulations exceed the 
implementation requirements of the Code in several respects. In particular, 
Canada enforces the ISPS Code more widely than required by imposing it not 
just against ships of the size or type designated by SOLAS, but also against 
“non-SOLAS” vessels. These are described as ships under the SOLAS 
minimum limit of 500 tons gross down to 100 tons gross, any vessel that carries 
more than 12 passengers regardless of tonnage, and all working barges that are 
carrying “certain dangerous cargoes”101 whenever they are engaged in 
international voyages.102 Thus Canada applies the ISPS Code’s standards to 
practically all foreign-going merchant ships, cruise ships, and ferries. Canada 
has also incorporated many elements of Part B of the ISPS Code, which are not 
mandatory, especially regarding restricted access to and around shipping, by 
imposing additional requirements on ferries, passenger vessels, cruise ships, 
certain dangerous cargoes facilities and barge fleeting stations, including 
provisions about personnel passes and keys.103 
Beyond ships, Canada also applies the ISPS Code to all marine facilities 
that interface with international shipping. These are defined in Canadian law as 
including “an area of land, water, ice or other supporting surface [together with 
any buildings, installations and equipment there] used, designed, prepared, 
equipped or set apart for use … for the arrival, departure, movement or 
servicing of vessels.”104 Canadian regulations apply the ISPS Code to all such 
marine facilities other than offshore drilling units and platforms.105 All ports 
and harbours are clearly included in separate specific provisions.106 The ISPS 
Code uses the phrase “port facility” which is defined by IMO resolution, rather 
than the Code itself, as “a location, as determined by the Contracting 
Government … where the ship/port interface takes place.”107 So it seems that 
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Canada has chosen to give the ISPS Code its widest possible application to 
coastal facilities for ships.  
In addition to the requirements of the ISPS Code, Canada has taken 
further regulatory steps in three other supportive directions, and has 
implemented administrative, in addition to criminal, penalties for violations. 
First, it has mandated the installation and use of security alert systems on 
vessels pursuant to IMO resolutions.108 Secondly, it has established 
requirements for the background security clearance of a comprehensive range 
of personnel connected in any way to shipping activities, whether cargo vessels 
or cruise ships, in the restricted areas of 13 principal ports and the marine traffic 
centres of the St. Lawrence Seaway.109 These requirements extend beyond on-
site port and waterfront workers who service ships, handle cargoes or direct 
passengers to any person who could cause a failure in the security system by 
reason of advance access to ships’ cargo or passenger documentation even, it 
seems, from a distant location.110 Security clearance is also voluntarily 
available to Canadian seafarers as a prerequisite to those who want a Canadian 
identity document. This document is not the same as the one prescribed under 
the ILO’s revised Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention described above 
and it does not contain biometric data of the holder. However, Canada is taking 
steps towards applying the ILO convention; tendering of a contract to fulfil ILO 
criteria is anticipated with a view to operating a compliant system in 2009.111 
Third, Canada has replicated US demands for 96 hours notice in advance 
of entering national waters. Canadian pre-arrival notices must provide an 
extensive list of information about the ship and its cargo, including its 
International Ship Security Certificate, a statement of when its last ten 
declarations of security were completed, and details of any security threats 
suffered at, as well as information about, its last ten ports of call.112 In addition, 
regulations made under the Canadian Customs Act113 reiterate the requirement 
of a 96-hour pre-arrival notice for liner shipping114 with the added demand that 
specified details about commercial goods stuffed in containers must be supplied 
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to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) at least 24 hours before loading 
at the foreign port of origin.115 This data is received and reviewed in Ottawa, 
where a risk assessment is made and a decision is reached about stopping, 
inspecting or interdicting the cargo upon arrival in Canada.  
Finally, as a means of enforcing all the regulatory prescriptions that give 
effect to the ISPS Code in Canada, the usual penal processes for violation have 
been enhanced by a system of simplified administrative penalties.116 These 
penalties are of two forms. Under one, the offender may be served with a notice 
of violation and a demand for payment of a prescribed penalty, which must be 
paid within 30 days unless the offender requests a review by the Transportation 
Appeal Tribunal of Canada (TATC).117 Alternatively, the violator may be 
required to enter an assurance of voluntary compliance in future and to deposit 
a sum of money as security for performance; a right of review by the TATC is 
available, but failure to comply will incur double the penalty prescribed for the 
original violation and forfeiture of the security deposit.118 
While the ISPS Code seeks to prevent maritime terrorism and minimise 
its effects, the SUA Convention and Protocols assert the prohibition of terrorist 
tactics. As a party to this convention, Canada has implemented its provisions in 
a couple of ways, twice over in fact. First, the proscriptions of the 1988 
Convention and Protocol have been engraved directly in Canada’s Criminal 
Code.119 Canada has not enacted the 2005 amendments to SUA but perhaps that 
is not so surprising since they are not yet in force internationally. Second, 
Canada has included the 1988 SUA offences in its own domestic anti-terrorism 
laws. In further additions to the Criminal Code, Canada has proscribed 
“terrorist activity” which is defined, in part, by reference to the offences under 
the SUA Convention and Protocol.120 Moreover, the Criminal Code goes on to 
prohibit a wider range of criminal actions that support terrorism. These include 
providing, collecting, making available or using property for terrorist 
activity,121 all of which are capable of encompassing terrorist attacks against 
ships, engaging ships to deliver terrorist bombs or other materiel, and using 
ships as terrorist weapons. 
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11.3.2.2. Canadian Policy Developments 
 
Transport Canada has declared that its marine security vision is “a nationally 
and internationally recognised marine transportation system that is secure, 
efficient and respects Canadian values.”122 Within that vision, the government 
department has a continuing mission that will “with partners, increase the level 
of Canada’s Marine Transportation Security System against: 1. unlawful 
interference, 2. terrorism attack, and 3. terrorist exploitation of it as a conduit to 
attack our allies.”123 The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group 
(IMSWG), formed by the Canadian government following the attacks of 11 
September 2001, leads fulfilment of this mission. Chaired by Transport Canada, 
the IMSWG coordinates the marine security efforts of nine other departments: 
Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of 
Justice, Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and 
Solicitor General of Canada.124 Together, these departments have undertaken 
a variety of security enhancing initiatives (in addition to the administrative 
programmes to operate and enforce the regulatory schemes already discussed) 
of which the following are of particular note. 
Scanning of cargo containers and their contents on arrival in Canada has 
been identified as an important security precaution. Two types of scanning 
equipment are operated. The Canada Border Services Agency employs a 
number of Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems or VACIS units for the 
purpose of scanning the contents of containers. These units are truck mounted, 
mobile, gamma ray scanning equipment that can generate an image of even 
densely loaded containers.125 Whether a container is taken temporarily out of 
the supply chain for VACIS scanning depends on the risk it is assessed to 
present. This risk assessment is made by CBSA for every arriving container by 
screening the information supplied by carriers 24 hours before the container is 
loaded in the port of origin, as described previously.  
A second scanning effort detects radioactive materials. By arrangement 
with the terminals, every container, as soon as it is offloaded from the ship by 
crane and placed on a terminal transporter, is driven through a radiation 
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detection portal before being stacked in the yard or loaded for onward surface 
transport.126 Any container that is shown to hold radioactive material is then 
isolated for further testing and investigation.127 
Domain awareness is another important aspect of Canada’s marine 
security system. Canada operates an air surveillance programme that conducts 
patrols both within and without Canada’s 200 nautical mile coastal zone for 
security purposes, fisheries enforcement, pollution detection, and sea ice 
coverage. The Department of National Defence is promoting an advanced radar 
system that can follow the curvature of the earth over the oceans. The Canadian 
Coast Guard is responsible for the shore-based components required to operate 
the automatic identification system (AIS) now required of ships by IMO.128 
Canada also fully supports the work of IMO to establish a global Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system for ships, which is now at the testing 
stage. The necessary regulations to implement Canada’s participation in the 
system are being drafted under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and should be in 
place during 2009. Canada is also committed to provide a national data centre 
for LRIT data exchange.129 
Cruise shipping in Canadian waters has grown greatly in recent years. 
Whether visiting port cities, cruising inland waters, or exploring the Canadian 
Arctic, these vessels pose a specific set of security risks beyond merchant 
shipping on account of the numbers of passengers on board. The requirements 
of the ISPS Code are enforced and security clearance is required of all 
personnel who service a cruise ship at sea or in port. In addition, everyone who 
goes on board or enters the restricted area around the dock is subjected to 
screening and search. Even so, Transport Canada is working towards a specific 
set of measures specially designed for cruise ships.130 
Separate consideration has been given to passenger vessels classed as 
“tall ships.” These visiting (training and cruising) sailing ships are subject to 
special security arrangements in accordance with ISPS Code standards, which 
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will be reviewed in the context of an overall review of Canada’s marine 
security regulations of 2004.131 
Finally, domestic coastal shipping is also the subject of security 
consideration. A risk assessment of different types of domestic shipping, 
including ferries, small commercial vessels, fishing boats and pleasure craft, as 
well as the port facilities they use, is being undertaken with a view to 
developing an appropriate security strategy. The higher risk classes of vessels, 
such as the large and busy vehicle and passenger ferries operating in British 
Columbia, will be subject to security requirements akin to the ISPS Code in 
order of priority. In 2008, active consultation with industry was being 
undertaken. Eventually the strategy will cover all domestic shipping by 
regulatory provisions that demand security measures commensurate by type of 
vessel and marine activity with the risk presented.132  
 
 
11.3.2.3. Canadian Co-operation with the United States 
 
As an immediate neighbour of the United States by land and sea, Canada has 
been co-operatively involved in North American security in all modes of 
transport. Perhaps more indicative than anything else, the response of Canada to 
the events of 11 September 2001 was immediate and supportive of its 
neighbour’s concerns about security. In addition to Canadian authorities 
providing a safe haven for those air passengers en route to the United States 
that day and unable to enter the United States during the air space lock down, 
Canada moved quickly to open a dialogue with US authorities on how matching 
regulations might be adopted so as to expedite security procedures while 
maintaining trade relationships. On 12 December 2001, Tom Ridge 
(responsible for US security) and John Manley (Canada’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) agreed on a common security approach, and signed a 30-Point Smart 
Border Declaration and Action Plan. The Smart Border list of projects included 
many that could be incorporated into a North American “perimeter clearance” 
process, including the agreement to station customs inspectors at each other’s 
seaports for targeted maritime container inspections. Subsequent execution of 
this initiative, however, now means that US Customs may inspect marine 
containers at Canadian seaports, and then again at land border crossings, in 
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addition to the inspection that might have been undertaken in advance of 
loading in the foreign port through the CSI. 
A 2004 compendium of Canada-US government collaboration identified 
two bilateral institutional arrangements relevant to marine security issues—the 
Canada-US Transportation Security Co-operation Group (with the 
Transportation Security Administration), and the Bi-National Marine Security 
Compliance and Enforcement Working Group.133 These administrative 
arrangements facilitate the operation of their respective national security 
officers and laws across their shared borders. In addition the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership signed between Canada, the United States, and Mexico 
at Waco, Texas, in 2005 set two relevant targets for North American security: 
(1) “Make compatible US-Canada requirements for participation in Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Partnership in Protection 
(PIP) within 36 months” (June 2008), and (2) “Develop appropriate linkages, 
including officer exchanges among Canadian, Mexican and US customs 
agencies, to ensure analysis of cargo data and appropriate sharing of 
information on high-risk shipments.”134 There is no evidence that the first target 
has been reached, and while the second was reported in 2006 as initiated,135 it 
can be considered in development. A detailed report on the progress achieved at 
the 2008 Summit of the three partners was not published; all that was released 
was a brief joint ministerial declaration indicating continued emphasis on 
security issues. It is too soon to have a clear understanding of what might be 
achieved under the Obama Administration.136  
An example of the Canada-United States bilateral relationship in 
operation is the application of their separate marine security regulations. 
Having determined they provide equivalent levels of security, the two states 
reached an arrangement for the reciprocal recognition and acceptance of each 
other’s documentary approval of a vessel’s security plan. This arrangement was 
first established in June 2004 and has since been amended to accommodate 
alternative security arrangements for passenger vessels and ferries that operate 
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on short fixed routes between the two countries on their Pacific and Atlantic 
coasts as well as across the rivers and lakes that separate them.137 Subsequently 
a Canada-United States Maritime Security Working Group was created in 
February 2006 to enhance the facilitation of their respective marine security 
operations.138 Topics of discussion between Canada and the United States have 
included joint vessel inspections of foreign flagged ships, reciprocal port visits 
to develop best practices, and seafarers’ identity documents.139 
 
 
11.4. EU and Canadian Approaches to Maritime Security Compared 
 
The approaches to maritime security of the EU and Canada display points both 
of convergence and divergence. Convergence in this context signifies similar or 
parallel implementation of security measures. Exactly the same tools are not 
necessarily used on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean; indeed maritime security 
regimes are typically works in progress, but both the EU and Canada can be 
seen as converging in their actions when they take steps for the same purpose 
towards the same goal. 
 A striking feature of the international maritime security regime at large 
is that its compulsory components—chiefly Part A of the ISPS Code—address 
the risk of terrorist threats to ships and ports but do not focus on that which 
gives purpose to their existence, that is to say, their cargoes. Cargo security has 
not been ignored, however; cargo protection is only advanced internationally by 
hortatory guidelines for supply chain management, such as those produced by 
WCO, and by whatever extra-territorial reach may be achieved by national 
initiatives, such as the US Cargo Security Initiative, the US Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism initiative, and the Canadian Partners in 
Protection programme. Whatever the merits of the difference in attention paid 
to the elaboration and enforcement of security regimes for ships, ports and 
cargoes, the international character of the measures concerning ships and ports 
almost inevitably ensures a degree of uniformity in application that the 
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essentially national development and proliferation of cargo initiatives cannot be 
expected to achieve. In light of these observations, the EU and Canada might be 
expected to converge in their actions to advance ship and port security but 
potentially to diverge in their approaches to trade and cargo security issues, 
especially as presented to them by US initiatives. The evidence drawn from the 
discussion above in this chapter confirms these expectations. 
Given the multilateral uniformity of maritime security imposed by the 
ISPS Code of the IMO and related programmes of other intergovernmental 
organisations—the multilateral platform as it has been described here, it is not 
surprising to find a high degree of convergence in EU and Canadian marine 
security regulations. Only small differences appear in their practices around the 
edges of the multilateral platform.  
In addition, both the EU and Canada have been faced with the need to 
respond to US security concerns. Their large and well-developed trading 
relations with the United States have encouraged broad cooperative 
arrangements bilaterally for the implementation of the ISPS Code. However, 
beyond the multilateral platform, and in response to the unilateral security 
initiatives of the United States concerning the cargo traffic carried by ships, the 
actions of the EU and Canada are more divergent. The different geographical, 
political and economic contexts of their relations with the United States presage 
a different outlook on the priorities for enhancing the cargo-related aspects of 
maritime security. 
These general observations about EU and Canadian approaches are 
substantiated by the following dialogue about the specific measures that each 
has, or has not, undertaken or proposed. Convergence around the ISPS Code is 
nearly complete. In respect of ships, Part A of the Code is mandated and Part B 
is also applied or followed closely. In addition, although the ISPS Code does 
not apply to domestic shipping, the EU has already imposed it on vessels that 
carry more than 12 passengers and Canada is working on a comparable security 
strategy for its domestic ferries. In one respect Canada has gone further than the 
EU, and, indeed further than the ISPS Code demands, by applying the Code to 
‘non-SOLAS’ ships, i.e. to classes of foreign-going vessels that are smaller than 
the ships regulated by SOLAS. Finally, in accordance with other IMO 
requirements under SOLAS, both the EU and Canada require ships to be 
equipped with an operable Ship Security Alert System. 
Regarding ports and harbours, the EU and Canada require the security 
plans and measures of the ISPS Code in all marine facilities that serve ships on 
international voyages. They also both mandate restricted access and personnel 
security clearance in sensitive areas around ships in port. In addition the EU 
already does, and Canada will, apply measures at least complementary to the 
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ISPS Code to the facilities that service domestic shipping that is subjected to 
security requirements.  
The prescriptions of the ISPS Code are the subject of criminal penalties in 
the event of violation in both the EU and Canada, but, in addition, Canada 
imposes two types of alternative, intentionally streamlined and quicker, 
administrative penalties. Instead of prosecution, an alleged perpetrator of 
an offence may be charged with a violation and fined unless a timely appeal is 
launched for a hearing about the incident, or a perpetrator may be invited to 
sign an assurance of voluntary compliance in future in addition to paying a fine 
for the past violation. 
Concerning seafarers, convergence also marks the steps the EU and 
Canada are taking towards security clearance and identification. Neither yet 
applies the ILO’s revised Convention on Seafarers’ Identity Documents but the 
EU has requested Member States to ratify it and Canada is working towards its 
implementation. Respecting the 2005 Protocol, which increases the criminal 
offences under the SUA Convention, the EU has similarly urged its Member 
States to ratify it. Canada has not, as yet, ratified the Protocol but already has 
wider criminal proscriptions against terrorism than the SUA Convention.  
Marine surveillance and domain awareness are important matters of 
current concern to both the EU and Canada. Both are working with IMO to 
establish its proposed LRIT and both operate multiple ship, air and radar 
surveillance systems over their marginal seas together with national databases. 
The EU is additionally seeking to unify and enhance the existing Member 
States’ ship tracking systems by establishing a Europe-wide marine observation 
and data network.  
Beyond these internal actions and policies, the EU and Canada also 
recognise cooperation with other states as an essential part of the struggle to 
suppress maritime terrorism. Canada believes its interests are best served by 
working with like-minded states in institutional capacity building, in 
harmonising operational guidelines and standards, and in sharing best practices 
over maritime security. It pursues these objectives by fostering global 
partnerships through, for example, the G8 Roma/Lyon Process, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation’s Marine Security Experts Sub-Group and the 
Organization of American States.140 The EU has similar external cooperative 
involvements in addition to its internal thrust to achieve a unified and integrated 
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marine policy, including maritime security, over the common European 
maritime area.141 
Of particular importance to both the EU and Canada are their relations 
with the United States. Both have established a variety of bilateral institutional 
relationships and administrative arrangements with the United States for the 
furtherance of maritime security. Specific cooperative activities as a result of 
these arrangements include the posting of US Customs and Border Protection 
agents in EU and Canadian ports, and reciprocal appointment of customs 
officers in US ports. These postings implement the US Container Security 
Initiative, although Canada’s participation predates the formal establishment of 
that US programme. Canada and European Member States have also pursued 
with the United States a varying degree of bilateral discussion or agreement 
about boarding and inspecting each other’s flagged vessels.  
The US CSI 96-hour and 24-hour security programmes discussed above 
have heavy information requirements that have not been resisted by other 
states, probably as a result of their desire to maintain positive trade and 
economic relations with the United States. However, the cargo related data 
demanded by the United States continues to increase. For example, the latest 
addition at the time of writing was the so-called “10 + 2 Rule,” which was 
submitted in November 2008 to the US Federal Register as an interim final rule 
with effect 60 days after publication. This Rule requires importers to submit 10 
data elements about their cargo at least 24 hours before it is loaded in the port 
of origin and demands carriers supply two further data elements—the vessel’s 
stowage plan and any container status messages—within 48 hours of departing 
from that port. It is anticipated that these greater informational demands by the 
United States in its pursuit of cargo security will be mutely accepted as the 
industry has adapted to the rising volume of similar requirements in the past. 
Canada cooperates with the United States in maritime security further 
than the EU in two particular ways. Canada and the United States have 
a bilateral arrangement for the reciprocal recognition of each other’s ship 
security documentation. Canada has also established a comparable cargo 
programme, Partners in Protection, to the US C-TPAT initiative that is 
supposed to fast-track containerised cargo at border crossings. 
The present point of divergence in this otherwise cooperative spirit 
amongst the EU, Canada and the United States appears to be their policies 
about cargo scanning. The US SAFE Port Act sets the level of scanning of 
arriving containers at 100 percent. This target, already noted to be likely to fail 
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in implementation in the United States, is supposed to be achieved by 2012. At 
present, the EU and Canada only engage in scanning a small percentage of 
containers as a result of their risk assessments of cargo documentation. Neither 
seems intent on increasing the proportion of its own scanning. Moreover, while 
Canada has not spoken out, the EU has expressed strong objections to US plans 
to advance to 100 percent scanning of inbound containers, asserting that the 
costs and delays involved will be severe. For certain, the physical interruption 
in the movement of containers for the purpose of scanning their cargo contents 
is a very much greater interference in the free flow of the international supply 
chains than the heavy informational burden of advanced notification about 
those cargoes. As a result, it is argued, trade will be inhibited and 
competitiveness will be reduced. In any case, 100 percent cargo scanning would 
amount to abandonment of the risk management approach espoused throughout 
the multilateral platform of maritime security as well as the United States’ own 
programmes, as the US Government Accountability Office itself has 
reported.142 
A quite separate aspect of maritime security that is worthy of 
consideration is the repetitive nature of security checks liable to be imposed 
even in a supposedly security fast-tracked supply chain, such as those of US C-
TPAT participants, or of AEOs within the SAFE Framework guidelines of the 
WCO. A single container of cargo may pass through several frontiers from its 
inland origin, across the ocean, and on to its inland destination; to use the 
language of the ISPS Code, such a container will be involved in a number of 
ship, port and terminal interfaces. For example, a cargo from Germany bound 
for Chicago via Rotterdam and Halifax, Nova Scotia, might be interdicted for 
inspection at the German/Dutch frontier, in the port of Rotterdam, in the port of 
Halifax, and at the US/Canadian border. While each state is entitled to exercise 
its sovereign powers to inspect cargo arriving at its borders, the multiplicity of 
effort to apply the ISPS Code-mandated or similar measures at every stage of 
the movement seems excessively wasteful of resources and likely to create 
unnecessary delay in trade deliveries. One may legitimately wonder about the 
success of the risk management approach to maritime security when, as 
reported, a shipment can suffer 28 security documentation or inspection 
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requirements in one 5-day voyage between Canada and the United States.143 
This unspoken problem of administration seems to beg the attention of the EU 
and Canada as well as other states that promote risk management of maritime 
security.  
 
 
11.5. Conclusion 
 
The EU and Canada have each put in place the ISPS Code and are moving 
towards fulfilment of the other elements of the multilateral platform of 
international maritime security. In these endeavours they have worked 
cooperatively with third countries, particularly the United States. Now they are 
addressing the security threats to their domestic shipping in apparently 
comparable ways. A very high level of convergence in the approaches of the 
EU and Canada to maritime security is evident. Divergence from the ISPS 
Code, in the form of unilateral action exceeding its requirements, only seems to 
occur in two respects: (1) the application by Canada of the ISPS Code to 
smaller, “non-SOLAS” ships, and (2) the use by Canada of administrative 
penalties as alternatives to the criminal prosecution of Code violators. 
The most significant divergence between EU and Canadian perspectives 
arise over cooperation with the United States. Canada clearly has a closer 
operational relationship than the EU with the United States. Amongst 
cooperative practices, their reciprocal recognition of shipping security 
documents is clear evidence of that. By contrast, while Canada, like the EU, 
only engages in scanning a small percentage of cargo containers, the EU has 
spoken strongly against the United States’ goal of 100 percent scanning. This 
difference of opinions over the cost effectiveness and risk management of 
different degrees of cargo scanning is likely to present on-going problems in the 
administration of cargo security programmes on the ground and to require 
continuous negotiations at the policy level between the EU and the United 
States as well. Canada has not made public its views on the issue but, given its 
shared landmass and borders with the United States, it is obviously more 
difficult for Canada to resist its neighbour’s initiative even if it wishes to.  
Yet the potential tension over this difference in plans and perspectives 
may, perhaps, be relieved ultimately by the inability of the United States to 
reach its goal of 100 percent scanning as a result of the practical problems it 
presents, and the difficulty, as the US Government Accountability Office has 
                                                 
143
 As recounted by J. Greenway, Vice-President Operations, Seaway Marine Transportation, at 
“Canada and the IMO: Maritime Symposium 2008,” Halifax, Nova Scotia, 17 November 2008. 
  386 
reported, that the United States is having in fulfilling the mandate of the SAFE 
Port Act. A more pressing problem that seems not to have been engaged by the 
EU, Canada or the United States in promoting maritime security is the expense, 
wasted effort and delay, along with the resulting costs incurred by commercial 
parties, consumers and taxpayers, that may be occasioned by multiple cargo 
scans and documentary checks. The EU and Canada, along with the United 
States, appear to need to extend their dialogue about the administrative quality 
and efficiency of their risk management of maritime security. 
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Chapter 12 
 
Illegal Immigration by Sea as a Challenge to the Maritime Border Security of 
the European Union with a Special Focus on Maritime Surveillance Systems 
 
Henna Tervo, Kamrul Hossain, and Adam Stepien 
 
 
12.1. Introduction 
 
This contribution introduces illegal immigration across maritime borders as one 
of the most topical challenges to the maritime border security of the Member 
States of the European Union (EU). The study pays special attention to 
maritime border surveillance, which plays a crucial role in ensuring efficient 
border security and control, and tackles the problem of unlawful acts, such as 
unauthorised border crossings, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug 
smuggling, and illicit arms trafficking. 
Prevention of illegal immigration is a top priority issue in the EU’s 
agenda. The majority of illegal immigrants entering the EU by sea originate 
from African countries. They come across the Mediterranean Sea or the 
Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the Canary Islands. The sea crossing 
threatens the lives of many immigrants as they often travel by boats that are 
unseaworthy and overcrowded. Accidents occur and many unfortunate 
immigrants lose their lives at sea.  
The immigrant pressure from Africa with its unfortunate consequences is 
expanding, and therefore the issue has become a subject of increasing attention 
in the EU. While illegal immigration was put under EU jurisdiction in 1999, 
external border control and surveillance continues to be responsibility of the 
Member States. Current border controls provide insufficient coverage, and 
parallel competences have proven to be inadequate to prevent immigration 
flows. In order to enhance surveillance, the EU has undertaken a series of 
initiatives—including enhanced integration of surveillance systems and 
cooperation between various agencies responsible for migration control and 
border surveillance, and the creation of the Frontex agency—and continues to 
aim at more effective border management at both the national and European 
level.  
This contribution describes the problem of illegal immigration by sea and 
its extent in the European Union. It outlines the most relevant EU policies and 
regulations related to it. Rights and obligations provided by international legal 
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instruments are examined separately. Special attention is paid to the current 
surveillance systems of the Member States and the EU. Finally, the main EU 
proposals to enhance the control of the marine borders of the southern Member 
States, in particular the proposal to establish the European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR), are outlined. 
 
 
12.2. The Problem of Illegal Immigration Across the Maritime Borders of 
the EU Member States 
 
Illegal immigration is defined here as an unauthorised entry of a third-country 
national to the territory of a Member State of the EU by land, sea or air. This 
definition also includes third-country nationals who arrive in EU with a valid 
visa but do not departure after their visa has expired and asylum seekers who 
refuse to leave after the rejection of their application for asylum. The focus here 
is merely on the aspects of illegal immigration by sea and does not cover 
immigrants who already are in a Member State seeking asylum, those who have 
overstayed their visa, or immigrants arriving in the EU through external borders 
other than maritime borders. 
Illegal immigration is a major challenge for the EU; it is estimated that 
there are between 4.5 and 8 million illegal immigrants living in the Union at 
present and the figure increases by approximately 350,000–500,000 per year.1 
The majority of illegal immigrants trying to enter the EU by sea come across 
the western and central Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean between 
Africa and the Canary Islands. The main immigrant flows depart from Libya, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and northern Mauritania aiming to reach either the mainland 
of Spain or Italy or their islands, such as the Canary Islands and Sicily, or the 
island state of Malta. Most immigrants originate from sub-Saharan and other 
parts of Africa and have first travelled long distances to reach the departure 
countries.2 Another route, used mostly by Middle Eastern and Central Asian 
migrants, goes across the eastern Mediterranean Sea.3 
                                                 
1
 Commission of the European Communities, “Towards a comprehensive European Migration 
Policy: Cracking down on employment of illegal immigrants and fostering circular migration 
and mobility partnerships,” Press releases RAPID (IP/07/678, 16 May 2007), available: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/678&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (retrieved 20 January 2007). 
2
 “Key facts: Africa to Europe migration,” BBC News (2 July 2007), available: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm> (retrieved 10 July 2008). 
3
 Frontex, “Joint MTM Map on Irregular Mediterranean and African Migration Routes, 
Mediterranean Transit Migration,” Press releases of FRONTEX (22 January 2007), available: 
  389 
The crossing is highly risky as the boats and vessels used are often 
unseaworthy and/or overcrowded. Accidents are common and many lives are 
lost at sea. During the past few years, thousands of Africans are believed to 
have died at sea in their attempts to reach Europe.4 The use of cargo vessels, 
fishing boats and pleasure crafts as a way to transfer illegal immigrants is also 
widespread and problematic for the EU although not as life-threatening for the 
immigrants themselves.5 In addition, illegal immigration may have other 
serious consequences to the security of the EU such as trafficking in human 
beings, smuggling of drugs and weapons, and terrorism.6 
The southern Member States of the EU, in particular Spain, Italy and 
Malta, are under great pressure as they are at the frontline receiving illegal 
immigrants. The figure of over 22,000 immigrants arriving to Italy by boat in 
2006 demonstrates the magnitude of the problem.7 It is expected that the 
migration pressure from Africa will further increase due to, inter alia, the 
continent’s rapidly growing population rate.8 
 
 
12.2.1. Legal and Policy Framework 
 
The legal and policy framework for illegal immigration by sea and maritime 
surveillance consists of policy making at the EU and national levels, as well as 
the provisions and principles of international law, Community law, and national 
legislation. The national policies and laws of the EU Member States are not 
                                                                                                                                  
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art11.html> (retrieved 7 August 
2008). 
4
 For instance, in July 2008, fourteen African immigrants were reported to have died from heat 
exposure during the passage and fourteen were believed to have drowned in another accident. 
See “Fourteen Africans die on boat to Spain,” Reuters (10 July 2008), available: 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL1011279720080710> (retrieved 10 July 2008). 
5
 Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration across the maritime borders of the 
Member States of the European Union adopted by the Council 27 November 2003, Council 
doc. 15445/03, available: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15445.en03.pdf> 
(retrieved 14 July 2008). 
6
 Commission of the European Communities, “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe,” 
Press releases RAPID (MEMO/08/402, 17 June 2008), available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/402&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en> (retrieved 4 August 2008). 
7
 See “Key facts,” n. 2 above. 
8
 “Visit to Ceuta and Melilla–Mission Report, Technical Mission to Morocco on Illegal 
Immigration 7th October – 11th October 2005,” Press Release (MEMO/05/380, Brussels, 19 
October 2005), available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/ 
05/380&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (retrieved 10 July 2008). 
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dealt with extensively here. The Member States are mainly examined in the 
context of surveillance systems as the control of the external borders of the EU 
continues to be their responsibility. However, there are also some surveillance 
measures taken by the EU that are mainly coordinative and supportive in 
nature. The legal basis of EU action regarding border control is provided in 
Article 62 (2a) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.9  
 
 
12.2.1.1. Background: Towards Common Immigration Policy 
 
In contrast to border surveillance, which continues to be in Member States’ 
control, illegal immigration came under EU jurisdiction in 1999 by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.10 Since that time, the EU has sought to formulate a common 
migration policy, including all aspects of illegal immigration, and has taken 
a series of initiatives to reach the goal.11 It is worth noting, however, that while 
                                                 
9
 Article 62(2a) reads: “The Council […] shall, within a period of five year after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, adopt […] measures on the crossing of the external borders 
of the Member States which shall establish: (a) standards and procedures to be followed by 
Member States in carrying out checks on persons at such borders.” Consolidated version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated text), published in Official Journal 
C 325 of 24 December 2002, available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/ 
pdf/12002E_EN.pdf> (retrieved 22 August 2008). Further regulation on external border control 
is provided in the Schengen Borders Code, of which Article 12 deals with border surveillance in 
general terms, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders [hereinafter Schengen Borders Code], available: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=R
egulation&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=562> (retrieved 22 August 2008). 
10
 In particular, paragraph 3(b) of Article 63 put immigration under the competence of the EU; 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and related acts, adopted by the European Council on 16 and 17 June 
1997, signed on 2 October 1997 by the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen Member States and 
entered into force on 1 May 1999, Official Journal C 340 (10 November 1997), available: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html> (retrieved 9 July 2008). 
11
 The first real call for common policy on immigration and asylum was made in the European 
Council Meeting in Tampere in 1999. For an overview of the early years’ progress towards a 
 common immigration policy, see Committee of the Regions, Local and Regional Authorities 
and the Immigration Challenge (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2005), pp. 15–24; see also, Commission of the European Communities, Common 
policy on illegal immigration, Communication from the Commission, COM(2001) 672 
(Brussels, 15 November 2001) available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc? 
smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2001&nu_doc=6
72> (retrieved 15 August 2008) [European Commission’s Communications cited hereinafter by 
the main title]. Of special importance among the EU initiatives to promote a common migration 
policy are the three Council action plans on illegal immigration, external border control and 
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several legislative instruments have been adopted, e.g., in asylum, relatively 
few binding regulations and directives have been adopted on illegal 
immigration, aside from several binding decisions of the Council of the 
European Union.12 
Despite the progress so far, the EU continues to strive for further 
integration on illegal immigration, asylum, and other migration issues.13 
The goal of the EU’s migration policy is two tiered: preventing illegal 
immigration on one hand, and encouraging legal migration on the other, in 
order to ensure the sustainability of the labour market of the EU.14 The main 
tools of the first goal are, inter alia, reinforcing external border security, 
strengthening cooperation with third countries, fighting against trafficking of 
human beings, preventing illegal employment, and improving return policies.15 
Of special concern for the EU are immigrants in a genuine need of 
asylum whose access to the EU is given priority.16 However, EU policy has 
                                                                                                                                  
return policy, namely Council doc. 6621/1/02: Proposal for a comprehensive plan to combat 
illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the European Union, available: 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st06/06621-r1en2.pdf> (retrieved 14 July 2008); 
Plan for management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
Council doc. 10019/02, available: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st10/ 
10019en2.pdf> (retrieved 1 August 2008); and Proposal for a Return Action Programme, 
Council doc. 14673/02, available: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/st14/ 
14673en2.pdf> (retrieved 15 July 2008). 
12
 A list of EU legislation, Community acts, and main proposals regarding illegal immigration is 
available on the website for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/illegal/doc_immigration_illegal_en.
htm> (retrieved 14 July 2008). 
13
 E.g., Commission of the European Communities, A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: 
Principles, actions and tools, Communication from the Commission, COM(2008) 359, 
available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0359:FIN: 
EN:PDF> (retrieved 4 August 2008); for an evaluation of the EU immigration policy, see, e.g., 
P. Bendel, “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress 
Europe?” Migration Letters 2 (April 2005), pp. 20–31. 
14
 Unambiguous encouragement for legal migration was given, for example, in the COM(2006) 
735, which states that “the EU will need migrants to ensure the sustainability of its labour 
markets given its demographic developments.” The main aspect of the demographic change is 
the ageing European population resulting in the lack of workforce, see Committee of the 
Regions, Local and regional authorities and the immigration challenge (Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), p. 13. 
15
 Commission of the European Communities, Policy priorities in the fight against illegal 
immigration of third-country nationals, Communication from the Commission, COM(2006) 402 
(Brussels, 19 July 2006), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi! 
celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=402> (re-
trieved 11 July 2008).  
16
 E.g., Commission of the European Communities, Policy plan on asylum – An integrated 
approach to protection across the EU, Communication from the Commission, COM(2008) 360 
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been criticised as “sealing of the borders of European States” and not providing 
adequate refugee protection.17  
 
 
12.2.1.2. Increasing Attention on Illegal Immigration by Sea 
 
In recent years, illegal immigration through maritime borders has attracted 
rapidly increasing attention in the EU. The expanding immigrant pressure from 
Africa and its consequences, in particular the high death toll of unsuccessful sea 
crossings, have been the focus of this attention. 
In September 2003, the Commission presented a report of a study 
conducted by CIVIPOL regarding the control of the EU’s maritime borders.18 
The extensive report revealed loopholes of the maritime borders. It identified 
five priority areas to enhance control, namely, identification of illegal 
immigration routes, cooperation with third countries of origin and transit, 
introduction of effective operational structures for coordination between 
Member States, identification of the best technologies available, and the legal 
aspects of maritime border controls. Furthermore, the report laid the foundation 
for a programme of measures to combat illegal immigration across the maritime 
borders of the EU Member States, which was adopted in 2003.19 The 16-paged 
programme proposed a number of measures, mostly operational, to enhance 
border control. It highlighted the importance of relations with the third 
countries from which illegal migration flows originate or through which they 
pass, as well as the importance of strengthened cooperation between the 
Member States. In 2004, the Council conducted an assessment of the 
implementation of the programme of measures. The assessment recognised the 
progress already made but also called for further operational and legislative 
measures to meet the requirements of the programme.20 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                                  
(Brussels, 17 June 2008), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:52008DC0360:EN:HTML> (retrieved 4 August 2008). 
17
 M-T. Gil-Bazo, “The practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European 
Union’s Justice and Home Affairs external dimension. The safe third country concept 
revisited,” International Journal of Refugee Law 18(3–4) (September/December, 2006), 
pp. 571–600. 
18
 Council of the European Union, Feasibility study on the control of the European Union’s 
maritime borders – Final report, Council doc. 11490/1/03 (Brussels, 19 September 2003) 
available: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/external_border/ 
feasibility_study_en.pdf> (retrieved 28 July 2008). 
19
 Programme of measures..., n. 5 above. 
20
 Council of the European Union, Draft Council conclusions evaluating the progress made 
with regard to the implementation of the Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration 
across the maritime borders of the Member States of the European Union, Council doc. 
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the Council invited the Commission to conduct an in-depth study on existing 
international instruments in regard to illegal immigration.  
In 2005, the European Union Council adopted a Global Approach to 
Migration.21 A more integrated and global approach was called for to balance 
diverse objectives, in particular preventing illegal immigration and benefiting 
from legal migration, in a way that would be beneficial to all the countries 
involved. Africa and the Mediterranean region were considered priority areas. 
The need for a global approach, especially in issues concerning both the 
Mediterranean and certain African countries, such as safety at sea, was 
highlighted. Special attention was paid to the need for further operational 
cooperation between Member States on maritime border control and enhanced 
dialogue and cooperation with all countries of the region. 
The EU has also undertaken financial initiatives to prevent unwanted 
immigration flows. It has provided significant financial support to Member 
States to deal with illegal immigration through the Mediterranean Sea, e.g., by 
developing specific programmes such as Odysseus and ARGO.22 The support 
and grants awarded have been considerable. For example, under the ARGO 
programme in 2006, the Commission co-financed six projects in Spain, Italy, 
and Malta totalling more than €3 million.23 The EU financial support to third 
countries has likewise been notable; this will be discussed further below. 
                                                                                                                                  
15087/04 (Brussels, 22 November 2004), available: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ 
en/04/st15/st15087.en04.pdf> (retrieved 14 July 2008). 
21
 Council of the European Union, Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions on the European 
Council meeting in Brussels 15 and 16 December 2005, Global approach to migration: priority 
actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, Council doc. 15914/1/05, REV 1, CONCL 3 
(Brussels, 30 January 2006) available: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ 
docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf> (retrieved 30 July 2008). The Global Approach to Migration 
built on Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration – First follow-up to 
Hampton Court, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2005) 621 (Brussels, 30 November 2005), available: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0621:EN:HTML> (retrieved 
16 July 2008). 
22
 For further information on the ARGO programme, see Commission of the European 
Communities, “Argo – external borders, asylum, visas and immigration,” available: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/argo/funding_argo_en.htm> (retrieved 
6 July 2008); for further information on the Odysseus programme, see “Odysseus – to help 
strengthen EU-wide cooperation in the field of asylum, immigration and external borders,” 
available: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/expired/odysseus/funding_odysseus 
_en.htm> (retrieved 6 July 2008). 
23
 “Commission offers support to Spain, Italy and Malta for the reception of illegal 
immigrants,” Press Releases RAPID, IP/06/1208 (Brussels, 19 September 2006), available: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1208&format=HTML&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (retrieved 5 August 2008). 
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12.2.1.3. International Law 
 
Several international law instruments are relevant when considering illegal 
immigration across maritime borders and maritime surveillance, in particular of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention).24 At 
all times, states are also obliged to respect human rights and the rights of 
refugees that are protected by international and regional agreements.25 
Surveillance measures of maritime areas are limited by a diverse set of 
rules in different maritime zones. As a rule, coastal states have sovereignty over 
their territorial sea. Despite the universally applicable right of innocent passage, 
coastal states have the right to prevent the passage of ships transporting illegal 
immigrants through their territorial waters.26 To a large extent, this also applies 
to contiguous waters.27 On high seas, due to the basic principles of the freedom 
of navigation and the extensive jurisdiction of the flag state, other states cannot, 
in principle, intervene against ships carrying illegal immigrants.28 Exceptions to 
the rule of flag state jurisdiction are made in cases of piracy, transport of slaves, 
and non-authorised radio emissions, but no exception is made for the transport 
of illegal immigrants.29 Flagless ships, often used by illegal immigrants trying 
to enter the EU, do not invoke freedom of navigation on the high seas and can 
be intercepted by any state.30 
                                                 
24
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, available: 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm>, 
 (retrieved 30 July 2008) [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
25
 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 1966; European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950; Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 
1967. 
26
 LOS Convention, n. 24 above, Article 25(1): “The coastal State may take the necessary steps 
in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent”; Id., Article 19(1): “Passage is 
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State 
…”; Id., Article 19(2g): “Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in … the 
loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.” 
27
 Id., Article 33(1a): “In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous 
zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to … prevent infringement of its 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial 
sea.” 
28
 Id., Article 87, freedom of the high seas; Id., Article 92(1): “Ships shall sail under the flag of 
one State only and … shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
29
 Id., Articles 99–110. 
30
 Id., Article 110(1d). 
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Ships are bound by the obligation to rescue and render assistance to any 
person or ship in distress at sea.31 This applies in all cases, including the 
transport of illegal immigrants, and can be abused if immigrants are 
intentionally left in distress. Such transport usually takes place in worn-out 
large ships that fly under a flag of convenience and are run by criminal 
organisations.32 
Illegal immigration by sea is often related to smuggling. The Protocol 
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, addresses 
this issue.33 The Protocol promotes cooperation among state parties and urges 
them to take legislative and other measures to prevent smuggling.34 It proposes 
specific measures against smuggling of migrants by sea, which are mainly 
aimed at enhancing cooperation between the states “to the fullest extent 
possible.”35 To support the Protocol, the Council of the European Union 
adopted a Decision to further promote cooperation and information sharing 
among the EU Member States that are parties to the Protocol.36 
                                                 
31
 Id., Article 98(1b); International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Hamburg, 
27 April 1979, entered into force 22 June 1985 and amended in 1998 and 2004, available: 
<http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=653&topic_id=257> (retrieved 
20 August 2008). 
32
 Commission of the European Communities, Examining the creation of a European border 
surveillance system (EUROSUR) – Impact assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission, Commission staff working document, SEC(2008) 151 
(Brussels, 13 February 2008), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0151:EN:HTML> (retrieved 20 August 2008).  
33
 Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, air and sea, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 28 January 2004, 
available: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20 
Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>. On 13 August 2008, 114 states were parties to the protocol, for 
a comprehensive list of signatories and parties see <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-migrantsmugglingprotocol.html> (retrieved 20 August 2008). 
34
 Article 3(a) of the Protocol defines “smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of 
a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” 
35
 Inter alia, Article 8(1) obligates state parties to give assistance on request in certain cases, 
e.g. when a state party suspects that a vessel flying its flag is used for smuggling of migrants. 
According to Article 8(2), if such a vessel flies a flag of another state party, the flag state may 
be notified and request authorisation to board, search or/and take measures against the vessel by 
other state parties. Article 8(4) obligates state parties to respond to such requests without delay. 
Finally, Article 8(5) gives the flag state the power to decide on which conditions and to what 
extent authorisation is given, and forbids states to exceed it. 
36
 Council Decision of 24 July 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community 
of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
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In 2007, the Commission completed a study on international instruments 
in relation to illegal immigration by sea.37 The study examined the role and the 
gaps of international treaties. The study proposed clarifications and adjustments 
to many of the treaties it reviewed. It suggested, inter alia, amending the 
exceptions in the LOS Convention regarding the flag state’s extensive 
jurisdiction on the high seas to include transport of illegal immigrants. 
 
 
12.2.2. Current Surveillance Systems 
 
Presently, border surveillance has become the most emphasised element of the 
border management policy as described by Tampere JHA Council. 
The Schengen Border Code defines “border surveillance” as “the surveillance 
of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border 
crossing points outside the fixed opening hours, in order to prevent persons 
from circumventing border checks.”38 
 
 
12.2.2.1. Maritime Surveillance on the National Level 
 
A number of separate areas of maritime surveillance can be distinguished: 
fisheries, vessel traffic management, and border security surveillance.39 
Systems not designed for border protection may also prove to be an important 
                                                                                                                                  
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime concerning the provisions 
of the Protocol, in so far as the provisions of this Protocol fall within the scope of Articles 179 
and 181(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2006/616/EC; the Decision is 
not binding on the United Kingdom, Ireland or Denmark; available: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=D
ecision&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=616> (retrieved 20 August 2008). 
37
 Commission of the European Communities, Study on the international law instruments in 
relation to illegal immigration by sea, Commission staff working document, SEC(2007) 691 
(Brussels, 15 May 2007), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/ 
illegal/doc/sec_2007_691_en.pdf> (retrieved 11 July 2008). 
38
 Council Regulation EC/562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rights governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 15 March 2006, Official 
Journal L 105/1, 13 April 2006, Art. 2.11. 
39
 S. Ruzittu, “The new roles of European navies: the maritime and air surveillance. National 
experience and coordination among administrations” (Lisbon, 18 September 2007); 
Commission of the European Communities/Joint Research Centre Ispra, Working Document III 
on Maritime Surveillance Systems (Italy, 14 June 2008), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
maritimeaffairs/pdf/maritime_policy_action/maritime-surveillance_en.pdf> (retrieved 7 August 
2008) [hereinafter Ispra], pp. 2, 6. 
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element of action against irregular migration. It is possible, owing to fisheries 
or maritime traffic surveillance, not only to supervise ship movements but also 
to easily distinguish (e.g., on the satellite or radar picture) vessels lawfully 
performing their business from those possibly carrying illegal immigrants or 
used for drug trafficking or smuggling. In the light of the loss of so many 
migrants’ lives, distress and safety systems may also become useful. In general, 
the more systems that are being used at the same time reduce the possibility of 
overlooking a threat or unwanted vessel.40 
It is worth mentioning several important national and International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) systems of non-border security surveillance 
operating in European waters: 
 
a) The vessel monitoring system (VMS) used for monitoring fisheries.41 
b) The automatic identification system (AIS) designed for maritime safety 
and collision avoidance. EU Member States are obliged to prepare on-
shore installations for receiving and utilising the AIS information.42 
c) The vessel traffic services (VTS) designed for areas of dense shipping.43 
d) The long range identification and tracking (LITR) regulated system 
under SOLAS for monitoring vessels located farther from the shore. It is 
mandatory, e.g., for passenger vessels and larger cargo ships. In 2007, 
EU Member States agreed to create the EU LITR Data Centre managed 
by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).44 
 
Additionally, there are other reporting regimes and maritime safety systems.45 
Each Member State has its own border surveillance system, procedures 
and agencies responsible for border protection. According to the BORTEC 
study, there are about 50 authorities from 30 institutions involved in border 
surveillance in the Mediterranean and Central Atlantic states (Portugal, Spain, 
                                                 
40
 Commission of the European Communities, “Background Paper No. 4B on improving 
European integration in maritime reporting, monitoring and surveillance” (to the Green Paper 
on European Integrated Maritime Policy, 2006), available: <http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/ 
pdf/SEC(2006)_689%20_4b.pdf> (retrieved 5 August 2008), p. 6; Ispra, id., p. 18. 
41
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2244/2003, 18 December 2003; Ispra, id., p. 8; 
Commission of the European Communities, id., pp. 8–9. 
42
 Ispra, id., pp. 8, 14; Commission of the European Communities, id., p. 8; see also, 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), IMO, 1974; Directive 
2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing 
a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and repealing Council Directive 
93/75/EEC, Official Journal L 208, 05/08/2002. 
43
 Ispra, id., pp. 8–9; Commission of the European Communities, id., pp. 6–7. 
44
 Ispra, id., pp. 11, 16; Commission of the European Communities, id., pp. 9–10. 
45
 Ispra, id., pp. 9–12.  
  398 
France, Italy, Malta, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus), sometimes with parallel 
competencies and systems. Moreover, integrated national border surveillance 
systems cover only a few selected parts of the EU external border owing to 
technical and financial limitations.46 
In spite of this diversity, it is possible to observe some common trends. 
Militarisation of surveillance forces is visible. This is especially true in the 
changing modes of organisation as well as in equipping forces originally 
responsible for customs or patrolling territorial waters with military-style 
hardware and increasingly specialised surveillance equipment. Furthermore, the 
States’ spending on border surveillance systems has increased significantly, 
together with rising employment in relevant supporting state agencies. 
The Spanish Guardia Civil and Italian Guardia di Finanza are fine examples.47 
The participation of the national navies in the prevention of the irregular 
immigration has been also increasing (e.g., in 2002, one-quarter of the Italian 
Navy’s working hours were devoted to immigration control). Since 2002, 
several joint operations have been conducted by national naval forces, including 
Amarante (France), Ulysses (Strait of Gibraltar, several navies), and Active 
Endeavour (NATO).48 
EU Mediterranean States are presently developing more advanced and 
integrated surveillance systems. The Spanish SIVE (Sistema Integrado de 
Vigilancia del Estrecho) system is one of the most costly, sophisticated, and 
successful. SIVE is composed of various military-style technologies, including 
fixed and mobile radars, infrared sensors, and patrolling equipment. This, 
together with satellite images and the data from maritime surveillance systems, 
allows SIVE to detect objects that “barely stick out from the water surface.” 
SIVE was initially established in the area of the Strait of Gibraltar. It is being 
expanded to other crucial areas, such as the Canary Islands (where the 
migration routes have shifted mostly as an effect of SIVE). Other European 
states are considering following Spanish example (e.g., Portugal and Estonia).49 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Commission of the European Communities, Examining the creation of a European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), Communication from the Commission, COM(2008) 68 final 
(Brussels, 13 February 2008), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0068:FIN:EN:PDF> (retrieved 8 August 2008). 
47
 See in greater detail: D. Lutterbeck, “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean,” 
Mediterranean Politics 11(1) (Routledge, March 2006), 59–82, especially pp. 68–69. 
48
 Lutterbeck, id., pp. 67–68; Ruzittu, n. 39 above. 
49
 Lutterbeck, id., p. 66; “Spain’s Border Surveillance System Remains Controversial,” 
Deutsche Welle (29 October 2007), available: <www.dw-world.de/dw/article/ 
0,2144,2835465,00.html> (retrieved 13 August 2008); Ispra, n. 39 above, pp. 18–19. 
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12.2.2.2. EU Efforts Towards Integrated Maritime Surveillance 
 
Major EU documents such as the Integrated Maritime Policy Blue Book 
characterise national and local maritime surveillance systems as “sub-optimal” 
and therefore ineffective.50 Consequently, the need for integration of 
surveillance systems is seen as a necessity. 
The possible integration of maritime surveillance systems was an object 
of research in various studies, e.g., the BORTEC report (confidential apart from 
the public excerpt).51 These systems, originally not designed for border 
surveillance, provide vital data for immigration officers. Within the framework 
of Directive 2002/59/EC, the Community vessel traffic monitoring and 
information system (VTMIS) is being built up under the auspices of EMSA.52 
The system is based on several components: 
 
a) SafeSeaNet (SSN) Version 1 is a constantly developed system of 
information exchange between Member States’ authorities to help 
prevent pollution and accidents at sea.  
b) The short range identification and tracking (SRIT) system is to 
eventually collect AIS data at the EU level (EMSA) and create an EU 
AIS-based real-time traffic image integrated into SSN (pilot project 
should be completed by the end of 2008). 
c) The Shore-based Traffic Monitoring and Information Database 
(STMID) gathers descriptive information on the Member States’ shore-
based vessel monitoring and reporting infrastructure at a central level 
(the database is under constant development).53 
 
To address exclusively border surveillance, in 2004 the European Agency 
for the Management of Operation Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (hereinafter FRONTEX) was 
established.54 FRONTEX, which became fully operation in October 2005,55 is 
                                                 
50
 Commission of the European Communities, An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European 
Union, Communication from the Commission, COM(2007)575 final (Brussels, 10 October 
2007), p. 5. 
51
 Ispra, n. 39 above.  
52
 Ispra, n. 39 above, pp. 14–16; Commission of the European Communities, n. 40 above, 
pp. 7–8; EMSA website available: <http://www.emsa.eu.int/end806d008.html>, 
<http://www.emsa.eu.int/end806.html> (retrieved 13 August 2008).  
53
 Ispra, n. 39 above, pp. 14–15. 
54
 Council Regulation EC No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, 26 October 2004, Official Journal L 349/1, 25 November 2004. 
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an intelligence-based and depoliticised body of the Community. Its main task is 
to coordinate cost-effective, systematically-managed joint operations based on 
thorough risk analysis. The resources at the agency’s disposal also position it as 
a key institution in the consolidation, implementation, and expansion of the EU 
Integrated Border Management System.56 FRONTEX tasks also include 
providing assistance to Member States in the training of national border guards, 
including the establishment of common training standards57; conducting risk 
analyses; undertaking research relevant for the control and surveillance of 
external borders; providing assistance to Member States in circumstances 
requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; and 
providing Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return 
operations.58 
Joint operations conducted by FRONTEX can take form of, for example, 
expert assistance (e.g., HERA I) or joint operations at sea (e.g., NAUTILUS, 
HERA II).59 The results of the joint operations, apart from operational 
outcomes (e.g., a significant number of apprehended illegal immigrants and 
immigration facilitators) include exchanging best practices and information 
between Member States and enhancing cooperation between national border 
guard authorities.60 Despite it success, there is also criticism of FRONTEX 
activities, e.g., refugee protection violations.61 
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 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 FRONTEX. The FRONTEX legal base also includes: 
Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers; 2005/358/EC: Council Decision of 26 April 2005 designating the seat 
of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union and Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
56
 S. Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the Challenges of 
Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Document No. 261 (Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2007), pp. 1, 8–9; “More about FRONTEX” (n.d.), 
FRONTEX Agency website at: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/more_about_frontex/> (re-
trieved 6 August 2008). 
57
 The Common Core Curriculum for border guards was presented in March 2008, see 
“Common Training Standards for the EU Border Guard Services,” Press Release (4 March 
2008), available: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art33.html> (re-
trieved 18 August 2008). 
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 “More about FRONTEX,” n. 56 above. 
59
 For more on particular joint operations, see Carrera, n. 56 above, pp. 20–22. 
60
 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the evaluation and future development 
of the FRONTEX Agency, Communication from the Commission, SEC(2008) 149 (Brussels, 
13 February 2008), para. II A. 
61
 See, e.g., M. Vella, “FRONTEX: Out of control?” Malta Today (20 July 2008), available: 
<http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2008/07/20/n6.html> (retrieved 19 August 2008). 
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Another FRONTEX instrument is the European Border Patrols Network 
(EBPN). The first phase (preceded by the MEDSEA study) began in 2007 with 
seven patrolling areas.62 The main objective of EBPN is to “facilitate a closer 
and cost-effective operational cooperation between the national authorities 
responsible for patrolling the Member States’ Southern external maritime 
borders” as well as the synchronisation of national measures. This should not 
only prevent irregular immigration, but also help in detecting emergencies at 
sea and reducing loss of lives.63 
There are a number of additional FRONTEX instruments used for border 
surveillance. The most important among these are the Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams (RABIT, a pool of experts deployed in exceptional 
situations), the Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE, 
a database of border surveillance equipment), BorderTechNet (development of 
capacities and technologies), and Information and Coordination Network for 
Member States’ Migration Management Services (ICONET, a web-based 
platform for information exchange).64 
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Release (10 April 2008), available: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/ 
art35.html> (retrieved 18 August 2008); “European Border Patrols Network,” n. 63 above; 
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establishing a secure web/based Information and Coordination Network for Member States’ 
Migration Management Services of 16 March 2005, 2005/267/EC, Official Journal L 083 (1 
April 2005). See also “Reinforcing the fight against illegal immigration – Secure web-based 
network for the coordination and exchange of information on irregular migration,” Press 
Release, IP/06/57 (Brussels, 20 January 2006), available: <http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/57&format=HTM> (retrieved 13 August 2006) and D. 
Naujoks, “ICONET – EU Commission launches network on irregular migration” (Portal 
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12.2.3. Proposed Surveillance Systems 
 
Efficient border control is a prerequisite for preventing illegal immigrants 
entering the EU. Current external border control and surveillance measures 
have proven to be inadequate in preventing illegal immigration through the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the Canary 
Islands. The measures lack in scope coverage and are often fragmented. 
Furthermore, different border agencies are burdened with parallel competences. 
The EU has identified integrated and secure border management as one of its 
policy priorities.65 It has taken initiatives to enhance the control but, so far, no 
effort has succeeded in stopping illegal immigrant flows. Thus, the EU has 
taken further steps to create a new, effective and EU-wide border management 
system. 
Designed to support Member States in preventing illegal immigration, 
a common European Surveillance System for Borders (EUROSUR) was 
proposed in a Communication from the Commission to the Council on 
reinforcing the management of the European Union’s southern maritime 
borders in 2006.66 It was proposed that the EUROSUR system would first 
improve surveillance by creating more efficient cooperation between the 
existing national surveillance systems of the Member States but in the long 
term “it should gradually replace national surveillance systems at land and 
maritime borders, providing cost-effective solution, including e.g. 
a combination of radar and satellite surveillance at European level.” A few 
weeks after the Commission adopted its Communication the European Council 
stressed the need to examine the creation of EUROSUR but did not assess the 
proposed system.67 In February 2008, the Commission responded to the request 
by adopting the Communication Examining the Creation of a European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR).68 It stated that, if created, the EUROSUR 
system would prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime as well as 
                                                                                                                                  
Migrationsrecht.net, 13 January 2006), available: <http://www.migrationsrecht.net/index2.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=> (retrieved 13 August 2008). 
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 Commission of the European Communities, n. 15 above. 
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(Brussels, 30 November 2006), available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc? 
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33> (retrieved 11 July 2008). 
67
 16879/1/06 Brussels European Council 14/15 December 2006, Press Release, available: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf> 
(retrieved 8 August 2008). 
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 “Examining the creation,” n. 46 above. 
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enhance search and rescue capability thereby decreasing the number of 
unfortunate immigrants who die at sea. Interestingly, and contrary to its earlier 
Communication, the Commission stated that “… such a framework would be 
set up without affecting the respective areas of jurisdiction of Member States 
nor replace any existing systems.” It was now indicated that, instead of being 
aimed at replacing the national systems, the EUROSUR system would support 
the Member States by enhancing their capacity to detect crossing boats and 
vessels and increasing their capacity to react in such situations. First, 
the EUROSUR would interconnect and rationalise the national systems, and 
secondly, it would improve the existing surveillance tools. Its final goal would 
be to create a common monitoring and information sharing environment for the 
EU maritime domain. The Commission suggested implementing EUROSUR in 
three phases starting in 2010.69 
In addition to the Communication on examining the creation of the 
EUROSUR system, the Commission presented other two Communications as 
a package of measures to enhance border security and to facilitate ease of travel 
for people who legally enter the EU.70 The package included a Communication 
on preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union and 
a Communication on evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX 
Agency.71 Further information and analysis of the topics were provided in the 
staff working documents accompanying the Communications.72 The package of 
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measures was aimed at enhancing all aspects of border control and surveillance, 
and at the same time it was aimed at improving smooth passenger flows of bona 
fide travellers. Measures proposed were wide-ranging and included, inter alia, 
the use of new technology, creating the EUROSUR system, reinforcing the 
capacity of FRONTEX, establishing a system for simplified and automated 
border checks for low-risk travellers from third countries, as well as a system to 
register third country nationals on entry and exit. 
Once again, in June 2008, the EU reconfirmed integrated external border 
management as its goal in a Commission communication on a common 
immigration policy for Europe.73 The existing border control tools, including 
FRONTEX, the use of latest technologies and well-coordinated cooperation 
with third countries are considered important but there continues to be a need of 
EU-wide surveillance system. The Commission requires Member States to 
continue building the EUROSUR concept. The EU’s efforts towards further 
integration of surveillance systems, and border management in general, are in 
line with the overall Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU, which aims to create 
common sea-related policies for the EU Member States.74 
The last but not least aspect of the future development of maritime 
surveillance is cooperation with third countries. The EU has emphasised that 
cooperation with countries of origin and transit is a prerequisite for effective 
external border control and thus, for the prevention of illegal immigrant flows.75 
Cooperation has been named as one of the policy priorities of the EU in the 
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fight against illegal immigration.76 The EU has taken concrete actions to 
establish or strengthen relations with several countries: agreements have been 
made and cooperative measures undertaken between the EU and third countries 
such as Morocco and Algeria.77 Among other measures, the EU has provided 
a substantial amount of funding to third countries to improve their management 
of migrant flows.78 The arrangements are not only targeted at enhancing 
relations between the EU and North African countries, but also to support the 
capacity of the North African countries, which are often used as countries of 
transit, to prevent illegal immigration and to provide necessary protection on 
their own as well as to support relationship-building between the countries of 
origin and transit. It seems clear, however, that all arrangements share the same 
ultimate goal: they all aim at preventing illegal immigration to the EU.79 
 
 
12.3. Conclusion  
 
Illegal immigration by sea is a problem of great magnitude and has attracted 
a great deal of attention in the EU. Immigration pressure from Africa is 
expanding, and many immigrants continue to die at sea on their unfortunate 
journey across the Mediterranean or the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the 
Canary Islands trying to reach Europe. The efforts taken at national and EU 
levels have been unable to stop the immigration flows so far. One reason 
behind this is inadequate and fragmented external maritime border control, 
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which remains under the national jurisdiction of the Member States and results 
in a great diversity of surveillance systems and agencies. In order to enhance 
surveillance, numerous cooperation measures have been set up between the 
Member States and initiatives, mostly cooperative or coordinative, have been 
taken by the EU. A particularly significant proposal of the EU is the proposed 
European Surveillance System for Borders (EUROSUR), which is designed to 
interconnect and rationalise the national systems, and in the long term, to create 
a common monitoring and information sharing network. 
In contrast to external maritime border control being under Member 
States control, illegal immigration has been part of the EU competence since 
1999. From the beginning, the EU has attempted to integrate immigration and 
asylum policy and further integration continues to be its goal. The EU has 
undertaken a series of initiatives, e.g., established specific programs, built 
relations with third countries of origin and transit, and provided funding both to 
Member States and third countries. It is worth noting, however, that the EU has 
adopted few legally-binding regulations and directives.  
There are also several international law instruments that are relevant to 
immigration policies and maritime surveillance. Of special importance is the 
LOS Convention that lays out the basic rules and limitations on surveillance 
measures in various maritime zones. Furthermore, the states are obliged to 
respect the human rights and the rights of refugees protected by many 
international and regional agreements. 
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Chapter 13 
 
Illegal Immigration to Canada by Sea: An Integrated Marine Security 
Response 
 
Hugh R. Williamson 
 
 
13.1. Introduction 
 
One problem with illegal immigration is that there is not a precise definition of 
the term, nor is there an agreed set of classifications for those persons who 
arrive or stay “improperly” in another country. The person might be a refugee 
fleeing a well founded fear of persecution, an economic migrant seeking 
employment, or a criminal or terrorist with anti-social motives. The terms 
illegal immigration, irregular migration,1 improperly documented arrival2 (IDA) 
all mean substantially the same thing. For the purpose of this contribution, 
illegal immigration will be the most commonly used term. 
It should be stated from the outset that illegal immigration by sea is not 
the highest priority problem for Canada, both in terms of government activity 
and in the total number of persons and incidents that have occurred. That being 
said, the situation is analogous to marine pollution incidents. While the major 
source of marine pollution comes from land-based sources, a tanker accident 
will attract major attention from government and the media since it is a single, 
obvious and concentrated incident. Similarly, as will be discussed below, while 
the majority of illegal immigrants enter Canada by land or air, this usually 
occurs singly or in small groups. However, a small percentage of illegal 
immigrant ships3 have garnered considerable attention and press comment. As 
a result, Canada has taken steps to deal with the problem, though as will be 
discussed, these are usually included as components of initiatives intended to 
deal with higher priority problems such as drug smuggling or anti-terrorism. 
                                                 
1
 F. Crepeau and D. Nakache, “Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada,” IRPP Choices 12, 
no. 1 (February 2006), available: <http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol12no1.pdf> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
2
 A term used by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC). 
3
 Probably less than ten ships in the past 20 years. Although the number of small boats illegally 
crossing between Canada and the United States is unknown, it is quite large. 
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Canada receives approximately 90 to 100 million travellers per year 
across its borders.4 The majority of these are American tourists who drive 
across the border and do not require visas or passports. Only two percent of 
entrants arrive by sea, most of these being tourists on ferries or visiting cruise 
ships. Canada issues approximately 800,000 visas per year for students, 
visitors, and temporary workers. Canada, like the United States and Australia, 
has a long history of actively encouraging immigration, and historically has one 
of the larges annual intakes, averaging 200,000 persons per year over the last 
ten years.5 Canada also has approximately 40,000 refugee claimants per year.  
Some of those who enter Canada do so illegally, and others violate the 
terms of their legal entry. It is estimated that there are approximately 200,000 
illegal immigrants in Canada at any time.6 Some of these make refugee claims 
in Canada, others work illegal, and others are intending to use Canada as 
an entry point into the United States. It is the latter two groups that are the main 
focus of Canada’s efforts to suppress irregular migration. 
 
 
13.2. Canada’s Maritime Borders 
 
Canada has two borders: One with the United States, and one with the 
surrounding oceans. Canada and the United States share a 5,500 km land border 
and a 11,400 km water border, including the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway 
system (3,500 km) and maritime frontiers on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic 
ocean coasts. Canada also has one of the world’s longest coastlines at 243,042 
                                                 
4
 In 2001–2002, a total of 102,217,849 travellers came to Canada, of which 80,889,680 (78%) 
arrived by land, 19,000,000 (19%) arrived by air and 2,200,000 (2%) arrived by sea. Of this 
total, 50,809,257 (58%) went to the province of Ontario, which has no direct sea access. See 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the 
House of Commons (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
2003), Chapter 5, available: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att_20030405xe03_ 
e_12706.html> (retrieved 4 December 2008). Since 11 September 2001, the number of arrivals 
has decreased slightly. In fiscal year 2006–2007, the CBSA processed more than 95 million 
travellers arriving by highway, air, sea and rail, with 260,300 travellers entering Canada per 
day. 
5
 E. Simck, “Canada’s Immigration Policy,” CFR Backgrounder (2 July 2006), available: 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/11047> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
6
 It is estimated that 95 percent of illegal immigrants to Canada arrive by air. See K. J. Torrance 
and K. Steel, “A Country for the Taking. Canada could stop the migrant onslaught but chooses 
not to,” B.C. Report Magazine (1999), available: <http://www.axionet.com/bcreport/ 
web/990927f.html> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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km. In addition to its high seas boundaries, Canada has ocean boundaries with 
Denmark (Greenland) and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon). 
In 1996 Canada passed the Oceans Act, consolidating its maritime claims 
in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention). More controversially, Canada has also established straight 
baselines around much of the country, including the Arctic archipelago, 
claiming as internal waters Hudson’s Bay, the Bay of Fundy, the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, and the High Arctic waters of the Northwest Passage. The latter 
claim is not accepted by the United States among others. Nonetheless, Canada 
has extended its legal jurisdiction to cover these areas. 
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system are shared by Canada 
and the United States, with numerous bilateral agreements covering aspects of 
security, environmental protection, safety, transportation, and commerce. 
 
 
13.3. Types of Illegal Immigration 
 
For the purpose of this contribution, we can classify maritime illegal 
immigration into three categories depending on the nature of the transport and 
the terms of entry into Canada: 
 
1. Legitimate documentation – Legal means of transport: This category 
includes those persons who possess the necessary documentation and 
arrive by a regular vessel in compliance with Canadian law as passenger 
or crew. However, once in the country, they violate the terms of their 
entry. This would include either crew or passengers who leave the 
vessel (ship jumpers) or visitors who change their minds about leaving, 
possibly making a refugee claim. This is a matter of internal 
immigration control, since it is difficult to identify the intention prior to 
the legal entry into the country. 
 
2. False documentation – Legal means of transportation: This category 
includes those persons who obtain passage on a vessel under a false 
identity, or with forged or improperly issued visas or passports. This 
would include passengers or crew who enter the country under false 
pretences. It also includes, from a maritime perspective, persons who 
enter the country posing as seamen or crew ostensibly to join a foreign-
flag vessel in a Canadian port. This is a matter of security and 
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intelligence involving documentary validation or the identification of 
the undesirable persons. 
 
3. False/no documentation – Illegal means of transportation: This 
category includes those persons who have no valid documentation or 
visa for entry, and those who attempt to smuggle themselves into the 
country. This would include stowaways and illegal immigrant ships. 
This is both a maritime security issue, requiring identification of the 
ship at sea, and a port/ship security issue, dealing with the prevention 
and detection of stowaways.  
 
This contribution focuses on the second and third categories of migrants. 
 
 
13.4. Illegal Immigration by Sea into Canada  
 
Part of Canada’s attitude toward illegal immigration probably stems from two 
incidents in the first half of the 20th century that are at serious odds with 
Canada’s present self-opinion as modern liberal and moral state. In 1914, the 
Komagata Maru incident occurred.7 This was a ship carrying 376 Indian 
passengers, including 240 Sikhs, and all of whom were British subjects. 
The Komagata Maru arrived at the port of Vancouver and was held in the 
harbour for two months before being forced to return to India with all the 
passengers aboard.  
The more infamous “Voyage of the Damned” incident occurred in 1939. 
The MV St. Louis, a German ship carrying 907 Jewish refugees from Nazi 
Germany, was denied entry into Canada8 after both Cuba and the United States 
                                                 
7
 The ship was eventually escorted out of Canadian waters by HMCS Rainbow, one of two 
naval vessels possessed by Canada at the time, and the only one on the West Coast. “Komagata 
Maru incident,” Wikipedia entry, available: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Komagata_ 
Maru_incident> (retrieved 4 December 2008) 
8
 The passengers on the St. Louis had originally sailed for Cuba, however the Cuban 
government changed the visa requirements after public pressure, and the passengers were 
refused entry. Attempts to get sanctuary from the both the United States and Canada failed. The 
ship eventually returned to Germany, where many of the passengers eventually perished during 
the Holocaust. See J. Rosenberg, “The Tragedy of the S.S. St Louis,” Jewish Virtual Library 
(1998), available: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/stlouis.html> (re-
trieved 4 December 2008). In 2000, Canadian clergy members held a ceremony of public 
apology in Ottawa for 25 survivors. See “Canadian clergy apologize to ‘Voyage of the 
Damned’ survivors,” CBC News (6 November 2000), available: <http://www.cbc.ca/ 
canada/story/2000/11/06/holocaust001106.html> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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had denied entry. Both these incidents had serious racial overtones, which still 
play out in Canadian immigration and refugee debates. 
Over the last twenty years, Canada has experienced a series of maritime 
incidents involving economic migrants entering Canadian ports and waters. 
While the number of migrants involved was relatively small, the nature of the 
entries raised considerable public and political interest. 
First, there were a series of illegal immigrant ship incidents. In July 1986, 
155 Tamils were found drifting in a lifeboat off the coast of Newfoundland, 
claiming to be refugees from Sri Lanka. It was later discovered that they had 
been dropped off by a German-owned but Honduran-registered vessel, Aurigae, 
and that they had boarded in West Germany. 
In July 1987, 173 Sikhs appeared one morning in a small Nova Scotia 
fishing village claiming to be fleeing India and seeking refugee status. It later 
transpired that they had boarded a small freighter in Rotterdam after arriving in 
the European Union (EU), probably by air through West Berlin. 
In June 1999, four small freighters were discovered off Vancouver Island 
with several hundred Chinese immigrants from Fujin province. A fifth boat was 
discovered empty in the same region.9 This was believed to be part of 
a criminal “snake head” human smuggling ring bound for the United States.10 
During the 1990s, a more common occurrence on the East Coast was for 
small groups of stowaways, mostly Romanians, to smuggle themselves into 
Canada in freight containers.11 These stowaways generally originated in ports in 
the Mediterranean. In 1996, several Romanian stowaways were forced over the 
side of the Taiwanese-flagged Maersk Dubai, bound from Spain to Halifax. 
This was reported by the Filipino crew, who successfully hid another stowaway 
until the vessel reached Halifax. This incident resulted in a criminal enquiry and 
charges being brought against the Taiwanese officers.12 In 2000 and 2001, 
several Chinese stowaways were found in shipping containers at the Port of 
                                                 
9
 Many of the immigrants from the first vessel disappeared shortly after their release from 
immigration custody, probably making their way into the United States. After this, the 
remaining migrants were kept in custody until their hearings and subsequent deportation. This 
practice seemed to discourage subsequent immigrant vessels since the criminal ring leaders are 
only repaid for the cost of the journey once the migrants start working in the United States. 
Unattributable pers. comm. (15 November 2008).  
10
 Unattributable pers. comm. (15 November 2008). 
11
 Between 1991 and 1995, 742 stowaways are known to have entered Canada. 
12
 The charges were stayed in Canada after a finding that Canada had no jurisdiction over the 
incident. The evidence was sent to Taiwan, as the flag state, but charges were never pursued. 
See B. Carty, “The cost of witness. Murder and the Maersk Dubai,” CBC Radio Canada, 
a broadcast from CBC, available: <http://www.savintage.com/magellen/Maersk9.html> (re-
trieved 4 December 2008). 
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Vancouver.13 In March 2008, four Algerian stowaways were caught attempting 
to board a train 100 km from Halifax after hiding in a double-decker bus being 
transported in an ACL container ship from Liverpool. 
In September 2005, 17 Chinese nationals travelling as passengers on 
a cruise ship and using forged South Korean passports left the ship in Halifax 
posing as day tourists and boarded a train for central Canada. Four others were 
caught on board before they could leave. The voyage had originated in Le 
Havre. 
The significant pattern in these cases is that on Canada’s west coast most 
of the illegal migrants came from China, generally Fujin province, as part of 
organised criminal activity. On Canada’s east coast, however, most of the 
illegal immigrants were eastern European, primarily Romanian, and boarded 
the vessels in EU ports.14 While the total number of incidents is relatively 
small, it still raises concerns, especially when the situation exposes weakness in 
the maritime and port security systems. 
 
 
13.5. Changes to Maritime Security Post 9/11 
 
After 11 September 2001, Canada’s position, like much of the rest of the world, 
changed markedly. In Canada’s case, this was exacerbated by its close 
proximity to the United States, and the overwhelming concern with maintaining 
both security and trade relationships with the United States. Three key factors 
influenced subsequent policy decisions. First, the United States and Canada are 
each other’s largest trading partner, with large quantities of cargo,15 much of it 
transhipped, crossing the border every day. Second, large numbers of people 
cross the border every day. Until recently, Canadians and Americans did not 
require visitor’s visas or passports to cross the border. Third, there was an early 
perception that some of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the United States 
through Canada.16 
                                                 
13
 Interestingly, the containers, and presumably the stowaways, were destined for Seattle but 
landed in Canada after Canadian customs officers uncovered them. 
14
 The decrease in Romanian stowaways may be the result of Romania’s entry into the EU and 
the better employment prospects available there. 
15
 The majority of containers landed in the ports of Montreal and Halifax are transhipped to 
destinations in the United States. See Port of Halifax website at <http://www.portofhalifax.ca/> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
16
 This was disproved but is still believed by some Americans. There have been, however, 
several other instances of suspected terrorists living in Canada, or entering the United States 
from Canada. See “Canada and Terrorism,” Anti-Defamation League (January 2004), available: 
<http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_canada.asp> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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As a result, Canada needed to demonstrate to the United States that it was 
serious about keeping its part of “Fortress North America” safe, to ensure that 
marine security was sufficiently robust to prevent terrorists from entering 
Canada, and to keep weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled into the 
United States through Canadian ports. On its own behalf, Canada also needed 
to maintain its own marine security. 
While Canada had developed its own plans for integrated maritime 
security, 9/11 brought an additional urgency. This resulted in a number of 
government initiatives to enhance national security in general, maritime 
security in particular, and as a consequence, to institute initiatives that directly 
or indirectly enhanced the programmes to prevent illegal maritime immigration.  
Part of the response was to re-energise the process of cooperation and 
integration between government departments. This process had already been 
underway in some sectors, partially due to the government’s policy to 
consolidate some of its departmental functions, such as the separate fleets of 
ships operated by the Canadian Coast Guard, Canadian Hydrographic Services, 
and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. There was also the growing 
awareness, even prior to 11 September 2001 that there was a need to share both 
resources and information, since decreasing departmental budgets meant that 
they could no longer afford to “go it alone.” 
In 2004, Canada produced its first National Security Policy, “Securing an 
Open Society.” The policy focused on three core areas: 
 
1. Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad  
2. Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies 
3. Contributing to international security  
 
It also included a $308 million six-point plan to enhance marine security by 
 
1. Clarifying and strengthening accountability 
2. Establishing Marine Security Operations Centres 
3. Increasing on-water presence and aerial surveillance activities 
4. Securing fleet communications 
5. Pursuing closer cooperation with the United States 
6. Strengthening security at ports and other marine facilities17 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National 
Security Policy (Public Safety Canada, n.d.), available: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/pol/ns/ 
secpol04-eng.aspx> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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13.5.1. Canadian Departments with Marine Security Mandates 
 
As with most countries, Canada has several departments and agencies 
responsible for maintaining the security over maritime-related activities. Each 
one has a unique set of capabilities and legal authority to carry out its mission. 
Table 13.1 sets out the key departments and agencies with marine security 
mandates. 
 
Table 13.1. Canadian government departments with marine security 
responsibilities 
 
Department Role Platform Weapons 
Maritime 
Surveillance 
Capabilities 
Intelligence Enforcement Authority 
DND Sovereignty Ships 
Aircraft 
Heavy Yes, but not 
on 
Canadians 
Yes No 
CBSA Customs 
Immigrations 
Food safety 
None Side arms No API/PNR 
FOSS 
Yes 
DFO 
 
Fisheries 
Environmental 
protection 
Aircraft 
 
Side arms 
(in 
fisheries 
role) 
Yes  
 
Yes Yes, fisheries 
officers 
Coast Guard Marine Safety Ships 
Helicopters 
 AIS 
LRIT 
MCTS 
Yes No 
RCMP Policing Coastal 
(limited) 
RHIB 
Side arms 
MSERT 
Yes, coastal 
watch 
Yes Yes 
TC Marine 
Security 
Aircraft None 1 aircraft PAIR Yes, ship 
safety 
CSIS Security None None None Yes No 
 
Key: AIS – Automatic Identification System; API – Advanced Passenger Information; CBSA – 
Canada Border Services Agency; CSIS – Canada Security and Intelligence Service; DFO – 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans; DND – Department of National Defence; FOSS –Field 
Operations Support System; LRIT – Long Range Identification and Tracking; MCTS – 
Maritime Communications and Traffic Services; MSERT – Marine Security Emergency 
Response Team; PAIR – Pre Arrival Information Report; PNR – Passenger Name Record; 
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police; RHIB – Ridge Hulled Inflatable Boat; TC – 
Transport Canada 
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13.5.1.1. Department of National Defence 
 
The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces 
comprises Canada’s military, including the Navy, Army and Air Force. The 
Navy maintains a fleet of warship and submarines, as well as surveillance and 
intelligence capabilities. Under Canadian law, the Canadian Forces do not have 
a law enforcement role, but may be called upon to assist other government 
departments either under standing memoranda of understanding (MOU) or on 
a contingency basis. 
DND, and in this specific case, the maritime forces, collect and process 
a wide range of information concerning the presence of vessels and activities in 
Canadian maritime waters. Navy ships, including submarines, and maritime 
patrol aircraft routinely gather information on the identity and movements of 
foreign warships, as well as commercial and fishing vessels. This is augmented 
with additional information from satellite and other electronic means and used 
to compile the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), a critical component of 
Marine Domain Awareness (MDA).18 One of the key factors in gathering this 
information is the ability to maintain a real-time surveillance capability. Since 
both ships and aircraft cannot be continuously present on station, surveillance 
information is only as current as the last recorded observation. Several 
innovative programmes were undertaken post-9/11 to improve target tracking 
and identification ability. Two projects are elaborated on below. 
                                                 
18
 See G. Reedel, Comparative Study of Formal Knowledge Representation Enablers for the 
Collaborative Knowledge Exploitation Framework, Final Report (MacDonald Dettwiler and 
Associates Ltd., 13 July 2007), available: <http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/PDFS/ unc64/p527928.pdf> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008), A-1, pp. 17–18: 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), or Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA), has 
to do with the effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime 
environment that could impact security, safety, economy or environment. MDA 
comprises the contextualisation of positional and identification data with intelligence 
data. A NATO definition states that MDA is about all areas and things of, on, under, 
relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway; 
including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo and vessels and 
other conveyances. In Canada, the MDA activity sphere includes Canada’s 
surveillance and awareness efforts within marine zones as well as liaison and 
coordination with Canadian and international intelligence gathering bodies. Within this 
activity sphere, security efforts are guided by the principle that the greater the 
vulnerability, the more detailed the Government of Canada’s information 
requirements. Key objectives include developing comprehensive knowledge of people, 
containers, goods and vessels from foreign points of origin to Canadian points of 
destination; and timely information collection and sharing among key departments 
through secure means. Collaboration is key to the effectiveness of domain awareness, 
responsiveness and safeguarding activities.  
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High-Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) – This programme 
utilised a land-based fixed-array radar system that has the ability to track 
surface targets at a range of several hundred miles. The intention was to 
establish a series of sites along Canada’s coast to provide continuous radar 
coverage of the entire coastline and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Two test 
sites were established in Newfoundland to track vessel fishing on the Grand 
Banks at the edge of Canada’s 200 nm EEZ. Technological problems led to the 
project being cancelled. 
Atlantic Littoral ISR Experiment (ALIX) – This 2004 project involved 
the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or remotely-controlled pilotless 
aircraft (drones) and integrated intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) architectures to conduct ocean and High Arctic patrols. The project made 
use of an Altair UAV equipped with radar and day/night photo imagery 
capabilities. The trials proved to be moderately successful, however, the system 
proved to have a limited capability to operate in poor weather or in the High 
Arctic. 
 
 
13.5.1.2. Canadian Border Services Agency 
 
The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)19 was created in 2003, and 
combined the enforcement and intelligence arms of what was the Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
(CIC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). CBSA maintains 
1,200 service locations across Canada, including all border crossings with the 
United States, and 39 offices in other countries. It maintains detention facilities 
in Toronto and Kingston, Ontario, and in the port cities of Montreal and 
Vancouver. It also has major seaport operations in the ports of Halifax, 
Montreal and Vancouver. CBSA is responsible for enforcing the Customs Act 
and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, as well other legislation dealing 
with entry of goods or persons into Canada. CBSA has no maritime 
surveillance capability, but maintains a number of intelligence programmes 
targeting both customs and immigration issues. It has the primary mandate for 
detecting and suppressing illegal immigration by all means, including marine. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Canada Border Services Agency website at <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/menu-eng.html> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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Marine Programmes and Units 
 
1. Marine Passenger Analysis Unit (MPAU) – A follow on to the 
Passenger Analysis Units established at airports, these units target cruise 
ships and ferries, as well the crew of commercial vessels. 
 
2. Marine Container Targeting Units (MCTU) – Established in 2004 in the 
ports of Montreal, Halifax, and Vancouver, their primary tasking is 
against contraband and weapons of mass destruction, however, they also 
target suspected stowaway containers. 
 
3. Vessel Targeting Units (VTU) – These teams are located in smaller 
ports and target vessels suspected of holding contraband or illegal 
immigrants. 
 
4. Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) – Established in 2005, these 
units are set up at airports, and cruise ship and ferry terminals to provide 
disembarkation screening of passengers. 
 
5. National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC) – Established in Ottawa, 
NRAC is a 24 hour a day/7 day a week focal point for national and 
international intelligence and enforcement liaison. 
 
In addition, CBSA receives marine cargo import reports that must be sent in by 
any vessel 24 hours prior to loading cargo bound for Canada. 
 
 
1.3.5.1.3. Public Safety Canada 
 
Public Safety Canada (PSC) (formerly Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness Canada) was established in 2003 following a major departmental 
reorganisation which consolidated Canadian law enforcement and security 
activity under a single department. The functions of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP), CBSA, Canadian Security and Intelligence Agency 
(CSIS), Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and the National Parole Board 
were brought together under PSC. This is not unlike the US Department of 
Homeland Security with the exception that PSC has no mandate for maritime 
sovereignty operations. 
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13.5.1.4. Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
 
As Canada’s national police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) have the major responsibility for the enforcement of Canadian law. 
They are the lead enforcement arm used for the majority of non-fishing illegal 
maritime activities. The RCMP have several smaller vessels, primarily used for 
patrol on the Great Lakes, and against contraband smuggling, primarily liquor 
from St. Pierre and Miquelon. 
The Marine Security Enforcement Teams (MSET) are a joint 
RCMP/Canadian Coast Guard initiative to provide three co-manned vessels for 
patrol on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway. The RCMP also 
provide the Marine Security Emergency Response Teams (MSERTs), which 
are the highly mobile and heavily-armed policing units used whenever armed 
force may be needed against active opposition. They are generally present for 
any major maritime incident requiring the armed boarding of a vessel. 
The RCMP Coastal Watch Programme is a community-based initiative 
intended to obtain information from local residents on suspicious activities 
taking place in and around coastal communities. Its major targets are drug 
offloads, however, it also identifies illegal immigration activities. 
 
 
13.5.1.5. Canadian Coast Guard  
 
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is responsible for maritime safety, including 
navigational aids, search and rescue, and marine environmental protection. 
The CCG operate the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS), 
which includes vessel traffic management at major ports and on waterways. 
The CCG is the main recipient of pre-arrival information reports (PAIR) from 
commercial vessels entering Canadian waters. 
After the reorganisation of the Canadian government fleets, the CCG was 
transferred from Transport Canada to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
where it also took over the operations of Canadian fisheries patrol vessels. 
Unlike the US Coast Guard, the CCG is not an enforcement body, and CCG 
vessels are not normally armed. Coast Guard officers are not fisheries 
enforcement officers or peace officers. However, their vessels provide the fleet 
support for marine enforcement activities and will carry enforcement officers 
from other government departments to carry out their marine mandates. 
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13.5.1.6. Department of Fisheries and Oceans  
 
The main task of the Department of Fisheries and Ocean (DFO) is the 
monitoring of fishing activity, which it accomplishes through the use of fishing 
vessel reports, fisheries patrol vessels, and fisheries surveillance flights, a major 
contributor to MDA. Since 1989, DFO has utilised several light aircraft, owned 
and operated by Provincial Airways, a small commercial airline, for aerial 
fisheries patrols. These aircraft have been equipped with high capability surface 
search radar, originally developed for military long-range patrol aircraft, as well 
as day/night digital photographic cameras. The aircraft are operated by the 
airline, which also provides the flight crew and sensor operators. DFO provides 
a fisheries officer who provides tactical direction and serves as the on-board 
enforcement authority. Vessel tracking, environmental information, and other 
surveillance data from these flights are provided to other government 
departments. 
 
 
13.5.1.7. Transport Canada 
 
Transport Canada retained the Ship Safety branch after the reorganisation of 
Canadian government fleets. It also has responsibility for port and vessel 
security under the ISPS Code. As such, Transport Canada is the main recipient 
of the PAIR that must be sent by vessels 96 hours prior to arriving in Canadian 
waters. 
 
 
13.5.1.8. Canadian Security Intelligence Service  
 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is the government agency 
with the primary task of collecting, monitoring, and analysing intelligence on 
threats to Canada’s national security and conducting covert and overt 
operations within Canada.20 CSIS has no enforcement mandate. However, it 
provides intelligence to other government departments. CSIS also operates the 
Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, which has been operational since 2004 on 
a 24/7 basis. The Centre has representation from PSC, CSIS, CBSA, the 
Communications Security Establishment, DND, Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada, CSC, 
the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, the RCMP, 
                                                 
20
 Canadian Security Intelligence Service website at <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/index-
eng.asp> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
  420 
Ontario Provincial Police, and Sûreté du Québec. CSIS also links with 
international centres, including the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre in Britain, 
the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States, the National Threat 
Assessment Centre in Australia, and the Combined Threat Assessment Group in 
New Zealand. 
 
 
13.6. Integrated Responses and Planning 
 
13.6.1. Planning Committees and Working Groups 
 
The Canadian government has established several planning bodies to coordinate 
marine security activities. 
 
 
13.6.1.1. Interdepartmental Programme Coordination and Review Committee 
 
In 1991, in response to a Senate and Treasury Board recommendation calling 
for greater cooperation between government departments, the Interdepartmental 
Programme Coordination and Review Committee (IPCRC) was established 
with a marine security/enforcement mandate. IPCRC established regional 
operational sub-committees. The Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee oversaw 
development of CANMARNET, an intra-governmental web site for the sharing 
of information. IPCRC also established the Interdepartmental Concept of 
Operations (ICMO). IPCRC was the main federal government coordinating 
body for the 1995 “Turbot War” with the EU (Spain) and for the Swiss Air 
crash of 1998. IPCRC stood down in September 2001. 
 
 
13.6.1.2. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group 
 
Established in 2001, immediately after 11 September 2001, the 
Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG) was set up under 
the chair of Transport Canada to coordinate the activities of 17 government 
departments, including DND, CBSA, and the RCMP among others. 
The IMSWG is charged with identifying and coordinating federal government 
actions and objectives for marine security. It ensures effectiveness in 
implementing marine security initiatives and provides strategic advice to 
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address marine security gaps. The IMSWG also supports several 
interdepartmental marine security initiatives through a dedicated Marine 
Security Coordination Fund.21 
 
 
13.6.1.3. Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee 
 
The Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee 
(ECIMOC) is the successor of the Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee. 
ECIMOC is made up of federal departments that either conduct, or have 
an interest in, operations in the maritime environment.22 A key aim of this 
committee is identifying and developing the most practical means of applying 
operational resources to facilitate their joint and effective employment. 
Principal members include Maritime Forces Atlantic (the current chair), DFO 
(representatives from both the CCG Maritimes and Newfoundland and 
Labrador regions, as well as from various sections of Fisheries and Oceans 
Management), CBSA (for both customs and immigration matters), Transport 
Canada, and Environment Canada. Health Canada was invited to participate as 
a result of the Wadi Al Arab anthrax incident.23 ECIMOC generally meets four 
times a year. 
 
 
13.6.2. Intelligence and Information Sharing 
 
Individually, and collectively, the Canadian government departments tasked 
with marine security gather information and develop intelligence in their field 
                                                 
21
 L. Kinney, “Marine Security in Canada, Current Status, Future Directions 2007” 
(presentation, Transport Canada, 24 May 2007), available: <http://www.portsecure.ca/2008/ 
program/presentations/Laureen_Kinney.pdf> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
22
 For a description of ECIMOC’s mandate see Senate Committee for National Security and 
Defence, Background Brief – OGD Cooperation in Atlantic Region, available: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/witn-e/hickey3-e.htm> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
23
 In April 2003, the MV Wadi al Arab was diverted to an offshore anchorage near Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, after a report that a crew member may have died of anthrax. The vessel was 
transporting bauxite from Brazil to an aluminium smelter in Saguenay, Quebec. The crewman 
had died in Brazil prior to sailing and was autopsied there. Brazilian police initially reported the 
suspicion of a terrorist connection. The vessel was boarded by police and health authorities in 
Canada, where medical and forensic investigations failed to turn up any evidence of anthrax or 
a terrorist connection. For further information, see <http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/ 
story/CTVNews/1051632607624_94/?hub=Canada> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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of responsibility. This intelligence may be shared under the appropriate 
circumstances, taking into account the legal and political constraints involved. 
While the records and databases of the individual departments are 
accessible by the authorised agents of that department for the purpose collected, 
use for other purposes or sharing with other departments is subject to several 
considerations: 
 
1. The terms on which the information was collected: Certain reports, such 
as customs declarations, while required under statute, can only be used 
for that purpose and by that department unless a legal authorisation is 
given for its disclosure. This is usually requires a court order or judicial 
warrant. 
 
2. Information of a personal nature: Information on an individual may be 
covered by privacy, access to information, or Charter of Rights 
legislation. 
 
3. Property rights, proprietary and copyrighted information: Information 
may be subject to commercial ownership, involving licensing 
agreements or royalties, and might not be sharable without permission 
or additional payment. 
 
4. Legal prohibitions on collection or surveillance of certain information: 
There may be specific prohibitions on the collection of certain 
information by specific government agencies. For example, DND is not 
permitted to carry out intelligence gathering or surveillance on 
Canadians. 
 
5. Government policy with respect to the release and sharing of 
information.24 
 
 
13.6.3. Information Collection for Marine Security 
  
One of the major complaints of the maritime shipping community has been the 
number of times that they have to report to government authorities prior to 
                                                 
24
 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Government Security Policy (1 February 2002), 
available <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12322&section=text#cha3> (retrieved 
4 December 2008). 
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arriving in Canada. Much of the required information is identical and is sent to 
exactly the same recipient, often the CCG MCTS stations. Often the 
information is then sent on to other government departments for action. 
In Canada, the following are some of the reports required concerning 
ships, crew, and passengers: 
 . 
1. CBSA – Customs Advance Commercial Information (ACI) – 24 hours 
before loading  
2. Transport Canada – ECAREG – Marine Pollution prevention report – 96 
hours before entering Canadian waters 
3. Transport Canada – Marine Security – Pre Arrival Information Report 
(PAIR) – 96 hours before arrival in Canadian waters 
4. CBSA – Passenger and Crew Information – 7 days prior to arrival 
5. CBSA Passenger Name report  
6. CBSA – Before Arrival Information – Cruise ships 
7. CBSA – Cruise Ship Pre-Arrival Notice – 96 hours before arrival25 
 
As noted above, while the information may be sent to the same recipient, the 
information is then passed on to the appropriate government authority. It can 
only be released or shared if it complies with the specified guidelines governing 
its handling, use, and distribution. 
 
 
13.7. Integrated Marine Security Activity  
 
13.7.1. Marine Security Operations Centres 
 
One of the priorities under the National Security Policy and Marine Security 
Initiatives was the establishment of Marine Security Operations Centres 
(MSOCs). These were to be regional focal points where representatives of 
government authorities would be collocated and able to respond quickly on 
behalf if their department to any incident. Participants in the MSOC come from 
DND, the RCMP, CCG/DFO, Transport Canada, and CBSA. In addition, 
                                                 
25
 The CBSA’s authority to obtain and collect such information is found under section 107.1 of 
the Customs Act, S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) and the Passenger Information (Customs) 
Regulations, P.C. 2003-908, 12 June 2003, and in paragraph 148 (1)(d) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, and regulation 269 of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227. 
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liaison officers from the US Coast Guard are assigned to each MSOC, attending 
meetings several times a month, as required. 
The plan called for three centres: one on the Atlantic coast, in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia; a second on the Pacific coast, in Victoria, British Columbia; and 
the third on the Great Lakes (GL-MSOC) in the Niagara, Ontario, region. DND 
is the lead agency for the coastal MSOCs, and they are collocated with the 
Naval Headquarters. The lead agency for the GL-MSOC is the RCMP. 
The advantage of having personnel from the different departments at the 
MSOC is that they can work in a common environment and bring their 
department’s expertise and capabilities to bear on any situation. They are also 
able to respond to queries from their departments for tactical information from 
other participating departments. At the MSOC, each staff member has access to 
their individual intelligence databases. These are appropriately secured and 
access controlled, and can determine whether or not information can be shared 
with other departments according to their own departmental policies and 
directives. Since only authorised members can access departmental databases, it 
is necessary to ensure that no-one looks on when certain functions are being 
utilised. This, however, is a matter of the physical layout of the MSOC, which 
is designed to ensure that data systems are properly safeguarded from 
accidental or intentional disclosure.  
 
 
13.7.2. Canada-US Bilateral Initiatives 
 
Canada and the United Sates have a long history of bilateral cooperation on 
regional security matters. This was demonstrated during and immediately after 
11 September 2001 and continues to this day.  Several programmes illustrate 
this cooperation. In December 2001, Canada and the United States issued 
a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration 
Issues. This called for, among other things, the establishment of Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) to help combat cross-boarder criminal 
activity.  
The IBET is comprised of RCMP, CBSA, US Customs and Border 
Protection /Office of Border Patrol, US Department of Homeland Security, US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Coast Guard 
representatives. Teams were set up at the Detroit/Windsor and the Maine/New 
Brunswick borders, and on the west coast in the Lower Mainland of British 
Columbia. There have been a number of successful operations, including 
several illicit drug seizures and illegal immigrant arrests. 
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13.7.3. Integrated Maritime Security Operations – Ship Rider Agreement 
 
The Ship Rider Agreement is a more controversial initiative because it involves 
not just cooperation, but actual reciprocal enforcement by the partner agencies. 
The Ship Rider Agreement involves officers from the US Coast Guard and the 
RCMP. So far, activity has been focused on the Great Lakes and Strait of Juan 
de Fuca. RCMP and US Coast Guard officers undertook several weeks of 
training in the law enforcement requirements of the partner country. Officers 
were then assigned to vessels of the other nation, where they were integrated 
into enforcement operations. 
Several “proof of concept” trials were undertaken during 2005 and 2006 
on the river between Detroit and Windsor during the Super Bowl football game, 
which was considered to be a potential terrorist target, and in 2007 at the 
Ontario-New York border near Cornwall, Ontario, and in British Columbia. In 
39 separate incidents, ship rider teams contributed to 41 arrests, with six of 
these being made directly by the integrated marine teams.26 
In March 2008, the Canadian Minister of Public Safety announced that 
a formal, permanent agreement would be negotiated. 
 
 
13.8. An Exercise in Integrated Marine Security Operations  
 
13.8.1. Illegal Immigrant Planning and Response – Operation Heave To 
and the MV Cala Puebla 
 
In April 2007, intelligence was received that up to 180 illegal migrants of 
eastern European or West African origin may be bound for Halifax on the 
container ship MV Cala Puebla. The Italian-owned and Cyprus-registered ship 
was en route from the Mediterranean to Halifax and due to arrive in four or five 
days.  
It was Easter weekend, but a federal interagency meeting was called 
immediately. CBSA was designated as the lead agency; MSOC staff were 
notified, as well as their departments. In addition, because there was a potential 
                                                 
26
 Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada takes action during Cross-Border Crime 
Forum to prevent crimes in shared waterways” (Quebec City, 19 March 2008), available: 
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2008/nr20080319-eng.aspx> (retrieved 4 December 
2008). 
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public health issue, Public Health Canada was also notified and included, 
although not at the beginning. United States’ authorities were also notified. 
The plan was to detect and interdict the vessel and process the persons on 
board. The intent was to 
 
a) interdict the vessel at sea 
b) ensure the safety and security of those on board 
c) ensure that no-one on board posed a safety or security risk to Canada, 
including a public health risk 
 
The MSOC had the task of locating the vessel. The Navy, CCG, and RCMP had 
the task of preparing to interdict and board the vessel at sea. CBSA had to 
prepare to search the vessel. Regional health officials were notified in case 
there was a need for use of local hospital or health facilities. 
Prior to the vessel’s arrival, the story leaked to the local media and soon 
gained national attention. Officials decided to bring the vessel along side and 
search it in Halifax. No stowaways were detected. However, the operation 
served as a “live exercise” allowing for detailed post-action analysis and 
lessons learned.27 
 
 
13.9. Conclusion 
 
Canada’s marine security issues are not unique. Unlike Europe, geographical 
isolation from the rest of the world and close proximity to the United States 
bring a different set of priorities to security planning, especially as it involves 
illegal immigration. Canada has no close neighbours, other than the United 
States, from where illegal immigrants can easily come in smaller vessels. The 
nature of the North Atlantic and the distances involved require larger vessels. 
This makes the task of location and identification somewhat easier, provided, of 
course, that you know what you are looking for. This does not, however, mean 
that Canada can be complacent, since there is a strong incentive for criminal 
elements to exploit any weakness. If Canada is seen as the easy way to get into 
the United States, then smugglers will utilise it. If the United States does not 
consider that Canada is stopping the threat before it enters Canada, then the 
United States will take the necessary steps to stop the threat at the Canada-US 
border. The resulting effect on Canada’s easy access to the United States would 
have serious financial, as well as social, repercussions. 
                                                 
27
 S. Kempton, Public Health Agency of Canada, pers. comm. (29 November 2008). 
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In terms of the EU experience, while the situation on Canada’s Atlantic 
coast is quite different, the situation on the Great Lakes and Strait of Juan de 
Fuca may be somewhat analogous. With shorter distances across the St. 
Lawrence River boundary, there is a considerable amount of cross border 
smuggling in small boats. The success of the Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams and the Ship Rider Agreement may be worth considering by the EU as 
a possible model. 
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Workshop Discussion Summary 
 
Maritime Security Issues 
 
Susan Rolston 
 
 
Kamrul Hossain, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and Hugh Kindred, 
Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University (with Mary 
Brooks, Dalhousie University), and Adam Stepien, Arctic Centre, University of 
Lapland (with  Henna Tervo and Kamrul Hossain, Arctic Centre, University of 
Lapland), and Hugh Williamson, Marine Affairs Programme, Dalhousie 
University, presented their papers on maritime security initiatives in the 
European Union and Canada and the issue of illegal immigration by sea to the 
EU and Canada respectively, focussing on maritime security response 
approaches. 
Following the paper presentations, Louise Head, DG MARE B-1, 
European Commission, commented on initiatives of the European Commission 
regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia. In light of the recent increase in 
piracy attacks, the international community has increased its efforts through 
NATO, IMO, at the national level (e.g., The Netherlands protection of the 
World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia under NAVCO), the EU (e.g., naval 
mission Atalanta under the European Security and Defence Policy), and the 
United Nations (e.g., recent resolutions on piracy and the 10–11 December 
2008 conference on piracy in Nairobi). Operation Atalanta will be the first 
under the second pillar of the EU and will be launched on 15 December 2008. 
Under the command of the UK, ships and patrol aircraft will escort WFP 
shipments and contribute to preventing acts of piracy and attacking pirate 
vessels. Only four Member States have provisions to try pirates under national 
criminal law and they might not be willing to use it; neighbouring countries 
such as Kenya and Djibouti may request support to do so. Under the Instrument 
for Stability, which offers financial assistance to countries threatened or 
undergoing severe political instability or suffering from disasters, the EU is 
conducting an ongoing study on critical maritime routes in the Horn of African 
and Arabian Peninsula. A possible follow-up to this study might be a ReCAPP 
style operation focussing on coordination of information, documentation and 
control operations. The upcoming UN conference on piracy, comprised of a 
technical meeting and a ministerial meeting, is expected to lead to agreement on 
recommendations to control piracy, e.g., closing the land bases of pirates with 
the assistance of authorities in Puntland, increasing intelligence on local 
structures and re-engaging the Somali peace process. 
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Discussion following the presentations largely focussed on the issue of 
piracy. Fishing vessels are not being targeted by pirates despite the argument 
that illegal fishing is largely responsible for the economic situation encouraging 
pirate activity off Somalia. It was suggested that the international community 
could offer to provide fisheries surveillance capacity in the region, thereby 
reducing the threat of pirate activity. The problem of laying criminal charges 
against pirates was also raised. International law allows national laws to be put 
in place, but very few countries have chosen to do so. For example, Canada has 
broadened the definition of piracy in its law, but it is applicable only within 
waters over which it has national jurisdiction. The SUA Convention does not 
deal with piracy. There is no widely defined international crime of “piracy” and 
even if there were, it would need to be implemented nationally. Piracy on the 
high seas has resulted in significant changes in the availability of marine 
insurance and its cost; some ships are now going around the Cape of Good 
Hope despite the increased fuel costs and time delay in order to avoid the 
waters off Somalia. 
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Part IV 
 
 
Management of Maritime Safety and  
Vessel-Source Pollution 
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Chapter 14 
 
Responsive Ocean Governance: The Problem of Invasive Species and Ships’ 
Ballast Water – A Canadian Study 
 
Moira McConnell* 
 
 
14.1. Introduction 
 
The problem of terrestrial and aquatic alien invasive species as 
an environmental concern came to the forefront of international law and policy 
and public awareness in conjunction with the adoption of the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity1 (CBD) and the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED). However this has been present both 
as a “real world” phenomenon and concern for a significantly longer period.2 
As pointed out in a recent interdisciplinary publication focusing on invasive 
seaweeds,  
 
… the introduction of alien invasive species poses one of the most 
serious threats to both terrestrial and marine biodiversity. In fact, habitat 
loss, climate change, and alien invasive species are generally considered 
to top the list of biodiversity threats. Concern about invasions is not 
limited to biodiversity per se but extends to its broader socio-economic 
impacts on agriculture, forests, fisheries, aquaculture, and other human 
activities dependent on the stability of living resources in a particular 
                                                 
*
 The author is grateful for the research support provided by the European Commission. 
The author acknowledges the contribution of Mr. Eric Machum, LLB candidate at Dalhousie 
Law School, a research assistant on this project. 
1
 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), available: <http://www.cbd.int> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008) [hereinafter CBD]. In force December 1993. As at October 2008, 
191 states are party. Canada ratified in December 1992.  
2
 As recently pointed out by E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), “Scientists first recognized the signs of introduction of aquatic alien 
species after a mass occurrence of the Asian phytoplankton algae Odontella in the North Sea in 
1903,” Foreword, in M. H. Fonseca de Souza Rolim, The International Law on Ballast Water. 
Preventing Biopollution (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff/Brill, 2008). Some authors suggest 
even earlier dates: see O. Endresen, H. Lee Behrens, S. Brynestad, A. B. Andersen, and R. 
Skjong, “Challenges in ballast water management,” Viewpoint, in Marine Pollution Bulletin 48 
(2004): 615, citing J. T. Carlton, Introduced Species in US Coastal Waters: Environmental 
Impacts and Management Priorities (Pew Oceans Commission, 2001). 
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ecosystem. As a result, invasive species pose almost incalculable 
economic, socio-cultural and human health security risks. Estimates of 
the cost of responding to this problem around the globe vary widely. 
One estimate of the cost to the US economy is USD137 billion per year 
(Murray et al. 2004). Although concern about the issue of introduction 
of alien species was evident in the late 1970s, the scope of the problem 
only gained widespread attention of law and policy makers in the 
1990s.3 
 
The last comment is, however, qualified by the fact that, for the most part, 
concern about invasive species and biodiversity protection per se focused, at 
least initially, on the introduction of terrestrial species and, in particular, 
intentional introductions. The reason for this focus probably relates to the 
institutional location of the CBD (the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP)), and the fact that, at a national level, regulations could build upon 
existing practice in connection with agricultural health practices and border 
control inspections (e.g., quarantine) that were already in existence in most 
countries in relation to the introduction of species diseases and pests. 
More recently, extensive attention, at all levels of regulatory activity, has 
been paid to the problem of intentional and unintentional introductions of 
marine or aquatic species. Intentional introductions, such as import of species 
for aquariums or aquaculture, largely fall under the same regime as terrestrial 
border control practices involving permits and licenses, etc.4 Unintentional 
introductions, primarily through ships operations, pose a different, and in many 
respects, a more complex problem. This problem is part of the overall concern 
for biosecurity and protection from what has been called “biopollution.”5 As 
discussed extensively in other studies,6 an important unintentional vector or 
                                                 
3
 M. Doelle, M. L. McConnell, and D. L. VanderZwaag “Invasive seaweeds: global and 
regional law and policy responses,” Botanica Marina Vol. 50 (2007): 438–450, p. 438. 
4
 To secure biosafety, transfer of organisms that have been modified by biotechnology (Living 
Modified Organisms – LMOs) are the subject of the Cartegna Protocol on Biosafety to the 
CBD. It entered into force in 2003.  
5
 Rolim, see n. 2 above. 
6
 M. L. McConnell, “Ballast & Biosecurity: The Legal, Economic and Safety Implications of 
the Developing International Regime to Prevent the Spread of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and 
Pathogens in Ships’ Ballast Water,” Ocean Yearbook 17 (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press: 2003), 
p. 213. See also M. L. McConnell, Globallast Legislative Review – Final Report, Globallast 
Monograph Series I (London: IMO, 2002), available: <http://globallast.imo.org> (retrieved 
4 December 2008). See also Endresen et al., n. 2 above and references cited therein or more 
recently, S. McGee, R. Piorkowski, and G. Ruiz, “Analysis of recent vessel arrivals and ballast 
water discharge in Alaska: Towards assessing ship-mediated invasion risk,” Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 52 (2006), p. 1634 and references cited therein. 
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path for the transfer of species between marine ecosystems is through ships’ 
ballasting operations: organisms can “stow away”7 in the water taken on board 
ships in one port as ballast when cargo is discharged. This water is then carried 
in ships’ tanks and discharged in another port or ports, when cargo is picked up. 
The potential enormity of the problem is revealed when one considers that: 
 
Globally, it is estimated that about 10 billion tonnes of ballast water are 
transferred [between ports] each year. Each ship may carry from several 
hundred litres to more than 100,000 tons of ballast water, depending on 
the size and purpose of the ship.8 
 
 Thus the ordinary activities of shipping and transport, the foundation for 
international trade, are now also “vectors” or carriers of disease and harmful 
aquatic organisms. The problem is largely the result of increasingly seamless 
transport systems and larger ships moving more rapidly between ports on 
continuous routes. It is also, therefore, a by-product of the increased 
globalisation of trade. It means that shipowners now find themselves operators 
of vectors that form part of a transport corridor for species and organisms that 
may pose a danger to human and ecological security. Port and coastal 
authorities in this scenario are cast as either guardians or gaps in the biosecurity 
of the state. In both cases the reality of a world of biosecure ports is on the 
horizon.9 Indeed, the Global Ballast Water Exchange Management Programme 
(GloBallast),10 created by the Global Environment Facility, United Nations 
Development Programme, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
in the spring of 2000, was established on the view that: 
                                                 
7
 The imagery used in describing the problem is itself of interest, although not the subject of 
this chapter. For example the language has focused on the “foreignness” of the organisms as 
analogised to the human construct of citizen and immigration practices, e.g., “alien.” Perhaps, 
more curious, the terms have also attributed a level of intentionality on the organisms involved 
in the process, e.g., “stowaways,” “alien invaders,” “hitchhikers,” and “uninvited guests.” 
Nature itself is cast as a hostile force, with ecosystems envisaged as essentially static and as 
constructed at the point of ratification of the CBD.  
8
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), “Alien invaders–putting a stop to the ballast 
water hitchhikers,” Focus on IMO (London: IMO, 1998), available: <http://www.imo.org> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008), p. 1 [hereafter IMO]. 
9
 M. Grey, “More muscle for port health,” Lloyd’s List Maritime Asia (May 2001), p. 10, 
comments on this point in the context of the foot-and-mouth disease restrictions. See also the 
recent Canadian approach, which cast the problem as one of protecting “ocean health”; see 
“Purpose of the Health of the Oceans Initiatives,” available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans/management-gestion/healthyoceans-santedesoceans/initiatives-eng.htm> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
10
 The Problem, GloBallast Programme Website (London: IMO, 2000 and ongoing), available: 
<http://globallast.imo.org/problem.htm> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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The introduction of invasive marine species into new environments by 
ships’ ballast water attached to ships’ hulls and via other vectors has 
been identified as one of the four greatest threats to the world’s oceans.11 
 
The present chapter is concerned specifically with providing an overview 
of the Canadian regulatory response to the issue. The study begins by providing 
a brief description of various dimensions and characterisations of “the problem” 
and is followed by an outline of international regulatory responses. The 
Canadian response is set out in section 14.4 and followed by observations in 
section 14.5. This study suggests that Canada has shown leadership 
internationally in raising awareness of the problem generally, as well as 
working effectively on a bilateral/regional basis to address it with respect to 
specific species. Concrete efforts have been made in Canada to find a way to 
bring together diverse governance institutions and interests, under the theme 
“Health of the Oceans.” This is despite the fact that Canada has not yet ratified 
the relevant international convention. However, more attention still needs to be 
paid to regulatory design. In particular, efforts need to be devoted to risk 
assessment and baseline studies and monitoring in connection with the shift 
from discharging in ports to discharging in coastal water and to address the 
issue of the coasting trade. In addition, efforts need to be made to also prevent 
the export of species. Despite these concerns it is suggested that the Canadian 
experience to date demonstrates that an approach which explicitly focuses on 
regulatory design concerns provides a more effective means of addressing the 
multiple dimension of problems that cut across sectors and institutional and 
legal frameworks.  
 
 
14.2. The Nature of the Problem12 
 
This section considers, first, the nature of the problem posed by species 
movement. It then considers the specific problem of transport in ships’ ballast 
water. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 The discussion in this section is drawn from McConnell, Ocean Yearbook, n. 6 above. 
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14.2.1. The Problem of Species Movement 
  
There has always been some natural movement of species through the medium 
of water; however, the combination of distance, weather, differing water 
temperatures, and salinity and food sources in the various marine ecosystems of 
the southern and northern waters has limited the scope and range of natural 
migration. Human assisted species transfer does not easily fit the traditional 
paradigm of human activity resulting in pollution. In the last two decades, 
particularly since 1992, environmental law and international environmental 
institutions have embraced a systemic view of the interaction between human 
activity and the physical environment. This system or ecosystem is understood 
to be dynamic and is not easily subject to the more usual point-in-time 
evaluations of cause, effect, and singular responsibility. The significance of the 
environment in the maintenance of human health and economic security is now 
also part of national security agendas. This acceptance of these ideas is 
evidenced by the nearly universal ratification level (190 states and the European 
Community as of October 2008) of the CBD.13  
Emphasis has shifted from a narrow focus on preventing pollution to 
a broader approach aimed at supporting and maintaining the existing ecosystem 
and its chain of interdependence as intrinsically valuable. This view clearly 
encompasses the question of human intervention in the ecosystem through 
activities such as transport systems that transfer species. Despite this conceptual 
shift found in modern multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 
questions of enforcement and compliance are rendered somewhat more difficult 
by the more traditional pollutant/substance orientation of many international 
and domestic regulatory regimes. As alluded to in the introduction, this shift to 
the concept of biodiversity also has broader implications for international and 
domestic governance. The divide between land-based marine pollution and 
environmental protection (UNEP) and ocean activities (e.g., United Nations 
Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea; IMO; Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations Agency (FAO), UNESCO 
(Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission)) is narrowed and perhaps 
even closed. At a national level, the former is usually dealt with by 
an environmental ministry, while maritime transport, for example, is usually 
dealt with by maritime transport administrations. 
Leaving aside the situation of disease-carrying microbes or toxic 
dinoflagellates, the question of whether species migration is a “natural” event 
and whether an organism is invasive or harmful in an absolute sense is difficult, 
largely because its introduction and “harmfulness” is contingent on various 
                                                 
13
 See CBD, n. 2 above. 
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factors. In many cases, a species may not be invasive or a pest in its home state, 
where it forms part of the ecosystem (which includes natural predators or other 
factors that limit its growth). However, it may become a pest in another 
welcoming host environment where there are no natural limits on its growth. In 
these cases, it may become a predator on indigenous species, or it may disrupt 
and even destroy the food chain or ecosystem to which it has emigrated. This 
can have a significant impact on indigenous species in the region, in particular, 
fisheries. The case of the American comb jellyfish that destroyed the entire 
anchovy fishery when it migrated to the Black Sea is infamous. That same 
species has now migrated, probably in ballast water, east to the Caspian Sea, 
endangering the seal and other species populations.14 This is only one case out 
of many.15 There are the obvious commercial consequences arising from the 
destruction of a marine capture fishery. In addition, this issue threatens coastal 
aquaculture species that are often more vulnerable. On a broader level, this 
poses a significant risk to the success of states working with international 
organisations such as FAO to encourage aquaculture/mariculture as a way to 
meet the escalating demand for protein and food security in the face of the loss 
of marine capture stocks as a result of environmental changes and 
overexploitation.16 
Some aquatic organisms such as algae blooms or toxic dinoflagellates 
also pose a significant danger to human health when they enter the food chain. 
A summary published by the IMO regarding the Australian experience with 
“red tide” is a good illustration of challenges posed by the spread of some 
organisms: 
 
Toxic dinoflagellates are a type of algae known to cause paralytic 
shellfish poisoning in humans. Evidence suggested that the toxic 
dinoflagellate Gymnodium catenatum became established in Australian 
waters after arriving in ballast water – the species was already present in 
waters of Argentina, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Venezuela and in 
Mediterranean sea ports … Dinoflagellates can reproduce simply by 
splitting in two, allowing multiplication wherever conditions are 
favourable. Gymnodium catenateum also has a type of reproduction in 
unfavourable conditions, which can result in a tough encased spore that 
                                                 
14
 A. Morgan, and D. Harrison, “Invading jellyfish crisis for Caspian seals,” Nature Watch, 
Sunday Telegraph (London, 5 November 2000), p. 15. 
15
 S. Gollasch, Removal of Barriers to the Effective Implementation of Ballast Water Control 
and Management Measures in Developing Countries (London: GEF/UNDP/IMO, 1997), 
available: <http://www.imo.org/imo/focus> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
16
 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2000 (Rome: FAO, 2000), available: 
<http://fao.org/DOCREP/003> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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can survive different conditions by staying dormant in sediment. These 
spores remain viable for 20–30 years, germinating in the usual 
swimming form when conditions are suitable, and entering the food 
cycle of shellfish causing the shellfish to become toxic to humans.17  
 
The same study also notes that similar problems resulting from dinoflagellates 
introduced through ballast water have been experienced in other countries, 
including China and India.18 
The fact that many species and pathogens can survive in adverse 
conditions and remain undetected in a new environment for a long period of 
time after the transfer means that both their detection and eradication is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, as is the attribution of specific blame or 
liability. The problem is compounded in the case of pathogens. A related 
problem is that most countries have very little scientific knowledge about the 
range of organisms in their waters to determine whether they have a problem 
organism in their coastal water that they may be exporting or whether their 
systems will have a problem with a species that might be imported. This means 
that the determination of the current level of biodiversity is itself an inexact 
process.19 
At the same time it must be understood that the majority of species will 
not adapt to new environments, particularly if there is a great variation in 
temperature or salinity or other conditions between ecosystems. However, 
unlike oil and other pollutants, once an invasive organism is introduced it is 
virtually impossible to remediate the environment. There have been some 
instances of physical removal or introduction of predators, but they are 
relatively few and may pose their own problems.20 Accordingly most responses 
have focused on containment strategies.21 Once a new species is introduced, the 
host ecosystem or environment is changed forever. This explains why 
                                                 
17
 See IMO, n. 8 above. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Efforts have been underway now for several to encourage ports to conduct baseline port 
surveys. See S. Raaymakers, “Port Surveys Underway,” Ballast Water News 4 (2001): 3–5; C. 
L. Hewitt, and R. B. Martin, Revised Protocols for Baseline Port Surveys for Introduced 
Marine Species: Survey Design, Sampling Protocols and Specimen Handling, Technical Report 
No. 22. Centre for Research on Introduced Marine Pests (Hobart, Australia: CSIRO, 2001), 
available: <http://www.marine.csiro.au/CRIMP> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
20
 F. McEnnulty, N. Bax, B. Schaffelke, and M. Campbell, A Rapid Response Toolbox: 
Strategies for the Control of ABWMAC Listed Species and Related Taxa in Australia, Centre 
for Research on Introduced Marine Pests (Hobart, Australia: CSIRO, posted draft August 
2000), available: <http://www.marine.csiro/CRIMP/toolbox> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
21
 See The Problem, n. 10 above. 
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regulatory strategies should and indeed have focused on preventing the 
introduction of alien species and pathogens: there is no viable cure. 
 Although there is a great deal of recent interest in this problem, 
particularly in the last decade, it has a much longer history. Alien aquatic 
organism transfer has been dealt with in a number of international regulatory 
instruments since the 1970s. Although the International Convention for the 
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (BWM 
Convention) is not likely to come into force the near future,22 the call to ratify it 
and bring it into force in order to establish obligations to address the issue is in 
fact a misunderstanding. International obligations regarding marine and other 
alien species transfer have existed since 1982. The development of a regulatory 
regime specific to the ballast water aspects of the pre-existing international 
obligations is simply a question of elaborating a respose to existing obligations. 
 
 
14.2.2. Ships’ Ballasting Operations and Species Movement 
 
In simple terms, ballast and the process of ballast discharge and intake (ballast 
management) keeps ships balanced or stable and mitigates the stresses that the 
ocean’s movements place on the ship’s superstructure. Ballast is functionally 
critical to ships’ safety, particularly when a ship is not fully laden. Ballast in 
this sense is simply a concept or a function rather than any particular substance. 
Various materials have been used as ballast through the centuries. However, 
since the development of steel-hulled ships in the 19th century, seawater has 
been used for reasons of economy and efficiency.23 Modern ships are equipped 
with various types of ballast tanks located at strategic points, relative to the 
cargo or passenger spaces, in the ship’s hull. Depending on the ship’s structure, 
many ballast tanks have extensive internal piping or other formations that 
facilitate the build-up of sludge or sediment in which organisms can thrive.24 
Depending on the voyage conditions, whether it has any cargo on board and the 
                                                 
22
 The Convention will come into force on the ratification by 30 states whose combined 
merchant fleets constitute not less than thirty-five percent of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant shipping fleet. As of February 2009, 18 states have ratified, amounting to 15.36 
percent of the world fleet: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Egypt, France, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Liberia, Maldives, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, and Tuvalu. 
23
 See IMO, n. 8 above.  
24
 Tanks vary depending on ships’ functions. Modern ships have segregated ballast tanks (SBT), 
i.e., tanks devoted only to the ballasting operation. Some older ships still operate with 
integrated systems, but these are being phased out. 
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size and function of the ship, e.g., bulk carrier, oil tanker, ferry, or fish factory, 
differing quantities of ballast water are taken on to maintain stability. It is a by-
product of this core operational process, one that is intrinsically related to the 
operation of ships as carriers, that is causing the problem. Since the quantity of 
ballast required at any one time is directly related to the loading or unloading of 
cargo and the particular ship’s stability requirements, the discharge or intake of 
ballast usually occurs either in or en route to and from port areas, or in sheltered 
waters close to the coastline of a country. The coastal and near coastal zones are 
replete with plant and animal organisms in various stages of their life cycles. 
They are also host to pathogens that may have entered port waters through 
municipal sewage outlets, discharge from other ships, or other land-based 
marine pollution sources. These organisms can live for long periods of time in 
the tanks. Estimates suggest they can survive up to three months or even longer 
in the water and sediment taken from coastal waters and pumped into the ballast 
tanks.  
The microscopic size of many organisms and the point in their life cycles 
when they are taken on board also means that the ballast water filters currently 
in use are of limited utility. The extent of intake of organisms is exacerbated if 
the water is taken in very shallow or turbulent waters close to shore and at 
night, when many species move to the surface of the water. It is believed that at 
any one time “ballast water may be transporting 3000 species of animals and 
plants a day around the world.”25 With faster and larger ships going to more 
ports of call on each voyage the problems are magnified. While the operational 
activity causing the problem is reasonably simple to understand, given the key 
role of ballast in ships’ operations and, ultimately, international trade, 
the solution is not equivalently simple. 
The ballast water problem has come to international attention, particularly 
in the last two decades, as both ship speed and international trade have grown. 
This has been combined with the development of awareness of biodiversity 
maintenance as a core environmental and human security concern. However, 
concern about the transfer of species in ballast is not a new phenomenon. 
The problem, as it relates to transfer in ballast water, was documented as early 
as 1903 in the North Sea.26 Regulatory controls of ballast discharge and 
dumping, not unlike those currently under discussion internationally, also 
existed well before the 20th century. Cohen and Foster comment on the 
experience in the United States as follows: 
 
                                                 
25
 See IMO, n. 8 above. 
26
 Rolim, n. 2 above, and Gollasch, n. 15 above. 
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Ballast dumping came under regulatory control during the 19th century, 
as harbor masters barred ships from dumping rock, sand, mud and 
miscellaneous debris carried as ballast into harbors and channels, to 
prevent shoaling. In many areas, ballast dumping was banned by statute, 
both to protect channel depths, and in some cases, to prevent the fouling 
of waters. “Ballast grounds” were set up where ballast could be legally 
disposed of, and professional “ballast haulers” and guilds of “ballast 
heavers” serviced the merchant shipping industry. Even on America’s 
wild frontier, laws and regulations prohibited the dumping of ballast into 
harbors, although … ships on the California coast frequently violated 
them.27 
  
Efforts are underway to develop and approve technology28 to solve the 
problem of ships safety and ballasting operations. The most viable solution 
developed to date, aside from precautionary procedures to prevent or limit the 
initial intake of species in the water, is to exchange coastal ballast water for 
mid-ocean water that does not contain or support the coastal organisms. Open 
sea exchange does not totally eliminate the problem, but it can significantly 
reduce the risk of species transfer. However, mid-ocean or open sea exchange is 
anathema to most seafarers. It is seen as posing unacceptable safety risks to 
ships and seafarers’ and passengers’ lives, possibly in contravention of the 
annexes to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and 
its Protocol of 1978 (SOLAS).29 
                                                 
27
 A. Cohen and B. Foster, “The Regulation of Biological Pollution: Preventing Exotic Species 
Invasions from Ballast Water Discharged Into California Coastal Waters,” Golden Gate 
University Law Review 30 (Spring 2000): 787, p. 787. NB: Citations in the original text have 
been omitted. Interestingly reference to ballast dumping is still found in modern legislation. For 
example, a recent proposal (2008) to update Canada’s national fisheries law contained the 
following provision in connection with pollution prevention: “60. (1) No person shall (a) throw 
overboard ballast, stones or other substances that are detrimental to fish habitat in any waters 
frequented by fish.” See Bill C-32: An Act Respecting the Sustainable Development of 
Canada’s Seacoast and Inland Fisheries (the 39th Parliament ended on 7 September 2008 before 
the Bill was adopted), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication. 
aspx?Docid=3153379&file=4> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
28
 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediment, 2004. Circulars: BWM.2/Circ.113 October 2007, available <http://www.imo.org> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). List of ballast water management systems that make use of 
Active Substances which received Basic and Final Approval. 
29
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 (and its Protocol of 
1978 (IMO, London)). See IMO, Harmful Aquatic Organisms in Ballast Water. Alternative 
ballast water treatment method. Submission by Japan. 15 February 2001. MEPC 46/INF.19 
(London: IMO). 
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Although species carried in ballast water is the focus of this study, from 
the point of view of ecological security, commercial efficiency and effective 
regulatory design, it is important to be aware that organisms are transferred 
between countries in other ways related to ships’ operations. These include 
attaching to the ship’s hull (a process called fouling), sea chest, the anchor and 
other parts of a ship, as well as cargo, cargo packaging and loading equipment. 
Of these, arguably ballast water operations pose the largest problem. Concerns 
have been expressed about these other maritime transport related vectors in 
various fora, but so far there is no specific international regulatory 
development.30 
 
 
14.3. The International Legal Response to the Problem of Aquatic Invasive 
Species and Harmful Organisms 
 
International response to the problem aquatic invasive species and harmful 
organisms carried in ships’ ballast water has occurred in various fora. This has 
led to conceptual complexity, problems of terminology and fragmented 
responses internationally and nationally. In part this relates to how the problem 
has been conceptualised and the related decisions on the appropriate 
institutional location for solving “the problem.” However, it is one of the 
contemporary breed of cross cutting-issues that pose a challenge to existing 
international institutions and the related interaction at the national level. For 
example, it could be seen as purely a ship-source discharge problem and 
essentially addressed as a ship-source pollution issue. It could also be regarded 
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 Some states, such as Australia and New Zealand, also check for hull fouling. An electronic 
list serve posted a notice in early July 2001 of a proposed “Planning Meeting: Workshop on 
Ship Fouling and Biological Invasions in Aquatic Ecosystems” (notice on file). The workshop 
was proposed by a member of the US Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Centre, and a member of 
the US Coast Guard Environmental Standards Division. The proponents noted that: 
Historically, hull fouling has been the most important means by which shipping has 
transported non-indigenous species … impending limitations on the use of the most 
effective antifouling paint [organotin based] and on the conduct of hull cleanings, may 
result in increased fouling of ships and the subsequent transport of non-indigenous 
species. 
The issue has also been raised in the meetings relating to the CBD. See, for example, 
SBSTTA/6/ paras 20–22, available: <http://www.cbd.int> (retrieved 4 December 208). More 
recently, see R. Herwig, “Vessel fouling research,” and I. Davidson, “Vessel biofouling,” 
(Powerpoint presentations to the Pacific Ballast Water Group, A Regional Coordination Project, 
Meeting, 4–5 December 2007), available: <http://www.psmfc.org/ballast/past-meetings/> 
(retrieved 4 December 2008). 
  444 
as a health security problem, or as an environmental protection/biodiversity 
problem, or all of these.  
Like many of these other cross-cutting issues, such as climate change, 
the particular conceptualisation adopted and institutional placement affects the 
design of a regulatory approach and ideas about the best way to address the 
problem. Should the focus be on preventing the “export” with the source 
country responsible for preventing the uptake and spread, or is it purely 
a carriage problem with efforts directed toward the carrier? Is it an 
import/border control problem with the focus on the receiving country to 
prevent the inadvertent introduction/import of species? Or is it all three? The 
obvious answer is that efforts should be made in connection with all three 
points of potential response and responsibility. However, from an international 
regulatory perspective, this poses a challenge for achieving a comprehensive 
and integrated response. Initiatives first at the international level and then at the 
national level have generated differing terminology and with it potential 
differences in the scope of coverage and approaches. For example, the range of 
terms adopted includes “alien species,”31 “harmful aquatic organisms and 
pathogens,”32 “aquatic invasive species (AIS),”33 and “non-indigenous aquatic 
organisms and pathogens,”34 to name but a few.  
This section provides a brief overview of the international regime 
concerning aquatic invasive species and harmful organisms. There are two 
primary sources for the international obligation to prevent the transfer and 
spread of species. The first and earliest source, the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention),35 with its 
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 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter LOS Convention], Article 196. 
32
 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments, 2004, IMO BWM/CONF/36 16 February 2004 [hereinafter BWM Convention]. 
Article 1(8), Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens, means aquatic organisms or 
pathogens which, if introduced into the sea including estuaries, or into fresh water courses, may 
create hazards to the environment, human health, property or resources, impair biological 
diversity or interfere with other legitimate uses of such areas. Ballast Water Control and 
Management Regulations, Canada (SOR/2006-129), section 1, “‘harmful aquatic organisms or 
pathogens’ means aquatic organisms or pathogens that, if introduced into the sea, including 
estuaries, or into fresh water courses, could create hazards to human health, harm organisms, 
damage amenities, impair biological diversity or interfere with legitimate uses of the waters.” 
33
 The Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of Aquatic Invasive Species defined aquatic 
invasive species as “Fish, animal, and plant species that have been introduced into a new 
aquatic ecosystem and are having harmful consequences for the natural resources in the native 
aquatic ecosystem and/or the human use of the resource.” 
34
 Transport Canada, A Guide to Canada’s Ballast Water Control and Management Regulations 
(TP 136117E 11/2007), p. 1. 
35
 LOS Convention, n. 31 above. 
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careful delineation of flag, port and coastal state responsibilities and control 
over activities and actors, recognises a range of oceanic actors. Under this 
regime, matters relating to international standards for shipping as an ocean 
activity are primarily situated in the IMO, which has a well-developed 
regulatory model that it used for almost issues it has addressed. This model is 
focused on the ship and the flag state as the primary actors with port state 
inspections as the complementary mechanism for ensuring compliance on 
ships. Uniformity in approach among countries with the related minimisation of 
barriers to efficient and rapid movement of ships is an important value. In 
connection with this issue the IMO approach also involves some provisions 
relating to coastal state obligations to identify risky water and to warn ships 
regarding uptake36 and an obligation to develop sediment reception facilities.37 
The later source, the CBD, has grown up within in the MEA system of 
UNEP and affiliated institutions and actors. In the marine context, the CBD 
primarily addresses coastal state responsibility to prevent loss of biodiversity 
and to avoid transboundary harm. Concern and practices such as environmental 
impact assessments, precaution, and valuing ecosystem diversity are important 
values in the CBD.  
The regimes that have evolved in connection with these two conventions 
are consistent with each other in terms of their objectives, however, there are 
significant differences in their institutional and management cultures and 
frameworks. Although this contribution is not focused on the issue of 
integration of global governance per se, it does form part of the regulatory 
context because the tension that results from the difference in these two regimes 
is played out at the level of domestic institutional and legal implementation.  
 
 
14.3.1. The Law of the Sea38 
 
The LOS Convention39 was adopted in 1982, came into force in 1994 and, as of 
November 2008, is binding on 157 states.40 The LOS Convention was one of 
the first attempts by the global community to provide a comprehensive regime 
for managing an international space. It also introduced an holistic framework 
for addressing environmental rights and responsibilities.41 Article 196 of the 
                                                 
36
 BWM Convention, n. 32 above, Regulation C-2.  
37
 Id., Article 5. 
38
 The text in the section draws upon earlier studies, see McConnell, n. 6 above.  
39
 BWM Convention, n. 32 above. 
40
 See United Nations website at <http://www.un.org/depts//los> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
41
 J. Charney, “The Marine Environment and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” 
The International Lawyer 28 (Washington: American Bar Association Press, 1994): 879–901. 
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LOS Convention specifically addresses the problem of alien species and state 
obligations. 
 
Article 196 
  Use of technologies or introduction of alien or new species  
1. States shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of 
technologies under their jurisdiction or control, or the intentional or 
accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to a particular part of 
the marine environment, which may cause significant and harmful 
changes thereto. 
2. This article does not affect the application of this Convention regarding 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine 
environment. (emphasis added) 
 
This provision places an obligation on all states to prevent the intentional and 
the unintentional transfer of species that may be harmful to another marine 
environment. One of the difficulties that has arisen in connection with Article 
196 relates to the distinction seemingly being drawn in subsection 2 between 
marine pollution, defined in Article 1 (4) of the LOS Convention: 
 
1. For the purposes of this Convention:  
… 
 (4) “pollution of the marine environment” means the introduction by 
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in 
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, 
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including 
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for 
use of sea water and reduction of amenities … 
 
This definition of marine pollution, which does not clearly cover the situation 
of species transfer, has been adopted in many national laws. The negotiating 
history of Article 196 indicates that, in the course of developing this text, there 
were two distinct duties in mind: preventing pollution, and closer to the more 
recent biodiversity concept, maintaining the natural state of the marine 
environment.42 Although it did not survive the final negotations, it is also 
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 M. Nordqvist, ed. in chief, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. 
A Commentary, Vol. IV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 73–76. 
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interesting that one version of the text imposed a responsibility to restore 
affected environments to their pre-alien species transfer state.43 
Another related question arises as to what actions states can, or are 
obliged, to take to prevent the risk of a transfer of invasive species and 
pathogens, both coming into and leaving their jurisdictions. This question might 
itself comprise a paper. The LOS Convention does not specifically address this 
question, however, it is clear that a state has a sovereign right to determine the 
basis of entry into its internal waters (i.e., most ports), subject to the customary 
practice regarding situations where human lives are in danger.44 The coastal 
state can also pass laws governing the innocent passage (defined in Article 19) 
of foreign ships through its territorial sea (out to 12 nautical miles) in order to, 
inter alia, preserve the environment of the coastal state (Article 22 (1)(f)), 
conserve living resources and prevent the infringement of fisheries regulations 
(Article 22(1)(d) & (e)), and prevent infringement of sanitary laws and 
regulations (Article 22(1)(h)). However, this legislative authority is subject to 
the important restriction in Article 21(2): 
 
Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, 
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules and standards. 
 
Coastal/port state marine pollution prevention and enforcement rights and 
obligations are primarily set out in Part XII of the LOS Convention. These 
rights are very complex and depend on a range of factors45 including restrictions 
– safeguards – placed upon the right to inspect and detain ships (e.g., Article 
226). There is a clear duty under Article 194 on states to prevent, control and 
reduce marine pollution caused by activities under their control and to prevent 
damage to other states, including the duty to prevent pollution from ships by, 
inter alia, “… preventing intentional and unintentional discharges and 
regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of 
ships.” Articles 194, 211 and 217 are the source of flag state responsibility for 
primary regulation of ships. The omission of the word operation from Article 
21(2) appears to allow a coastal state to adopt national standards, subject 
perhaps to other agreements that may be been ratifed, in the territorial sea with 
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 R. Platzöder, ed., Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol. 
X (New York: Oceana Publications, 1986), p. 453. 
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 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Juris Publishing, 1999), 
pp. 62–65, regarding the right to set conditions for access to the port as stated in Nicaragua 
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14, p. 111. 
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 For example, Articles 211, 217, 218 and 219 and 220, which all require a detailed 
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respect to ships’ operations without offending the right to innocent passage, 
although any national legislation will be subject to the requirement of non-
discrimination (Article 24; Article 227). In the absence of an internationally-
binding standard, this point is relevant to coastal states’ choices regarding the 
method adopted to prevent the transfer of species in ballast water (equipment 
based or operational procedures). 
The LOS Convention regime recognises that “problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole” (Preamble). It is 
based on a careful balancing of rights and claims and remains a key source of 
state responsibility for protection of the marine environment and its living 
resources. However, since 1982, the evolution of global comprehension of the 
relationship between human activities and the environment and the concept of 
sustainble development has taken the next step to an even more holistic or 
integrated approach based on an ecosystemic view. It means that, aside from 
questions of interpreting national legislation and coastal state and port state 
enforcement rights, the later and even more broadly supported 1992 CBD have, 
arguably, subsumed or at least significantly altered the understanding and 
implications of the LOS Convention marine pollution provisions. 
 
  
14.3.2. The Convention on Biological Diversity46 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity47 was adopted in 1992 at UNCED and 
came into force soon after, in late 1993. As noted earlier it has close to 
universal ratification.48 The CBD also addresses state obligations regarding 
alien species. Article 8, In-Situ Conservation, of the CBD requires, inter alia, 
that: 
 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate:  
(h) Prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species 
which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species; 
 
 These obligations apply not only to protecting biodiversity in the state’s 
territory but also to the effects on biodiversity elsewhere. Article 4, 
Jurisdictional Scope, provides: 
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 The text in the section draws upon earlier studies, see McConnell, n. 6 above.  
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 CBD, n. 1 above. 
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Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in 
relation to each Contracting Party: 
(b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their 
effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area 
of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
(emphasis added) 
 
It is clear then, given the high level of ratification of both the LOS 
Convention and the CDB, that most states already have an international 
obligation to address the problem of alien species transfer, to the extent that it 
occurs within their jurisdiction or because of an activity under their control. 
This includes the role of flag states and the role of coastal/port states as 
“source” and”import” states. The CBD is clearly relevant to the question of 
a state’s international responsibility to prevent both the export and the import of 
alien species and pathogens in ships’ ballast water. 
 
 
14.3.3. Ships’ Ballast Water: The International Regulatory Response49  
 
In addition to these two comprehensive conventions establishing general 
obligations regarding species transfer, efforts began as early as 1973, under the 
auspices of the IMO, to address the specific problem of species carried in ships’ 
ballast water. These efforts, which largely follow the aproach taken by IMO 
Member States to dealing with ship source pollution, can also be understood as 
a step to implement the obligations in the LOS Convention. In 2004 these 
efforts, complemented by a programme for implementation, culminated in the 
adoption of the International Convention for the Control and Management of 
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (BWM).50 The following briefly 
outlines the progress of the issue in the IMO.  
In 1973, an International Conference on Marine Pollution organised by 
IMO passed Resolution 18, Research into the effect of discharge of ballast 
water containing bacteria of epidemic diseases.51 However no specific 
international regulatory action was taken with respect to species transfer until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when a number of states presented research and 
argued for international rules on this issue in IMO’s Marine and Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC). Canada was one of the lead countries raising 
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 The text in the section draws upon earlier studies, see McConnell, n. 6 above. 
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 BWM Convention, n. 32 above. 
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 IMO, n. 8 above, p. 15. 
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this concern, largely as a result of the economic and other impacts of invasive 
species in waters shared with the United States.52 In 1991, non-binding rules 
entitled Guidelines for Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Organisms and 
Pathogens from Ships’ Ballast Waters and Sediment Discharges, originally 
drafted by Canada and modified in a working group, were adopted by the 
MEPC.53 These were further developed in light of more experience and 
adopted, in 1993, by the IMO General Assembly.54 In 1994 a working group 
began to examine the possibility of legally binding regulations that also tried to 
address the ship safety issues. In 1997 the IMO General Assembly adopted 
Resolution A.868 (20)55 that revised the earlier guidelines. One of the more 
significant features of the revision was the formal adoption of a risk 
minimisation and management approach to the problem, as reflected in the new 
title, Guidelines for the control and management of ships’ ballast water to 
minimize the transfer of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens.  
The 1997 Guidelines differ from the more usual IMO regulatory strategy 
which emphasises flag state responsibility and control. The Guidelines apply to 
all ships and encourage adoption of uniform rather than unilateral state 
practices. However, they also state that, 
  
11.2  Member States have the right to manage ballast water by national 
legislation. However, any ballast water discharge restrictions should 
be notified to the Organization. 
 
The majority of the provisions in the Guidelines are directed either to 
port/coastal states or simply recommend that ships’ have a Ballast Water 
Management Plan (BWMP) and keep a record of ballast water intake and 
discharge that can be reported to port authorities. Both port administrations and 
ships are to make use of a standardised Ballast Water Reporting Form. 
Governments are required to ensure training for ships’ crews and masters to 
ensure proper implementation of the BWMP. The Guidelines also recommend 
that ships adopt precautionary approaches to try to prevent or reduce the risk of 
uptake or discharge of harmful organisms. Precautions include avoiding taking 
up ballast water at night; removing tank sediment regularly; avoiding uptake in 
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 Canada and Australia were the first countries to pursue this issue at the international level as 
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very shallow water or where a propeller may stir up sediment and practice 
either open sea exchange, minimal or no release of ballast water; discharge into 
reception facilities; or making use of other treatment options. Under the 
Guidelines, ports are required to provide information to ships corresponding to 
the operational requirements. For example, a port state is required to inform 
ships about its ballast water management requirements, reception facilities, 
alternate discharge zones and other port contingency requirements. In addition, 
the port state is required to support ships’ measures to avoid the intake of 
organisms and pathogens by providing information on  
 
… areas with outbreaks, infestations or known populations of harmful 
organisms and pathogens; areas with phytoplankton blooms (algal 
blooms, such as red tides); nearby sewage outfalls; nearby dredging 
operations; when a tidal stream is known to be the more turbid; and 
areas where tidal flushing is known to be poor.56 
 
The Guidelines also recommend a risk minimisation approach that 
involves the port state taking into account factors that indicate that a ship’s 
ballast water is low risk for species transfer. The two factors mentioned that can 
reduce the risk of an invasive species establishing in the coastal zone are 
disparate conditions between the place of ballast water intake and the port, and 
the age of the ballast water.57 The Guidelines are important because they 
apportion responsibility for prevention to both ships’ and the port/coastal state. 
Although the BWM Convention was subsequently adopted, it is not in force: 
the 1997 Guidelines, therefore, remain the existing applicable but non-binding 
instrument. 
The BWM Convention, adopted by the IMO in 2004, reflects an approach 
based on the more traditional IMO regulatory strategy with its focus on the flag 
state management/certification rules, with less emphasis on port/coastal state 
export prevention responsibilities. Its Preamble refers to the LOS Convention 
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and the CBD regimes, public health, the need for a precautionary approach, and 
notes concerns about unilateral action and the need for globally applicable 
regulations and guidelines for effective implementation and uniform 
interpretation. This Preamble firmly connects the issue and the Convention to 
the UNEP/World Health Organization biosecurity/state responsibility agenda 
and the UN Office for Ocean Affairs (LOS Convention Secretariat), as well as 
the more traditional IMO concerns about ship safety, security and uniformity of 
national regulation. At a macro-system level, this reflects the increasing 
integration and, perhaps, even overlapping oceanic interests of the various UN 
agencies. 
The BWM Convention follows the structure and regulatory strategy used 
in IMO’s other major ship-source marine pollution prevention instrument 
(MARPOL73/78) dealing with oil, chemicals, harmful substances in packaged 
forms, sewage, garbage and air emissions.58 In fact, much of the text is based 
on MARPOL, Annex 1, Regulation from Prevention of Pollution by Oil, which 
regulates operational discharges of oil from ships. The Convention comprises 
a short agreement with articles setting out general rights and responsibilities of 
the states party followed by an annex with more detailed regulations that 
foresees the adoption of guidelines on specific technical issues. It affirms in 
Article 2 (3), 
 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a Party 
from taking individually or jointly, more stringent measures with respect 
to the prevention, reduction or elimination of the transfer of harmful 
aquatic organisms and pathogens through the control and management 
of ships’ ballast water sediments consistent with international law. 
 
Flag state control and responsibility is central to the Convention, which 
provides for certification and recognition of an International Ballast Water 
Management Certificate. Ships must also have a flag state approved BWMP 
and ballast water record book that is available for inspection in foreign ports. 
This requires an initial ship survey, monitoring, and regulatory control by the 
flag state (as delegated in many cases to a classification society), with port 
states monitoring to ensure ongoing ship compliance with the certificate 
requirements. There are “existing ship” and “new ship” requirements for tanks 
and other equipment design issues, with a schedule under negotiation for 
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 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London, 2 November 
1973, as amended by Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, reprinted in MARPOL 73/78 
consolidated edition 1997 (London: IMO, 1997) [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]. 
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phasing out existing ships. As is the case with MARPOL73/7859 it also requires 
efficient port state reception facilities for sediment disposal. The BWM 
Convention also provides for inspection and sampling but recognises potential 
commercial consequences by providing compensation for “undue delay.”  
Also similar to MARPOL’s designated “special areas” formula found in, 
for example, MARPOL Annex 1 (Regulation 10),60 the BWM Convention 
establishes generally applicable measures and standards with some ability to 
designate (based on internationally accepted criteria) areas in which more 
stringent ballast water discharge requirements may be imposed.61  
The BWM Convention details technical standards and requirements for 
the control and management of ships’ ballast water and sediments. Ships are to 
maintain the on board BWMP and record ballast water operations in the ships’ 
ballast water record book. Ballast water exchange (discharge port/coastal water 
and up take of new water), if that is the management method used by the ship, 
is to be conducted at least 200 nautical miles from the nearest land and in water 
which is at least 200 metres in depth. In cases where the ship is unable to do 
this, the exchange can be conducted in areas at least 50 nautical miles from the 
nearest land and where the depth of the water is at least 200 metres. However, if 
the parameters of distance and depth cannot be met, the coastal/port state can 
designate, in consultation with adjacent states, areas where a ship could conduct 
the exchange. 
The Convention also establishes standards for ballast water exchange, if 
that is the management method adopted, and ballast water performance 
standards if other measures are adopted beside ballast water exchange, i.e., 
concentration of viable organisms in the ballast water discharged. The latter has 
been one of the more complex issues with guidelines on the performance 
standards for the Convention only recently adopted.62 In addition, states are to 
have sediment reception facilities. 
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 See BWM Convention, n. 32 above, Regulation C-1. See also the discussion in Advice 
Concerning Legal Aspects of the Draft International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 16 February 2001, MEPC 46/3/4 (London: 
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 The following Guidelines have been adopted so far:  
Guidelines for sediment reception facilities (G1) adopted by resolution MEPC.152(55); 
Guidelines for ballast water management equivalent compliance (G3) adopted by resolution 
MEPC.123(53); 
Guidelines for ballast water management and development of ballast water management plans 
(G4) adopted by resolution MEPC.127(53); 
Guidelines for ballast water reception facilities (G5) adopted by resolution MEPC.153(55); 
Guidelines for ballast water exchange (G6) adopted by resolution MEPC.124(53); 
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Since ballast water exchange can have serious repercussions for the safety 
of ships, the BWM Convention provides that a ship need not comply with these 
requirements if the ship’s master reasonably decides that such exchange would 
threaten the safety or stability of the ship, its crew, or its passengers either due 
to adverse weather, ship design or stress, equipment failure, or any other 
extraordinary condition.63 Article 13 of the Convention provides that parties 
with a common interest in protecting the environment, human health, property, 
and resources in a given geographical area, particularly those parties bordering 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, can establish regional agreements consistent 
with the Convention.64 
This very brief overview of the BWM Convention illustrates the 
complexity of the regulatory challenges posed by this issue. There are also 
numerous aspects that are not addressed here, for example, the problem of 
coasting trade ships that may spread existing invasive species within 
                                                                                                                                  
Guidelines for risk assessment under regulation A-4 of the BWM convention (G7) adopted by 
resolution MEPC.162(56); 
Guidelines for approval of ballast water management systems (G8) adopted by resolution 
MEPC.125(53); 
Procedure for approval of ballast water management systems that make use of active 
substances (G9) adopted by resolution MEPC.126(53); 
Guidelines for approval and oversight of prototype ballast water treatment technology 
programmes (G10) adopted by resolution MEPC.140(54); 
Guidelines for ballast water exchange design and construction standards (G11) adopted by 
resolution MEPC.149(55); 
Guidelines on design and construction to facilitate sediment control on ships (G12) adopted by 
resolution MEPC.150(55); 
Guidelines for additional measures regarding ballast water management including emergency 
situations (G13) adopted by resolution MEPC.161(56); 
Guidelines on designation of areas for ballast water exchange (G14) adopted by resolution 
MEPC.151(55); 
Guidelines for ballast water exchange in the Antarctic treaty area adopted by resolution 
MEPC.163(56).  
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 On 13 July 2007, IMO adopted Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange in the Antarctic 
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Arctic waters (para.7). 
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a jurisdiction or the emerging concern with respect to ships that do not have 
ballast on board (NOBOB).65  
Although many coastal and port states have adopted national laws or 
regulations to implement the IMO resolutions and to protect their coastlines 
from this threat, the BWM Convention, which is primarily directed to flag 
states, is not yet in force. To date, the BWM Convention has been ratified by 
only 18 countries representing 15.36 per cent of the world gross tonnage.66 It is 
unclear when or, perhaps even, whether the BWM will come into force. At 
present, then the binding preventative international obligations under the LOS 
Convention and the CBD are the applicable international regulatory regime. 
Until the the BWM Convention enters into force, Resolution A.868 (20) 
Guidelines remain the main international source for harmonising national 
practices. The problem of diverse national practices and the extent to which 
more stringent standards can be adopted, consistent with international law are, 
as yet, unresolved. 
It is troubling that, despite some consideration in the MEPC working 
group for consistency in format between the BWM Convention and the then 
developing (and now in force) Anti-fouling Convention,67the former was not 
expanded to cover the other ways that ships carry organisms, such as on 
anchors and other equipment. The problem with the Anti-fouling Convention is 
that, whilst the decision to ban organotin-based anti-fouling paint is laudable 
and sensible, unless a substitute can be found that is equally effective, then the 
risk of alien species transfer will be increased due to increased ship fouling. 
The increased speed of trips may also mean that transfer by fouling will be 
increased. This means that regulators must also be prepared to inspect hull 
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 The International Joint Commission (IJC) established between Canada and the United States 
in 1978 to address concerns with respect to the shared Great Lakes’ waters areas reported: 
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2000, AFS/Conf/2, MEPC (London: IMO).  
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fouling as well as ballast water to ensure that there are no invasive species. The 
fact that other parts of the ship are not addressed in the ballast water regime has 
been noted in meetings related to the CBD and concern was expressed at the 
time about a piecemeal, gap-filling approach to dealing with related issues.68 
 
 
14.4. The Canadian Regulatory Response 
 
As pointed out in the 2005 Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of 
Aquatic Invasive Species:69 
 
Aquatic invasive species (AIS) have been entering Canadian waters for 
centuries but never as rapidly as today. Every decade, some 15 alien 
species establish themselves in our coastal or inland waters and, in the 
absence of their natural predators, the most aggressive of them spread 
rapidly. They can radically alter habitat, rendering it inhospitable for 
native species. 
 
Invading species have been implicated in both the vast reductions in, or 
outright extinction of, indigenous fish and the resulting devastation of 
local fisheries. Some invasives, such as the zebra mussel, do millions of 
dollars in damage annually to human infrastructure. In addition to 
damage to the environment, in total, invasive species cost billions of 
dollars every year due to lost revenue and the implementation of control 
measures. With more species poised to enter the country, these costs will 
only rise. Canada has 20 per cent of the world’s fresh water and one of 
the longest coastlines, thereby placing it at high risk from AIS. As 
a result of insufficient awareness of the nature and size of the threat, 
there have been limited levels of compliance with practices and 
regulations designed to minimize the damage. 
 
World leaders officially recognized the threat posed by invasive species 
in 1992, with the adoption of the UN Convention on Biodiversity. 
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 See SBSTTA/6/, n. 30 above. See also Invasive Alien Species, Options for Future Work, 
SBSTTA VI/8 (20 December 2000), available: <http://www.cbd.int> (retrieved 4 December 
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 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canadian Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers, 
Aquatic Invasive Species Task Group, A Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of 
Aquatic Invasive Species (2005), available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/environmental-
environnement/action_plan/action_plan_e.htm> (retrieved 4 December 2008). 
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Canada responded in 1995 with the Canadian Biodiversity Strategy. In 
September 2001, federal, provincial and territorial ministers of forests, 
fisheries and aquaculture, endangered species and wildlife agreed to 
develop a Canadian plan to deal with the threat of invasive alien species. 
In 2002, they approved a blueprint for the plan. Also in 2002, the 
Canadian Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers created the 
Aquatic Invasive Species Task Group to develop an action plan to 
address the threat of aquatic invasive species. 
 
The most effective approach to dealing with the hundreds of species that 
are (or could become) established in Canada involves managing the 
pathways through which invasive species enter and spread through 
Canadian waters. For aquatic species, these pathways are shipping, 
recreational and commercial boating, the use of live bait, the 
aquarium/water garden trade, live food fish, unauthorized introductions 
and transfers, and canals and water diversions. This plan does not 
address authorized introductions such as aquaculture or fish stocking, as 
they are covered by the National Code on Introductions and Transfers of 
Aquatic Organisms. 
 
The shipping pathway is considered the largest single source of new 
aquatic invasive species. Ballast water that is taken on in foreign ports, 
for ship stability and safety at sea, is discharged in Canadian waters, 
along with undesirable “hitchhikers”—foreign species ranging from 
bacteria to larger organisms. While other pathways can also be a source 
of new species, they generally serve to spread species that have already 
established themselves in Canada and other parts of North America. 
 
As discussed above in section 14.3.3, Canada has been active in raising 
international awareness and taking steps to address the problem of aquatic 
invasive species carried in ships’ ballast water (or hull fouling) in the IMO 
since the 1980s. Despite this relatively lengthy history of interest, progress on 
developing legislation has been surprisingly slow with the Ballast Water 
Control and Management Regulations70 adopted only in 2006. Canada has not 
ratified the BWM Convention, although it is clear that the Regulations have 
been designed with view to implementation of the BWM Convention if Canada 
does ratify.71 There were, however, efforts and cooperative and research 
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 BWM Convention, n. 32 above, adopted pursuant to section 657.1 of the Canada Shipping 
Act, 2001. 
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 Transport Canada, n. 34 above. 
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activities underway well before the adoption of these Regulations, including 
adoption of national guidelines in 1989 and cooperative activity with the United 
States in connection with specific species in the St. Lawrence Seaway and 
Great Lakes, since the early 1950s. These were areas that had been colonised by 
two very invasive species, the zebra mussel and the sea lamprey, as well what is 
now estimated as, 
 
… over 150 other Aquatic Invasive Species (AIS)... [that are] believed 
to have been introduced initially via ballast water discharged from 
incoming foreign vessels, with secondary invasions and dissemination 
facilitated in many cases by carriage as hull-fouling organisms.72  
  
A brief overview of the wider Canadian response to invasive species in 
general is offered here to provide information on the institutional framework 
that was developed to address the fact that a number of institutions have a role 
to play, given that Canada has ratified both the LOS Convention and the CBD 
and was instrumental in encouraging the IMO to adopt the resolutions to 
address the problem species transferred in ships’ ballast water. This is followed 
by a review of the specific responses to species carried in ships’ ballast water. 
 
 
14.4.1. Invasive (Alien) Species in General 
 
Canada is a federation with legislative jurisdiction (powers) under its 
constitution shared between the national (federal) level and the provincial 
level.73 The federal parliament is assigned the power to make international 
commitments. However, in many areas it cannot implement these obligations 
without the agreement and, often, the adoption of legislation by the provincial 
legislature. Navigation and shipping is a subject that is allocated to the federal 
government. However, for more recent cross-cutting issues such as 
“environment,” both the federal and provincial governments have established 
government agencies and adopted legislation. “Canada is a dualist jurisdiction 
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 Fisheries and Ocean Canada, Canadian Scientific Advice Secretariat, Alternative Ballast 
Water Exchange Zones, 30 November – 1 December 2004, Montreal PQ, Proceedings Series 
2004/042 (April 2005), pp. 1–2.  
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 Canada has 13 provinces and territories. The Constitution Act, 1867, section 91 and 92, 
contains a list of enumerated “heads “ or subject matters of legislative concerns over which 
parliament (federal) and each legislature (provinces) have exclusive authority. Residual law-
making power is left with the federal government (Parliament). See N. Craik and C. Forcese, 
Public Law, Cases, Materials and Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2006), p. 125.  
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… [which means that a] … treaty has no direct effect in domestic law until 
domestic legislation is passed to “transform” or “implement” it into Canadian 
law.”74 Canada ratified the CBD in 199275 and the LOS Convention in late 
2003.76 
As noted in the above excerpt from the Action Plan,77 a Canadian 
Biodiversity Strategy was adopted in 1995. This was followed in 2001 and 
2002 by efforts to coordinate responses by the various implicated departments 
of the federal government and a Canadian plan to deal with invasive species 
adopted in 2001. In 2004, An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada78 
(IAS Strategy) was approved by federal, provincial, and territorial ministers 
responsible for wildlife, forests, fisheries and aquaculture, and endangered 
species.79 
In 2004, the federal government also committed to addressing invasive 
species in general in cooperation with the United States through agencies such 
as the International Joint Commission.80 In 2005, a trilateral Prosperity Agenda 
for North America agreed to by the political leaders of Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico called on the governments of all three countries to 
“[c]ombat the spread of invasive species in both coastal and fresh waters.”81 
The federal government’s budget in 2005 provided CAD85 million over 
five years to support implementation of the IAS Strategy. The funding was to 
be divided between:82 
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• Environment Canada 
• Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
• Natural Resources Canada 
• Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
 
Several other initiatives were also undertaken in connection with this 
Strategy.83 For example, an inter-departmental “Leadership and Coordination 
Committee” oversees implementation of the IAS Strategy and addresses IAS 
issues of a horizontal nature.84 The Ministers of Environment, Fisheries and 
Oceans, Agriculture, and Natural Resources play a leadership role with regard 
to implementing the IAS Strategy at the federal level.85 National IAS working 
groups were also established to develop national action plans for aquatic 
species, terrestrial plants and plant pests.  
In connection with aquatic invasive species (AIS) and national action 
plans, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is the federal lead agency. It 
facilitated, through a task group, the development of the Canadian Action Plan 
to Address the Threat of Aquatic Invasive Species86 (Action Plan for AIS). 
The Action Plan for AIS was approved at the ministers’ joint meeting in 
October 2005,87 along with other action plans for terrestrial species. 
The Action Plan for AIS outlines a strategic management framework for 
addressing AIS and their pathways of introduction. It addresses “unauthorised” 
(unintentional) introductions of AIS from seven key “pathways” including 
shipping, recreational and commercial boating, and the live bait and aquarium 
trades, and, like the Strategy, prioritises prevention. The Action Plan “does not 
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address international introductions such as aquaculture or fish stocking, as they 
are covered by the National Code on Introductions and Transfers of Aquatic 
Organisms.”88 Leadership for implementing the Action Plan for AIS is shared 
between the federal government and the provinces. At the federal level, the lead 
agencies are DFO and Environment Canada (IAS activities are coordinated by 
Environment Canada through a secretariat). In the federal budget of 2005, DFO 
was allocated CAD10 million over five years to assist with the implementation 
of the aquatic component of the national IAS Strategy.89  
It is of interest to note that the issue of AIS issue is now addressed by 
DFO under the rubric “Health of Oceans Initiatives,” 90 under the auspices of 
the 2005 Oceans Action Plan and the subsequent 2007 National Water Strategy, 
which were both adopted pursuant to the Oceans Act.91 In turn these initiatives 
are intended to 
 
… protect fragile marine environments, counter pollution and strengthen 
preventive measures by: 
• strengthening pollution prevention at source (conservation of 
natural resources); increasing capacity to lessen the effects of 
pollution when and where it occurs; increasing protection of 
ecologically significant marine areas through the establishment 
of nine new marine protected areas (MPAs); 
• investing in science to better understand the oceans; and  
• co-operating more closely with domestic and international 
partners for more integrated oceans management92 
  
DFO is the lead agency under for the overall initiative; however, other 
departments also have specific roles where they are to take a lead role. Relevant 
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to the issue of AIS in ships’ ballast water, DFO has responsibility for 
“ecosystem science to provide support and advice on the health of the oceans, 
while Transport Canada (the national maritime administration) is the lead 
agency for adoption, implementation and enforcement of the Ballast Water 
Control Regulations.”93 
 
 
14.4.2. Control of Invasive Species in Ships’ Ballast Water  
 
The majority of the efforts mentioned above in connection with invasive 
species and ocean health are largely responding to the obligations under the 
CBD. However, it should be noted that well before these efforts, in 1989 and 
into the 1990s and early 2000 in parallel to the CBD-related activity, Canada 
had also adopted voluntary guidelines which influenced the adoption, in 1991, 
of the IMO resolution on ships’ ballast water management.94 These guidelines 
were developed under the auspices of the Canadian Coast Guard (an agency 
later transferred to Transport Canada and then to DFO). Despite this early 
history of concerns about this issue in Canada, there has been relatively less 
research activity or resources devoted to the issue until the last few years, at 
least in comparison with Australia or the United States. 
In 1988, Canada presented a study to IMO entitled “The Presence and 
Implication of Foreign Organisms in Ship Ballast Water Discharged in the 
Great Lakes.”95 Canadian concern was triggered by the significant economic 
impact of the introduction and spread of a non-native mussel species (zebra 
mussel) in the St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes as well as earlier action 
taken in connection with the sea lamprey. Parts of this water system are shared 
with the United States with the result that a cooperative approach was 
developed to deal effectively with the problem.96 In 1988, the Shipping 
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Federation of Canada, an industry association, was among the first to take 
action to encourage the development of a ballast water exchange regime to 
prevent the further spread of harmful aquatic organisms to the Great Lakes.97 In 
1989, the Voluntary Guidelines for the Control of Ballast Water Discharges 
from Ships Proceeding to the St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes were 
developed by the Canadian Coast Guard.98 These Guidelines require that the 
ship’s master file a Ballast Water Exchange Report on entering the St. 
Lawrence Seaway. The Guidelines also provided for a designated alternative 
discharge zone where deep water exchange was not possible for reasons of 
safety or the voyage route. The main concern was to ensure that the ballast 
water had high salinity—a fact that made it unlikely that species could survive 
in the water of the Great Lakes. In all cases, ship and seafarer safety was 
declared paramount.  
The 1989 regionally specific Voluntary Guidelines were rescinded in 
September 2000 when they were replaced by the Canadian Ballast Water 
Management Guidelines, as amended to 8 June 2001.99 These Guidelines were 
explicitly intended to implement the IMO Guidelines, with regional annexes 
setting out specific additional requirements. One of the main changes was that 
the Guidelines apply to “all vessels entering Canada’s exclusive economic zone 
from seaward.” The Guidelines were developed by the Canadian Marine 
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Advisory Council (CMAC),100 a consultative body with a Secretariat in the 
Coordination and Consultation Directorate of Transport Canada. CMAC is 
jointly chaired and coordinated by Transport Canada (which deals with 
shipping) and the Canadian Coast Guard (which by then was relocated to DFO).  
In 2001 it was believed that these Guidelines would become regulations 
in September 2002 as there was already legislative authority to adopt such 
regulations under the applicable Canada Shipping Act (a predecessor to the 
Canada Shipping Act, 2001101), a comprehensive national law that governs 
most aspects of shipping in Canada. However, regulations were not in fact 
adopted until 2006, perhaps to allow for consideration of the changes that 
would be needed to implement the BWM Convention which was under 
negotiation during that period. 
The Guidelines also provided for alternative ballast exchange zones and 
one was designated, as noted earlier, in 1989 by the Canadian and US Coast 
Guards, located near the entry to the St. Lawrence Seaway. However, this site 
eventually became controversial as studies indicated that it may result in risk to 
fisheries and aquaculture in fisheries in nearby provinces. During the late 1990s 
and first few years of 2000, in conjunction with the heightened awareness of the 
problem of invasive species and the move to develop the BWM Convention in 
IMO, increasing interest and studies of ships’ ballast water were undertaken in 
ports in Canada.102 
Under the auspices of the CMAC, Transport Canada initiated both 
national and regional working groups on ballast water. The result of the 
consultations with industry players was that the original intention to regulate 
ships that enter the St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes water system, was 
expanded to apply to all ships in Canada.103 DFO and academic researchers at 
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universities were also consulted, in particular on the recommended use of 
alternative ballast water exchange zones. 
The Ballast Water Control and Management Regulations104 (the 
“Regulations”) under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 came into force on 28 
June 2006. The Regulations were developed by Transport Canada and were 
based on the Guidelines. As noted above, they were also drafted with an eye to 
potential future ratification of the BWM Convention. Interestingly one of the 
main concerns cited was prevention of harm to existing fish species in the 
fisheries. (This in turn was linked to an estimate of potential economic 
consequence of inaction in connection with fisheries.) Accordingly, their 
terminology reflects the BWM Convention rather than the Action Plan on AIS 
terminology. For example, the Regulations arguably deal with much wider 
range of concerns then AIS in that they are concerned with “harmful aquatic 
organisms or pathogens”105 (HAOP). The purpose of the Regulations is to 
prevent the introduction of HAOP in ships’ ballast waters and sediments. 
Accordingly, the Regulations require all ships entering Canada (except from US 
Great Lakes’ water and adjacent French waters) to “manage” their ballast 
water.106 
The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement published in the Canada 
Gazette when these draft Regulation were published for public review and 
comment107 states that three alternatives were considered in preparing the 
Regulations: 
 
1. Maintain the status quo 
2. Incorporate the BWM Convention 
3. Follow the US regulations 
 
Maintenance of the status quo was seen as unsatisfactory because of 
Canada’s obligations under the CBD. There was also some concern that 
voluntary compliance was insufficient to curb the risks posed by HAOP.108 
Incorporation of the BWM Convention prior to its entry into force was also 
deemed ineffective “in particular with respect to the fact that foreign 
administrations would be under no obligation to ensure that their ships meet the 
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requirements for certification, inspection and fitting of approved ballast water 
treatment systems.”109 The option of duplicating the US rules for ballast water 
management was rejected because they did not provide for alternative ballast 
water exchange areas (established in the Regulations) if the primary exchange 
area could not be used. In the United States, if the exchange cannot be made for 
safety or other reasons, the ship may discharge ballast water in port but only the 
amount “operationally necessary.” In Canada, however, it was possible to 
identify alternative exchange areas, thus foreclosing the need for discharge in 
ports.110 
Under the Regulations, ballast water can be managed by a combination of 
the following: 
 
• Exchange 
• Treatment 
• Discharge into a reception facility 
• Retention on board ship 
 
The Regulations provide that ships coming into Canada from a transoceanic 
voyage must exchange ballast water before entering Canada in an area at least 
200 nautical miles from shore where the water depth is at least 2,000 metres.111 
The Regulations provide for alternative exchange areas in each region of the 
country if the previous exchange is not possible because it would be impractical 
or compromise the safety of the voyage.112 Alternate Ballast Water Discharge 
Zones (ABWDZ) have been designated for the Atlantic/East Coast, 
the Laurentian Channel, and in the north in Hudson’s Bay and the High 
Arctic.113 The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement published in the Canada 
Gazette114 explains how the ballast water exchange areas were identified: 
 
A preliminary scan conducted in support of the strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) suggests that further consideration be given to the 
selection of areas where exchange is permitted. Thus, for the selection 
of these zones, Transport Canada sought scientific advice from DFO. In 
order to provide this advice, DFO used scientific criteria to select zones 
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where the environmental impact caused by ships releasing their ballast 
would be minimized. The zones were critically reviewed through DFO’s 
peer review process. Transport Canada has implemented the advice 
provided by DFO in order to fulfill its requirement under the SEA 
process.115 
 
It should, however, be noted that the DFO peer review process took the view 
that, given the risk of AIS introduction with ballast water exchanges, 
the preferred option was on-board or onshore treatment for management. It was 
pointed out:  
 
Ballast water exchange seeks to minimize ecological risk , not eliminate 
it. Any ballast water exchange option will carry a risk to the receiving 
ecosystem.116  
 
The Regulations apply to every ship in waters under Canadian jurisdiction 
that is designed or constructed to carry ballast water (other than some 
specifically exempted categories of ships).117 It applies to both Canadian 
flagged ships and foreign flag ships in Canadian waters and requires that ballast 
water be managed if taken on board outside waters under Canadian 
jurisdiction.118 Ships in the coasting trade119 and ships that do not carry ballast 
water (NOBOB ships) are not required to comply with the Regulations. Both of 
these are categories that raise concerns about the risk of spreading or 
introducing species.120 
 The Regulations essentially follow the recommendations under IMO 
Resolution A.868 (20) practice on record keeping and the requirement for 
onboard BWMP. Sections 8 and 9 of the Regulations provide for minimum 
ballast water exchange standards and ballast water treatment standards, 
respectively. If a ship cannot manage ballast in accordance with the Regulations 
due to exceptional circumstances, it must notify the Minister of Transport at 
least 96 hours (or as soon as possible) prior to entry into the territorial sea.121 
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The decision as to measures to take is then up to the minister in consultation 
with the ship’s master.122 Marine safety inspectors enforce the regulations 
during normal periodic inspections.123 The Canadian Marine Communication 
and Traffic Services Centre receives reports.124 
According to Canada’s November 2007 submission to the CBD on 
Canada’s response to the risk of AIS: 
 
Joint Canadian and American inspections cover about 80% ocean going 
foreign ships before they enter the Great Lakes. For the 2006 shipping 
season, 94% of the ships inspected were in compliance with the 
Regulations. The remaining 6% of ships had to take corrective action, 
effectively providing 100% compliance of inspected ships. For 2007, 
non-compliance dropped to 3.5% for ships entering the Great Lakes. 
While the Great Lakes inspections cover all ships, for 2007, TC also 
selectively targeted higher risk ships destined for Quebec ports found 
a higher rate of non-compliance.125 
 
In November 2007, Transport Canada announced that over the next five 
years, CAD4.5 million would be used to enforce the Regulations.126 
Specifically, the funding was to be used to:  
 
• increase the number of marine inspectors enforcing ballast water 
regulations 
• support the development of technologies to better deal with ballast water 
issues 
• equip marine inspectors with the necessary tools to enforce ballast water 
regulations127 
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It should be noted, however, that these Regulations are primarily “border 
control” regulations that are essentially concerned with the import and 
introduction of HOAP/AIS into Canada and not with the export of species from 
Canada. The Regulations are jurisdictional and not ecosystem based in the 
sense that section 2(1) provides an exemption for ships operating exclusively in 
waters under Canadian jurisdiction or certain adjacent waters, thus allowing for 
the possibility of HOAP/AIS being spread within Canada by coasting trade 
ships. In addition, the designation of near costal ABWDZ may generate 
problems in the future with problems moved along the coast and out of the 
ports. The more complex and expensive aspects related to carrying out baseline 
and monitoring port water studies and setting up systems for warning regarding 
uptake and establishing reception facilities may be the next steps.  
 
 
14.5. Observations 
 
Elsewhere I have argued for a precautionary approach to regulatory 
design advocating an approach that is based on explicitly considering the 
impact of legal and institutional systems adopted to address emerging 
environmental protection and other issues.128 Essentially the view advocated is 
that “design matters.” Even the best of policies can fail or have unintended 
consequences if the legal and institutional implementation is not carefully 
designed. Too often the legal and institutional location components of 
responding to a problem are assumed as part of the infrastructure and receive 
little attention or resources. This approach is particularly relevant in connection 
with issues such as the introduction of harmful or invasive species or organisms 
and pathogens, where prevention must be the paramount concern since 
remediation is for the most part impossible and containment is very costly. 
This Canadian study and the related EU study129 point to some important 
patterns in the regulatory response, perhaps in common with other jurisdictions. 
First, the problem was identified and surfaced as an essentially sectoral 
“shipping” issue in connection with the IMO. However, as suggested in the 
studies, a response also along the lines of the IMO Resolution A.868 (20) 
requires a high level of institutional integration. Like Transport Canada, most 
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maritime administrations are not equipped with scientific staff to carry out risk 
assessments or baseline studies to determine the location of safe ballast water 
discharge or uptake zones. This necessarily requires coordination with other 
parts of the government. As a result of an explicit decision in Canada to adopt 
an integrated ocean governance/management approach as mandated by the 
Oceans Act, one agency, DFO, an agency with scientific expertise, was given 
overall responsibility for all “oceans issues.” In addition, other agencies have 
overlapping responsibilities e.g., for environmental and biodiversity protection. 
This means that attention must be paid to establishing responsibilities and 
relationships between these actors.  
Another important point in the Canadian story is that Canada had ratified 
the CBD at an early stage and, importantly, the CBD Secretariat is located in 
Canada. Not surprisingly, then, in the 1990s, the CBD-related agenda was 
an important concern for Canada and essentially drove the process for 
developing responses in general to invasive species. Under that approach, DFO 
became the agency responsible for AIS from the perspective of their potential 
impact, particularly in relation to the fisheries. However DFO does not have 
regulatory authority for the shipping sector. In addition Transport Canada has 
a long history and strong industry and stakeholder relationships with respect to 
the issue. The final result, whilst taking a long time to develop means that, at 
least on paper, there is some coherence to the approach whereby one agency 
addresses “Ocean Health” and, where appropriate, provides scientific advice on 
matters such as designating ABWDZ. However, it does not deal with regulation 
of ships.  
In the Canadian context the designation of ABWDZ is a sensitive issue 
and it will probably be the case in many jurisdictions. In some cases areas 
designated are seen as too close to aquaculture and posing risks to those areas. 
On the other hand Canada exports a large quantity of agricultural products and 
natural resources and is very dependent on ship-borne trade. The question of 
whether it is acceptable to designate areas in the Arctic or other areas that are 
possibly considered as fragile ecosystems also poses significant problems.  
 
The areas that still remain difficult to address are related to 
 
- risk assessments  
- preventing movement if species within the jurisdiction  
- carrying out baselines studies  
- establishing uptake warning systems  
- establishing reception facilities. 
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The situation in Canada has benefitted in this respect from that fact that it 
has a lengthy experience in addressing the issue on a regional basis, as a result 
of its relationship with the United States in connection with shared waters and 
specific invasive species. The United States has had a long-standing concern 
about invasive species and has invested significant resources in scientific 
research as well as regulatory activity at the federal and state levels.  
As discussed in the EU study, the situation in the EU has many of the 
same dynamics in that often there are competitor ports involved. At the same 
time, there is a need for a regional cooperation as well as need for scientific 
studies to establish baselines and warning systems. There are also similar 
concerns about the transfer of species and pathogens through the coasting 
trades.  
Establishing an import related regulatory system appears reasonably 
straightforward (aside from dealing with the problem of the location and impact 
of ABWDZ) but the potential export of species and pathogens is less easy to 
address. In addition, problems related to ships and issues not regulated by the 
BWM Convention (even if not in force), e.g., NOBOB and hull fouling, also 
pose particular concerns. The final conclusion of this Canadian study is that 
when issues arise that cut across traditional regulatory allocations and require 
a multipronged legal and institutional approach, then it is essential that explicit 
attention be paid to regulatory design to ensure that the responses are, in fact, 
effective. 
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Chapter 15 
 
Responsive Ocean Governance: The Problem of Invasive Species  
and Ships’ Ballast Water  – An EU Study 
 
Lotta Viikari* 
 
 
15.1. Introduction  
 
Shipping is the dominant mode of transport worldwide, accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of world trade. Furthermore, maritime traffic is steadily increasing. 
As much as 85 percent of all maritime traffic takes place in the northern 
hemisphere (North Atlantic, Northern Europe, North Pacific).1 Accordingly, 
problems related to shipping are particularly relevant in the northern 
hemisphere, including the transfer of unwanted alien organisms in ships’ ballast 
water.2 Commodities are often transported in ships on “one-way routes” 
without suitable cargo for the return trip; hence the need to take on ballast water 
to help stabilise the vessel.3 Shipping in general is one of the primary vectors 
for the transfer of marine invasive species nationally and internationally.4  
Shipping is of utmost importance for Europe: about 90 percent of the 
European Union’s (EU) external trade goes by sea. The United States, Europe, 
and Japan are the biggest exporters of ballast water by crude oil carriers.5 In 
Europe (like in many other regions), inshore marine areas are among the 
ecosystems considered to be most vulnerable to invasions. Moreover, dense 
transport networks tend to increase the amount and frequency of introductions 
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of alien species.6 The EU has a significant number of ports used for 
international trade. In addition, there are numerous “secondary” ports for 
transporting goods inside the EU region.7 As a consequence, about a thousand 
species (from bacteria to fishes) have been recorded in the ballast water 
entering European ports.8 Of these, alien species of European origin still 
constitute the largest group, due to the importance of trade within Europe (and 
the Single Market). Intra-European trade has grown considerably, but trade 
with China, for instance, has also multiplied. The increasing spread of invasive 
alien species (IAS) is closely linked to the increasing volume of trade. 
Furthermore, as sources of trade become more diverse, a greater variety of IAS 
can be expected.9 Additionally, as an important exporter, the EU contributes to 
the spread of IAS to other parts of the world, something for which it should 
take responsibility.10 
The problem of invasive alien species and ships’ ballast water is in many 
respects quite similar in Canada and the EU. The biogeographical conditions of 
the two regions are largely alike. The EU consists of numerous states, but 
Canada has had to address IAS issues in shared waters with the United States. 
Accordingly, Canadian responses to the problem can serve as useful examples 
for the EU to learn from. Furthermore, Europe shares the problem of invasive 
aquatic organism with Canada, as well as the United States, in the very practical 
sense that the risk of introductions of alien organisms via ballast water is often 
particularly high where traffic between these regions is concerned. For instance, 
evaluation of transport of ballast water to the western coast of Norway has 
shown that ballast water from the northeast coast of the United States poses 
a high risk all year round. The risk is equally high in case of ballast water from 
Vancouver, Canada. This is because the biogeographical compatibility level 
between these regions is high, as well as the overlap in temperature, salinity and 
other such conditions. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, shipping within Europe 
can pose much lower risks in this respect. For instance, water transported to the 
Norwegian coast from Greece (Mediterranean) is estimated to have a high risk 
level only in spring time; for the rest of the year, the risk level is only 
“medium.” In a similar manner, the Atlantic coast of Spain is evaluated to have 
                                                 
6
 Hulme, n. 3 above, p. 62. 
7
 M. David, S. Gollasch, C. Hewitt, and L. Jakomin, “Ballast Water Management for European 
Seas – Is there a need for a decision support system,” OCEANS 2007 – Europe (June 2007): 1–
6, p. 2. 
8
 Id.; Hulme, n. 3 above, p. 61. 
9
 Hulme, n. 3 above, p. 75. 
10
 “Developing an EU Framework for Invasive Alien Species,” Discussion Paper (Final), a-
vailable: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/invasivealien/docs/ias_discussion_paper.pdf> 
(retrieved 23 November 2008), p. 17. 
  475 
a mere “medium” compatibility level in relation to the western coast of 
Norway.11 
Often foreign organisms are not able to survive in a new environment. 
When they are, however, the economic, environmental, and social 
consequences of invasions can be significant. A Background Paper to a recent 
European Ballast Water Management Workshop organised by the European 
Maritime Safety Agency EMSA (see more below) described the European 
status of invasive aquatic species in the following manner: 
 
Numerous alien species have also been introduced into the North Sea, 
the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Only in a few cases 
has it been possible to estimate the cost of the damage caused by non-
indigenous species. In the North and Baltic Seas, for example, the 
shipworm Teredo navalis has caused considerable damage by attacking 
coastal protection structures such as pilings made of domestic wood. A 
study from 2004 by the Hydrographic Service of the Federal Republic of 
Germany sought to determine the economic impacts of the introduction 
of exotic species in fisheries, aquaculture, coastal facilities for shipping 
and tourism, and other sectors. Its conclusion was that the shipworm, for 
example, has caused economic damage in the amount of an estimated 50 
million Euro since its introduction into the Baltic Sea in 1993. The 
Chinese mitten crab has caused an estimated 73.5–85 million Euro 
economic damage in German waters.12 
 
This chapter examines the ballast water issue in the European context in 
particular. It outlines existing and, above all, potential EU responses to the 
problem of invasive non-indigenous species affecting the marine environment 
through the introduction of ballast water. It starts with an overview of the 
problem in the European context. This is followed by a short introduction of 
ballast water management options. The study then examines EU law from the 
point of view of the ballast water issue. First, it sketches out the relationship of 
the EU and its Member States in terms of responsibility for responding to the 
problem. The relationship of EU legislation and international regulation of 
ballast water management is also discussed. In addition to existing regulation 
and expected future developments in ballast water management in the EU, the 
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study examines the most important sub-regional attempts within Europe to 
address the problem. The conclusion sums up the present situation and outlines 
possible future approaches from a European perspective. It is argued that the 
Canadian responses to the problem of invasive alien species being transported 
in ships’ ballast water could serve as a useful source of inspiration for European 
decision makers.  
 
 
15.2. Ballast Water Management 
  
Organisms transported in ships’ ballast are clearly a problem. Aquatic IAS have 
caused a lot of damage worldwide and there hardly is disagreement about the 
need to control their movements and effects. Far less unanimity exists over how 
to do this in practice, however. In addition to differences of opinion, 
a significant restrictive factor is the state of development of suitable 
technologies for combating the problem. 
At the moment, the method most often used for controlling the 
introduction of non-indigenous species in ships’ ballast is the exchange of 
ballast water mid-ocean. The idea is that coastal aquatic organisms released at 
high sea are unlikely to survive there, and vice versa. Moreover, organism 
densities are significantly lower in the high sea areas.13 However, such 
exchange is not always easy to perform. The safety critical significant wave 
height for open sea exchange is approximately three metres. An average ballast 
voyage by vessels engaged in international trade is seven days, of which five 
are spent on the high seas. Depending on the ballast water exchange method 
used, the exchange may take up to two days when larger ships are concerned.14 
The calculations concerning the possibility of performing ballast water 
exchange under the criteria of three metre wave height and five days show that 
of ships which need one day for ballast water exchange, seven percent will not 
be able to perform open sea exchange in practice (meaning that 93 percent of 
such vessels can do it). If a ship needs two days for the exchange, the chance of 
being able to exchange ballast water drops to only 70 percent, leaving 
30 percent of these ships not capable of performing exchange. Variations in 
seasonal traffic, geography and weather conditions further influence the 
possibilities, often to the detriment of vessels operating in the northern 
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hemisphere. Not surprisingly, the chances to perform ballast water exchange 
are significantly reduced in winter conditions.15 Some of the European seas, for 
instance, are covered by ice for long periods of the year. 
As pointed out in the Canadian part of this study (see Chapter 14 of this 
book), open sea exchange of ballast water is viewed by many as posing 
unacceptable safety risks, which can even be in contravention of the annexes to 
the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea16 and its 1978 
Protocol (SOLAS). The 2004 Ballast Water Management Convention (see more 
below) exempts ships from the duty to comply with its ballast water exchange 
requirements when the exchange would threaten safety or stability of the ship.17 
In addition to safety concerns, there are other factors which also limit the 
feasibility of open ocean exchange of ballast water in many areas. In the North 
and Mediterranean seas, for instance, ships use mostly shallow coastal routes. 
Also in the North Atlantic, 60 percent of vessels sail within 200 nautical miles 
from shore. In the Baltic Sea, ships have to operate in very narrow straits and 
shallow waters (see more below). In fact, a large amount of all ship traffic is 
regional or coastal trade; in Europe, for instance, some 60–65 percent of the 
traffic is regional.18 Furthermore, ballast water exchange is not 100 percent 
biologically effective, and is thus considered only as an interim measure.  
The Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)19 will, once in force, provide global performance 
standards for ballast water and sediments management. The Convention 
requires phased implementation of its standards to replace ballast water 
exchange (D-1 Performance Standard) with ballast water treatment (D-2 
Performance Standard) as suitable technologies become available. All ships 
will have to implement a Ballast Water and Sediments Management Plan 
(Regulation B-1), and have a Ballast Water Record Book (Regulation B-2). 
The same requirements apply to existing ships, after a phase-in period. 
However, the standards of the BWM Convention have been described as 
representing only a “minimum level of improvement”20 and thus necessitating 
further development. The Convention establishes a review process for assessing 
whether its standards are achievable and if more progress could be made. 
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Additionally, tier-two regional measures can be adopted for the protection of 
particularly sensitive areas, for instance.21 The phasing-in of ballast water 
treatment in all ships with a type-approved treatment technology is foreseen by 
the end of 2015 at latest.22 
However, to date, the only viable ballast water management option has 
been ballast water exchange. Accordingly, the BWM Convention defines where 
ships are allowed to exchange ballast water during the transitional period, 
before treatment systems can and must be used. As a general rule, all ships 
must, whenever possible, conduct ballast water exchange at least 200 nautical 
miles from the nearest land and in water depth of at least 200 metres, taking 
into account the Guidelines developed by IMO (Regulation B-4.1). Where these 
requirements cannot be met, the port state may designate (in consultation with 
adjacent or other states) special areas where vessels can conduct the ballast 
water exchange (Regulation B-4.2). This must be done in accordance with the 
IMO Guidelines. 
Unfortunately, in areas such as the Baltic Sea, the general requirements of 
the BWM Convention for conducting ballast water exchange cannot be met. 
The Baltic Sea has a mean depth of 55 metres only and all areas deeper than 
200 metres are within less than 50 nautical miles to the nearest land.23 In 
practice, ballast water exchange is a very limited option for ballast water 
management within the Baltic Sea.24 Due to the specific conditions in this sea 
area, regional cooperation for minimising the risk of ballast water mediated 
introductions of unwanted alien organisms is particularly relevant. Prevention 
of invasions is of utmost importance because alien species once settled 
somewhere in the Baltic Sea can often easily spread even through natural 
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 Regulations, Section C, “Special Requirements in Certain Areas.” Additionally, Article 2.3 
provides that states can take “individually or jointly with other Parties, more stringent measures 
with respect to the prevention, reduction or elimination of the transfer of Harmful Aquatic 
Organisms and Pathogens through the control and management of ships’ Ballast Water and 
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 “Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,” n. 12 above, p. 6. 
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 Ballast Water Scoping Study: North Western Europe, Det Norske Veritas, Report No. 2005-
0638 (Revision No. 02; 21 June 2006), p. 28. 
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 Sweden is considering postponing its ratification of the BWM Convention until 2016 (when 
all vessels are required to treat their ballast water) for the very reason that ballast water 
exchange is not very feasible in the Baltic Sea. Markus Helavuori, Maritime Inspector, FMA, 
pers. comm. (21 November 2008). 
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means. Possibilities for effectively preventing secondary introductions through 
ballast water within the region are also very limited. Accordingly, internal 
Baltic ship traffic is not of primary interest in this context.25 The North Sea and 
some regions of the Mediterranean have similar constraints in respect to ballast 
water exchange.26 
Ballast water issues were recently discussed in the IMO Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 58. The Ballast Water Review 
Group convened in early October 2008 to evaluate the availability of ballast 
water treatment systems on the market, and to consider whether it is possible to 
demand that new vessels built in 2010 are fitted with ballast water treatment 
equipment in accordance with the BWM Convention (D-2 Standard). 
Compliance with the requirement has already been postponed as concerns ships 
to be constructed in 2009. At the moment, however, there are already some 
type-approved treatment systems available.27 Moreover, it has been estimated 
that by 2010, there will be several ballast water treatment systems on the 
market. Hence it should be possible to find suitable ballast water treatment 
equipment for most ships and shipping routes. The issue will be discussed 
further in MEPC 59. MEPC 58 also approved the last BWM Guideline (G2), on 
ballast water sampling (for controlling compliance with the BWM 
Convention).28 Now that all 14 BWM Guidelines have been approved and 
an increasing number of ballast water treatment systems will be available, 
prospects for the BWM Convention to be ratified and, eventually, enter into 
force look better than ever.29 The IMO is encouraging states to ratify the 
Convention as soon as possible. A significant step forward was the recent 
ratification by Liberia, a major seafaring country.30  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Ballast Water Scoping Study, n. 23 above, pp. 30–31.  
26
 David et al., n. 7 above, p. 3. 
27
 For a current assessment of the availability of ballast water treatment technology, see Ballast 
Water Treatment Technology – Current Status, Lloyd’s Register (September 2008), available: 
<http://www.lr.org/NR/rdonlyres/04FE9132-031E-4468-A567-F69359B3E86E/85364/ 
BWT021008.pdf> (retrieved 23 November 2008). The systems approved by MEPC 58 are 
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German) which can be tested in international waters. Markus Helavuori, Maritime Inspector, 
FMA, pers. comm. (14 October 2008).  
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 The Guideline will be supplemented later by additional port state control instructions and 
an IMO circular letter for further guidance on sampling and analysing of samples. Id. 
29
 Id. For a more detailed assessment of the present situation, see “Control and Management of 
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,” n. 12 above, pp. 7–9. 
30
 Markus Helavuori, Maritime Inspector, FMA, pers. comm. (21 November 2008). 
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15.3. European Union 
 
The legal system of the European Community (EC) consists of exclusive 
competence of the Community in some specific areas of operation; competence 
shared between the Community and Member States in certain other areas; and, 
finally, areas of operation where EC Member States have, in principle, 
exclusive jurisdiction. Responsibility and jurisdiction to act in a particular area 
are determined by the level of competence. The Single Market is based on the 
principle of free movement of goods within the Community. Accordingly, 
the EC has exclusive competence in relation to the free movement of goods 
within Community territory (Treaty establishing the European Community,31 
Arts. 28–29). Quantitative restrictions imposed by Member States on imports 
and exports can be justified only in special cases (listed in Article 30). Even in 
these cases, Member States’ restrictions are not allowed to “constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States” (Art. 30).  
In practice, IAS-related restrictions imposed by Member States could be 
treated as “disguised restrictions on trade,” and hence a breach of Community 
legislation.32 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has examined thus far only 
two cases in relation to control of IAS.  
 
The first, in 1994, concerned imports of live freshwater crayfish to 
Germany (case C-131/93).33 The Commission sued Germany for 
initiating a ban on live crayfish imports. The ban was a response to 
crayfish plague (Aphanomyces astaci), which was being spread mainly 
by the introduction of alien species of crayfish. The German law 
required an import licence to be obtained for the import of live crayfish 
into Germany. Even with such a licence, crayfish could be imported 
only for research and teaching purposes. A conditional exemption was 
provided to allow the import of crayfish for a limited time. The 
Commission argued that such restrictions were in violation of the EC 
Treaty because they established import bans against member states. The 
ECJ found in favour of the Commission, as it considered that the 
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 Treaty establishing the European Community, 25 March 1957, Official Journal C 325 
(24 December 2002). 
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 C. Miller, M. Kettunen, and C. Shine, Scope Options for EU Action on Invasive Alien 
Species, Final Report for the European Commission, ENV.B.2/SER/2005/0078r, Institute for 
European Environmental Policy (Brussels, June 2006), pp. 53–54. For a more detailed 
assessment, see id., pp. 54 et seq. 
33
 Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, E.C.R. 1994, 
p. I-03303. 
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reduction in risks from the crayfish plague could have been achieved 
through measures that were less restrictive on intra-Community trade. 
Alternatives to a ban could have included requirements for health 
certification for the crayfish, or regulation of the marketing and 
management of crayfish within Germany.  
 
The second case was the ‘Danish bees case’ (case C-67/97).34 Danish 
law prohibited the keeping of any non-indigenous species of nectar-
gathering bee on the island of Læsø, the only species permitted being 
the brown bee indigenous to that island. When the Danish government 
pursued a prosecution against an individual who was breaching this rule, 
he claimed that the law constituted a quantitative restriction on imports 
and was therefore contrary to Article 28 of the EC Treaty. The Court 
found that the law was indeed a restriction, but that it was justified under 
Article 30 of the Treaty, for the protection of the health and life of 
animals.35 
 
Some additional guidance could be derived from more general case law 
of the ECJ concerning trade in goods.36 Nevertheless, it remains quite unclear 
what could constitute a justifiable IAS-motivated restriction on trade. Some 
Member States perceive this as a barrier to their taking action in respect of the 
problem of non-indigenous invasive organisms; a state can understandably be 
reluctant to establish restrictions that may face legal challenges from the EC.37 
Of course, this is a very unfortunate situation—it is a pity if such uncertainty 
prevents states from combating the IAS problem and protecting its biodiversity. 
Responsibilities and competence between the Community and its member states 
should obviously be clarified. Most areas for action in the management of 
invasive alien species appear to be issues of shared competence between the 
Community and its Member States, however.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme, reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Kriminalretten i Frederikshavn – Denmark, E.C.R. 1998, p. I-08033. 
35
 “Developing an EU Framework for Invasive Alien Species,” n. 10 above, pp. 8–9. 
36
 Id., p. 22. 
37
 Miller et al., n. 32 above, p. 83. 
38
 For a more detailed treatment, see Miller et al., n. 32 above. 
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15.3.1. Existing Regulation 
 
Reduction of pollution from shipping is a central part of EU’s maritime safety 
policy. Transport of alien species in ships’ ballast water is a long-known 
problem in this area. Tangible concerns that the issue has raised within the EU 
are, however, relatively recent.39 EU measures in marine environmental 
protection have concentrated on reducing ship-generated waste and cargo 
residues. For instance, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted 
Directives 2000/59/EC40 and 2005/35/EC41 to complement the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL)42 in this respect. 
More relevant from the point of view of protecting the marine 
environment from non-indigenous invasive species is Regulation (EC) 
782/200343 which phases out and prohibits the use on ships of paint with 
organotin or tributyltin (TBT) components.44 This Regulation implements 
within EU law the 2001 IMO Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-
Fouling Systems on Ships,45 which prohibits the use of highly toxic anti-fouling 
paints. The purpose of the Convention is, of course, to reduce detrimental 
impacts of environmentally harmful substances. Paradoxically, the control of 
the environmentally most harmful but effective anti-fouling systems is, 
however, likely to increase hull-fouling and hence the risk of unwanted 
transport of alien organisms.  
As concerns ships’ ballast water as a vector for IAS, EU law does not 
have much to offer. In fact, the EU has no regulation pertaining directly to 
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 See “Preventing Pollution from Ships,” n. 2 above. 
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 Directive 2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000 
on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues, Official Journal L 332, 
28 December 2000. 
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 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on 
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ballast water management. Apparently, enactment of such regulation is not 
even planned at the moment.46 The Commission has “strongly recommended” 
the ratification of the BWM Convention. On balance, the involvement of the 
EU in ballast water management has been described as “limited.”47 
Nevertheless, the BWM Convention has clear links to existing Community 
maritime policies, notably the Marine Equipment Directive (96/98/EC),48 
the Directives on port state control (Directive 95/21/EC as amended)49 and on 
port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues (Directive 
2000/59/EC),50 and the Biocides Directive (98/8/EC).51 
 
For instance, the Marine Equipment Directive sets out Europe-wide 
requirements on the type approval of safety and pollution prevention 
equipment. The Directive moves arrangements for type approving such 
equipment to EU notified bodies who apply a mark of conformity based 
on accepted international standards. Since April 30, 1999, the testing 
standards in the amended Annex A of this Directive must be used to 
obtain an EC type approval certificate. However, as the BWM 
Convention has yet to come into force, type approval for ballast water 
management systems by one EU member state under this procedure only 
apply to the ships flagged to that state. When the BWM Convention 
comes into force, type approval under this procedure will be EU-wide, 
and any system type approved by one member state may have to be re-
certified or re-tested to apply to all vessels flagged to EU member 
states.52 Also the Directives on port state control and on port reception 
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 Markus Helavuori, Maritime Inspector, FMA, pers. comm. (21 November 2008). 
47
 “Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,” n. 12 above, p. 14. 
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 Amended by Directive 2002/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 November 2002 amending the Directives on maritime safety and the prevention of pollution 
from ships, Official Journal L 324/53, 29 November 2002. 
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 Council Directive 95/21/EC of 19 June 1995 concerning the enforcement, in respect of 
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 Directive 2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000 
on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues, Official Journal L 332, 
28 December 2000. 
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 Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 
concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market, Official Journal L 123/1 (24 April 
1998). 
52
 “Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,” n. 12 above, p. 16. 
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facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues may need to be 
updated once the BWM enters into force.53 
 
The Commission has (through its Environment Directorate-General) 
provided its expertise in the discussions at IMO MEPC, particularly in respect 
of the methodology for indentifying and assessing active substances in 
connection to the Biocides Directive.54 This Directive concerns the placing of 
biocidal products on the market within the EU, requiring treatment technologies 
that use active substances to undergo evaluation processes. Certain ballast water 
management systems fall under the requirements of both the Biocides Directive 
and the IMO BWM Convention’s Guidelines. In order to provide a clear 
procedure and guidance for Member States on this issue, the Council Working 
Group on Transport developed a particular procedure in September 2006 (in 
response to systems being submitted to the IMO by EU Member States for 
approval under the IMO’s G9 Guidelines).55  
 
This procedure states that prior to submitting an application for the basic 
approval of ballast water systems based on active substance to IMO, the 
member state in question would be expected to consult with other 
member states and the Commission on whether the concerned active 
substance falls within the scope of the Biocides Directive. If it does not, 
the application to IMO can proceed. If it does, the member state will be 
expected to ensure that the substance can be placed on the EU market 
before making any submission. This coordination is necessary in order 
to prevent cases where a system receives the IMO approval, yet cannot 
be placed on the EU market in accordance with the provisions of the 
Biocides Directive. However, there is still some uncertainty in practice 
as to when and how this procedure should be applied.56 
 
The Biocides Directive is being revised.57 Several issues identified for the 
revision are likely to have an impact on the interaction between the Biocides 
Directive and the BWM Convention.58 Particularly significant appears to be the 
proposal that the Directive would apply not merely to the placing of biocidal 
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 Markus Helavuori, Maritime Inspector, FMA, pers. comm. (21 November 2008). 
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 “Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments,” n. 12 above, p. 14. 
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 Id., pp. 14–15. 
56
 Id., p. 15. 
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 The revision is expected to be ready in 2009, and the amended directive should enter into 
force in 2011 or 2012. At the same time, it will also turn into a regulation. Markus Helavuori, 
Maritime Inspector, FMA, pers. comm. (21 November 2008). 
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products on the market (as it currently does) but also to any use of such 
products within the EU. In practice, this means that all vessels entering the 
waters of EU Member States would need an approval in accordance with the 
Directive for any biocides used in their ballast water treatment systems. 
Understandably, this is a very controversial suggestion. Such a requirement 
could obviously cause significant problems for vessels of non-EU states, but 
also for those vessels of EU Member States that have acquired their ballast 
water treatment systems from outside the EU.59 
Finally, the problem of invasive alien species in the marine environment 
has been touched upon in the recent Marine Strategy Directive (2008/56/EC).60 
The Directive is based on an ecosystem approach, i.e., ecosystem-based regions 
of European marine waters. It recognises the introduction of exotic aquatic 
species as a major threat to European biodiversity. The main objective of the 
Directive is to achieve environmentally healthy marine waters (“good 
environmental status”) by 2020. The aim is to draw marine strategies for EU 
marine regions and sub-regions, managed by Member States in an integrated 
manner. Good environmental status includes that “non-indigenous species 
introduced by human activities are at levels that do not adversely alter the 
ecosystems” (Annex I, para. 2). Measures used for achieving good 
environmental status can thus include control of invasive alien species, or 
prevention of introductions in the European seas. Further criteria and 
methodological standards to make this concept operational will be developed 
later, in consultation with the various European regional seas organisations (see 
more below).61 
However, IAS issues in general have not had a particularly high profile at 
the Community level.62 “Europe’s practical programmes and coordination on 
invasive alien species lag behind many other regions of the world.”63 
Furthermore, the approach of individual European states, including EU Member 
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States, to prevention and management of invasive non-indigenous organisms 
varies considerably.64 As concerns ballast water management, formal, national 
policies are rare.65 Apparently, very few EU Member States have at the moment 
any regulation for the purpose. In this sense, the situation is very different from 
that in the United States and Canada.66 Nevertheless, EU countries are 
becoming more active in this respect. Finland, for instance, is currently drafting 
its national invasive alien species strategy, which relates, of course, to the 
ongoing developments within the EU, the upcoming strategy dealing with IAS, 
and criteria and methodological standards for non-indigenous species in 
particular (see more below).67 
Invasive alien species in general relate to several fields of Community 
environmental policy. Nevertheless, the issue lacks inclusion in many relevant 
European policies and documents.68 EU’s policy framework for combating the 
problem of non-indigenous species’ introductions is based in essence on the 
commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity69 (CBD) to which 
the EC, together with all Member States, is a contracting party. Article 8(h) of 
the CBD obligates convention parties to “prevent the introduction of, control or 
eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species.” 
Accordingly, the EC must ensure that its policies comply with, inter alia, 
Article 8(h) as far as possible. In practice, the Community has been relatively 
active in developing policy instruments in relation to biodiversity strategies.70 It 
has been argued, however, that “European states rate implementation of Article 
8h as a significantly lower priority than do non-European nations. This 
difference between policy awareness and implementation results in insufficient 
resources being made available to target invasive species.”71 Importantly, 
the CBD was supplemented in 2002 by fifteen “Guiding Principles for the 
prevention, introduction and mitigation of impacts of alien species that threaten 
ecosystems, habitats or species,”72 which provide an international framework 
for the development of IAS strategies. The Principles affirm that prevention is 
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normally the most desirable measure in combating IAS. If an invasion 
nevertheless takes place, early detection and rapid eradication are essential. If 
eradication is not possible, containment and long-term control measures should 
be implemented.73  
In 2003, a European Strategy on Invasive Alien Species74 was adopted 
under the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats (Bern Convention),75 to which most European states are parties. 
The challenges that European states face in their IAS efforts are often similar. 
The Strategy promotes coordinated measures and cooperative efforts to 
minimise adverse impacts of IAS in Europe. It aims to support development of 
realistic policies, measures and targets, and proposes priority actions. 
The Strategy covers, inter alia, marine environments under the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction of Bern Convention parties. Additionally, it provides guidance for 
activities carried out in areas beyond national jurisdictions, e.g., shipping. 
The European Strategy is “closely aligned with the CBD Guiding Principles,” 
aiming to promote regional consistency and best practice in their regional 
implementation.76  
 Moreover, invasive alien species were identified already in the Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme of the EC (2002) as “a priority for action.”77 
The Programme requires application of the ecosystem approach “wherever 
appropriate.” The Commission’s Communication, Halting the Loss of 
Biodiversity by 2010 – and Beyond, which was adopted in 2006, places 
substantial reduction of the impact on EU biodiversity of invasive alien 
organisms as a key Community policy and a priority objective.78 It is also noted 
that the Community needs to “develop a comprehensive strategy to address this 
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issue.”79 One specific goal is to establish an early warning system for the 
exchange of information between European states on the emergence of IAS.80 
Also the need to ensure adequate (centralised) financing for IAS management is 
recognised.81  
The European Commission (DG ENV) is currently preparing an EU 
strategy for IAS in the context of the Biodiversity Action Plan. The idea is that 
the strategy will follow a three-stage hierarchical approach in line with the 
CBD Guiding Principles (prevention – early detection and rapid eradication – 
long-term control and containment).82 The Communication entitled Towards an 
EU Strategy on Invasive Species was adopted 3 December 2008.83 
The Communication examines the IAS issue in general (terrestrial, fresh water, 
marine), hence ballast-related marine invasions are viewed only as a part of 
a more comprehensive problem. The transport of alien organisms in ballast 
water is not touched upon in detail.84 This is logical in the sense that the 
impulse for the EU to act in the area derives from its commitments under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, above all. The Communication describes 
four possible policy options for the future EU strategy. These are (in order of 
increasing intensity) Option A: Business as usual; Option B: Maximising the 
use of existing legal instruments together with voluntary measures; Option B+: 
Adapted existing legislation; and Option C: Comprehensive, dedicated EU legal 
instrument.85 The Communication will serve as a discussion paper between 
Member States, the European Parliament, and other stakeholders. The final EU 
strategy on IAS (with possible proposals for new legal instruments) is expected 
to be finished in 2010.86  
Of course, binding legal instruments that may have some relevance to the 
IAS issue in general exist in EU law. The Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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(SEA) Directive (2001/42/EC)87 requires an environmental assessment for all 
“plans and programmes” for, e.g., transport and water management. Such an 
assessment should consider significant environmental effects of proposed plans 
and programmes. For instance, plans and programmes for transport could 
include development of transport corridors representing potential pathways for 
invasive non-indigenous species. Environmental impacts of IAS can be 
considerable, and should thus be taken into account in a SEA process (as well 
as in project-specific environmental impact assessments). Apparently, the SEA 
Directive has thus far never been applied to the IAS issue, however.88 
Another instrument that deserves to be mentioned here is the 
Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC).89 In principle, it could be used 
to apply the polluter pays principle to those who introduce harmful IAS into an 
environment. However, the Directive requires, inter alia, that there is an 
identifiable polluter at fault (or at least negligent); a concrete and quantifiable 
damage; and that a causal link between the polluter and the damage can be 
established. In the case of IAS introductions, fulfilling all these requirements, 
and hence bringing successful proceedings can be quite difficult in practice.90 
Nevertheless, it should, in principle, be the carrier’s responsibility to ensure that 
it does not contaminate waters anywhere with, inter alia, harmful alien 
organisms – neither through ballast water nor through other vectors.91 
 
 
15.3.2. European Maritime Safety Agency 
 
Although the EU has been relatively inactive in ballast water issues, there have 
been certain promising developments in this respect lately. One central actor in 
the area is the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). EMSA was 
established in 200292 “to provide technical and scientific assistance to the 
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European Commission and Member States in the proper development and 
implementation of EU legislation on maritime safety, pollution by ships and 
security on board ships.”93 Among other things, the Commission has asked 
EMSA to “monitor the on-going international and regional developments” in 
respect of the BWM Convention and “to actively collaborate with the 
Commission to promote a coherent approach for the implementation of the 
IMO Convention in the various regional seas around Europe.”94 In compliance 
with this mandate, EMSA recently organised a workshop on “Implementing the 
Ballast Water Management Convention – the EU dimension” (Lisbon, 10–11 
November 2008). Apparently, this was the first workshop to discuss ways to 
solve the ballast water problem in the European context.95 It was aimed at, inter 
alia, sharing experiences with respect to ratifying the BWM Convention and 
identifying challenges related to ballast water management in Europe. 
The workshop discussed European cooperation in ballast water management, 
the role of the EU in the area, and measures to be taken in the future.  
Currently, EMSA is trying to find out what kind of practical challenges 
EU Member States are facing in ratification and implementation of the BWM 
Convention. For instance, there are technical problems that could benefit from 
EU level cooperation, such as those related to risk assessment methodologies 
and the relationship between the IMO type approvals and the Biocides 
Directive. EMSA intends to make concrete proposals to the Commission (DG 
Environment and DG Energy and Transport) for advancing such cooperation 
and hence to facilitate the implementation of the BWM Convention within the 
European Union. Another central question that EMSA is currently working 
with is how the Marine Strategy Directive could provide EU Member States 
with a viable legal framework for strengthening measures to combat harmful 
aquatic invasions.96 
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15.4. Activities of European Sub-regional Organizations 
 
Article 13.3 of the BWM Convention provides that 
 
In order to progress further the objectives of the Convention, Parties 
with common interests to protect the environment, human health, 
property and resources in a given geographical area, in particular, those 
parties bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, shall endeavour, 
taking into account characteristic regional features, to enhance regional 
co-operation, including through the conclusion of regional arrangements 
consistent with this Convention. Parties shall seek to co-operate with the 
Parties to regional arrangements to develop harmonized procedures. 
 
Given the multitude of jurisdictions and the various aquatic ecosystems in 
Europe, the need for regional and sub-regional cooperation in addressing the 
IAS issue is obvious. The legal and political specificities in the different 
European seas are highly diverse.97 Regional arrangements can usually better 
meet local demands and focus on specific pressures on a particular ecosystem. 
Regional (let alone national) regulation is also normally much easier to make 
than a global convention.98 
Although the EU has not yet done much in the area of ballast water 
management, there are several regional seas organisations within Europe that 
have been more active in dealing with aquatic invasions. Also the European 
Commission has supported the development of ballast water management 
strategies through the European regional seas efforts.99 These efforts are usually 
carried out under regional agreements. They include the OSPAR Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic100 and 
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area.101 The problem of invasive aquatic species has been addressed in Europe 
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also in the context of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention)102 and the 
Black Sea (Bucharest Convention).103  
However, the regional seas agreements operate, of course, within their 
respective regions only. Given the highly cross-border nature of the ballast 
water problem, the need for additional coordination in ballast water 
management at least at the EU level is obvious.104 The size and biogeographical 
characteristics of Europe and the free trade arrangements within the area make 
it particularly essential to promote consistency in approach against the threat of 
IAS.105 Furthermore, most EU Member States have coastlines, several even 
along more than one sea. Along with the continuous enlargement of the EU 
(and the Single Market), possibilities for new invasions of aquatic as well as 
other non-native species are likely to increase further.106  
 
 
15.4.1. OSPAR 
 
More than 400 non-native species have been found in northwestern Europe. 
A vast majority of them occur in freshwater and, above all, marine habitats.107 
OSPAR is a mechanism by which fifteen Western European states,108 together 
with the EC, cooperate to protect the marine environment of the northeast 
Atlantic. The 1992 OSPAR Convention consists of the 1972 Oslo Convention 
against dumping109 and the 1974 Paris Convention which broadened the scope 
to cover land-based sources and offshore industry.110 An annex on biodiversity 
and ecosystems was adopted in 1998 to cover non-polluting human activities 
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that can adversely affect the sea.111 Work under the Convention is managed by 
the OSPAR Commission. 
The OSPAR Commission began to develop a ballast water management 
strategy for northwest Europe in 2003. The outcome was interim guidelines 
(based on the ballast water exchange requirements of the IMO BWM 
Convention) for voluntary measures to reduce the risk of marine invasions in 
the OSPAR area, pending the entry into force of the BWM Convention. In June 
2007, OSPAR endorsed the General Guidance on the Voluntary Interim 
application of the D1 Ballast Water Exchange Standard in the North-East 
Atlantic. It was found that the Guidelines were prevalent also to ships operating 
in the Baltic, and hence they were expanded to include the Baltic Sea. 
Contracting states to HELCOM and OSPAR (a total of 21 countries) adopted 
the voluntary Guidelines112 in spring 2008.113 The Guidelines are also supported 
by the European Commission. In order to reduce the risk of non-indigenous 
species entering the OSPAR and HELCOM maritime areas through ballast 
water exchange, vessels entering the waters of northwest Europe are requested 
to voluntarily apply the BWM Convention’s ballast water exchange guidelines, 
to prepare a ballast water management plan,114 and to keep a record of their 
procedures related to ballast water management (paras. 4–5). The guidance is 
addressed specifically to vessels entering these areas from transatlantic routes 
and routes passing West Africa; the Guidelines do not apply to vessels coming 
from the Mediterranean (para. 6). 
A second phase of this voluntary strategy should include the development 
of further guidance and appropriate management measures for ships operating 
within the OSPAR and HELCOM regions.115 The idea is to use a risk 
assessment based management approach to identify high risk voyages and to 
provide guidance on appropriate management measures in order to reduce the 
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risk of secondary introductions.116 Furthermore, it has been proposed that the 
strategy be strengthened by some kind of a certification mechanism or some 
other systems to make shipping companies more interested in the issue.117 In 
compliance with the interim nature of the voluntary strategy, the measures put 
forward by the Guidelines will become mandatory once the BWM Convention 
comes into force. Eventually, the ballast water exchange requirements will, of 
course, be phased out, once the BWM Convention’s D-2 Performance Standard 
for the treatment of ballast water is applied.118  
 
 
15.4.2. HELCOM 
 
HELCOM, or the Helsinki Commission, is the governing body of the 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 
(or Helsinki Convention).119 It works to “protect the marine environment of the 
Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution through intergovernmental co-operation 
between Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden.”120 The introduction of alien 
organisms via ships’ ballast water and hulls is one of the main negative 
environmental effects of shipping in the Baltic Sea. 
In November 2007, HELCOM adopted the Baltic Sea Action Plan, which 
is a ministry-level instrument containing, inter alia, a management objective 
(“No introductions of alien species from ships”) and actions for preventing 
introduction of alien species.121 The 2007 HELCOM ministerial meeting also 
adopted a Road Map Towards Harmonised Implementation and Ratification of 
the 2004 International Convention for Control and Management of Ships’ 
Ballast Water and Sediments within the HELCOM area.122 HELCOM countries 
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have agreed to ratify the BWM Convention by the year 2013. Measures 
included in the Road Map will be taken before ratification to combat the urgent 
threat of invasion of non-native marine species in the Baltic Sea.  
The 17 action points of the Roadmap now form part of the Baltic Sea 
Action Plan. In the Road Map, HELCOM states agreed, inter alia, 
 
… to select and agree by the end of 2008 on the HELCOM Target 
Species, i.e. species that may impair or damage the environment, human 
health, property or resources in the Baltic Sea region, relevant for risk 
assessments according to the IMO Guidelines G7 (para. 4); 
 
[t]o conduct by the end of 2008 baseline surveys of prevailing 
environmental conditions in major ports and to outline the major long-
distance high risk voyages in order to gather data necessary to conduct 
and/or evaluate and consult risk assessments according to the IMO 
Guidelines G7 (para. 5); 
 
[t]o specify and agree as soon as possible but not later than 2009 on 
criteria to distinguish between unacceptable high risk scenarios and 
acceptable low risk scenarios for regional voyages … (para. 6). 
 
Currently, HELCOM is compiling a list of invasive alien species and 
collecting environmental and traffic data from major ports for the purpose of 
risk assessments.123 The states also agreed 
 
… for voyages connecting the Baltic Sea and the North Sea where no 
areas exist that meet the Ballast Water Exchange criteria according to 
the BWM Convention, to consider jointly with OSPAR adequate 
management measures, including possibilities for ballast water exchange 
(para. 8);124 
  
[t]o join the OSPAR initiative to request vessels transiting the Atlantic 
or entering the North-East Atlantic from routes passing the West African 
Coast to conduct on a voluntary basis ballast water exchange before 
arriving at the OSPAR area or passing through the OSPAR area and 
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heading to the Baltic Sea and to notify jointly with OSPAR the IMO of 
this action (para. 9);  
 
[t]o undertake a similar initiative for vessels leaving the Baltic and 
transiting through the OSPAR region to other destinations so the ballast 
water would not be exchanged until the vessel was 200 nm off the coast 
of North West Europe in waters greater than 200 m deep (para. 10);  
 
[t]o cooperate with OSPAR on any other relevant topics for the benefit 
of both regions and as necessary for harmonised implementation of the 
BWM Convention (para. 11). 
 
As mentioned above, HELCOM joined OSPAR in supporting the voluntary 
Guidelines of the OSPAR Ballast Water Management Strategy. The aim is to 
strengthen the cooperation between HELCOM and OSPAR further.  
Within the HELCOM cooperation, the states involved have not thus far 
discussed the EU dimension of the ballast issue to any significant extent; their 
focus has been on the IMO and its BWM Convention. However, most 
HELCOM states are also EU Member States and must thus take into 
consideration the treatment of the problem within the EU as well. As mentioned 
above, Finland, for instance, is presently drafting its national invasive alien 
species strategy, which closely relates to the current developments within the 
EU. It should also be mentioned that the Russian Federation, the only 
HELCOM state outside the EU, recently has been very active in the IAS sector, 
not only in HELCOM cooperation but in IAS-related scientific research in 
general.125 In 2006, the Russians established a new electronic journal, Aquatic 
Invasions, which is described as “an important part of developing European 
early warning system on aquatic invasive species.”126  
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15.4.3. Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea 
 
Out of 121 species listed as Europe’s “worst invasive,” as many as 105 have 
been reported in the Mediterranean Sea.127 The total amount of known aquatic 
alien species in the Mediterranean Sea is over 660.128 Hence there is an obvious 
interest to minimise and control the spread of alien, potentially harmful aquatic 
organisms in the Mediterranean. Ballast water management is a very important 
issue, as ballast water is a major vector for marine introductions in the area. 
However, the Mediterranean is by no means a uniform ecosystem, as climatic 
conditions throughout the region vary significantly. This affects the pattern of 
invasions. Additionally, in some parts of the Mediterranean, such as the 
Adriatic Sea, the waters are so shallow that ballast water exchange is not 
a feasible option.129 Furthermore, the Middle East and North Africa are 
particularly heavily influenced by imported ballast water because they are oil 
exporting countries (contributing to some 90 percent of all ballast water 
volumes introduced to the Mediterranean from outside the region).130  
The Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC)131 organised a workshop in September 2008 to 
initiate the development of a regional strategy addressing the transfer of 
harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens via ships’ ballast water and sediments 
for the Mediterranean with the help of the GloBallast Partnership.132 As 
a consequence, eighteen Mediterranean coastal states and the European 
Commission established a regional task force and four focus groups on specific 
subject matters to develop such a strategy. The task force discussed principles, 
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key elements and an appropriate format for the future strategy, and agreed that 
the strategy should also include an action plan containing operational 
arrangements. Additionally, the task force will promote bringing into effect the 
BWM Convention in the Mediterranean.133  
 
 
15.4.4. Black Sea 
 
The Black Sea is the most isolated sea in the world. Nevertheless, it has over 
200 alien species.134 As with many other seas, also the Black Sea has a special 
convention for its protection, the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the 
Black Sea against Pollution (Bucharest Convention, or Black Sea Convention), 
which entered into force in 1994. Among other issues, the Bucharest 
Convention has put ballast water on its agenda. The Commission on the 
Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution (Black Sea Commission) is the 
intergovernmental body established for the implementation of the Black Sea 
Convention.135 Additionally, there is regional cooperation on ballast water 
management through a regional task force. The Black Sea states have 
developed a regional action plan to minimise the transfer of harmful aquatic 
organisms and pathogens in ships ballast water (2001), as well as a short-term 
regional action plan (apparently to support implementation of the regional 
action plan). National initiatives and legislation relating to the IAS issue also 
exist in Ukraine and Georgia, at least.136 
If compared to other regional seas in Europe, Black Sea countries started 
developing ballast water management and policies relatively early on. One 
reason for them to take such an active stance on IAS is the unfortunate fact that 
the local fisheries, and thereby the entire ecosystem of the Black Sea, have 
collapsed due to the introduction of a non-indigenous invasive aquatic species, 
the American comb jelly. Additionally, Ukraine has been one of the six 
developing countries participating in the GloBallast Programme.137 
Interestingly, ballast water exchange is not very effective in the Black Sea 
either. Although there is a relatively large area in the Black Sea where ballast 
water exchange can be performed in accordance with the requirements of the 
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BWM Convention, the local conditions are such that ballast released anywhere 
in the Black Sea finds is way to the coast very quickly. Consequently, the risk 
for the spread of species is high, no matter where in the Black Sea they are 
released.138 
 
 
15.5. Conclusion 
 
The word “alien” in the term “invasive alien species” refers to ecosystem 
borders, not national ones. The fact that both causes and effects of IAS 
introductions are largely international seems to call for international 
management of the problem.139 Given the inherent internationality of shipping 
in particular, regional and national regulation can normally not be as effective 
as international rules. Accordingly, the role of the IMO is central in combating 
the problem of invasive aquatic species; in practice, the BWM Convention is 
the only chance of addressing the ballast water issue in an effective manner. 
The slow ratification of the Convention derives from several reasons, among 
them the practical challenges in ballast water exchange and the lack of 
approved and feasible ballast water treatment technologies. However, such 
technologies are constantly being developed, and thus compliance with the 
BWM Convention should soon be viable also in practice (if it is not already).140  
Despite the importance of the IMO BWM Convention, global regulation 
does not necessarily always reflect the specific circumstances of particular 
areas in an optimal way. Measures tailored to the unique circumstances of 
biogeographical regions and ecosystems are often advantageous. Ecological 
regions could benefit from, inter alia, designation of regional ballast water 
exchange zones, where needed. Given the patterns of invasion for aquatic 
species, cooperation is needed in the context of the northern hemisphere, for 
instance. One interesting proposal is that for negotiating a new global treaty on 
IAS in the form of a framework convention.141 The more or less regional 
approach that the unique characteristics of the northern sea areas, for instance, 
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call for could be realised by adopting a specific protocol or protocols to the 
main convention. An IAS network of all states along the northern seas is 
another idea worth consideration. Such a network should include at least 
information system(s) for data exchange, consultations, early warning, and 
emergency measures. An emergency response fund could facilitate prompt 
action to eradicate new invasions.142 Then again, a regional approach, 
particularly an ecosystem approach, can be difficult to implement because 
jurisdictional boundaries seldom coincide with those of ecological units.143  
Accordingly, there is need for regulation at different levels: national 
legislation for IAS transfers within a country, bilateral agreements between 
source and recipient states, coordinated regional (or sub-regional) approaches, 
and international regulation. Regulation at all these levels should be consistent 
and complement each other—at the least it should not be contradictory. 
Moreover, whatever type of regulation is used, it needs to be able to balance 
a variety of interests such as trade, shipping, and environmental protection. This 
can be demanding as the IAS issue is sensitive for many stakeholders. 
Additionally, the interests and preferences of different states and regions can 
vary significantly. Ballast water management, particularly through ballast water 
treatment, tends to be costly, which obviously is likely to generate opposition at 
many levels.  
The design of regulatory regimes is of utmost importance. Equally 
important is that their implementation is made feasible by the availability of 
suitable technologies, cooperation mechanisms, and adequate funding. 
However, ships do not always comply with international environmental 
standards even if they could (and should). Some operators/crews may be less 
sincere in their intentions and breach legal obligations in order to save costs or 
purely for convenience reasons. Therefore all the better, of course, if 
international regulation could provide incentives making compliance with its 
norms more attractive than non-compliance. In the context of the ballast issue, 
one could think about coupling compliance with ballast water treatment 
obligations (and even non-binding guidelines) with reduced port fees, for 
instance.144  
All the above mentioned challenges in ballast water management are 
evident also within the EU. The EU is a large free-trade region. Unfortunately, 
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free trade also facilitates the transfer of alien organisms. Combining free trade 
and the single market ideology with environmental protection can be 
complicated.145 Furthermore, Europe covers a variety of biogeographical zones. 
In a certain EU Member State a particular species may pose no risk whatsoever 
(and even be native to the country), whereas the consequences that its 
introduction to another member state entails can be devastating to the local 
ecosystem.146 Unfortunately, the geography of Europe is such that species 
introduced into the territory of one European state can in most cases spread to 
the neighbouring countries relatively easily.147 Negligence of one state could 
thus water down the efforts of others. At the same time, EU countries are 
exposed to invasions of species in a very heterogeneous manner. Obviously, 
coastal states on the EU borders have the highest probability of receiving new 
invasions.148 This affects the recognition of risks, as well as prioritisations in 
IAS management.149 Moreover, many measures that are needed for combating 
IAS effectively are likely to be “financially demanding.” Leaving these costs on 
Member States alone could severely hamper compliance with any new 
obligations (let alone recommendations).150 Consequently, the development and 
implementation of unified IAS policies, regulations and systems within Europe 
can be challenging.  
Nevertheless, a common European approach to the problem of invasive 
alien species being transported in ships’ ballast water is essential. Cooperation 
should be improved at all levels (EU, regional, national, and local). Fortunately, 
many (if not most) EU Member States are apparently planning to ratify the 
IMO BWM Convention in the near future.151 However, there are still significant 
practical problems involved: those related to risk assessments (in accordance 
with IMO G7 Guidelines; see more below), port state control sampling and 
analysing of samples, and ballast water treatment system type approvals, above 
all. Furthermore, ballast water exchange is problematic in most parts of Europe 
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due to the characteristics of the European seas.152 Fortunately, these are largely 
“technical,” not ideological problems. Most of them can be solved with money. 
For instance, an EU fund could be established for eradication and control of 
IAS.153 Thus one can still be optimistic about the prospects for the development 
of a common regulatory regime for Europe in the area of ballast water 
management. 
The compatibility and collaboration of any new European regime with 
other management systems, organisations, institutions and programmes 
pertaining to ballast water must be guaranteed. Moreover, it needs to be 
a dynamic and proactive system. Essential for its efficiency is the capability to 
adapt to improved scientific knowledge, changing circumstances, and advances 
in technology. Most importantly, the various uncertainties connected to IAS 
necessitate utmost precaution. This seems to call for risk assessment based 
management combined with prevention strategies.154 Risk-based decision 
support systems require accurate, timely information about potentially invasive 
species, port characteristics and invasion patterns, for instance. 
The development of good monitoring mechanisms and databases, as well as 
systems for using all the information gathered, is essential. Otherwise risk 
cannot be assessed reliably, which makes prioritisation and hence differentiated 
treatment levels of ballast water impossible without compromising risk 
levels.155 Obviously, the voyage-specific selective approach in ballast water 
management is more demanding for the port state than a so-called blanket 
approach where the same measures are categorically required from all ships, 
without any consideration of their risk potential.156  
Risk assessments can be used for “environmental matching” between the 
areas of ballast water origin and discharge, and hence for making estimations of 
the capability of survival of species in a new environment. Additionally, risks 
related to the invasiveness of a particular species and the potential harm it can 
cause in the new environment can be assessed.157 In the European context, it 
has been suggested that risk assessment could be used, inter alia, for 
developing lists of species for regulating the spread of IAS (white list for low 
risk species; black list for prohibited or strictly regulated species; grey for 
species which have not been assessed yet, etc.). Such lists call for flexibility in 
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administrative procedures in order to be able to accommodate rapid response to 
emerging threats. On the other hand, they should be able to cater for regional 
differences, which can be quite difficult given that one Member State’s native 
species can be a highly invasive, harmful alien species in another Member 
State.158  
At least the adoption of legally binding measures (such as directives and 
regulations within the EU) would seem to call for strict risk assessment 
procedures.159 Thus far risk assessment based ballast water management has 
been used in many of the regional IAS strategies in Europe. Models employed 
for undertaking the assessments vary, but most of them are based on the IMO 
G7 Guidelines for risk assessment160 or the model developed through the 
GloBallast Programme.161 The G7 Guidelines are very specific, and a number 
of risk assessment tools will be used. The application of such risk assessments 
in practice is still subject to uncertainty, however.162  
Some kind of a standardised European approach to risk assessment in 
ballast water management could be helpful.163 One of the biggest problems in 
this respect is lack of information.164 The development of a standardised 
European approach to risk assessment would require further research at least 
about ballast water discharge patterns and presence/absence of non-indigenous 
species in the European waters.165 There exists, for instance, a North European 
and Baltic Network on Invasive Alien Species (NOBANIS), which is a network 
of common databases on IAS in this particular region.166 However, this network 
covers only Northern Europe. The European Strategy on Invasive Alien Species 
(2002) encouraged the development of a Europe-wide inventory of invasive 
alien species. As a consequence, the European Commission funded a three-year 
Strategic Targeted Research project, DAISIE (Delivering Alien Invasive 
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Species Inventories in Europe), which was launched in 2005.167 DAISIE 
focused on the following areas of information gathering and dissemination: 1) 
the European Alien Species Expertise Registry; 2) the European Alien Species 
Database; and 3) the European Invasive Alien Species Information System.168 It 
can thus provide useful tools for the further development of European risk 
assessment mechanisms for IAS. The European Commission is currently 
examining the feasibility of a Europe-wide Early Warning and Information 
System based on existing activities such as NOBANIS and DAISIE.169 
Risks that are already known call directly for prevention, which is 
generally a far more effective and desirable option than reactive measures taken 
after an invasion has occurred.170 Prevention is particularly critical for aquatic 
ecosystems as detecting IAS in water can be very challenging and the 
organisms can disperse quickly.171 Furthermore, invasions of marine alien 
species are largely irreversible; eradicating an IAS once it has become 
established in the marine environment can even be considered unrealistic.172 
Many of the management options used in terrestrial ecosystems are not 
available or at least harder to apply.173 In the northern hemisphere, harsh 
weather conditions and geographical remoteness can make operations 
particularly challenging and expensive. Hence minimisation of future species 
introductions is fundamentally important. On the other hand, given that 
prevention of all invasions is an impossible goal, more effective rules on 
liability for IAS introductions and improved insurance mechanisms are 
needed.174 Besides, well-designed liability rules can also have a significant 
preventive effect and work as powerful economic incentives promoting 
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compliance with environmental regulation.175 
On balance, a strong precautionary approach is absolutely essential for 
the development and operation of any IAS regime, both in Canada and the 
European Union. Hopefully, the two can learn from each others’ efforts to 
address the challenge of non-native aquatic species—a large number of which 
are constantly transported between these very regions. The EU in particular 
should examine carefully the Canadian regime for ballast water management, 
given that Canada has been very active in this sector. One area where the 
Canadian efforts could serve as a source of inspiration for the Europeans is the 
utilisation of risk assessment methodologies in responding to the IAS issue. 
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Chapter 16 
 
Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution Control in the European Union 
Context 
 
Malgorzata Anna Nesterowicz∗ 
 
 
16.1. Introduction  
 
The analysis of maritime safety and vessel-source pollution control issues is 
a part of a comparative, European Union-Canadian exercise, whose aim is to 
increase academic and public understanding of European Union (EU) and 
Canadian approaches and challenges in governing key human uses of the 
oceans. The particular aim of this contribution is to compare solutions to similar 
problems relating to maritime safety and vessel source pollution control in two 
different settings, highlighting areas of convergence and divergence of interests 
and practices. 
This chapter presents the legislative solutions concerning maritime safety 
in the EU. In particular, it touches upon accelerated phasing out of single-hulls, 
establishment of places of refuge, supervision over classification societies, port 
state control, vessel traffic monitoring, liability issues, as well as protection of 
sensitive environments and criminalisation of ship-source pollution. 
 
 
16.2. The Significance of Maritime Trade for the European Union 
 
The 27 EU Member States have over 600 significant ports along their 
thousands kilometres of coastline. Nearly 90 percent of the trade volume 
between the EU and the rest of the world is transported by sea. In relation to the 
trade between the EU Member States (short sea shipping), this number reaches 
69 percent and is still growing. Amongst all this, there is an ever-growing 
number of tankers carrying increasing volumes of oil and hazardous substances 
through sensitive areas such as the Mediterranean and Baltic seas.1 
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It is obvious that such traffic, due to its density and potential 
consequences to the environment needs to be regulated. On the basis of the 
subsidiarity principle, one of basic principles of European law, if certain 
objectives can be achieved better by the Community as a whole than by 
individual Member States, then the Community can legislate in the area 
belonging to shared competencies (like maritime transport) and in this way 
“takes over” the subject. This means that Member States will no longer legislate 
within it independently and the rules that the EU establishes are supreme. 
Maritime safety, due to the transboundary character of pollution and maritime 
transport as such, is deemed to be an area where the Community can achieve 
the objectives of the protection of the environment and vessel-source pollution 
control better than the Member States individually. As a result, since the early 
1990s, the legislative activity of the Community in this area has been notable.  
 
 
16.3. Institutional Framework of Decision Making in the EU 
  
There are three main institutions involved in the EU law-making process: the 
European Commission, European Parliament and the European Council. Each 
has a different role and objective. The process can be described as a rather 
general scheme with the European Commission serving as the executive body 
and “watchdog” of the EU. It has responsibility for bringing action for 
infringements against the Member States. The Commission also has 
an exclusive right of initiating legislation (the “proposal”). The European 
Parliament consists of directly elected Members. The European Council is 
comprised of representatives from each Member State. They consider, 
according to a certain legislative path within the so-called co-decision 
procedure (in relation to maritime transport issues), the proposal and propose 
their amendments.2 
Under the co-decision procedure,3 a new legislative proposal is drafted by 
the European Commission. The proposal then comes before the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The two institutions discuss the 
proposal independently, and each may amend it freely. In Council, a new 
proposal is first considered by a working group for that policy area. 
                                                 
2
 See H. Ringbom, The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law (Leiden, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 11 et seq.; K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional 
Law of the European Union (London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), p. 592 et seq. 
3
 Treaty establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Rome], Article 251. 
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The conclusion of the working group’s discussions is known as the orientation 
generale, and usually forms the basis of Council’s position at the end of the 
first reading, which is known as the common position. Meanwhile, Parliament 
appoints one of its members as Rapporteur to steer the proposal through its 
committee stage. The Rapporteur is responsible for incorporating the 
committee’s amendments into the draft proposal, as well as the 
recommendations of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and 
Social Committee. The finished report is then voted on in full plenary, where 
further amendments may be introduced. 
In order for the proposal to become law, Council and Parliament must 
approve each other’s amendments and agree upon a final text in identical terms. 
If the two institutions have agreed on identical amendments after the first 
reading, the proposal becomes law; this happens from time to time, either 
where there is a general consensus or where there is great time pressure to 
adopt the legislation. Otherwise, there is a second reading in each institution, 
where each considers the other’s amendments. Parliament must conduct its 
second reading within three months of Council delivering its common position, 
or else Council’s amendments are deemed to have been accepted, though this 
time period can be extended by Parliament if it chooses to do so. If the 
institutions are unable to reach agreement after the second reading, 
a conciliation committee is set up with an equal number of members from 
Parliament and Council. The committee attempts to negotiate a compromise 
text which must then be approved by both institutions. Both Parliament and 
Council have the power to reject a proposal either at second reading or 
following conciliation, causing the proposal to fall. The Commission may also 
withdraw its proposal at any time. 
 
 
16.4. Development of EU Maritime Policy  
 
The European rules on transport are provided for in Articles 70–80 (previously 
74–84) of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. However, they only apply to transport 
by rail, road and inland waterway.4 According to Article 80.2, the European 
Council was supposed to lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air 
transport.5 Nevertheless, the first legislative measures regarding sea transport 
                                                 
4
 L. O. Blanco and B. Van Houtte, Las Normas de Competencia Comunitarias en el Transporte, 
(Madrid: Civitas, 1996), p. 27 et seq. 
5
 R. Confavreux, “Les transports maritimes dans le droit de la concurrence communautaire,” 
Revue de Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 398 (May 1996): 369–379, p. 370. 
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were not taken until the 1970s and they mostly concerned issues of external 
relations of the Community.6 The Council delayed the creation of the Common 
Transport Policy as the EU Member States were unwilling to hand over to the 
Community the competences usually identified with the sovereignty and 
political and commercial power of the states. In 1983, the European Parliament 
brought to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) a case against the Council of the 
European Communities for failure to act and the ECJ confirmed that the 
Council failed to create common maritime transport policy.7 
Following this, on 22 December 1986, Council adopted four regulations 
that created the basis of such policy:8 
 
• Regulation 4055/86 on the principle of freedom to provide services 
between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries9 
• Regulation 4056/86 concerning detailed rules for the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty to maritime transport10 
• Regulation 4057/86 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport11 
• Regulation 4058/86 on co-ordination action to safeguard free access to 
cargoes in ocean trades12 
 
As Regulation 4055/86 did not deal with maritime cabotage, a separate legal act 
was adopted in 1992:  
 
• Regulation 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide 
services to maritime transport within Member States (cabotage)13 
 
The EU started to take interest in maritime safety policy only in the 
1990s. Until then it seemed sufficient that EU Member States were parties to 
                                                 
6
 F. Santoro, La Politica dei transporti della Comunita’ Economica Europea (Torino: UTET, 
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the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and were implementing 
international conventions. However, between 1986 and 1991 the worldwide rate 
of total losses of ships averaged 230 vessels per year, of which losses of oil 
tankers constituted a considerable part.14 Some of these vessels seriously 
damaged EU marine ecosystems.15 As a result, still maintaining its commitment 
to the implementation of international rules, the Council of the EU passed 
a resolution calling upon the European Commission to start promoting and 
improving EU action in the area of maritime safety.16 The Commission drafted 
its White17 and Green18 Papers on Common Maritime Transport Policy, 
analysing, among other matters, the impact of shipping on the environment. 
A more substantive document called Common Policy on Safe Seas was 
presented in 199319 as a direct consequence of other oil tanker accidents.20 In 
the latter document, the Commission prioritised common initiatives to 
implement the existing international rules and insisted on a stricter enforcement 
of those rules, especially through more effective control of ships visiting EU 
ports. The Commission also urged the development of maritime infrastructure, 
modernisation of traffic control navigation systems, installation of reception 
facilities in ports, and training and education of crews. In the same document, it 
emphasised that its role was not to replace IMO in its rule making but to assist 
it.21 
During the next several years, the EU Council adopted several directives 
and regulations on safety that mostly implemented IMO rules: 
 
                                                 
14 A. A. Pallis, The Common EU Maritime Transport Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 103 et 
seq.; C. de la Rue and Ch. B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment: Law and Practice 
(London: LLP 1998), p. 825 et seq. 
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16 Council Resolution on the prevention of accidents causing marine pollution, 19 June 1990, 
Official Journal 1990 C 206/1.  
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 Commission of the European Communities, The Future Development of the Common Transport 
Policy, Communication from the Commission, COM(92)494 final (Brussels, 2 December 1992). 
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 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Impact of Transport on the 
Environment, Communication from the Commission, COM(92)46 final (Brussels, 20 February 
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 Commission of the European Communities, A Common Policy on Safe Seas, Communication 
from the Commission, COM(93)66 final (24 February 1993). 
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 These include the Aegean Sea in 1992 and Braer in 1993. 
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 See also a new Communication: Commission of the European Communities, Strategic Goals 
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• Council Directive 93/75/EEC Concerning Minimum Requirements for 
Vessels Bound for or Leaving Community Ports and Carrying 
Dangerous or Polluting Goods22 
• Council Directive 94/57/EC on Common Rules and Standards for Ship 
Inspection and Survey Organizations and for the Relevant Activities of 
Maritime Administrations23  
• Council Directive 94/58/EC on the Minimum Level of Training of 
Seafarers24 
• Council Regulation No. 2978/94 on the Implementation of IMO 
Resolution A.747(18) on the Application of Tonnage Measurement of 
Ballast Spaces in Segregated Ballast Oil Tankers25 
• Council Regulation No. 3051/95 on the Safety Management of Roll-
on/Roll-off Passenger Ferries26 
• Council Directive 95/21/EC Concerning the Enforcement, in Respect of 
Shipping Using Community Ports and Sailing in the Waters Under the 
Jurisdiction of the Member States, of International Standards for Ship 
Safety, Pollution Prevention and Shipboard Living and Working 
Conditions (Port State Control)27 by which the voluntary rules on port 
state control included in the Paris Memorandum were made binding in 
the EU 
• Council Directive 98/18/EC on Safety Rules and Standards for 
Passenger Ships28 
• Council Directive 1999/35/EC on a System of Mandatory Surveys for 
the Safe Operation of Regular Ro-Ro Ferry and High-speed Passenger 
Craft Services29 
• Directive 2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 November 2000 on Port Reception Facilities for Ship-generated 
Waste and Cargo Residues30 
 
On 12 December 1999, a Maltese tanker, Erika, carrying approximately 
30,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, broke in two off the coast of Brittany, France. 
Age, corrosion, insufficient maintenance, and inadequate surveys were all 
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contributing factors to the structural failure of the ship. In response to the 
accident, the European Community decided to undertake measures that would 
help to avoid similar incidents in the future and that would assure adequate 
compensation to the victims of oil pollution disasters.31 
A package of legal measures, called the “Erika I package,” was issued by 
the Commission in March 2000. It consisted of proposals for a directive 
strengthening port state inspections in the EU, a directive strengthening the 
monitoring of the activities of classification societies, and a regulation 
introducing an accelerated timetable for the withdrawal of single-hulled 
tankers. In consequence, three measures were adopted: 
 
• Directive 2001/106/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 December 2001 Amending Council Directive 95/21/EC 
Concerning the Enforcement, in Respect of Shipping Using Community 
Ports and Sailing in the Waters Under the Jurisdiction of the Member 
States, of International Standards for Ship Safety, Pollution Prevention 
and Shipboard Living and Working Conditions (Port State Control)32 
• Directive 2001/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 December 2001 Amending Council Directive 94/57/EC on 
Common Rules and Standards for Ship Inspection and Survey 
Organizations and for the Relevant Activities of Maritime 
Administrations33 
• Regulation (EC) No. 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 February 2002 on the Accelerated Phasing-in of Double 
Hull or Equivalent Design Requirements for Single Hull Oil Tankers 
and Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 2798/9434 
 
In December 2000, the Commission issued a second package of proposals, 
the “Erika II package.”35 These proposals included a regulation creating the 
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European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), a directive concerning the 
establishing of a monitoring and information system for improving the surveillance 
of traffic in European waters, and a regulation aimed at establishing 
a complementary European fund (amounting to one billion euro) for the indemnity 
of victims of oil spills. Two measures were adopted: 
 
• Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
June 2002 Establishing a Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring and 
Information System and Repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC36 
• Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 June 2002 Establishing a European Maritime Safety 
Agency37 
 
The proposal for the establishment of the EU compensation fund was not adopted38 
because a supplementary fund of a similar scope, but at the international level, was 
created at the forum of the IOPC Funds in response to the EU proposal.39  
On 13 November 2002, a Bahamas-registered tanker, Prestige, broke in 
two off the coast of Galicia, Spain, spilling an unknown, but substantial, 
quantity of its cargo of heavy fuel oil.40 In response, in March 2003, 
the Commission drafted another proposal for a directive on ship-source 
pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, which was 
adopted in September 2005 as Directive 2005/35 on ship-source pollution and 
on the introduction of penalties for infringements. 41  
 In November 2005, the Commission presented a third package of 
legislative measures dealing with maritime safety42 The package consisted of the 
following seven proposals: 
 
1. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
compliance with flag State requirements43  
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2. Proposal for a Directive on common rules and standards for ship inspection 
and survey organizations and for the relevant activities of maritime 
administrations44 
3. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
port State control45 
4. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffic 
monitoring and information system46 
5. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of 
accidents in the maritime transport sector and amending Directives 
1999/35/EC and 2002/59/EC47 
6. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the liability of carriers of passengers by sea and inland waterways in the 
event of accidents48 
7. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
civil liability and financial guarantees of shipowners49 
 
The European Parliament held its first votes on the proposals on 29 
March and 25 April 2007, and was generally supportive of the Commission’s 
proposals. The Council adopted its common positions for the six files on 6 June 
2008. After long and difficult discussions, it adopted political agreements for 
flag state requirements and civil liability proposals on 9 October 2008. In the 
meantime, unsure of the outcome of the Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy Council of 9 October, the European Parliament held its second reading 
vote on 24 September 2008 on the other six proposals. Since it became clear 
that the Council would not be able to accept the Parliament’s position, the 
preparations for conciliation started.  
A series of informal trilogues on the six proposals were held during 
August, November and December 2008. On 8 December, the Conciliation 
Committee was convened to formalise the remaining differences between the 
Council and European Parliament. It included eight proposals (as the European 
Parliament agreed to approve the two Council common positions of 9 October 
without further amendments). Most of the proposals actually had already 
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arrived at that stage of Conciliation Committee without any controversial issues 
as the Parliament and Council (and the Commission) managed to come to 
a compromise over the two readings and the informal trilogues. One proposal, 
the Regulation on the liability of passenger carriers, was controversial and the 
Conciliation Committee had still to tackle some important issues. A common 
text was, however, finally agreed at the Conciliation Committee for all the 
proposals. 
 
 
16.5. Selected Comparative Thematic Issues 
 
16.5.1. Port State Control 
 
In January 1982, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control was adopted to promote ship safety and protect the environment. Its 
aim was to eliminate the operation of sub-standard ships through a harmonised 
system of port state control. It was initially signed by fourteen European 
countries, and subsequently joined by others, as well as non-European 
countries, inter alia, Canada. Those voluntary rules were made binding in the 
EU in 1995 by Council Directive 95/21/EC Concerning the Enforcement, in 
Respect of Shipping Using Community Ports and Sailing in the Waters Under 
the Jurisdiction of the Member States, of International Standards for Ship 
Safety, Pollution Prevention and Shipboard Living and Working Conditions 
(Port State Control).50 The Directive requires state parties to inspect at least 25 
percent of the ships entering their ports in relation to their compliance with 
binding IMO and International Labour Organization conventions.51 
This Directive has been amended repeatedly, but a notable amendment 
came within the Erika I package. The amendment, Directive 2001/106, 
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 The Paris MOU continues to exist, especially because non-EU countries such as Canada are 
party to it. 
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 For example, the International Convention on Load Lines, London, 5 April 1966, in force 21 
July 1968, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 
November 1974, 184 U.N.T.S. 278; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184; International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1 July 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 190; 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, London, 20 
October 1972, 1143 U.N.T.S. 347; International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 
London, 23 June 1969, 1110 U.N.T.S. 318; and Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in 
Merchant Shipping, 29 October 1976, 1259 U.N.T.S. 335 (ILO Convention No. 147). 
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consisted of banning ships older than fifteen years that have been detained more 
than twice in the course of the preceding two years from EU ports. 
A “blacklist” of detained and banned ships is now published every six 
months.52 In addition, inspections of older ships were made more detailed, for 
example tankers must now have one ballast tank inspected regularly. Ships are 
obliged to communicate certain information before entering ports to facilitate 
the preparation of inspections. 
In 2002, EMSA was entrusted the task of visiting Member States on a 
regular basis and assessing whether their port state control systems and related 
procedures fully comply with the EU legislation. EMSA also publishes and 
updates a list of banned ships. In the near future, EMSA will develop a project 
for a new information system which will support the considerable renewed new 
inspection regime for port state control. 
In 2005 the Commission proposed, within the third safety package, to 
recast the Directive and to simplify and amend certain provisions in order to 
reinforce effectiveness and quality of inspections on ships. The new Port State 
Control Directive will establish a new inspection system, both in relation to 
ships in ports and at anchorage, focused on “substandard vessels,” while the 
burden will be alleviated with regard to quality vessels. The new system will 
not be based on a 25 percent inspection requirement but in fact 100 percent in 
relation to some vessels. In particular it will take into account ships’ “risk 
profiles,” subjecting higher-risk vessels, including all passenger ships and oil 
and chemical tankers of more than 12 years of age, to more frequent checks. 
Special attention will be given to vessels that do not call often at Community 
ports. Ships not in conformity with the required standards can receive a three-
month ban on entering EU ports for the first time, a 12-month ban the second 
time, and a 24-month ban for the third time. Any further detention will result in 
a permanent ban from EU ports. This last point was a subject for the 
Conciliation Committee to consider as the European Parliament insisted on its 
inclusion. 
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 The first such list was published on 13 November 2003, see 2003 Official Journal C 272/16. See 
also, Commission of the European Communities, “One year after the Prestige disaster, 
the Commission publishes the first list of ships definitively banned from EU ports,” Press Release 
RAPID, IP/03/1547 (Brussels, 14 November 2003). It is currently maintained by EMSA and 
accessible through its webpage. 
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16.5.2. Delegation of Functions to Classification Societies and Their 
Supervision 
 
To a large extent, EU Member States delegate the statutory tasks of certification (in 
order to verify compliance of ships with international safety requirements) to 
classification societies. However, this can only be done in relation to the societies 
recognised by the EU. To date there are 13 such societies.53 
The rules on recognition were adopted in 1995 by the Directive 94/57/EC on 
Common Rules and Standards for Ship Inspection and Survey Organizations and 
for the Relevant Activities of Maritime Administrations. Only Member States can 
request EU recognition of a classification society. The Commission grants 
recognition on the basis of an assessment. The recognition is valid either for the 
whole EU or for certain countries. Thereafter, each recognised society is to be 
reassessed every two years. 
The amendment of the rules in the Erika I package, Directive 2001/105, 
simplified the procedure according to which the Commission can suspend or 
withdraw recognition from the societies that failed to comply with the criteria laid 
down in the Directive. Moreover, more stringent criteria were set for the societies 
(e.g., certain procedures when a ship changes class).  
EMSA has been entrusted with carrying out the inspections of classification 
societies on behalf of the European Commission, which in turn replaced the 
individual recognition procedures of the Member States. The inspections cover 
both head offices and selected regional offices, and also include visits to ships for 
the purpose of checking the performance of the classification society in question. 
EMSA also carries out special assessments of classification societies for which EU 
recognition is being requested by one or more (new) Member States. 
In 2005, the Commission proposed, within the third safety package, to recast 
the Directive. The aim of the new legislation is to strengthen the control over 
recognised organizations and to reform the system of penalties against those which 
infringe the minimum criteria. The Council proposed to split the Commission’s 
proposal into two acts: a directive and a regulation. The directive will include 
provisions addressed to Member States concerning their relationship with ship 
inspections and survey organisations. The regulation will contain all provisions 
related to recognition at the Community level, i.e., granting and withdrawal of the 
recognition by the Commission, the obligations and criteria to be fulfilled by the 
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 List of organisations recognised on the basis of Council Directive 94/57/EC on common rules 
and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for relevant activities of 
maritime administrations (Notices from Member States), Official Journal 2007 C 135/4. See 
also: European Maritime Safety Agency website at <http://www.emsa.europa.eu/ 
end185d007d001d001.html> (retrieved 15 November 2008). 
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organisations to be eligible for Community recognition, and sanctions on 
organisations for failing to fulfil those obligations.  
The Conciliation Committee discussed in particular, in relation to the 
proposed regulation, the issues of quality standards of the recognised organisations. 
It was agreed that the recognised organisation must develop, implement and 
maintain an effective internal quality system based on appropriate parts of 
internationally recognised quality standards and in compliance with EN ISO/IEC 
17020:2004 (inspection bodies) and with EN ISO 9001:2000 (quality management 
systems, requirements), as interpreted and certified by the Quality Assessment and 
Certification Entity. The Quality Assessment and Certification Entity shall have the 
necessary governance and competences to act independently of the recognised 
organisations and shall have the necessary means to carry out its duties effectively 
and to the highest professional standards.  
 
 
16.5.3. Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers 
 
A revised Regulation 13G, Annex I of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), contains provisions relating to 
the gradual phasing-out of single-hull oil tankers and their replacement by double-
hull tankers or tankers of equivalent design.54 Oil tankers built since 1996 must 
have a double hull or be of equivalent design, while all existing single-hull oil 
tankers are to be phased out by 2026. This timetable was, however, considered too 
slow by the EU. Regulation (EC) No. 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 18 February 2002 on the Accelerated Phasing-in of Double Hull or 
Equivalent Design Requirements for Single Hull Oil Tankers (…) was adopted 
within the Erika I package. It introduced an accelerated timetable (compared to 
that of the IMO) for replacement in EU waters of single-hull tankers by double-
hull tankers. Depending on their age and tonnage, the single-hull tankers are 
divided into three groups. They should be withdrawn by 2005, 2010, and 2015. 
The Regulation entered into force on 27 March 2002. The international 
community followed the EU approach, and the same timetable was introduced 
under MARPOL. 
                                                 
54
 Those rules were added to MARPOL in 1991 following Exxon Valdez accident (but the 
United States never adhered to them). 
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After the sinking of the Prestige, the Commission decided to propose 
additional amendments to the regulation on phasing-out of single-hull tankers.55 
According to those amendments, carriage of heavy fuel oil in single-hull tankers 
was banned, and the phasing-out timetable was accelerated, depending on tonnage 
and age, and for single-hull tankers older than 15 years an additional inspection, 
a condition assessment survey (CAS), was introduced in order to continue serving 
until the age of 25.56 This also was followed by a parallel amendment to 
MARPOL.57 
 
 
16.5.4. Use of Regulatory Tools to Monitor Vessel Traffic for the Purpose 
of Marine Safety and Environmental Protection  
 
16.5.4.1. Navigational Measures  
 
The Directive on Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System, 
adopted by the Council and European Parliament within the Erika II package, 
established an information system for all ships in EU waters, even if they do not 
enter any EU ports (however, enforcement is port based). Reporting requirements 
imposed on the shipowners (or ship operators or agents) were already provided for 
in Directive 93/75.58 The reporting requirements for vessels carry dangerous or 
polluting goods have been extended to new cargos and simplified. Notification can 
now be done through the electronic data exchange system. The Directive also 
improves the procedure for the transmission and use of data relating to dangerous 
cargo and creation of various common databases. It introduced an obligation for 
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Norton Moore, n. 37 above, p. 309–318. 
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ships to carry automatic identification systems (AIS). EMSA was tasked with the 
creation and management of SafeSeaNet, an EU information system that receives 
and stores the notifications sent by ships carrying hazardous cargos. The system is 
shared by all EU Member States. 
In 2005, the Commission proposed, within the Erika III package, to recast 
the Directive. The aim of the new Directive on Community Vessel Traffic 
Monitoring and Information System is to enhance ship safety and environmental 
protection. It contains provisions for the enhancement of the SafeSeaNet system 
(e.g., ensuring that the system is operational on a 24-hour-a-day basis). It also 
proposes that the AIS should be made mandatory for fishing vessels longer than 
15 metres.  
 
 
16.5.4.2. Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas 
 
Particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs) are created by the IMO on the initiative 
of one or more states for the purpose of protecting the coastal zone. 
The modalities of such zones are based on a series of IMO Guidelines.59 There 
are four PSSAs in the EU: Wadden Sea, Canary Islands, Western European 
Waters,60 and the Baltic Sea.61 However, there is no special EU policy on 
PSSAs; these PSSAs were created on the initiative of one or more Member 
States. The Baltic Sea PSSA includes ship routing measures based on other 
conventions, and the Western European Waters PSSA introduced a tanker 
reporting system, WETREP.62 
The EU has been trying to create a coherent network of protected areas 
within its environmental policy on the basis of Birds’ Directive63 and the 
Habitats Directive.64 In particular, the Habitats Directive establishes a network 
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 Res. A.720(17) of 1991, A.885(21) of 1999 and A.927(22) of 2001. The most recent are Res. 
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 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds, 2 April 1979, Official 
Journal 1979 L 221/10. 
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 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
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of protected areas called Natura 2000.65 These have been mainly land areas, 
although the Sixth Environmental Action Programme of 2001 and the 
Commission Communication of 200366 both recommend the extension of 
Natura 2000 to the marine environment.67 
 
 
16.5.5. Vessel-Source Pollution: The Regime for Pollution Offences 
 
In 2005, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2005/35/EC 
on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements.68 
The purpose of this Directive is to incorporate international standards for ship-
source pollution (especially MARPOL69) into Community law and to ensure that 
persons responsible for discharges are subject to adequate penalties in order to 
improve maritime safety and to enhance protection of the marine environment 
from pollution by ships. In particular, Member States are to ensure that ship-source 
discharges of polluting substances into internal waters, including ports, 
the territorial sea, straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of 
transit passage, the EEZ or equivalent zones, and the high seas, are regarded as 
infringements if committed with “intent, recklessly or by serious negligence.” Such 
infringements should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties 
(criminal or administrative).70 
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 See V. Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection in the 
International Law of the Sea (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), p. 380 et 
seq. 
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Publisher, 1998), p. 41 et seq. 
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 The validity of the Directive has been questioned in Case C-308/06, International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for 
Transport. The prejudicial questions were asked to the ECJ in relation to the compatibility of 
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The Directive was complemented by Council Framework Decision 
2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal law framework for the 
enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution.71 However, this Directive 
was later made invalid by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the case 
C-440/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Union.72 As a result, a new Proposal has been presented by the Commission,73 
which includes in the new directive certain elements that were previously in the 
Framework Decision regarding criminal offences. 
According to the Proposal, Member States are to ensure that ship-source 
discharges of polluting substances into the areas listed above are regarded as 
criminal offences if committed with intent, recklessly or with serious 
negligence. They should be punished by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive 
criminal penalties (imposed on both physical and legal persons). 
The enforcement of the Directive is mostly in ports (in reference to 
Article 218 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – LOS 
Convention74) either within the port of the Member State concerned, if the ship 
enters such a port, or within the next port of call (in the EU) if the discharge 
was done by the ship in transit. However, the Directive also provides for the 
possibility of at-sea enforcement. Article 7.2 states:  
 
Where there is clear, objective evidence that a ship navigating in the 
[territorial sea or EEZ] committed … an infringement resulting in 
a discharge causing major damage or a threat of major damage to the 
coastline or related interests of the Member State concerned …, that 
State shall, subject [Article 220(6) of the LOS Convention75] and 
                                                                                                                                  
the Directive with the LOS Convention and MARPOL and definition of “serious negligence.” 
The judgment of the Court of 3 June 2008 did not invalidate the Directive. 
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provided that the evidence so warrants, submit the matter to its 
competent authorities with a view to instituting proceedings, including 
detention of the ship, in accordance with its national law.76 
 
 
16.5.6. Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance 
 
A Directive on Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System 
from the Erika II package also introduced an obligation for EU Member States to 
draw up emergency plans for hosting ships in places of refuge in case of distress.77 
Only one article dealt with this issue. Article 20 provides: 
 
Member States, having consulted the parties concerned, shall draw up, 
taking into account relevant guidelines by IMO, plans to accommodate, 
in the waters under their jurisdiction, ships in distress. Such plans shall 
contain the necessary arrangements and procedures taking into account 
operational and environmental constraints, to ensure that ships in 
distress may immediately go to a place of refuge subject to authorisation 
by the competent authority. Where the Member State considers it 
necessary and feasible, the plans must contain arrangements for the 
provision of adequate means and facilities for assistance, salvage and 
pollution response. 
 
Plans for accommodating ships in distress shall be made available upon 
demand. Member States shall inform the Commission by 5 February 
2004 of the measures taken in application of the first paragraph. 
 
EMSA was tasked with verifying how the Member States implemented 
Article 20. The evaluation followed a number of steps. First, Member States 
agreed to common principles in order to establish the national plans in 
accordance with Article 20. These principles were agreed to during an expert 
meeting in 2003 in Brussels. Second, Member States were required to send the 
national plans, including the legal transposition and the operational measures 
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taken, to the European Commission by July 2003. The national plans had to 
contain certain elements: 
 
• the identification of the authority that handles the initial response 
• the identification of the authority that is responsible for directing 
a vessel to place of refuge 
• the planning and availability of an inventory of places of refuge 
• the type of cooperation that exists between neighbouring Member States 
• the compensation procedures in place to deal with the resulting damage 
that may occur when the situation arises of vessels in distress requiring 
a place of refuge 
 
A report was sent to the European Commission in September 2003 following an 
analysis of these plans. It was determined that additional information was 
required concerning the operational implementation of the national measures.  
The third and final step was visits to the Member States by the 
Commission, supported by EMSA, in order to evaluate how each Member State 
applied their plan in practice and to collect any missing information. 
The conclusions following this step were overwhelmingly positive and 
indicated that the Member States have legally transposed and implemented the 
requirements of Article 20. However, some concerns remained: 
 
• how the speed of decision making would be affected due to split 
responsibilities in certain Member States 
• the absence of formalised cooperation procedures between many of the 
neighbouring coastal states 
• gaps in the compensation system 
  
In the third safety package, a more elaborate Article 20 of the Directive on 
Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring proposed in 2005 by the Commission 
requires Member States to appoint an independent competent authority with the 
responsibility for deciding, on the basis of elaborated criteria, whether or not to 
accept a vessel in distress into a place of refuge. A financial guarantee for eventual 
liability may be required from the ship, although its absence cannot be decisive in 
the ultimate decision of the authority.  
The main discussion at the Conciliation Committee concerned the nature of 
the competent authority and the extent of its independence to take decisions. It was 
finally agreed in Article 20 that the Member States will appoint a “competent 
authority with powers to take independent decisions,” on the basis of prior 
evaluation of the situation, whether or not to allow a vessel in distress into a place 
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of refuge. Moreover, a financial guarantee for eventual liability may be required 
from the ship, although its absence cannot be decisive in the ultimate decision of 
the authority. 
 
 
16.5.7. Liability, Compensation and Response in Cases of Pollution 
 
The majority of the EU Member States are parties to the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention) and 
the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund 1992, as well as the 
Supplementary Fund. A significant number of Member States are party to the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
2001 (Bunkers Convention), but only a few are parties to the International 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996, and the Nairobi 
International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007. However, the latter 
two conventions are not yet in force. Nearly half of the Member States are party 
to the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (LLMC 
1976) and/or LLMC 1996, with only a few having not ratified either of these 
conventions. 
In the third safety package of November 2005, the European Commission 
presented two legislative projects related to the issue of civil liability: the 
Proposal for a regulation on liability of carriers of passengers by sea and inland 
waterways in the event of accidents78 and the Proposal for a directive on civil 
liability and financial guarantees of shipowners.79 Each of these Proposals is 
examined in turn. 
 
 
Proposal for a Regulation on Liability of Carriers of Passengers by Sea and 
Inland Waterways in the Event of Accidents 
 
The aim of the Regulation, as proposed in 2005, was to incorporate the 
provisions of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and 
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their Luggage by Sea, 2002 (which is not yet in force) regarding the liability of 
the carrier and a performing carrier in respect of passengers and their luggage 
into the European law. The Proposal actually extended the scope of application 
of the Athens liability rules (according to the Convention, the rules that are 
applicable to international maritime carriage only) to maritime cabotage and to 
international and domestic carriage by inland waterways. Moreover, 
the Regulation introduced an obligation that, in the event of the death or 
personal injury suffered by a passenger, the carrier is to make an advance 
payment sufficient to cover immediate economic needs of at least 21,000 Euro 
within 15 days. Finally, the carrier, the performing carrier, and/or the tour 
operator are to provide passengers, prior to their departure, with information 
regarding their rights as passengers (i.e., limits of compensation, right of direct 
action against the insurer or the person providing financial security, and the 
entitlement to advance payments). The Regulation will come into force when 
the Athens Convention does or on 31 December 2012, whichever comes first. 
The Conciliation Committee mostly debated the scope of the Regulation. 
It was agreed—and such is a final version of the Regulation—that it is not 
going to include inland waterways transport, but the Commission is to study the 
characteristics of this sector and propose separate rules in the future. Second, in 
relation to the application of the rules to cabotage, different transition periods 
were agreed upon depending on the class of the concerned ships (as in Directive 
98/18). Class A ships will enjoy a transition period until 31 December 2016 and 
class B ships until 31 December 2018. In respect of the class C and D ships, 
the Commission will present a new proposal by 30 June 2013. 
 
 
Proposal for a Directive on Civil Liability and Financial Guarantees of 
Shipowners 
 
The Proposal of the Commission provided that the EU Member States should 
all become contracting parties to the International Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims, as amended in 1996. It also proposed to limit the 
application of the rules on limitation of liability in relation to vessels flying 
a flag of a State not party to the LLMC 1996. That means that an owner of 
a ship flying the flag of a State not party to the LLMC 1996 would lose the 
right to limit his liability if it could be proven that “the damage resulted from 
his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage or 
through gross negligence.”80 
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 In relation to LLMC 1996, the formula “recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would 
probably occur” was exchanged for “through gross negligence.” 
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To ensure the effectiveness of the liability rules, the Proposal for the 
Directive imposed on shipowners an obligation to have insurance or other 
financial guarantees of civil liability and on the Member States an obligation to 
ensure that this in fact occurs. This obligation concerns not only every owner of 
a ship flying a flag of a Member State, but also every owner of a ship flying the 
flag of a third country “as soon as that ship enters its exclusive economic area 
or equivalent area.” Moreover, the relevant civil liability insurance has to cover 
an amount at least equal to double the limits that would be calculated on the 
basis of the LLMC 1996 in relation to the ship in question. The existence of 
such financial guarantee should be verified by certificates issued or certified by 
a competent authority in a Member State. 
In the first reading of the European Parliament (March 2007), several 
amendments were proposed, the most important being a proposal for the 
creation of the Community office for certificates of financial guarantee and 
a proposal for the establishment of the Solidarity Fund for compensation. 
Respectively, the Community office would be responsible for “keeping a full 
register of certificates issued, monitoring and updating their validity and 
checking the existence of financial guarantees registered by third countries.” 
The Solidarity Fund would serve to compensate any damage caused by ships 
not having a financial guarantee. However, the Council of the European Union, 
in Luxembourg on 6 June 2008 decided, to suspend the Proposal due to 
insufficient support. In October 2008, a compromise was reached to bring the 
Proposal back to the legislative track. The Council common position modified 
the proposed text, leaving only the insurance obligation: all Member States’ 
flagged vessels and all vessels entering EU ports will be obliged to present 
certificates of financial guarantee up to the LLMC 96 limits. Member States 
will ensure that the presence of the certificate onboard is controlled while the 
ship is in the port, and they will develop a system of penalties for breach of the 
obligation to possess a certificate. This is the final text of the Directive. 
 
 
Pollution Response 
 
The response to a pollution incident is a responsibility of each EU Member 
State. However, EMSA tops up their capabilities to fight oil pollution by 
providing special oil pollution response vessels. 
In August 2003, the Commission submitted a proposal to the European 
Parliament and Council to amend Regulation 1406/2002 by conferring new 
responsibilities on EMSA in relation to maritime security, combating oil 
pollution, and verification of the education of seafarers in third countries. 
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Regulation 724/2004 was adopted.81 In relation to combating oil pollution, 
EMSA was given a mandate to operate specialised pollution response ships, as 
well as equipment for collecting oil and other harmful substances from the sea. 
In order to perform this task, the Agency has signed “standby contracts” with 
vessels that normally do their usual work, but in an emergency will proceed to 
the port where they will have pollution response equipment installed and take 
part in the response action under the supervision of the Member State that 
called for such action. The vessels are stationed in a way that allows them to 
cover all areas identified as sensitive and with a high rate of pollution accidents 
in the past. 
 
 
16.6. Conclusion 
 
The European Union, within its maritime policy, has been following the 
international rules. The EU rules consist mostly of IMO rules made binding on 
the EU level. This has an added value: it allows for EU enforcement. 
The Commission can verify the implementation of the rules by the Member 
States and start an infringement procedure at the European Court of Justice if 
the implementation is not correct. 
Sometimes, however, the EU rules may go further than the IMO rules and 
provide for stricter standards in EU territory. In some cases (e.g., 
supplementary oil pollution fund and single-hull tankers), when the EU 
proposed a more far-reaching solution, the international community followed. 
An interesting characteristic of the EU “maritime” legislation is that the 
EU rules are mostly of “port state” nature. In effect, the EU acts as a port state 
and the rules are enforced in ports. Coastal and flag state enforcement is much 
less common. The legislative reviews in other chapters support these 
conclusions. 
                                                 
81
 Regulation (EC) No. 724/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 Establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, 
Official Journal 2004 L 129/1. 
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Chapter 17 
 
Shifting Focus: Towards Outcome-Based Policy and Regulation Making for 
Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution in Canada 
 
Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum* 
 
 
17.1. Introduction 
 
A recent publication concluded that “… Canadian water transportation policy is 
a history of: laissez faire; protection, financing and subsidization; government 
operation, ownership and privatization; expanded protection; commerciali-
zation; and a market oriented philosophy.”1 Consistent with this larger policy 
process, subsidiary policy and regulation making for maritime safety and 
vessel-source pollution in Canada have followed the roller-coaster pattern, 
punctuated by parallel milestones. 
This contribution is a survey and analysis of current Canadian directions 
for domestic maritime safety and vessel-source pollution regimes. 
Contemporary Canadian policy and regulation making are guided by outcome-
based approaches formulated on the basis of risk assessment.2 The chapter 
seeks to identify and explain the reasons for contemporary Canadian policy and 
regulatory directions and the philosophy guiding them with reference to the 
broader international context. In particular, appropriate comparisons are drawn 
                                                 
*
 The authors are indebted to the following persons for their assistance with various research 
queries: Dr. Mary Brooks, Professor of Marketing and Transportation and William A. Black 
Chair of Commerce, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University; Ross MacDonald, 
Manager, Special Projects and Arctic Shipping –AMSRP, Transport Canada; Valerie Devlin, 
A/Director, Seaway & Domestic Shipping Policy – ACFS, Transport Canada; Mark Covan, 
Senior Counsel (Practitioner), Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Atlantic Regional Office, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia; Bud Streeter, Vice President, Marine Manager for Canada, Lloyd’s 
Register North America, Inc.; Allan MacLean, Director, Conservation and Protection, Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada, Maritimes Region; David Michels, Dalhousie Law Library. 
1
 J. Monteiro, and G. Robertson, “Milestones in Canadian Transportation Policy – Water and 
Highway – Part II” (Paper presented to the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, “North 
American Networks: Gaps and Opportunities,” Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3–6 June 2007), p. 580. 
2
 At the time of writing the federal Department of Transport (Transport Canada) is planning to 
review the 1995 National Marine Policy and to update the Marine Safety “Strategic Plan for the 
period 2008–2015,” to be known as “The New Wave.” Valerie Devlin, Senior Advisor, 
Transport Canada, pers. comm. (26 June 2008). 
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with counterpart practices of the European Union. The foci include the 
Canadian approach to national maritime transport policy making, 
the institutional framework of Canada’s maritime administration, the process of 
reform of Canadian shipping regulation for maritime safety and marine 
pollution purposes culminating in a new shipping act, the strengthening of 
legislation and creation of penal offences to combat illegal ship discharges, 
places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, the use of shipping regulatory 
tools to address marine conservation concerns, supervision of classification 
societies, and the oil pollution liability and compensation regime. The study 
concludes with insights into the contemporary maritime policy and regulation 
in Canada. 
 
 
17.2. Context 
 
Bordering on three oceans (Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific) and the Great Lakes, 
Canada is a major trading nation, but not necessarily a seafaring nation. 
The bulk of Canadian trade is with the United States, much of which is by way 
of surface transportation.3 Whereas maritime cargo in 2005 accounted for 39.7 
percent of the volume of Canadian international trade, it accounted for only 
12.5 percent of the total value of that trade.4 In addition, Canada has a very 
small flag fleet,5 having made a deliberate policy choice not to provide 
incentives for shipping (other than for shipbuilding and cabotage), thus relying 
on international shipping (generally foreign-flagged) to carry the majority of its 
                                                 
3
 In 2007, approximately 59% of the value of trade with the United States was carried by trucks. 
Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada: An Overview (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services, 2007), p. 5. 
4
 Excluding trade with the United States, maritime traffic represented 45.2% of the value and 
83.2% of the volume of Canadian international trade. See WTO, “Trade Policy Review: 
Canada,” WTO Press Release No. PRESS/TPRB/280 (WTO, 21 March 2007), available: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp280_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008), para. 
159. See also Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2007 Annual Report Addendum, 
TP 13198E (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2007) [hereinafter 
Transportation in Canada 2007], Tables “EC6: Modal Shares in Canada-United States Trade, 
1997–2007” and “EC7: Canada/Other Countries Trade, by Mode and Sector, 1997–2007.” All 
hyperlinks last viewed 12 November 2008. 
5
 Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Table M15: Canadian-Registered Fleet by 
Type, 1987, 1997, 2007. The Canadian fleet is comprised of 182 vessels with a total registered 
tonnage of 2.2M tonnes. Dry bulk carriers make up over half the tonnage (1M), with tankers 
(515) and ferries (428) sharing the remaining majority. 
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trade.6 Accordingly, Canada is a continental state in which “shipping is not 
something that appears to rank very high in government priorities even though 
it is an essential element of Canadian trade and economy.”7 That may still be 
true of commercial shipping. However, for risk assessment purposes, the 
increasing numbers and importance of fishing vessels and recreational boating 
registered and/or operating in Canadian waters have justified focused attention 
and new directions for Canadian maritime regulators. Every year there are 
many recreational boating accidents resulting in death, injury or property loss.8 
Another significant contextual factor for Canadian maritime 
transportation law and policy is the constitutional framework. Since 
confederation in 1867, navigation and shipping have been federal subject-
matter so that maritime legislation has essentially consisted of federal law, 
despite a period during which provincial law was applied in a maritime law 
setting.9 Canadian maritime law draws very heavily from international maritime 
law and its judicial development takes into consideration this essentially 
international character and the need for international uniformity.10 However, 
federal and provincial courts have generally common responsibilities for the 
administration of Canadian maritime law, irrespective of the location, types or 
flags of vessels involved.11 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Transport Canada, A Shipping Policy for Canada, TP 1676 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 
Marine, 1979), p. 1; see also Monteiro and Robertson, n. 1 above, p. 581 (Stating that “in 1949, 
the government concluded that Canada was not justified in maintaining a Canadian flag deep 
sea fleet via subsidies or preferential tax treatment for shipowners and operators, a policy which 
has not changed to date”). 
7
 E. Gold, A. Chircop, and H. Kindred, Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), p. 23. 
8
 Every year some 150 persons die from boating accidents in Canada. See Transport Canada, 
Safe Boating Guide 2006, TP 511 (01/2008) (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Office of Boating 
Safety, 2008), p. 6, available: <http://www.fedpubs.com/subject/boat/safe_boating_guide.htm> 
(retrieved 30 March 2009). Statistics concerning accidents from other vessels are reported in: 
Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Tables “S14: Marine Occurrences, 2002–2007” 
and “S17: Small Canadian Vessels Engaged in Fishing Activity Marine Occurrences, 1997–
2007.” 
9
 Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, McNamara 
Construction (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, and Zavarovalna Skupnost Triglav 
(Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.) v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283, followed 
by ITO International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. (The Buenos Aires 
Maru), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, and Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437. 
10
 Gold et al., n. 7 above, pp. 115–117. 
11
 Federal Courts Act, R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 22(1) & (3). 
  534 
17.3. The Multiple Layers of Canadian Maritime Policy Making 
 
Canadian maritime policy has a problematique involving multiple layers of 
federal policy making processes. On one level, there is departmental policy, 
which is developed at the highest level of the department and frequently also at 
the unit level within the department. There are also policies of departments that 
share ocean responsibilities and which may overlap with the Department of 
Transport’s (Transport Canada) mandate, and that in turn may lead to inter-
departmental policies. Overarching departmental policies are national policies 
concerning sustainable development, modern comptrollership and other matters 
imposed on all line departments by the Office of the Prime Minister and/or the 
Treasury Board of Canada. For example, the Treasury Board’s Management 
Accountability Framework has had a far-reaching effect on the formulation of 
departmental policies, including maritime transport policy.12 
Although ostensibly setting out a framework for integrated oceans 
management, the Oceans Strategy13 and accompanying Oceans Action Plan14 
considered by other contributors in this project say very little about marine 
transportation generally, and maritime safety and vessel-source pollution in 
particular. This is partly explained by the difficulties faced by the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in performing its “integration” mandate as lead 
department under the Oceans Act,15 and partly due to a fundamental difference 
in marine culture between departments dedicated to oceans and fisheries on the 
one hand and maritime transport on the other.16 Although in public the federal 
institutional family tends to espouse interdepartmental cooperation, in reality 
Transport Canada has played a marginal role in DFO’s ocean policy initiatives.  
As with all federal departments, Transport Canada has its own national 
sectoral policy process, consisting of what may be described as macro and 
micro policies. In 2003 Liberal Transport Minister David Collenette announced 
                                                 
12
 See generally Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “TB Management Accountability 
Framework,” available: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
13
 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future 
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
14
 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future 
Generations (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/oap-pao/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
15
 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31. 
16
 See A. Chircop, “The Regulation of Marine Transportation and Integrated Coastal 
Management: Two Management Approaches in Need of Integration,” in J. Norton Moore, Kuen 
Chen Fu and M. Nordquist, eds, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China (Leiden: 
Nijhoff, 2005). 
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“Straight Ahead - A Vision for Transportation in Canada,” a major macro 
policy that contained little new provision for the marine sector, but confirmed 
existing port divestiture, review with industry of benefits of marine 
transportation, evaluation of the provision of marine navigational services and 
continued participation in international shipping policy processes, notably the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).17 Also at a macro level, the 
Department has its own Sustainable Development Strategy and Action Plan18 
outlining the strategic priorities, challenges, commitments, and performance 
measures for measuring success. The Department’s Sustainable Development 
Strategy (SDS) focuses on three areas (urban transportation, commercial freight 
transportation, and marine transportation) where the Department feels it can 
make a difference towards achieving sustainable development. In connection 
with marine transportation, the SDS states that the Department will address 
pollution from ship emissions (both atmospheric and marine) and from the 
presence of the ship itself, and identifies some of the major initiatives 
undertaken by the Department in that regard.19 However, it does not provide 
insight into how decisions regarding those initiatives are made. In addition to 
the macro policies, the Department has formulated problem-specific 
management responses that are in effect also policy decisions. These include 
the strategies for invasive alien species,20 places of refuge,21 Canada Shipping 
Act, 2001 compliance and enforcement, and safety and security culture.22 
                                                 
17
 Transport Canada, Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada, TP 14054, 
online: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/straightahead/vision/menu.htm> [hereinafter Trans-
port Canada, Straight Ahead]. 
18
 Transport Canada, Sustainable Development Strategy 2007–2009, TP 13123 (Transport 
Canada, 2006), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/acs/SD/sds0709/menu.htm> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
19
 Major initiatives include: Business case for environmental incentive programme in the 
marine sector, shortsea shipping, skills and labour, transportation data and information and 
marine pollution control initiatives (sulphur emission control areas, ballast water management, 
HNS response, ship waste management/reception and aerial surveillance). 
20
 Environment Canada, An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada (Environment Canada, 
2004), available: <www.ec.gc.ca/eee-ias> (retrieved 10 November 2008). Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of Aquatic Invasive Species (Canadian 
Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers: 2004), available: <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ 
science/environmental-environnement/invasive_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).  
21
 Transport Canada, National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan, TP 14707 (Transport 
Canada, 2007), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/tp/tp14707/menu.htm> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
22
 Transport Canada, Moving Forward: Changing the Safety and Security Culture, TP 14678 
(Transport Canada, 2008), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/tcss/StrategicPlan/menu.html> 
(retrieved 10 November 2008). 
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Transport Canada’s policy framework for the transportation industry in 
general is found in “Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada.” 
The document covers all modes of transportation, offering a framework to 
guide future transportation policy development and initiatives. In general, it 
emphasises a market-based approach to policy decisions in order to achieve 
“a better matching of investment decisions in infrastructure to user needs and 
offers.”23 In the context of marine safety and the environment, the document 
specifically supports the implementation of strategic plans formulated by 
Marine Safety, an important unit within Transport Canada.  
Marine Safety has produced two strategic plans (1997–2002; 2003–
2010)24 and is working on a third (2008–2015).25 The first plan, “The Way 
Ahead,” reflected the Department’s recent reorganisation and new oversight 
role. It focused on strategies that impacted Marine Safety’s internal 
environment and called for the modernisation and streamlining of the existing 
legislative regime (including the Canada Shipping Act and the Pilotage Act) to 
better reflect modern shipping practices. It also highlighted the need to maintain 
safety standards through more cost-effective means, i.e., the delegation of 
statutory inspection functions to classification societies and to formalise the 
consultation process and communication links within Transport Canada and 
between the Department and stakeholders. This entailed a renewal of the 
Canadian Marine Advisory Council, which is a key forum through which the 
various departmental units interact with stakeholders at the national level. 
The second plan, “The Next Wave,” continues the strategic direction set out in 
the previous plan and follows up on the implementation of the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, which had been adopted recently. The plan called for the 
development and enhancement of a comprehensive performance-based 
regulatory framework to enable the bringing into force of the Act. It also 
emphasised the need for a risk-based inspection regime, enhanced pollution 
prevention, development of a quality assurance programme and safety 
management systems, and promotion of a stronger safety culture within the 
marine industry. The plan also committed to the ongoing development of 
information systems to ensure data collection systems provide the best possible 
information for safety planning and decision making. At the time of writing, 
                                                 
23
 Transport Canada, Straight Ahead, n. 17 above, p. 84. 
24
 Transport Canada, Marine Safety Strategic Plan 1997–2002 (The Way Ahead), TP 13111, 
available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-1997-2002/ 
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008); and Transport Canada, The Next Wave: Marine 
Safety Strategic Plan 2003–2010, TP13111B (2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-2003-2010/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
25
 Transport Canada, The New Wave: Marine Safety Strategic Plan 2008–2015 (draft, 2008) 
[hereinafter Transport Canada, The New Wave]. 
  537 
Marine Safety is developing a third strategic plan, “The New Wave,” that will 
reflect the organisation’s increasing focus on small commercial vessels and 
tougher global pollution prevention regulations. It also recognises the growth 
and importance of the maritime labour market factors. The Plan further calls for 
strengthened risk-based decision making and the implementation of 
an integrated management system within Marine Safety. It also includes 
improvement of the regulatory framework by strengthening the consultation 
process, continuing a performance-based regulatory scheme, developing and 
implementing safety management systems for domestic shipping, and faster 
ratification of international instruments. 
Despite the various policy layers identified above, Canada does not have 
a dedicated and fully integrated marine transportation policy that includes 
directions for marine safety and vessel-source pollution. The National Marine 
Policy adopted in 199526 was not such a document as it focused, for the most 
part, on overhauling Canada’s overbuilt public infrastructure and its 
management on the basis of the principle of commercialisation. Consequently, 
the latter policy focused primarily on the re-organisation of the country’s port 
system and related legislation and led to the adoption of the Canada Marine 
Act.27 Although given general directions from higher policies, Canadian policy 
for maritime safety regulation and vessel-source pollution is fundamentally set 
at a departmental level, and more specifically at the unit level, i.e., Marine 
Safety, and formulated as strategic plans. Despite the series of strategy 
documents, there does not appear to be a straightforward policy plan, with clear 
and concise goals for marine safety and environmental regulation. On the 
environmental side the focus is on “sustainability”; on the safety side, the main 
focus is on safety management systems and accident prevention. Overall, the 
Canadian maritime regulatory framework is now less prescriptive and more 
focused on performance and risk management. Transport Canada’s shift toward 
greater focus on safety management reflects recognition that the regulatory 
approach does not ensure adequate risk management and adds a burden on the 
Department’s limited resources (e.g., enforcement).28 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Transport Canada, National Marine Policy (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 1995). 
27
 Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998, c. 10. 
28
 Moving Forward, TC’s safety management strategy, starts with the recognition that “an entity 
can comply with regulations without effectively managing risks to acceptable levels. A more 
comprehensive approach, which includes systematically understanding and managing risks and 
threats in the system, will enable us to make progress on our safety and security objectives.” 
Transport Canada, Moving Forward, n. 22 above, p. iii. 
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17.4. Evolution of the Maritime Legislative Framework and Canadian 
Ratification Pattern of IMO Conventions  
 
The contemporary sources of maritime law in Canada consist of federal 
statutes, case law and maritime law conventions to which Canada is a party. 
Canadian maritime law is federal law. Canada inherited the original structure of 
its maritime and admiralty law from English law.29 Much of Canada’s early 
maritime law consisted of 19th century English statutory law and case law, 
which was applied in the colonies, and generally received into Canadian law on 
confederation in 1867. Canada did not enjoy legislative powers over foreign 
affairs until the Statute of Westminster in 193130 and consequently the Canadian 
Parliament was limited in its ability to regulate shipping. With Westminster, 
Canada attained competence to deal with admiralty and shipping matters and in 
1934 enacted the Admiralty Act, 193431 and the first Canada Shipping Act.32 
British dominance of Canadian maritime legislation would continue well after 
this period.33 However, from 1931 onwards, Canada was in a position to further 
develop its policy and legislative framework for maritime matters generally 
through numerous amendments to the Canada Shipping Act and its eventual 
transformation into the Canada Shipping Act, 2001,34 the Marine Liability Act35 
and numerous other statutes listed in Table 17.1. Empowered by the Federal 
Court Act, which was adopted in 1971,36 Canadian courts would also embark 
on a case law development path that would part ways in many respects with 
English maritime law. 
                                                 
29
 For a historical account of the historical origins of Canadian maritime law and jurisdiction, 
see generally Gold et al., n. 7 above at 114–110. 
30
 Statute of Westminster, 22 Geo. V., c. 4. 
31
 Admiralty Act, S.C. 1934, c. 31. 
32
 Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1934, c. 44. 
33
 See T. L. McDorman, “The History of Shipping Law in Canada: The British Dominance,” 
Dalhousie Law Journal 7 (1982–1983): 620. 
34
 Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 2001, c. 26 [hereinafter CSA 2001]. 
35
 Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6. 
36
 Federal Court Act, S.C. 1971, c. 1. The title of the Act would later be amended to Federal 
Courts Act. The Federal Court, as the Admiralty Court of Canada, succeeded the Exchequer 
Court. 
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Table 17.1. Statutory scheme for maritime and related statutes in Canada 
 
Legislation Statutes 
Constitutional Constitution Act 
Judicature Federal Courts Act 
Maritime Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
Bills of Lading Act 
Canada Marine Act 
Canada Shipping Act 
Canada Transportation Act 
Coasting Trade Act 
Marine Insurance Act 
Marine Liability Act 
Marine Transportation Security Act 
Merchant Seamen Compensation Act 
Navigable Waters Protection Act 
Pilotage Act 
Safe Containers Convention Act 
Fisheries & 
Environmental 
Canada National Marine Conservation Areas 
Act 
Canada Water Act 
Canada Wildlife Act 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
Fisheries Act 
Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 
Oil & Gas Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act 
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Act 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum 
Resources Accord Implementation Act 
Other Atomic Energy Control Act 
Bank Act 
Canada Labour Code 
Canadian Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety Board Act 
Nuclear Liability Act 
Oceans Act 
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 
 
The development of Canadian maritime law as it relates to safety, 
environmental and security considerations has in great part reflected 
commitments to international maritime conventions and generally the work of 
the IMO in developing these instruments, as well as the incremental 
development of technical standards and guidelines. The Canada Shipping Act, 
2001 includes as an objective to “ensure that Canada can meet its international 
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obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements with respect to 
navigation and shipping.”37 The Act implements numerous international 
maritime conventions to which Canada is a party.38 Section 32(1) of the Act 
provides for referential incorporation of standards produced by international 
bodies through regulatory action. The Marine Liability Act essentially consists 
of principles and rules set out in international conventions to which Canada is 
or may become a party. 
Canada is not a party to all the IMO Conventions. On safety matters, 
Canada is a party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974 as amended (SOLAS),39 International Convention on Load Lines,40 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
197241 and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979,42 
but not to the 1978 and 1988 protocols of SOLAS.43 On vessel-source 
pollution, Canada is a party to International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973 as amended by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL) 
and Annexes I to III, but not to Annexes IV to VI.44 It is a party to the 
International Convention on Salvage, 198945 and International Convention on 
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), but not 
to the OPRC Protocol on Hazardous and Noxious Substances.46 Canada is not 
                                                 
37
 CSA 2001, n. 34 above, s. 6(g).  
38
 Id. (Schedule 1 lists 31 conventions as the responsibility of the Minister of Transport and 
Schedule 2 states two others under the responsibility of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans).  
39
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 1 November 1974, 1184 
U.N.T.S. 2, Institute of Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: 
Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003), Vol. I.3.20. 
40 International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 5 April 1966, 640 U.N.T.S. 133, Institute of 
Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003) 
Vol. I.3.50; Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 11 
November 1988, 2 U.S.T. 102, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.60. 
41
 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, 20 
October 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39, Vol. I.3.250. 
42
 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97, 
Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.280. 
43
 Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 17 
February 1978, 1276 U.N.T.S. 237, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.30; 
Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 11 
November 1988, U.S. Treaty Doc. 102-2, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.40. 
44
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. 
45
 International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 93. 
46
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
30 November 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733; OPRC/HNS Protocol, Protocol on Preparedness, Response 
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a party to the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling 
Systems on Ships, 2001,47 International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 200448 and the recently 
adopted International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007,49 but has 
legislated rules and standards for ballast waters, anti-fouling systems and 
wrecks in navigable waterways.50 On damage liability and compensation, 
Canada is a party to the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1992 (CLC)51 and Protocol to 
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 1992 (IOPCF),52 but 
not to the Protocol of 2003.53 Recently Canada became a party to the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (LLMC), as 
amended by the Protocol of 1996.54 Canada has not always become a party to 
international conventions that it has in fact implemented. For example, 
provisions of MARPOL and the LLMC were implemented in Canadian 
legislation long before Canada became a party to those instruments.  
There have been some departures from IMO international standards at 
various points in time. Canada did not become a party to MARPOL when this 
instrument came into force partly because it believed it had higher pollution 
                                                                                                                                  
and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000, IMO 
Doc. HNSOPRC/CONF/11/Rev 1, 15 March 2000. 
47
 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, London, 
5 October 2001 (London: IMO, 2005) [hereinafter AFS Convention]. 
48
 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments, London, 16 February 2004, IMO Doc. IMO/BWM/CONF/36. 
49
 International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, Nairobi, 18 May 2007, IMO Doc. No. 
LEG/CONF.16/21. 
50
 Navigable Waters Protection Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-22); Ballast Water Control and 
Management Regulations (SOR/2006-129); and Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals (SOR/2007-86). 
51
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 
973 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 27 November 1992, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87 
[hereinafter CLC]. 
52
 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, as amended by Protocol to 
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 27 November 1992, 1996 A.T.S. 3. 
53
 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, 16 May 2003, IMO Doc. No. 
LEG/CONF.14/20. 
54
 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 19 November 1976, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by the Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 2 May 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433. 
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standards in its legislation. In relation to Arctic waters, Canada made 
a reservation to its ratification to MARPOL to safeguard the application of the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act55 in the Canadian Arctic.56 This latter 
statute sets higher waste management and discharge standards in Arctic waters 
from ships for most ship-generated waste and anticipated the special power 
conferred on coastal states for ice-covered areas by Article 234 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,57 to which Canada is a party. 
 
17.5. Institutional Framework and New Directions for the Maritime 
Administration  
 
In principle and at law, Transport Canada is the maritime administration of 
Canada. In practice, functions related to maritime administration are shared 
among a number of federal government departments, forming a complex 
institutional mosaic.58 
A year after the adoption of the original Canada Shipping Act, Transport 
Canada’s first iteration was established in 1935 in response to the new 
challenges facing the organisation of national transportation.59 At this time, 
institutions responsible for Canadian railways, inland navigation and marine 
shipping were integrated and the Department of Transport Act, 1936 was 
adopted.60 Until 1994 Transport Canada performed a dual role that involved the 
“administration” and “management” of the transport system as well as 
developing the policy and regulatory framework. This was perceived to result 
                                                 
55
 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12 [hereinafter AWPPA]. 
56
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Status of Multilateral Conventions and 
Instruments in Respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its secretary-
General Performs Depositary or other Functions, as at 31 December 2005, IMO Doc. J/9193, 
p. 96 [hereinafter IMO]. 
57
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, 33 I.L.M. 1309. 
58
 There are, in addition: (1) consultative bodies, such as the Canadian Marine Advisory 
Council and National Marine and Industrial Council; and (2) technical or function-specific 
bodies, including those established by statute, such as the Canada Transportation Agency, 
Marine Technical Review Board, Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada, Transportation 
Safety Board, and Ship Source Pollution Fund. Further, industry and transportation professional 
groups (e.g., Canadian Maritime Law Association, Shipping Federation of Canada, and 
Canadian Shipowners Association, among several others) are active participants in maritime 
policy and law-making processes.  
59
 Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1936–1946] (n.d.), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1936-1946-menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008).  
60
 Today this statute is the Department of Transport Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-18. 
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in a conflict of interest and it was decided that Transport Canada should focus 
primarily on policy and regulatory responsibilities. Thus, in 1994 Transport 
Canada was reorganised, the St. Lawrence Seaway and numerous ports were 
also transferred from Transport Canada to local authorities. Transport Canada 
also lost the Canadian Coast Guard to DFO, ostensibly in order to rationalise 
government and reduce costs through the merger of the two departments’ 
fleets.61 As a result, and at least until 2003, Transport Canada became less of 
an organisation focused on “administration” and “management” of operations, 
and became more focused on policy and regulatory functions. In late 2003, all 
marine safety policy and regulatory responsibilities were consolidated under 
this department. As a result, the Office of Boating Safety, the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act,62 and certain regulatory aspects of pollution prevention and 
emergency response, formerly responsibilities of other departments, were 
transferred back to Transport Canada.63 At this time, the Canadian Coast Guard 
remains attached to DFO, although as a special operating agency. Today 
Transport Canada is responsible for developing national transportation policies 
and programmes. Within Transport Canada, Marine Safety is the principal 
policy, regulatory and enforcement agency relating to ship safety and marine 
pollution prevention. Transport Canada is the lead agency under the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act, and the Canada Marine Act.  
DFO is tasked by legislation to lead and develop Canada’s national 
oceans strategy and integrated management planning for the marine 
environment. This department focuses on Canada’s economic, ecological, and 
scientific interests in oceans, including fisheries, hydrography, and marine 
services, and the coordination of federal policies and programmes respecting 
oceans.64 It shares jurisdiction with Transport Canada in many areas and is 
responsible for the administration and implementation of the Oceans Act and 
Fisheries Act.65 In particular, it is responsible under the Canada Shipping Act, 
2001 for dealing with pollution response.66 Operating under the DFO umbrella, 
the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is the civilian federal agency responsible for 
patrolling Canada’s coastline, providing marine search and rescue, maintenance 
of aids to navigation, marine pollution response, and icebreaking services. The 
move to DFO led to low morale and caused operational difficulties possibly 
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 Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1986–1996] (n.d.), available: 
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1986-1996-2.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). 
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 Navigable Waters Protection Act, n. 50 above. 
63
 Transport Canada, The New Wave, n. 25 above, p. 4. 
64
 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-15, s. 4. 
65
 Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14 [hereinafter FA]. 
66
 CSA 2001, n. 34 above at ss. 174.1, 179 & 180. 
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resulting from differences between its shipping culture and the fisheries 
development and management culture of its new home, as well as budget cuts 
in the name of rationalisation.67 
The Department of Environment (Environment Canada)68 is responsible 
for the administration of several statutes for the protection and conservation of 
Canada’s environment. Environment Canada has direct responsibility for 
marine pollution under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,69 
Canada Water Act,70 Canada Wildlife Act,71 the Migratory Birds Convention 
Act, 199472 and the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act.73 
Environment Canada is the lead federal department on response and cleanup of 
up of hazardous wastes and oil spills. It operates in conjunction with DFO and 
Transport Canada in relation to several of its marine tasks. 
Given the complexity and overlap of legislative and enforcement 
authority within the federal government, it is not surprising that a great deal of 
coordination is required between the various agencies involved. For example, 
vessel-source marine pollution is enforced by Transport Canada Inspectors 
(CSA 2001), Fisheries Officers (FA), Environment Canada’s Enforcement 
Branch (CEPA), and the Canadian Wildlife Service’s Enforcement Branch 
(MBCA). Although some interdepartmental dialogue occurs at the legislative 
steering committee level, there appears to have been little effective dialogue 
and cooperation in the development of regulatory strategies and policy. Faced 
with overlapping and competing mandates, Transport Canada, DFO, and 
Environment Canada have concluded memoranda of agreement to cooperate on 
enforcement issues.74 
                                                 
67
 See the testimony of Michael Turner, former Deputy Commissioner and Acting 
Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard in Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and 
Oceans, “The Coast Guard in Canada’s Arctic: Interim Report,” Fourth Report, June 2008, 
p. 36. 
68
 Department of the Environment Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-10. 
69
 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 [hereinafter CEPA]. 
70
 Canada Water Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-11. 
71
 Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. W-9. 
72
 Migratory Birds Convention Act, S.C., 1994, c. 22 [hereinafter MBCA]. 
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 Under an administrative agreement with DFO, EC has primary responsibility for the pollution 
prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement 
Report - Volume 1, available: <http://environnementcanada.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang= 
en&n=09ECE703> (retrieved 10 November 2008), Section 1. 
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 Some of the main MOUs signed to date are: TC/EC MOU respecting Enforcement (of the 
CSA 2001, AWPPA, MBCA and CEPA) (2006); TC/DFO MOU respecting Safety at Sea of 
Commercial Fishers (November 2006); TC/EC/DFO MOU respecting Enforcement in Atlantic 
Canada (2002); TC/DFO MOU and Resource Transfer Agreement (regarding transfer of the 
CCG policy responsibilities to TC) (3 March 2005); TC/DFO MOU respecting Marine 
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17.6. Selected Thematic Issues 
 
17.6.1. Maritime Safety 
 
Canada’s principal legislation concerning maritime safety is the Canada 
Shipping Act, 2001, which came into force on 1 July 2007. As mentioned 
earlier, the original Canada Shipping Act dated back to 1934, and since then it 
saw numerous amendments and add-ons, making the legislation voluminous 
and unwieldy. As McDorman noted, the underlying policy rationale tended to 
reflect former British imperial interests rather than the contemporary trading 
interests of a modern nation such as Canada.75 The legislation was also 
notoriously complex and inefficient, with over one hundred sets of regulations, 
making it difficult to enforce. Perhaps a major problem with the old legislation 
was its emphasis on regulation that required enforcement. For these and other 
reasons, a process of legal reform was commenced in 1997 and culminated in 
the adoption of the modern and streamlined Canada Shipping Act, 2001. 
The change has been described as a move from an inspection-based to 
a compliance-based regime, with a greater emphasis on a proactive approach to 
maritime safety and promotion of compliance.76 Since the adoption of the Act 
in 2001, regulations under the new act took years to modernise and re-enact 
through an ongoing consultative process with industry and other bodies, and the 
process continues today. With its many changes, the Act is touted as better 
suited to promoting safer, more efficient, and environmentally sound shipping. 
In fact, it takes into consideration the broader range of vessels in Canadian 
navigable waters (from pleasure boating to commercial vessels) and provides 
for modern operational safety and environmental standards. 
In the European Union (EU), a similar trend toward performance based 
legislation is observed, but Member States insist on following initiatives within 
the IMO framework. A point of divergence is in the provision of services, 
which in Canada is determined on a mixed risk-based decision making plus 
market-based approach (e.g., privatisation, user-pays). In comparison, in the 
EU, provision of services is generally governed by the EU rule on free 
provision of services (also market-based approach), but with certain exclusions 
for public utility services. In addition, there are differences between Member 
                                                                                                                                  
Transportation Safety & Environmental Protection (April 1996); DFO/EC MOU respecting 
administration of the Fisheries Act (1985). 
75
 McDorman, n. 33 above, p. 651. 
76
 Transport Canada, “Canada Shipping Act, 2001 ushers in new era of safety and protection of 
the marine environment,” News Release, No. H 133/07 (3 July 2007). 
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States as this issue belongs to the area of shared (EU-Member State) 
competences. 
 
 
17.6.1.1. Delegation of Functions to Classification Societies and Their 
Supervision 
 
A major change introduced by the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the delegation 
of certain functions previously considered the exclusive reserve of the maritime 
administration. The EU also delegates certain tasks to classification societies. In 
Canada, the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 empowers the Minister of Transport 
with discretionary authority to delegate classification societies to issue 
Canadian maritime documents, carry out compliance inspections, and undertake 
audit inspections.77 To date, five classification societies have been authorised to 
do so.78 The move toward delegated statutory inspection was a specific 
commitment made in Marine Safety’s in “The Way Ahead” and was first 
implemented in 1998.79 In July 1999, prior to proceeding with the 
comprehensive “master” delegation agreements, Transport Canada signed 
agreements concerning certification for the International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code.80 Ships may enrol in the Delegated Statutory Inspection 
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 CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss. 12 & 13. 
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 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (4 December 2000), American Bureau of Shipping (23 March 
2001), Germanischer Lloyd (10 September 2001), Det Norske Veritas (22 April 2002), and 
Bureau Veritas (31 March 2003). Transport Canada, “Delegation of Statutory Inspection and 
Certification” website, available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/Intro-Text/ 
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 Bill C-15, an Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act and to make consequential amendments 
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of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 77: 19 March, 1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais), 
available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2332782& 
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1> (retrieved 10 November 2008) and House of 
Commons Debates, Third Reading of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 96: 30 April, 
1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ 
Publication.aspx?DocId=2332801&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1> (retrieved 
10 November 2008). 
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 This was done under the Safety Management Regulations with the five delegated 
classification societies. Those agreements are now considered complementary to the “master” 
agreements. Transport Canada, “DSI&C,” n. 78 above. 
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Programme (DSIP)81 and thereafter its classification society becomes the sole 
issuing authority for the vessel’s certificates. The DSIP encompasses most of 
the surveys and certification required under the Act and regulations, including 
documentary requirements of international conventions to which Canada is 
a party.82 Although these moves suggest a comprehensive delegation of 
authority, in practice Marine Safety has retained sole issuing authority for 
several important documents.83 Further, Marine Safety retains authority to 
ensure that Canadian vessels comply with all applicable international and 
domestic requirements, and may monitor compliance through various 
administrative and executive measures.84 
 
 
17.6.1.2. Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers 
 
The phasing-out of single-hull tankers from trading in Canadian waters has had 
to tie in to the requirements of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 199085 and 
subsequently the initiative to amend Regulation 13 of Annex I to MARPOL 
concerning existing and new tankers. The purpose was to improve the standards 
of existing and new tankers as a preventative measure to accidental oil pollution 
resulting from an incident, such as collision or grounding, or in a worse case 
scenario, a casualty at sea. As noted earlier, the bulk of Canadian trade is with 
its southern neighbour and therefore any major change to the conditions or 
transportation of that trade can be expected to affect Canada. Accordingly, 
Canada proceeded to implement the single-hull standard under the influence of 
the United States’ legislation as early as 1993 and further developed in 1995 to 
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 Transport Canada, Delegated Statutory Inspection Programme, TP 13585E (Ottawa: 
Transport Canada, 17 December 2001), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/ 
Delegated-Statutory-Inspection/Revision-1-signed.PDF> (retrieved 10 November 2008) 
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 Id., para. 3.2.4. 
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 E.g., Marine Occupational Safety and Heath requirements; Safety Convention certificates on 
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inspection); dry-dock examinations; marine casualties and damage surveys; liaison with the 
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 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 2701, et seq. See the US Coast Guard Interim Final Rule 
on Double Hull Standards for Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, issued 12 August 1992 for smaller 
existing tankers. 
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apply to both Canadian ships and non-Canadian ships trading in Canadian 
waters, including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).86 Following the loss of 
the Erika and subsequently the Prestige off the coasts of France and Spain 
respectively, the IMO was urged to accelerate the phasing out of single-hulls 
and to bring international standards more in line with the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 through further amendments to MARPOL.87 In addition to an accelerated 
phase-out for single-hulls, heavy grade oils (HGOs) were banned from carriage 
by single-hulls being phased out and the Condition Assessment Scheme for 
these ships was extended.88 
Despite what appeared to be a convergence of international standards for 
single-hull tankers and the oil trade, which had suffered a seismic split with the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, there continued to be differences between the 
regulations under the Act and the revised MARPOL Annex I regulations. This 
was a divergence that Canada obviously could not ignore. Hence, Canadian 
regulations on single-hull phase-outs have had to apply two parallel regimes. 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requirements continue to be applied to certain 
existing tankers, notably those trading with the United States,89 whereas others 
are to be governed by the amended MARPOL Annex I standards.90 In contrast, 
the EU has a single regime governed by the amended MARPOL to accelerate 
the phase-out, which was largely at the behest of the EU. 
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 Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, SOR/03-3, at s. 14.2: “Any oil tanker that is engaged in 
voyages that take place in waters under Canadian jurisdiction shall comply with Standards for 
the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710, published by the Canadian Coast 
Guard on July 6, 1993, as amended from time to time, other than sections 3 and 5 and 
subparagraphs 24(a)(i), (b)(i) and (c)(i) of those Standards.” Superseded by Regulations for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals, SOR/2007-86, s. 54 et. seq. 
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 Specifically Regulations 13F, 13G and 13H to Annex I for new tankers and existing large 
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 IMO, Resolutions MEPC.111(50) and MEPC.112(50). 
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 In particular the following: “Canadian tankers on domestic trade or only trading to the U.S.; 
U.S. tankers trading only to Canada or in transit through waters under Canadian jurisdiction; 
Canadian tankers that are less than 5000 DWT, except tankers over 600 DWT on international 
trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo; non-Canadian tankers on the coasting trade; non-
Canadian tankers on international trade calling at Canadian ports that are less than 5000 DWT, 
except tankers over 600 DWT carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.” Transport Canada, Standards 
for the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 6 July 
1993, rev. 5 April 2005). 
90
 Id., namely: “Canadian tankers over 5000 DWT requiring international certification; non-
Canadian tankers over 5000 DWT on international trade in waters under Canadian jurisdiction; 
tankers over 600 DWT on international trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.” 
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17.6.1.3. Use of Safety Regulatory Tools for Marine Environmental Protection 
and Conservation Purposes 
 
Canada has used regulatory tools normally reserved for the regulation and 
management of navigation safety for the purpose of achieving marine 
environmental protection and conservation objectives. This type of regulation 
relates to restrictions and controls on the movement of vessels, or the conditions 
of that movement, and may be of a mandatory or recommendatory nature. This 
is a function that rests in DFO and is carried out by the Canadian Coast 
Guard.91 The utilisation of these tools for protection and conservation purposes 
has provided Canada with the management and enforcement tools needed 
without necessarily resorting to the designation of a particularly sensitive sea 
area (PSSA) through the IMO, as has been the case in several other regions, 
including the marine areas of EU Member States in the Baltic Sea, Canary 
Islands region, North Sea (Wadden Sea), and Western European Waters. To 
date, there has been only one instance of a PSSA being mooted within the 
Canadian federal government, specifically in connection with oil pollution 
incidents and consequent bird mortality in the northwest Atlantic off 
Newfoundland.92 As it turned out, rather than proceeding the PSSA path, the 
federal government passed amendments to the Migratory Birds Convention Act 
and Canada Shipping Act, 2001, which toughened the sanctions for oil 
pollution offences. In general, there are a number of instances where safety 
regulation has been employed for marine environmental protection and 
conservation purposes, and in particular in two types of situations.  
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 Under the former Canada Shipping Act, s. 125. In 1996 pursuant to the Public Service 
Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-34, responsibility for vessel 
traffic and marine navigation services under s. 562.15-562.20 and 517-525 of the CSA 1985 
was transferred to DFO. TC/DFO, MOU respecting Marine Safety & Environmental Protection 
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(21 April 2008), Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents (7 March 2003). Fisheries and Oceans 
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established with regard to any of these. The departments and agencies are coordinated by the 
Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (Ottawa: DFO, 2005), available: <http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/mpa-zpm/fedmpa-zpmfed/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 Novem-
ber 2008). 
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The first concerns the requirement of use of automatic identification 
system (AIS), now an IMO international standard and which, while enabling 
the identification of the location of a vessel for the purposes of traffic regulation 
and search and rescue, also assists aerial surveillance of potential polluters and 
evidence for prosecutions.93 Information concerning the identity and course of 
the ship is relayed to coastal authorities on a real-time basis and has enabled 
more efficient use of limited surveillance resources. The reporting of a slick 
may thus be traced to a vessel that may have been navigating the area. In 
another application, a fishing vessel that appears to be undertaking irregular 
movement at a slow speed in a marine protected area may also suggest that 
illegal fishing may be taking place.  
The second situation concerns the conservation needs of a particular 
species and protection of its habitat, possibly on a seasonal basis. In the Atlantic 
region this has occurred in the form of change to the shipping lanes in the 
Canadian sector of the Bay of Fundy to protect the North Atlantic Right Whale 
population from ship strikes, a major cause of premature mortality for this 
endangered species. Studies of sightings between 1987–2000 suggested that the 
shipping lanes in the Bay of Fundy were in direct conflict with areas where 
major aggregations of this species occurred, and that a slight adjustment to the 
location of the lanes in the traffic separation scheme in the area could 
significantly reduce the ship strikes.94 A proposal was made to the IMO and 
after consideration by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV), 
the proposed changes were adopted. The changes were made as part of the 
North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan led by DFO95 after a joint 
government-industry working group concluded that the most cost effective way 
of reducing strikes (by as much as 80 percent) while maintaining safe 
commercial navigation was to shift ship traffic flow in areas of highest whale 
density.96 The success of this initiative led to a similar proposal for the 
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 Pursuant to the Navigation Safety Regulations, all vessels over 300 tons on international 
voyages and domestic trade ships of 500 GT or more except fishing vessels must carry AIS. 
Navigations Safety Regulations, SOR/2005-134, s. 65 (entered into force 10 May 2005). In the 
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 Transport Canada, “New Bay of Fundy Shipping Lanes to Protect Right Whale come into 
effect,” News Release, No. A007/03 (26 June 2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
mediaroom/releases/atl/2003/03-A007e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). See also 
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Assembly Res. A.857(20) (27 November 1997); 
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Roseway Basin. Again with the conservation needs of the North Atlantic Right 
Whale in mind, in 2007 Canada proposed to the IMO that the Roseway Basin, 
located off southeastern Nova Scotia, be designated as a seasonal area to be 
avoided (ATBA).97 The proposal was adopted by the IMO’s MSC in October 
2007 for ships 300 GT or more and takes effect from June 1st to December 31st 
each year.98 
On a related point, Canada has often used the powers under the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act to have sunken vessels and wrecks removed where they 
pose hazards to navigation or even constitute a threat to the marine 
environment. Although Canada is not yet a party to the recently adopted 
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007, it has been 
urged to do so to enable Transport Canada to undertake the removal of derelict 
vessels.99 Transport Canada proposes to amend the Act to implement the 
operational elements of the Convention.  
 
 
17.6.2. Vessel-Source Pollution 
 
17.6.2.1. Regime for Pollution Offences 
 
Canada’s approach to the regulation of marine pollution has been aptly 
summarised as follows: “Canada has created its marine environmental 
legislation through a series of uncoordinated statutes, each attempting to put an 
end to intentional marine pollution. Overlapping offences is unnecessary and 
useless.”100 This is indeed the situation in Canada—an extensive system of 
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2008). 
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statutes that establish overlapping sanctions legitimated by several statutes and 
for what amounts to the same offence (see Annex below). Moreover, there has 
been a consequent and not unexpected overlap, if not duplication, of 
institutional responsibilities among the various federal departments concerned. 
The EU, unlike Canada, has a single Ship Source Pollution Directive 
(2005/35/EC) to be implemented by all Member States. Nevertheless, there are 
similar underlying concerns in both systems regarding the criminalisation of 
seafarers and corporate and vicarious liability.  
Canada has been regulating vessel-source pollution utilising criminal and 
civil law tools ever since its implementation of OILPOL.101 In 1971 and 1984, 
comprehensive marine pollution provisions, including higher penalties, were 
added to the Canada Shipping Act.102 The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the 
principal statute now implementing international conventions addressing 
vessel-source pollution to which Canada is a party, such as MARPOL 73/78,103 
whereas civil liability and compensation are addressed by the Marine Liability 
Act, which is discussed below. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 provides for 
summary conviction procedures with substantial penalties for the most serious 
contraventions, such as illegal discharge of pollutant, failure to have or to 
implement oil pollution prevention or emergency plans, or failure to obey 
instructions resulting from a discharge. Less serious offences, such as failure to 
have response, emergency or prevention plans on site or failure to provide 
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 The Canada Shipping Act was amended in 1956 to give effect to the OILPOL Convention. 4 
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Code), the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code), and the AFS Convention, n. 47 above, in all 
Canadian waters although stricter requirements are often required for inland waters. 
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information when requested, may result in lower fines.104 These provisions 
were greatly influenced by consultations with the shipping industry, so that all 
but one of the stated offences were made subject to summary conviction.105 
Since 2004, Transport Canada has overall responsibility for enforcement of the 
pollution prevention provisions, while DFO is responsible for pollution 
response provisions. 
Despite the apparent stringent pollution provisions, ongoing illegal 
discharges of oily ballast and waste engine room oil in Canada’s EEZ in the 
Atlantic resulted in significant seabird mortality. The federal response to this 
problem was Bill C-15 amending the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the 
Environmental Protection Act. Bill C-15 was enacted to protect migratory birds 
and prevent oil pollution discharges from vessels by “expanding the zone where 
[Canada] can operate, bringing in tougher penalties and ensuring better 
protection for [Canadian] officers in the field.”106 The legislation was triggered 
by the perceived failure of the enforcement regime following the Tecum Sea 
incident. The Tecum Sea was observed trailing an oil slick, but charges against 
the vessel and master were dropped after several legal gaps were identified and 
a turf war between the various federal departments with related mandates could 
not be resolved.107 During parliamentary deliberations, it was further noted that 
it was essential to extend Canadian law to its EEZ and to bring its sanctions in 
line with those imposed by courts in the United States because the vast majority 
of vessels were simply transiting the Canadian EEZ while trading to or from 
that country.108 Because this trade did not include port entry in Canada, there 
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 Id., p. 1055, per Trevor Swerdfager (Director General, Canadian Wildlife Service, 
Environmental Conservation Service, Department of the Environment). 
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was a perceived gap in the exercise of port state and coastal state enforcement. 
The federal government justified the tougher sanctions in the interest of 
conformity with the contemporary shipping business, change of the risk-benefit 
assessment of polluting, and harmonisation of sanctions with those imposed in 
the United States to ensure that polluters no longer enjoy safe haven.109 
Political will ensured that the proposed legislation passed, but concerns 
were expressed. The role of Environment Canada as the lead agency was 
clarified. The power of arrest, entry, search and seizure, detention, and direction 
of movement to vessels in the Canadian EEZ was extended.110 Tougher 
sanctions were introduced and new penalties for tampering with or destruction 
of records were added to penalties for discharges, all to deter shipowners and 
operators from discharging pollutants in Canadian waters.111 There were issues 
of consistency with MARPOL commitments. At the same time, Courts were 
provided with sentencing guidelines.112 The bill contained hasty and vague 
drafting and could have given better consideration to the problem of legislative 
and institutional overlaps in Canada’s vessel-source pollution regime.  
Most significantly, strict and vicarious liability provisions applicable to 
masters and chief engineers, owners, operators, or directors of the corporate 
owner, with imprisonment as penalty, was legislated.113 The hope was that 
these measures would encourage whistle-blowing and strengthen the 
evidentiary base for the prosecution of offences. The new criminal offences 
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could potentially infringe on the human rights of seafarers, who are invariably 
more visible than the shipowners. However, no such convictions have as yet 
occurred.114 While much has been said about the rising trend of criminalisation 
of seafarers in Canada, it would appear that seafarers have been faced with the 
prospect of criminal liability for such offences since the inception of marine 
pollution regulation. Although there was a brief period during the 1970s in 
which shipping interests succeeded in removing the possibility of imprisonment 
for pollution offences, the victory was only brief, and perhaps the only 
remaining example of such legislation is found in the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA). 
Vessel-source pollution offences are also established and enforced under 
other statutes. Contemporaneous and parallel amendments to the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 establish similar sanctions for the disposal 
or incineration of polluting substances at sea, import or export of pollutants for 
disposal at sea, and the loading of a substance onto a ship for disposal at sea, 
unless done with a permit.115 As mentioned earlier, vessel-source pollution 
prosecutions may also be pursued under the Fisheries Act, implementation 
responsibility for which rests with DFO, and enforcement with Environment 
Canada. The Act prohibits “throwing prejudicial or deleterious substances 
overboard” or depositing such substances in fish habitats.116 It also establishes 
a duty to report an incident of pollution and to take measures to minimise the 
effects.117 Tough sanctions similar to those under the AWPPA and CEPA are 
imposed, possibly because of the socio-economic significance of fisheries for 
the Canadian economy. The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas 
Act,118 provides similar offences and sanctions for discharges in conservation 
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areas.119 Discharges in Arctic waters are enforced by Transport Canada by 
virtue of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Arctic Shipping 
Pollution Prevention Regulations.120 Inter alia, the AWPPA prohibits all waste 
disposal into Arctic waters and permits the removal or destruction of any 
vessel, cargo, or bunkers when a serious pollution discharge occurs.121 
Curiously, and inconsistently, the AWPPA marine pollution sanctions appear to 
be less severe than those under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the Migratory 
Birds Convention Act, and Canadian Environment Protection Act.122 This 
situation is inconsistent with the particular needs and difficulties of protecting 
the sensitive Arctic marine environment. Consistent, if not tougher sanctions, 
are likely justifiable to enhance deterrence and heighten vessel operational 
standards in a remote region where pollution response and monitoring are 
extremely difficult, at best.  
It is appropriate to enquire to what extent this legislative activity has 
managed to harmonise overlapping statutes addressing vessel-source pollution 
and equally overlapping mandates of multiple federal departments. Although 
the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 streamlined the prosecution of offences by 
providing only for summary conviction offences, that new and innovative effort 
was not carried through to the Fisheries Act, Bill C-15, and the National 
Marine Conservation Areas Act. The latter two continue to provide for 
prosecution by indictment or summary conviction. Despite serious concerns in 
the shipping and legal community about Bill C-15’s vicarious strict liability 
offences and stiff sanctions, in practice most oil pollution offences have been 
prosecuted by Transport Canada under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 or the 
Fisheries Act, rather than under the Migratory Birds Convention Act or the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act.123 Since 1996, Environment Canada 
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has charged only five vessels under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.124 Of 
these, only one was convicted under that Act.125 In the other cases, federal 
prosecutors preferred to proceed under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 for 
various reasons.126 Further, to date only one master has been charged and fined 
for an oil pollution offence under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001.127 
Imprisonment has not been applied. Considering the political fanfare 
accompanying Bill C-15, in hindsight it appears that the principal effect has 
been to “send a message” to the shipping community and to assuage public 
concern. Government wanted to be seen to be “getting tough on polluters.” 
However, the significance of the Bill C-15 amendments should not be 
underestimated. The enhanced sanctions therein accompany the practice of 
Canadian courts to progressively increase the fines assessed for pollution 
incidents and orders to pay contributions into the Environmental Damages 
Fund.128  
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17.6.2.2. Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance 
 
The international custom of granting refuge to ships in distress has been 
recognised in Canada at least since the 18th century.129 Canadian courts have 
enforced the international custom in a domestic context at least from the last 
quarter of the 19th century.130 In more recent times, ships in distress have been 
permitted to enter a Canadian port as a place of refuge only after their 
threatening condition was stabilised.131 This practice is consistent with that of 
other maritime states. While on the one hand recognising the humanitarian right 
of a ship in need of assistance to enter a place of refuge, Canada also takes the 
steps necessary to protect its interests, which may also include directing the 
ship to a particular location or possibly, in rare situations, to refuse admission. 
Canada supported efforts in the IMO to develop and adopt the 2003 Guidelines 
on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance as an attempt to 
standardise international practice and the use of a risk assessment framework.132 
Following the adoption of the IMO Guidelines, Canada embarked on a lengthy 
process to develop the National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP), 
which was finalised in 2007.133 Overall, the adoption of the PORCP in Canada 
was a relatively straightforward, non-contentious task, unlike the EU where 
public concern has delayed the adoption of a further directive in the Erika III 
package addressing this issue. The purpose of the PORCP is “to establish 
a national framework and approach which, with associated regional measures, 
will provide for an effective and efficient response to requests from ships in 
need of assistance seeking a place of refuge.” Based on the IMO Guidelines, 
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but contextualised for Canada, the PORCP aims at promoting a consistent 
approach to a national response plan for Canada’s oceans. By identifying the 
responsible authority for providing assistance, Canada also appears to have 
implemented an IMO resolution accompanying the Guidelines concerning 
maritime assistance services.134 PORCP has been prepared by Transport 
Canada and within it the regional Marine Safety directors are expected to 
engage in a thorough and balanced risk assessment exercise as a basis for 
a timely decision on providing safe assistance to such ships, refuge as may be 
appropriate, and any related conditions.  
 
 
17.6.2.3. Pollution Liability and Compensation Regime 
 
Canada has long been a party to the CLC and IOPCF conventions, and has 
recently become a party to the LLMC. Canada is not yet a party to HNS and 
Bunkers, but neither convention is yet in force. Under Canadian law, 
a shipowner who is not covered by the CLC Convention (e.g., he is flying the 
flag of a non-party) is entitled to claim limitation of liability under the LLMC. 
This is similar to other jurisdictions. However, the two most significant aspects 
of Canada’s pollution liability and compensation regime, and a significant 
departure from the practice of EU Member States, are (1) standing 
arrangements with response organisations and (2) Canada’s long-standing Ship-
Source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF).  
In its attempt to implement the polluter pays principle in relation to 
accidental oil pollution, Canada introduced a system of private responders 
across the country who would be equipped and certified as institutions with 
whom persons trading in oil in Canadian waters would be required to enter into 
a standing arrangement.135 The idea is that private response organisations would 
take on much of the response work of the Canadian Coast Guard, for a fee, and 
be available to respond promptly. They would operate under the authority of the 
master of the vessel that needs such assistance. Response organisations are 
entitled to claim their intervention costs as described further below. 
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Originally established in 1973 as the Marine Pollution Claims Fund in 
response to the Arrow casualty, the SOPF was launched in 1989 and is probably 
the first compensation fund for marine oil pollution damage that is separate 
from, but complements, the international liability and compensation regime.136 
The SOPF interweaves with the CLC and IOPCF regimes, and to a lesser extent 
with the LLMC, which are implemented through the Marine Liability Act and 
regulations.137 The shipowner remains the first line of liability within the strict 
liability limits based on tonnage of the ship set out in the CLC, with the second 
line of liability consisting of the cargo-owners share in the form of the IOPCF, 
liability under which is also governed by the principle of strict liability.138 In 
a suit for compensation, the directors of the IOPCF and SOPF are joined to the 
suit by law.  
The SOPF interacts with this combined regime in a number of ways. 
First, the SOPF is responsible for the imported oil contribution calls which are 
at the basis of the IOPCF. This is in contrast to the other IOPCF state parties, 
who have legislated direct contributions from qualifying major oil importers in 
their jurisdictions.139 Second, the SOPF covers a wider range of spills than the 
international regime. Any ship qualifies (not just tankers), the oil covered is not 
restricted to persistent oils, and the polluting oil does not need to be carried as 
cargo. CLC is limited to cargo, bunker oil, and slops. Third, the claims covered 
are similar to the CLC and IOPCF, such as oil pollution damage, and cleanup 
costs (including reasonable preventive measures, actually incurred). Pollution 
damage and cleanup where the ship’s identity is not established, such as 
mystery spills are covered, unlike the CLC and IOPCF. Anticipatory and 
remedial expenses are covered.140 Economic loss claims are also covered, but 
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they are limited to those connected with loss of income from fisheries 
(including sport fishing, and workers involved in handling and processing), 
aquaculture, and subsistence hunting in Canada. This is significantly narrower 
than the CLC and IOPCF parameters. In any case, claimants must show that 
they have no other right of recovery under any other law, and relational 
economic loss is not covered.141 Fourth, the SOPF is a fund of both first and last 
resort for Canadian claimants. Canadian claimants, except response 
organisations, may file a claim against the SOPF in an administrative 
procedure, so that they avoid the cumbersome judicial procedure of a suit 
against the shipowner and the IOPCF. The SOPF would then be subrogated into 
their claim against the shipowner and the IOPCF. Empowered as 
a commissioner under the Inquiries Act,142 the SOPF Administrator will 
investigate and assess all claims, and in practice rarely grants the entire amount 
claimed. The Administrator will make an offer to the claimant. If the claimant 
is dissatisfied, s/he will still have the right to appeal the Administrator’s 
decision to the Federal Court. 
Originally, the SOPF consisted of the receipts from a legally imposed 
levy of CAD 45.61 cents per metric ton of imported or exported oil in Canada. 
However, this levy was discontinued in 1976 as it was thought sufficient funds 
had accumulated to cover the claims that could arise. Although the idea of re-
introducing the levy has surfaced from time to time, it has not been re-
established. The SOPF has remained self-sufficient and has thus been able to 
pay off claims from its own growth. At the end of March 2008, the SOPF 
accumulated surplus stood at CAD376,425,567, with CAD152,110,416 being 
available for all claims from one major spill. This amount is significant when it 
is considered that it complements the CLC and IOPCF amounts. Thus a major 
spill that would necessitate combined compensation efforts would have 
CAD495,257,000 for claims. However, it is possible these funds might not be 
sufficient for a Prestige type scenario, and consequently it has been proposed 
that Canada should join the 2003 IOPC Protocol.143 Cleanup costs in the cases 
of Prestige and the earlier Exxon Valdez exceeded USD2 billion each; 
a Prestige scenario in Canada has been estimated at USD1.5 billion. Under the 
2003 protocol, combined CLC and IOPCF compensation amounts would be in 
                                                 
141
 This is similar in all three funds, based on the pragmatic rule and principle of remoteness. 
See Landcatch v. IOPC Fund, 1999 SLT 1208 (Court of Session: Inner House (Second 
Division). 
142
 Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11. 
143
 Transport Canada, Maritime Law Reform Discussion Paper, TP 14370E (May 2005), 
available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/tp14370/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 
2008), p. 14. 
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the region of CAD1.3 billion, thus bringing compensation levels closer to those 
of the United States’ Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 
In comparison, the EU does not have an EU-wide compensation fund, 
although it did obtain a higher level of compensation by successfully lobbying 
for the 2003 IOPCF Protocol. Nevertheless, some Member States, such as 
Finland, do have a separate national fund similar to the SOPF. 
 
 
17.7. Conclusion 
 
In general, and like EU Member States, Canada has pursued its shipping and 
marine environment protection interests within the global international 
maritime law regime serviced by IMO. Canada has been an active participant, 
frequently taking initiatives that have produced change in international 
regulations and standards. Canada has been able to do so even though it has not 
always embraced international conventions in a timely manner, if at all. 
However, its approach to the implementation of international standards has 
generally been solid: Canada has tended to legislate the amendments prior to or 
at the same time as it became a party to an international convention. 
In a contemporary setting, Canadian policy and regulation making for 
maritime safety and marine pollution, frequently under pressure from 
stakeholders and lack of resources, strives to produce results in an efficient 
(cost-effective) manner. Current policies are ostensibly geared towards the 
achievement of outcomes. It may be too soon to determine the extent to which 
intended results are being achieved, as the expected outcomes speak to 
medium- to long-term change. For successful results-based management, it 
should be expected that institutional efforts should be proactive. The Canadian 
experience appears to be more a mixture of proactive and reactive policy, 
institutional, and regulatory responses. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 reform 
process can be seen as a proactive approach to legislative modernisation. 
Similarly, the PORCP constitutes proactive planning for the likelihood that 
ships in need of assistance that may pose environmental and other threats might 
require and be given refuge in Canadian waters. Differently, the complicated 
legislative response to oil pollution as a result of illegal discharges from ships is 
indicative of a reactive approach. It is arguable that reactive approaches are less 
efficient than well-thought-out proactive approaches which are spared 
development under the heat of the moment. In this example, the response to oil 
pollution has produced a fragmented, laborious, and inefficient approach to 
dealing with the problem. 
A handicap Canadian maritime administration has laboured under since 
the 1990s is the split of maritime responsibilities between two departments, and 
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especially the migration of the Canadian Coast Guard from the core of the 
maritime administration. The issue of conflicting institutional cultures has not 
been resolved, and will likely not be resolved. The approach to maritime 
administration remains unnecessarily fragmented. 
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Annex. Ship Pollution Offences in Canada (all figures in CAD) 
 
Statute 
& Regu-
lations 
Offences Sanctions Enforcement Responsibility 
Oceans 
Act 
Carry out any activity — including 
depositing, discharging or dumping any 
substance, or causing any substance to 
be deposited, discharged or dumped — 
that is likely to result in the 
disturbance, damage, destruction or 
removal of a living marine organism or 
any part of its habitat. 
 
(various Marine Protected Areas 
Regulations, made pursuant to s. 35(3) 
Oceans Act) 
Summary conviction: 
Fine max. $100,000 
 
Indictment: 
Fine max. $500,000 
(s. 37) 
DFO names 
“enforcement 
officers” 
(s. 39) 
Failure to: (s. 183(1)) 
• Have arrangement with RO  
• Have procedures, equipment and 
resources for immediate use 
• Implement oil pollution prevention 
plan 
• Implement oil pollution emergency 
plan 
• Have equipment and resources at the 
site 
• Implement response plan 
• Obey direction resulting from 
a discharge or possible discharge of 
a pollutant 
Summary conviction: 
Fine max. $1 million 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 18 months 
(s. 183(2)) 
TC names 
“Pollution 
Prevention 
Officers” 
(s. 174) 
 
DFO names 
“Pollution 
Response 
Officers” 
(s. 174.1) 
CSA 
2001 
Failure to: (s. 184(1)) 
• Have a declaration on board 
• Have a declaration on site 
• Have oil pollution prevention plan 
on site 
• Have oil pollution emergency plan 
on site 
• Have a response plan 
• Provide or arrange for training 
• Undertake and participate in 
activities to evaluate response plan 
• Provide information 
• Provide information officer 
considers appropriate 
• Obey directions given under s. 
Summary conviction: 
Fine maximum 
$100,000 and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 1 year 
(s. 184(2)) 
TC & DFO 
 
s. 175.1(2) 
Powers of 
PRO re 
discharges 
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175(1)(b)(c)(d) or (e) and 
176(1)(b)(c) or (d) 
• Illegal discharge of pollutant (s. 
187) 
 
• Failure to implement shipboard oil 
pollution emergency plan (s. 188) 
 
• Failure to proceed to a place and 
unload a pollutant (s. 189) 
 
• Contravention of the regulations 
made under this Part (s. 190) 
 
Regulations include: 
• Carrying of pollutants on board a 
vessel, whether as cargo or fuel 
• Control and prevention of pollution 
of the air by vessels 
• Reception facilities 
• Ballast water management 
• Design, construction, manufacture 
and maintenance of vessels or 
classes of vessels 
• Inspecting and testing 
• Obtaining certificates 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 18 months 
(s. 191) 
Failure to obey directions: (s. 189) 
• To provide information  
• To proceed by a specified route 
• To proceed to a place and remain 
there 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 192) 
• Intentionally or recklessly causing a 
disaster that results in the loss of life 
or serious damage to the 
environment (s. 253(1)(a)) 
Indictment: 
• Fine (no limits) 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 5 years 
(s. 53) 
TC 
(s. 185) 
MBCA • Depositing or permitting harmful 
substances to be deposited  
 
in waters or an area frequented by 
migratory birds or in a place from 
which the substance may enter such 
waters or such an area (s. 5.1) 
Indictment: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 
• If vessel over 
5000 DWT 
minimum fine 
$500,000 
 
Summary conviction: 
EC: 
• Game 
Officers 
• RMCP  
(s. 6(1)) 
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• Fine max. $300,000 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 6 months  
• If vessel over 
5000 DWT 
minimum fine 
$100,000 
(ss. 13(1.1), (1.11)) 
• Destruction or alteration of records 
• Omissions or false entries in records.  
• Obstruction of Game Officers 
• Providing false or misleading 
information (s. 5.2) 
Ibid. 
• Throwing prejudicial or deleterious 
substances (incl. ballast, coal ashes, 
stones) overboard 
 
in any river, harbour or roadstead, or in 
any water where fishing is carried on  
(s. 36(1)) 
Indictment:  
• First offence: fine 
maximum $1 million  
• Subsequent offence: 
fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 
 
Summary conviction: 
• First offence: fine 
maximum $300,000  
• Subsequent offence: 
fine maximum 
$300,000 and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 6 months 
(s. 40(2)) 
• Depositing or permitting deposit of 
deleterious substances of any type in 
water frequented by fish or in any 
place under any conditions where the 
deleterious substance or any other 
deleterious substance that results 
from the deposit of the deleterious 
substance may enter any such water 
(s. 36(3)) 
Ibid. 
FA 
• Failure to report deposits of 
deleterious substances that occur “out 
of normal course of events” (s. 38(4)) 
Summary conviction:  
• First offence: fine 
max. $200,000  
• Subsequent offence, 
fine max. $200,000 
and/or imprisonment 
maximum 6 months 
(s. 40(3)) 
EC per MOU 
with DFO 
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• Failure to take reasonable measures to 
mitigate or remedy adverse effects of 
deposits regarding s. 38(4) (s. 38(5)) 
Ibid. 
• Failure to comply with direction of 
inspectors re deposit per s. 38(4) 
(s. 8(6)) 
Ibid. 
• Disposal or incineration of substances 
at sea 
• Importation or exportation of a 
substance for disposal at sea 
• Loading of a substance onto a ship for 
disposal at sea unless done with a 
permit (Part VIII Div. 3 – Disposal at 
Sea) 
Indictment: 
• Fine maximum 
$1 million and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 3 years 
 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$300,000 and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 6 months 
(s. 272) 
• Failure to prepare and implement 
environmental emergency plans in 
respect of listed substances (s. 199) 
 
• Failure to report and minimise 
environmental emergency in respect 
of listed substances (s. 201) 
Ibid. 
CEPA 
• Intentional or reckless damage to 
environment (causing disaster)  
(s. 274(1)(a)) 
Indictment: 
• Fine (no limit) and/or 
imprisonment 
maximum 5 years 
EC 
• Disposal of any substance  
(s. 14) 
 
within a marine conservation area 
except as authorised under CEPA 
 Indictment: 
• Fine maximum 
$500,000 
 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 24(1)) 
NMCA 
• Failure to mitigate degradation or 
injury caused by discharge or deposit 
of a substance capable of degrading 
the environment or injuring any 
animal, fish or plant within a marine 
conservation area (s. 29(1)) 
 
• Failure to comply with 
Minister’s irections (s. 29(2)) 
Ibid. (s. 24(1)) 
Parks Canada 
Agency 
AWPPA • Deposit of waste of any type (s. 4(1)) 
 
in the Arctic waters or in any place on 
Summary conviction: 
• Individual: fine 
maximum $5,000 
TC named 
Pollution 
Prevention 
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the mainland or islands of the Canadian 
Arctic under any conditions where the 
waste or any other waste that results 
from the deposit of the waste may enter 
the Arctic waters 
• Ship: fine maximum 
$100,000 (s. 18) 
• Failure to report deposit of waste or 
accident or other occurrence (s. 5(1)) 
• Failure to provide evidence of 
financial responsibility when required 
(s. 8(1)) 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$25,000 (s. 19(1)) 
• Navigating in shipping safety control 
zone without meeting standards 
• Navigating in shipping safety control 
zone contrary to regulations 
• Failure to comply with reasonable 
directions given by pilot 
• Failure to comply with orders given 
by pollution prevention officer in 
response to deposits or threat of 
deposit 
• Failure to report deposit (master of 
ship) 
• Obstructing PPO or making false 
statements (master of ship) 
Summary conviction: 
• Fine maximum 
$25,000 (s. 19(2)) 
• Obstructing or hindering a pollution 
prevention officer (other than master) 
• Making false or misleading 
statements to a pollution prevention 
officer (other than master) (s. 17) 
Summary conviction 
(no minimum/ 
maximum) 
Officers 
 
per 
Governor in 
Council 
Authority 
Delegation 
Order 
(C.R.C., c. 
355) 
 
Key: CEPA, Canadian Environmental Protection Act; CSA, Canada Shipping Act, 2001; DFO, 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans; EC, Environment Canada; FA, Fisheries Act; MBCA, 
Migratory Birds Convention Act; MOU, memorandum of understanding; NMCA, Canada 
National Marine Conservation Areas Act; PRO, pollution response officer; PPO, pollution 
prevention officer; RO, response organisation; TC, Transport Canada. 
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Workshop Discussion Summary 
 
Management of Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution 
 
Susan Rolston 
 
 
Moira McConnell, Marine & Environment Law Institute, Dalhousie University 
(making a joint presentation on behalf of Lotta Viikari, Faculty of Law, 
University of Lapland); Malgorzata Nesterowicz, European Maritime Safety 
Agency; and Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum, Marine & Environment Law 
Institute, Dalhousie University, presented their papers focussing on invasive 
species and ships’ ballast water, and maritime safety and vessel-source 
pollution control from both Canadian and EU perspectives. 
Discussion centered on the issue of transport of alien species, including 
the unaddressed issue of transport of introduction of alien species to land as a 
result of maritime transport (e.g., introduced beetles from wooden shipping 
platforms). It was agreed that we must also consider the issue from the 
perspective of what we are exporting, and identify means of reducing the 
transport of invasive species from this perspective. 
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Appendix  
 
Rapporteur’s Report 
 
EU–Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean Governance 
Universitaire Stichting, Brussels, 4–5 December 2008 
 
Prepared by Susan Rolston 
 
 
The Workshop commenced with Opening Remarks by Prof. Erik Franckx, 
Department of International and European Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, who 
welcomed participants and provided a brief outline of the history of the project 
and the venue of the workshop, the Universitaire Stichting. 
Timo Koivurova, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and David 
VanderZwaag, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, 
welcomed workshop participants making a short presentation on behalf of the 
Project Directors (including Erik Franckx; Erik Molenaar, Netherlands Institute 
of the Law of the Sea, Utrecht University; and Aldo Chircop, Marine & 
Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University). Timo Koivurova provided 
background information on the rationale for the project, focussing on the 
lessons to be learned from the implementation of the European Union’s 
Integrated Maritime Policy and Canada’s Ocean Policy. David VanderZwaag 
suggested a framework for the workshop based on a comparison of the 
challenges in implementing both of these policies, critical review of the 
presentations, and collaborative opportunities for European and Canadian 
researchers to work together to develop a common vision in law of the sea and 
ocean governance. They also thanked the workshop organisers and participants 
for their efforts and the European Commission for their financial support of the 
project and workshop. 
 
 
Session One: Ocean Governance and Maritime Policy Making 
 
The “Challenges to Ocean Policy Making” paper was presented in three parts: 
Erik Franckx on “National Ocean Policies: The General Framework”; Timo 
Koivurova on “Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU: Evaluation from the 
International, Canadian and EU Perspectives” and David VanderZwaag on 
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“Oceans Policy:  A Canadian Case Study” (with Camille Mageau and Susan 
Farlinger).  
Erik Franckx reviewed the findings of the International Oceanographic 
Commission report entitled “National Ocean Policy: The Basic Texts from 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, United States of America” (Paris: IOC, 2007). National ocean 
policies adopted by these states since 1982 are diverse in form but generally 
have sustainability as their cornerstone.  
Timo Koivurova provided a comparative perspective on EU–Canada 
approaches to ocean policy. A pioneer, Canada established its legal framework 
in 1996 and its strategic Oceans Action Plan in 2005. The EU has more recently 
adopted its Integrated Maritime Plan after a long policy-making process. Both 
approaches offer substantive similarities in regard to institutional arrangements, 
underlying principles, transparency, and participation, and offer flexible 
implementation mechanisms. Challenges in implementing the European 
Integrated Management Plan include its lack of a single legal basis (Member 
States must adopt their own laws) and potential coordination problems with the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Member States must have national plans 
in place by 2010). In the long-term, there is a clear need to enhance educational 
opportunities for ocean managers. 
David VanderZwaag outlined several lessons that can be learned from 
implementation of Canada’s Oceans Act and National Oceans Strategy. 
Although Canada has moved beyond a narrow focus on fisheries management, 
integrated coastal and ocean planning efforts are still in the early stages with 
only five large ocean management areas chosen as pilots for integrated planning 
and only seven marine protected areas established. The federal system of 
Canada has offered special challenges in achieving integrated coastal and ocean 
planning, as has limited funding for implementing policy. The key principles 
guiding integrated management are clearly set out. However, scientific 
understanding of marine ecosystems remains limited and the coastal land’s 
impact on oceans has not yet been fully addressed. 
Nicole Schäfer, DG Mare, European Commission, outlined the maritime 
spatial planning (MSP) process implemented by the European Union. 
Responding to uncoordinated and competitive activities and uses on European 
coasts and seas, the EU adopted a MSP process to map maritime activities 
building on the ecosystem approach. Different from the Integrated Management 
Planning process, the MSP process adopts an oceans management approach and 
covers all maritime sectors.  Within the process, Member States will adopt 
a national approach (to date only Germany has developed legally-binding 
maritime spatial plans, excluding fisheries). Regional approaches will be 
adopted as necessary. The Roadmap recently adopted by the European 
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Commission identifies ten key principles for MSP in the EU. The Roadmap 
seeks to facilitate development of MSP in Member States, encourage MSP 
implementation at the national and regional levels, and stimulate debate on 
development of a common approach to MSP in Europe. In 2009, the 
Commission will hold a series of workshops with Member States to discuss 
these key principles, launch cooperative pilot projects, and issue a progress 
report. 
Erik Molenaar presented the Arctic Ocean governance paper (written 
together with Timo Koivurova and David VanderZwaag) which addresses the 
rights, interests and obligations of Canada and the EU in the Arctic region, the 
role of the Arctic Council, and recent developments in Arctic governance and 
future directions. Although not an Arctic littoral state like Canada, the EU 
retains jurisdiction in the region through flag state and port state interests. In the 
EU, there is a distribution of competence between the European Commission 
and the Member States. Canada has had a pioneering role in Arctic governance, 
with the introduction of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970. 
The Arctic Council provides a high level platform for cooperation on projects 
to protect the Arctic marine environment. Its broad mandate excludes in 
practice several topics, including fisheries and marine mammals. Canada, the 
European Commission and EU Member States have played an active role in the 
Council, and the European Commission is seeking observer status at the 
Council. Recent initiatives in the United States (regarding management of fish 
stocks in the Arctic Ocean) and the EU (Parliamentary resolution of 9 October 
2008 and Commission Communication of 20 November 2008), and adoption of 
the Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states point to new 
interest in Arctic Ocean governance. Adjustments to existing regional 
agreements such as the NEAFC Convention and the OSPAR Convention, 
among others, are options for future changes to the Arctic oceans governance 
framework. 
Fernando Garces de los Fayos, DDG2 RELEX/Arctic and Black Sea 
Cooperation, European Commission, provided commentary on the EU’s and 
European Commission’s interests in the Arctic. Although not a littoral state, the 
EU has been a long-standing participant in the Arctic Council and a significant 
funder of scientific research in the Arctic. There are clear political interests that 
reinforce this activity by the Commission, e.g., climate change, fisheries and 
rights of indigenous peoples, and recent initiatives such as the Integrated 
Maritime Policy, that suggest a need for increased involvement in Arctic oceans 
governance mechanisms. However, the EU is not interested in reinventing the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by adopting a regional treaty to govern 
the Arctic Ocean. 
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Several issues were raised in the discussion following the presentations. 
The legal authority of the EU to achieve integrated oceans management was 
discussed in the context of MSP. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(June 2008) aims to enhance the quality of the marine environment by 2020; 
MSP is one tool to achieving this goal. Although the Commission does not take 
an integrated approach across all marine areas in Europe, the MSP process 
provides cross-cutting principles across diverse marine areas that will facilitate 
integrated oceans management. With regards to the Arctic, participants argued 
that EU interest in the Arctic region went well beyond climate change and 
environmental protection. Internationalisation of Arctic issues enhances the 
EU’s interest in ensuring balanced responses by existing regional organisations. 
However, the EU must ensure that it has the moral authority to participate in 
Arctic Ocean governance. Its failures to manage fisheries have raised 
a potential obstacle to its expanded participation. It was noted, however, that 
increased EU participation in Arctic issues should not be interpreted as a threat 
to other states in the region. 
 
 
Session Two: Ocean Energy Resources 
 
Maria Pettersson, Department of Social Science, Luleå University of 
Technology, and Meinhard Doelle, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, 
Dalhousie University, offered perspectives on ocean renewable energy in the 
EU and Canada respectively.  
Maria Pettersson outlined the legal aspects of implementation of 
renewable energy policy as part of the broader EU competence in energy 
matters. Over time, it is possible that Member States’ choice of legal 
instruments or planning regimes might hinder development of renewable 
energy resources. Nonetheless, marine renewables hold immense potential to 
meet the EU energy policy goals of combating environmental degradation and 
energy supply volatility. 
Meinhard Doelle presented a case study of the strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) process for tidal energy development in the Bay of Fundy, 
Canada. After reviewing the context of tidal energy in the Bay, he outlined the 
goals and structure of the SEA process and reviewed its key recommendations. 
The use of this process suggests that Canada and Nova Scotia are moving 
beyond a project focus in assessing the environmental impact of marine 
activities. The case study revealed the need for an early start of a SEA process 
prior to introduction of government regulation, that stakeholder involvement 
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and their capacity is critical to the success of a SEA process, and that the design 
of a SEA process can feed into regional planning and other processes. 
Jerome Davis, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 
used the Melville Island Project in the Sverdrup Basin in the Canadian Arctic as 
an example of the potential for development and diversification of natural gas 
resources in the EU. The proven reserves in the Basin are extensive and 
relatively close to existing LNG ports in Europe. Their development potential 
depends on the cost of the ships used for transport and the rate of transfer 
possible through Greenland. As an option for the EU, the Melville Island 
Project must also be considered in light of the natural gas reserves found on the 
eastern Canadian/Greenland continental shelf, resource and ocean management 
planning processes in both Nunavut and Greenland, and provisions of NAFTA 
(Article 60) which oblige Canada to maintain exports to the United States, 
thereby limiting opportunities to divert production to the EU. 
Giordano Rigon, DG Energy and Transport, European Commission, 
commented upon EU energy policy. At present, the Council has endorsed an 
energy policy that calls for a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
a 20% increase in energy efficiency, and a 20% increase in renewable sources 
by 2020. The continued reliance on oil and gas resources means that both 
diversification of supply and indigenous resource development are critical. 
Arctic resource development, particularly those within 200 nautical miles of the 
coast, with appropriate environmental protection standards, is a particularly 
important source to consider. Renewable energy resources, particularly tidal 
and wave, in offshore marine areas must be developed in tandem with maritime 
policy to ensure adequate environmental protection and integrated economic 
development. 
Much of the discussion focussed on the moral argument that states should 
not invest or develop Arctic oil and gas resources because of the environmental 
costs (climate change) of their exploitation and use. It was noted, however, that 
the Melville Island Project would provide relatively inexpensive natural gas 
compared to other projects elsewhere and that there is limited environmental 
impact in transporting LNG as the carriers use natural gas for propulsion and 
would not cause oil pollution in the event of an accident. It was also noted that 
there is an equity question that must be considered as the relatively poor coastal 
communities in the Arctic are looking to exploit these resources to develop 
economically. In some cases, Arctic coastal residents see climate change as 
opening new opportunities for their communities. Regulations developed under 
OSPAR might serve as a model for development of Arctic offshore oil and gas 
resources. 
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Session Three: Maritime Security Issues 
 
Kamrul Hossain, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and Hugh Kindred, 
Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, compared the 
existing maritime security initiatives in the European Union and Canada, 
examining both the multilateral platform and the unilateral initiatives of the 
United States adopted since September 2001. The most important program 
internationally is IMO’s International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code 
adopted under Chapter 11 of SOLAS. It includes mandatory measures for ship 
identification and and port security as well as recommendatory guidelines for 
their establishment and operation. The Code sets out three levels of security for 
ports, ships (both passenger and cargo) and mobile offshore drilling units. Ships 
must install a Ship Security Alert System and obtain an International Ship 
Security Certificate. Additional security measures are required under the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA) Convention, the World Customs Organization’s SAFE Framework 
Cargo guidelines, the ILO convention regarding seafarers’ identity documents 
(No. C185), and the International Standards Organization’s Standards for 
Freight Containers. Maritime security initiatives by the United States, in 
particular the Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 and the Security and 
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act 2006, implement the ISPS Code in 
US law and also respond to a particular concern for threats to cargo with the 
Cargo Security Initiative (CSI) and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which 
require advance notification and possible scanning of containers and freight 
respectively in a foreign port. 
Both Canada and the EU apply the provisions of the ISPS Code relating 
to ships and ports with the EU extending its application to domestic ferries and 
Canada applying it to “non-SOLAS” (smaller) vessels. Likewise, both apply the 
SUA Convention and are moving towards implementation of its amendments of 
2005 as well as ILO Convention No. C185. In addition, both are working with 
the IMO to establish a LRIT marine surveillance system. Three ports in Canada 
and the 23 in the EU accept unilateral extension of US cargo initiatives. Both 
meet the requirements of the CSI with Canada implementing additional 
measures, e.g., reciprocal recognition of ship security documentation and 
parallel cargo security programs (PIP & C-TPAT). With regard to the SAFE 
Port Act, the European Union has objected to the US target of 100% scanning 
of containerised cargoes citing the likely costs, delays and impracticality of 
such a target. Canada has not spoken on this issue. Overall, these maritime 
security measures provide a system of documentary screening and cargo 
scanning processes that is characterised by duplication of ship, cargo and 
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documentary checks on a single voyage resulting in waste and delay. This is an 
issue that is not being addressed; both Canada and the European Union should 
discuss it. 
Adam Stepien, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and Hugh 
Williamson, Marine Affairs Programme, Dalhousie University, discussed the 
issue of illegal immigration by sea to the EU and Canada respectively, 
focussing on maritime security response approaches. 
Adam Stepien, outlined the nature of illegal immigration by sea to the 
EU, which is primarily through the western and central Mediterranean and the 
Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the Canary Islands. Policy initiatives seek 
to distinguish between asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, offering the 
necessary protection to those seeking asylum in the EU and against those who 
are trafficking in humans. The legal policy framework adopted by the EU 
focuses on five priority areas: identification of immigration routes; cooperation 
with third countries; effective operational structures for coordination between 
Member States; identification of the best technologies; and legal instruments. 
Under the UN Law of the Sea Convention, the EU is obliged to rescue persons 
in distress at sea, however, the maritime zones established under the 
Convention complicate jurisdictional mandates with Member States. Although 
asylum and illegal immigration have been under the jurisdiction of the EU since 
1999, border control remains the responsibility of Member States. Existing 
vessel surveillance systems to monitor shipping and fisheries have also been 
used to monitor illegal immigration, as have naval surveillance agencies and 
systems. FRONTEX is the primary EU agency involved in operational and 
research in this area, with responsibilities for assisting Member States with joint 
operations and border patrols. A proposed European Surveillance System for 
Borders, EUROSUR, will be operational in 2010.  
Hugh Williamson outlined the parameters of illegal immigration by sea to 
Canada. In contrast to the EU, Canada does not have a significant influx of 
illegal immigrants by sea, with isolated instances of illegal immigrant ships and 
a few container stowaways or ship jumpers (crew and cruise ship passengers 
using false identification). Since most illegal immigrants are heading to the 
United States, Canada and the United States have adopted numerous joint 
border and security initiatives although none are focussed on illegal migration 
by sea. Canadian maritime anti-illegal immigration activities are generally 
components of these larger programs and integrated into security initiatives. 
Information sharing is a primary component of these programs and initiatives 
although this is complicated by legal confidentiality prohibitions and multiple 
reporting requirements. A case study on the M/V Cala Puebla demonstrates the 
problems of dealing with potential illegal immigrants by sea into Canada. 
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Louise Head, DG MARE B-1, European Commission, commented on 
initiatives of the European Commission regarding piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. In light of the recent increase in piracy attacks, the international 
community has increased its efforts through NATO, IMO, at the national level 
(e.g., The Netherlands protection of the World Food Programme (WFP) in 
Somalia under NAVCO) , the EU (e.g., naval mission Atalanta under the 
European Security and Defence Policy), and the United Nations (e.g., recent 
resolutions on piracy and the 10–11 December 2008 conference on piracy in 
Nairobi). Operation Atalanta will be the first under the second pillar of the EU 
and will be launched on 15 December 2008. Under the command of the UK, 
ships and patrol aircraft will escort WFP shipments and contribute to preventing 
acts of piracy and attacking pirate vessels. Only four Member States have 
provisions to try pirates under national criminal law and they might not be 
willing to use it; neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti may 
request support to do so. Under the Instrument for Stability, which offers 
financial assistance to countries threatened or undergoing severe political 
instability or suffering from disasters, the EU is conducting an ongoing study 
on critical maritime routes in the Horn of African and Arabian Peninsula. 
A possible follow-up to this study might be a ReCAPP style operation 
focussing on coordination of information, documentation and control 
operations. The upcoming UN conference on piracy, comprised of a technical 
meeting and a ministerial meeting, is expected to lead to agreement on 
recommendations to control piracy, e.g., closing the land bases of pirates with 
the assistance of authorities in Puntland, increasing intelligence on local 
structures and re-engaging the Somali peace process. 
Discussion following the presentations largely focussed on the issue of 
piracy. Fishing vessels are not being targeted by pirates despite the argument 
that illegal fishing is largely responsible for the economic situation encouraging 
pirate activity off Somalia. It was suggested that the international community 
could offer to provide fisheries surveillance capacity in the region, thereby 
reducing the threat of pirate activity. The problem of laying criminal charges 
against pirates was also raised. International law allows national laws to be put 
in place, but very few countries have chosen to do so. For example, Canada has 
broadened the definition of piracy in its law, but it is applicable only within 
waters over which it has national jurisdiction. The SUA Convention does not 
deal with piracy. There is no widely defined international crime of “piracy” and 
even if there were, it would need to be implemented nationally. Piracy on the 
high seas has resulted in significant changes in the availability of marine 
insurance and its cost; some ships are now going around the Cape of Good 
Hope despite the increased fuel costs and time delay in order to avoid the 
waters off Somalia. 
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Session Four: Management of Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source 
Pollution 
 
Moira McConnell, Marine & Environment Law Institute, Dalhousie University, 
made a joint presentation on invasive species and ships’ ballast water based on 
papers from a Canadian perspective and an EU perspective (Lotta Viikari, 
Faculty of Law, University of Lapland). A complex issue that spans many 
aspects of ocean governance, the problem of invasive species requires 
prevention and a precautionary approach for regulatory effectiveness. Given the 
multiple vectors for introduction of invasive marine species, a multi-
dimensional response is necessary, i.e., ecological, economic, human health, 
technological, legal and institutional. Outlining the extent and nature of species 
transfer illustrates the regulatory system design challenges faced by decision 
makers nationally and internationally. Targeting the point of intervention (e.g., 
vessel, import and/or export country) and the level of implementation (national 
and/or international) raises issues of coordination and integration. Canada and 
the EU have approached the issue largely in the context of shipping (flag state) 
but have moved to a more scientific approach (biodiversity protection). Canada 
has established a series of coastal ballast water exchange/discharge areas; it 
remains to be seen whether the problem has merely been shifted from ports to 
coastal waters. Both have ocean management policies (e.g., Canada’s Oceans 
Act and the EU Maritime Strategy) that would support preventative measures 
but there has been limited direct action and potentially conflicting regulations. 
In Canada, binding regulations replaced guidelines only in the last year. The 
EU faces the challenges posed by diverse biogeographic regions and 
a fragmented regulatory approach (there is no direct regulation of ballast water 
management). The European Maritime Safety Agency held its first workshop 
on this issue in 2008. Opportunities for EU-Canada cooperation include joint 
support for ratification of the IMO Ballast Water Convention and support for 
addressing the problem of hull fouling, joint research on shipping and coasting 
trade issues, risk assessment processes, and joint promotion of “healthy oceans” 
as the basis of effective integrated institutional and regulatory activity. 
Maritime safety and vessel-source pollution control was addressed from a 
European perspective (Malgorzata Nesterowicz, European Maritime Safety 
Agency) and Canadian perspective (Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum, Marine & 
Environment Law Institute, Dalhousie University). 
Malgorzata Nesterowicz outlined the development of the EU maritime 
policy noting that EU Member States retain competency in maritime safety but 
at a certain point, the EU assumes competency. Most of the Council directives 
and regulations implement maritime safety rules established by the IMO. In 
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response to the Erika tanker incident, the EU adopted a series of measures 
(Erika I – III) with more stringent rules with regard to port state control 
measures (Erika I), vessel traffic monitoring and information systems and 
establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency (Erika II), and 
additional flag and port state, monitoring and information, accident 
investigation and liability requirements (proposed under Erika III).  
Aldo Chircop set out the context of shipping in Canada noting that as 
a shipper nation, Canada is heavily influenced by actions of the United States. 
Unlike the EU, shipping is solely a federal responsibility in Canada. Many 
shipping services have been privatised, which influences the regulatory 
framework. The recently modernised Canada Shipping Act has streamlined 
regulations to promote compliance. Other general policies (e.g., Oceans 
Strategy and Management Accountability Framework) and Transport Canada 
policies and strategies (e.g., Marine Safety Strategic Plan) provide the policy 
and legal framework for maritime safety. Nonetheless, shipping is not a high 
federal government priority, shipping policy and regulation remain sectoral and 
much is duplicative, and there is no dedicated and fully integrated marine 
transportation policy that includes directions for marine safety and vessel-
source pollution. Active in international shipping safety and environmental 
spheres, Canada has used international marine conservation tools creatively and 
effectively.  
In comparing Canadian and EU approaches, the mutual support for IMO 
maritime safety measures was noted, although the EU and its Member States 
implement these measures separately. Likewise the split jurisdiction influences 
industry involvement in the regulation-making process. Both Canada and the 
EU delegate various maritime inspection and documentation activities to 
classification societies. With regards to environmental protection measures, the 
EU led the way in IMO on the phasing out of single-hull vessels, with Canada 
following its lead. Places of refuge is a more contentious issue in the EU than 
Canada, with a proposed amendment under consideration. The EU has 
identified four PSSAs while Canada has favoured specific SOLAS routeing 
schemes and reporting measures to achieve particular marine conservation 
objectives. Both the EU and Canada have similar approaches to penal offences 
for pollution with Canada having several overlapping statutes. Beyond 
international pollution liability and compensation schemes, Canada has a long-
standing national compensation fund (SOPF); there is no EU-wide 
compensation fund but some Member States have a national fund. 
Discussion centered on the issue of transport of alien species, including 
the unaddressed issue of transport of introduction of alien species to land as 
a result of maritime transport (e.g., introduced beetles from wooden shipping 
platforms). We must also consider the issue from the perspective of what we 
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are exporting, and identify means of reducing the transport of invasive species 
from this perspective. 
 
 
Session Five: Marine Biodiversity and Fisheries 
 
David VanderZwaag presented the joint paper on Canada, the EU and Regional 
Fisheries Management in the North Atlantic (with Koen van den Bossche, 
Centre for International Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and Erik Franckx, 
Department of International and European Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel). 
Canada and EU relations in fisheries in this region are characterised by conflict 
(e.g., Estai incident). However, they cooperate in the implementation of 
international instruments such as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and in 
regional fisheries management organisations such as NAFO and NEAFC, and 
have introduced measures to strengthen and modernise RFMOs such as NAFO. 
Canada and the EU have also worked cooperatively to protect vulnerable 
marine ecosystems from bottom fishing activities under the December 2006 UN 
Sustainable Fisheries Resolution, introducing a proposal for bringing NAFO 
into conformity with these commitments. NAFO and NEAFC face similar 
challenges in putting the precautionary approach into action, implementing the 
ecosystem approach, reaching consensus on allocation criteria, and with regards 
to compliance and enforcement. 
Erik Franckx elaborated upon a 2001 FAO analysis of national fisheries 
enforcement systems (FAO Legislative Study 71), which includes both NAFO 
and NEAFC. Although much has changed since 2001, the best practices 
identified in the study remain relevant. Both NAFO and NEAFC face the 
challenges associated with accepting new members and the unavailability of 
catch allocation and ensuring that states do not opt to join and continue to fish 
unregulated. Outlining the strengths (e.g., observer schemes implemented, 
established port state measures in place, review processes undertaken) and 
weaknesses (e.g., opting out of objection procedures, no dispute settlement 
procedures, absent non-contracting party provisions), it is clear that both NAFO 
and NEAFC are generally in line with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement. NAFO and NEAFC cooperate on 
straddling stocks between the two convention areas, have a common list of IUU 
vessels, and similar port state control schemes (although NEAFC is more 
advanced with NAFO only adopting similar measures in September 2008). In 
ensuring effective compliance and enforcement, it is still a question as to the 
appropriate role of science in allocation decisions. 
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Discussion following the fisheries presentations focussed on the role of 
science in fisheries management and comparisons between managing shipping 
and fisheries. With regard to science, it was suggested that fishers often 
mistrust the scientific advice provided by fisheries managers, arguing that 
scientists use measurement tools inappropriately. It was noted that in The 
Netherlands, fishers are placed aboard marine research vessels, enhancing the 
fishers’ acceptance of the data. NAFO has adopted an interim exploratory 
fisheries protocol that involves the fishing industry in the identification process 
of vulnerable marine ecosystems, e.g., corals. Other collaborative processes 
between fishers and managers include among others the Eastern Scotian Shelf 
Integrated Management Process (ESSIM) and other large ocean management 
area processes in Canada. 
In comparing the shipping and fisheries management regimes it was noted 
that the outcome based management regime (shipping) was generally more 
successful than the input/output model used for fisheries management. The 
fisheries management regime reflected the primacy that social and economic 
pressures place on managers in the international (FAO), national and regional 
(RFMOs) spheres. An exhaustible resource (unlike shipping), fishers will shift 
practices (e.g., opting for flags of convenience) in order to maintain fishing 
effort despite measures put in place by national governments (flag state 
measures). Unlike shipping, there are no enforcement measures against fishing 
vessels (e.g., liens on vessels), only measures directed to managing the fishing 
activity. Measures such as the FAO Compliance Agreement are directed to the 
flag state, but states are not joining, thus it is seen as ineffective.   
Technologies for monitoring ships on the high seas (e.g., long range 
satellite tracking systems) are difficult to translate into monitoring of fishing 
activity as the mere presence of a fishing vessel is not sufficient information for 
managing fishing activity. Generally much more frequent reporting would be 
required to determine fishing activity patterns, particularly on the high seas. 
Such technologies often do not work well in the poor sea and weather 
conditions that fishing vessels regularly work in. Private/public air surveillance 
programmes such as those in place in Canada might be a cost effective 
alternative for fisheries, shipping and environmental surveillance patrols. Both 
NAFO and NEAFC have cooperated in enforcement and compliance initiatives, 
and the tuna RFMOs have had some success in managing their stocks. A black 
listing system (i.e., IUU vessels as well as transhipment and resupply vessels) 
has been efficient in closing ports to flag states that do not respond to RFMO 
management initiatives. FAO has identified criteria against flag states that do 
not enforce their flag duties. Some states, e.g., Norway, have developed their 
own black lists for “non-cooperating” states; the EU is expected to adopt such 
a measure in the future. 
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Finally, the EU and the RFMO review processes were discussed with the 
complication of needing Member State agreement on fisheries policy being 
noted. The EU fisheries policy will be reviewed in 2009. 
Erik Molenaar, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht 
University, and Phillip Saunders, Marine & Environmental Law Institute, 
Dalhousie University, made a joint presentation on governance of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Given the value of biological 
diversity to humans both now and in the future and the transboundary nature of 
these resources, we need to manage biodiversity both within areas of national 
jurisdiction and in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Currently, most 
international legal instruments are implemented at the global and regional 
levels through international organisations (e.g., IMO, RFMOs, OSPAR 
Commission). Various regional instruments manage target species and their 
habitats (e.g., CMS, NAMMCO), fisheries resources and marine environmental 
protection. Bilateral arrangements also exist. There are several gaps in the 
regulatory and governance regime, including geographical areas and 
substantive issues (e.g., lack of a regime for new and emerging activities, no 
default mechanism or authority, sectoral nature of governance, no legal 
requirement for ecosystem-based management).  
With regard to management of bottom fisheries, RFMOs and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement offer protection to a limited number of species in a restricted 
geographic area. With the exception of CCAMLR, there is an unacceptable 
balance between regimes in these two areas. Within RFMOs, it is left to user 
states to make management decisions raising the issue of equity in allocation of 
fishing opportunity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Other area-based 
management tools can be used to regulate bottom fisheries to protect 
biodiversity, including marine protected areas, PSSAs, and seamount measures 
adopted by NAFO and NEAFC. However, the use of such measures is not 
integrated under one management authority. Similar issues can arise in the EEZ 
as well as the UN Law of the Sea Convention, which does not explicitly deal 
with marine protected areas. With regard to integrated ecosystem-based 
management in areas beyond national jurisdiction, there is also no legally 
binding commitment or agreed legal definition and it remains difficult to 
identify who should take the lead in determining which tools to use. 
Cooperation between Canada and the EU on implementing existing 
international measures in areas beyond national jurisdiction adjacent to their 
respective national areas is limited. Consideration might be given to negotiating 
a new global legal instrument or expanding the role of existing instruments or 
bodies such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) or the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) to protect biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. 
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Gäel de Rotalier, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European 
Commission, spoke on the work the EU is undertaking in the framework of the 
CBD and the UN General Assembly Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction Working Group. Credible measures need to be put in place to 
protect high seas biodiversity and planning, governance and legal issues need to 
be settled. The EU is calling for a new international agreement to operationalise 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction using the ecosystem and precautionary principles as default 
mechanisms. With regard to marine protected areas, criteria for the 
identification of areas that need to be protected have to be developed as must 
the applicable measures to be taken by competent organisations (e.g., IMO, 
RFMOs). The EU proposal has not been well received by many states, 
suggesting that high seas biodiversity is best protected through measures 
adopted through RFMOs (regarding fisheries) and the IMO (regarding 
shipping). Developing countries are particularly interested in genetic resources 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction, regarding them as part of the common 
heritage of humankind. Canada and the EU have had limited discussions on this 
matter. The EU has called for immediate action to promote an integrated 
approach in existing agreements and within the CBD. 
Discussion following the presentations and commentary focussed on 
opportunities for further regime building, particularly outcome-based 
approaches useful for areas beyond national jurisdiction (e.g., targets for marine 
protected areas). Compliance must also be considered in any new regime, 
particularly the control of extractive industries, as well as the integration of new 
science findings into any new legal instrument in a timely manner. The 
opportunity for managing biodiversity through regulation of companies under 
national laws was seen as being limited to intellectual property aspects. It was 
suggested, however, that challenges remain in determining the boundaries 
between the international law of the sea (i.e., UN Law of the Sea Convention) 
and the international law relating to patents and intellectual property. 
Determining why companies would be interested in working in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction was also raised as opportunities in the area are generally 
considered to be speculative although they are perceived as being economically 
valuable. Any new integrated ocean management regime must deal with 
bioprospecting for marine genetic resources. Given the lack of a responsible 
international organisation, there was general discussion about prospects for 
moving the issue under an existing organisation (e.g., International Seabed 
Authority). However many states (e.g., the United States) are not interested in 
new institutions; regional management organisations might be a more 
appropriate mechanism (e.g., CCAMLR or UNEP Regional Seas models). 
Despite the perceived need for sectoral implementation of measures, it was 
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suggested that there is a need for an overarching international instrument that 
was negotiated with the full participation of developing states. 
 
 
The Way Forward: Conference Summary and Discussion 
 
The Workshop concluded with a brief wrap-up of the next steps and possible 
avenues for future collaboration that was led by Timo Koivurova and David 
VanderZwaag. Erik Franckx thanked local organising staff members as well as 
participants for their contributions. The draft papers circulated at the Workshop 
will be updated and published by the Arctic Centre in a book by June 2009. 
The summary of the discussion will be shared amongst the Workshop 
participants. 
Priorities for research and future collaboration between EU and Canadian 
researchers included a workshop on Canada/EU approaches to biodiversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction and assessing opportunities for developing 
a common Canada/EU view on providing joint surveillance capacity-building 
and technical support for developing countries. The possibilities for cooperation 
in marine research between EU/Canadian researchers in the Arctic and marine 
spatial planning (modeled on the Canadian Ocean Management Research 
Network – OMRN, or the Australia Canada Ocean Research Network – 
ACORN) were also discussed. It was suggested that promoting an EU/Canada 
marine research network would provide a vehicle for increased networking, 
broaden the base for collaborative research in areas of mutual interest, and 
promote project development and implementation. It was noted that there will 
be another round of proposals called for in November 2009 by the EU 
mechanism that funded the current project. 
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